How and why is the 2013 Yarnell Hill Fire SAIT Investigator allegedly unethically continuing to attempt to foist his vision quest upon us while making a profit from the 19 GMHS deaths in 2025? Pt. 3
- Oct 16
- 107 min read
Restating the post title beyond the limited Wix title allowance: How and why is the 2013 Yarnell Hill Fire SAIT Investigator allegedly unethically continuing to attempt to foist his vision quest upon us, avoiding the truth of the matter, failing to utilize all the available evidence at his disposal, all while making a profit from the 19 GMHS deaths in 2025?
Author Fred J. Schoeffler and other contributing authors
Views expressed to "the public at large” and "of public concern"
(Crystal Cox vs. Obsidian Finance Group, 2011),
DISCLAIMERS to follow: Please fully read the front page of the website (link below) before reading any of the posts. This includes that you must be at least 18 years of age or older to view this website and these posts.
This post is based on the author's professional judgment and opinions based on available evidence, with no intention to defame individuals.
The authors and the blog deny responsibility for misuse, reuse, recycled, and cited, and/or uncited copies of content within this blog by others. The content, even though presented publicly, if being reused, must get written permission in doing so due to copyrighted material. Thank you.
Abbreviations used: Wildland Firefighters (WFs), Firefighters (FFs), Escape Route (ER), Safety Zone (SZ).
All emphasis is added unless otherwise noted. All Figures are Snippets.
Beware of false prophets, who come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are ravenous wolves.
Matthew 7:15 (NKJV)
"It is usually futile to try to talk facts and analysis to people who are enjoying a sense of moral superiority in their ignorance."
Thomas Sowell
Sowell observes that reason cannot reach those who take pride in their false beliefs. When ignorance is worn like a badge of honor, facts are seen as attacks. The challenge is a lack of information, an unwillingness to listen. Surely, you have attempted to reason with someone who refused to want the truth, personally and professionally, even more so!
Figure 1. Big Bad Wolf image Source: Disney, Alamy
Even my own familiar friend in whom I trusted, who ate my bread,
has lifted up his heel against me.
Psalm 4:19 (NKJV)
"It is the duty of every man, as far as his ability extends,
to detect and expose delusion and error."
Statesman Thomas Paine
Paine's quote emphasizes the individual's responsibility to critically examine information and challenge falsehoods, a core principle of
his Enlightenment philosophy.
Wix denied us the ability to add the following paragraph to Part 1 due to space restrictions, so adding it here. This author anticipates and prays that those of you holding onto the actual, truthful YH Fire and GMHS tragedy information, for whatever justification, are failing to expose, release, and/or share it, including the tenuous “protecting our Brothers, willing to take it to the grave,” or for whatever excuse you're using to justify it, would come forth after all these years and honorably do the right thing.
The goal of this author on this YHFR post is to call out and reveal, in this author's professional opinion, that Mr. Brad Mayhew was supposedly christened to become the self-proclaimed, groomed-for-years, pre-planned YH Fire & GMHS Lead Investigator by the U.S. Forest Service (USFS). In addition, in this author's professional opinion, he was alleged to be and did eventually become so by deceit and design. And so, for years, this author has further alleged that Mr. Brad Mayhew, a former Los Padres Hot Shot, at the behest of his at-the-time HS Supt's recommendation for this author to check out his proposed LCES training, with this author approving what he had to offer, suggested going forward with it. And he did. This began his meteoric career after vouching for him. He eventually formed his highly profitable and successful "Fireline Factors - Human Factors, Risk, Operational Learning" company in 2007. Among the other issues in question mentioned above is also his alleged making a profit from this fatality based on his Lead Investigator position and status. An alleged stew of hypertoxic rhetoric has surged from this tragic YH Fire event regarding Mr. Mayhew as the Lead Investigator. He claims that he currently "serves as a wildland Firefighter on the Santa Ynez Helitack Crew in Southern California."
"If you see the … violent perversion of justice and righteousness in a province, do not marvel at the matter; for high official watches over high official, and higher officials are over them. ... There is an evil which I have seen under the sun, and it is common among men: A man to whom God has given riches and wealth and honor, so that he lacks nothing for himself of all he desires; ... This is vanity, and it is an evil affliction.
The Whole Duty of Man Fear God and keep His commandments, For this is man’s all. For God will bring every work into judgment, including every secret thing, Whether good or evil." Ecclesiastes 12 (NKJV)
Consider this gem from a 2021 KJZZ podcast with Mayhew: "Word S6:E7 — Season's endings bring reflection and a look forward. KJZZ. What do a former hotshot from Arizona, a Valley poet with a new collection about addiction, as well as a planetary scientist and creative writer from Tucson, have in common? They comprise our season-ending episode of "Word." It’s a podcast about literature in Arizona and the region." Tom Maxedon.
"Brad Mayhew is a former wildland firefighter, better known as a hotshot, and was the lead investigator for the 2013 Yarnell Hill Fire in which 19 firefighters perished amid one of the country’s deadliest wildfires. Mayhew still lives in Arizona and is working on a memoir about the fire with the working title, “Silence Is Golden.” The book examines how communication breakdown can lead to deadly consequences. He shared his experience and explored the human factors of communication and operational learning, topics which he also covers routinely on his podcast, “Anchor and Flank.” His memoir is expected in Spring 2022."
However, several Sept. 2025 Google searches by this author for this alleged 2022 Mayhew memoir mentioned above revealed that it appears to be nonexistent!
"The smart way to keep people passive and obedient is to strictly limit the spectrum of acceptable opinion, but allow very lively debate within that spectrum - even encourage the more critical and dissident views. That gives people the sense that there's free thinking going on, while all the time the presuppositions of the system are being reinforced by the limits put on the range of the debate."
Noam Chomsky - American professor known for his work in linguistics and social criticism
Utilizing the following Otter.ai app results, consider now the extensive, somewhat cryptic, and often difficult-to-follow-along session by Brad Mayhew, titled "How to Build Risk Communication Protocols" from the 2019 CA Interagency Wildland Fire Risk Management Conference. Friday, May 19, 2023, 1:24 PM. 1:16:38 in length. However, he does occasionally make some very valid points and recommendations from time to time. And several members in his audience definitely do so as well. Mayhew is the primary speaker, with others making comments or asking questions, and those will be realized in context. But not in the 2023 forum because it was shut down immediately upon Joy asking clarification questions, and then he rudely ignored her. Then, this author attempted to ask questions and was shut down immediately with “not you Fred!” In hindsight, it would have been better to wait for others to ask questions and to see how they were treated. Next time, ey.
Based on the alleged fact that Mayhew pledges something and then often fails to heed his own advice, based on alleged dubious means, he would be considered a "Hypocrite: This is a common term for someone's actions contradicting their stated beliefs or advice. It comes from the Greek word hypokrites, meaning "stage actor" or "pretender," suggesting someone feigning qualities or beliefs they lack. The Solomon Paradox would apply: This psychological concept describes the phenomenon of being good at giving advice to others but struggling to apply that same wisdom to one's own life. The term is named after the biblical King Solomon, known for his wisdom in dispensing advice but who also made personal choices that went against his own counsel." (BigThink, 2023)
"Insincere or lack of integrity: These terms can describe a person who doesn't practice what they preach without the strong negative connotation of "hypocrite." Incongruent: This term suggests a mismatch between beliefs and actions, without necessarily implying a moral failing. ... This informal and potentially offensive term describes someone who backs out of a commitment. Backslider: This term can be used for someone who gives advice to others but struggles to apply it to themselves, implying they know what to do but are hesitant or resistant to acting on it. These seem to be the most fitting based on his specific actions in these ongoing situations and his intent behind his actions." Source: 2016 Research Gate article by authors Sara B. Algoe, Laura E Kurtz, and Nicole M Hilaire, titled: Putting the “You” in “Thank You” - Examining Other-Praising Behavior as the Active Relational Ingredient in Expressed Gratitude.
Please consider these "continue to do your inherently dangerous jobs exceptionally well”" lessons learned" nuggets from our Part 1 of 2 - Why Were Vital Human Factors Influencing the June 30, 2013, YH Fire GMHS Fatalities Never Revealed? (YHFR, 2023) post. Did or does Mayhew ever allegedly consider any of these in his talks, books, or on his June 2013 YH Fire Investigation?
Doing it Right - Entrapment Avoidance, Talk With Each Other / Discuss the YH Fire to Encourage and Foster Healing, If You Are The Boss, Then BE The Boss! Boss spelled backwards is Double SSOB!, Know, Understand, and Recognize ALL the WF Rules of Engagement and Entrapment Avoidance Principles by Heart, Give Leader’s Intent and Then Ask Your Resources For Answers, Input, Ideas, Suggestions to Avoid Groupthink, Heed Watch Out No. 4, dealing with local weather and fire behavior factors, Know, Understand, and Practice Sound Risk Management, Learn to Properly Process All the Information You Receive by ALWAYS HEEDING and DISCUSSING INSTINCTS, INNER WARNING SIGNS, THE HOLY SPIRIT, ‘GUT FEELINGS,’ Know How to Properly Refuse Risk (Turn Down Protocol) IRPG p. 19, If You See Something, Say Something to Others AND Especially Your Supervisor(s), Use Direct Speech! - Avoid Mitigating and/or Hinting Speech, Speak Up If / When Uncomfortable With and/or Unsure of Tactics, Plan, Avoid the Dangers and Traps of Groupthink, and Avoid ‘Going Along Just To Get Along’ with everyone else, i.e., Trips to Abilene (The inability to manage agreement. Mentorlink (2025), The Digestible Deming, 2024)
"The National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) urged investigators to withhold some findings from the public, and to avoid analyzing whether crews violated fundamental fire-line rules.” Sanchez and Wagner (2013). The Arizona Republic and Desert Sun. Was Mayhew one of these alleged Investigators?
This author’s interest in taking this stance is to hopefully continue to expose and reveal to the inquisitive and generally clueless general public, informed and interested FFs, and WFs, to become better aware of the ongoing alleged June 2013 YH Fire and GMHS tragedy Lead Investigator's misleading messaging, at a time when he's continually attempting to glorify himself while quashing the truth, while allegedly profiting from it.
This author’s experience as a truth-telling Scapegoat, in addition to revealing other uncovered and reported details, led to the conclusion that the wildland fire cover-up industry is engaged in an all-out public relations war to pre-empt all criticisms of its predetermined Fairy Tale conclusions – and that those PR efforts have been increasing up to now, as far back as the fatal 1949 Mann Gulch Fire. Consider now our several related YHFR-linked posts directly below; and, as always, they are best viewed on a laptop or PC titled accordingly:
How was it possible to do everything right and yet 19 Prescott Fire Dept. Firefighters died in one fell swoop on June 30, 2013? (July 2023), Why Were Vital Human Factors Influencing the June 30, 2013, YH Fire GMHS Fatalities Never Revealed? (July 2023), Part 2 of 2 - Why Were Vital Human Factors Influencing the June 30, 2013, YH Fire GMHS Fatalities Never Revealed? (July 2023), How are the Alleged "Historical Fiction" Writer John Maclean and the Alleged YH Fire "Lead Investigator" Brad Mayhew Both Off Track About the June 30, 2013, YH Fire? (July 2023), How are the Alleged "Historical Fiction" Writer John Maclean and the Alleged YH Fire "Lead Investigator" Brad Mayhew Both Off Track About the June 30, 2013, YH Fire? Pt 2 (July 2023), Who Are the Underground Honor the Fallen Group, Couple Dozen Current and Former Federal WFs and FFs, and Others; and What Are Their Underlying Goals and Ulterior Motives for Defending the GMHS Flawed and Ultimately Fatal Decisions and Actions on June 30, 2013? (July 2023), Was the NWCG 2020 entrapment avoidance lesson to vindicate the SAIT-SAIR conclusion? (August 2023), How Is It Possible That The June 30, 2013, Yarnell Hill Fire Human Factors Perspective Is Exploited To Restrict Our First Amendment Rights of Free Association and Free Speech? (April, 2024) "Why Is There No Yarnell Hill Fire Site Visit and/or Staff Ride At The Annual March ERAU Wildfire Management Academy Of This Fatal June 2013 Epic Event?" (April 2025),
Staff Rides - Immersing Yourself in Learning. WLF Leadership (2023)
NWCG Wildland Fire Staff Ride Guide, PMS 470 (PDF, 2023)
"Staff rides are an integral part of being a 'student of fire.' Physically walking the very ground where an event occurred is a powerful learning experience. Individuals are able to get a sense of what those who came before them may have experienced--better so than by just reading or hearing about the event." (Unknown WF)
A retired USFS WF is attributed with saying: "Once firefighter and investigator lies about fatality fires get written into official reports, staff rides only turn the lies into dramas. Even if the Truth later seeps out, the staff rides keep regurgitating the same original lies. ... [WFs] keep dying for the same reasons, thus NWCG and all its ilk are truly guilty of negligent homicide. We lie to protect our imaginary personal, crew, and agency images, and real firefighters keep suffering and dying to nourish those collective fragile egos." IAWF (2011)
Figure 2. The Dude & Yarnell Fires Staff Ride Source: USFS, YouTube
"The Dude & Yarnell Fires Staff Ride guides participants through the events and decisions made during the 1990 Dude Fire and the 2013 Yarnell Fire."
Why Is There No Yarnell Hill Fire Site Visit and/or Staff Ride At The Annual March ERAU Wildfire Management Academy Of This Fatal June 2013 Epic Event? Schoeffler and other contributing authors (2022)
Did Similar Known & Later-Discovered Human & Psychological Factors & Wildland Fire Weather Causal Connections Save Lives on Both the June 26, 1990, Dude Fire & the June 30, 2013, Yarnell Hill Fire 23 Years Apart? Schoeffler and other authors (Part 1, 2025) and (Part 2, 2025)
For let not that man suppose
that he will receive
anything from the Lord;
he is a double-minded man,
unstable in all his ways.
James 1:7-8 NKJV
It’s safe to state at this point that Mayhew is allegedly a Non-believer because he never mentions God or Jesus Christ in any of his conferences, writings, and/or presentations. Jesus Christ was the greatest leader to ever walk this earth. His leadership was unlike any the world had seen before or since.Jesus Christ was the greatest leader to ever walk this earth. His leadership was unlike any the world had seen before or since.
Additionally, of all the major GMHS lobbies, the Eric Marsh Foundation (Facebook EMF) has arguably done the most to mobilize on the topic of a no-blame, no-fault pattern. Our strategy and funding documents review · from the past decade indicates that the EMF sees itself as perpetually under attack by a variety of hostile forces, with Truth Tellers like us considered as an alleged ongoing threatening concern. Consider a Dec. 1, 2024, Gary Olson EMF FB post by the very credible, yet mostly unfiltered, former Happy Jack Hot Shot Crew Boss, Santa Fe Hot Shot Supt., and USFS Criminal Investigator, and Facebook Wildland Firefighter Fire Line Safety and Burn Over Survivability Blog author and creator Gary Olson: "Oh ... and for everyone who looked the other way because the Eric Marsh Foundation was raising money for WTF? Well, I think that is largely a duplication of efforts with the long established and highly respected https://wffoundation.org/ I'm not convinced they raised any "new money" by making a larger pie, but rather they just take the same size pie and divided it up into more pieces. And besides that, I don't care what their purported purpose is, they were an objective in search of a mission and wrong from the get go. We should not be honoring a man like Eric Marsh ... period. Rename the foundation the GMIHC Foundation. Just take Marsh's name specifically off everything except that he was on the crew as crew boss. Unless of course, neither Amanda Marsh nor Karen Fann will support any efforts that don't have Eric's name on it? In addition, I just think it sets a “bad precedent” and you know…gives us a “bad look.” The “optics” are just terrible from where I am standing. So… Of course the only difference between the good work the two organizations do, is that with the Wildland Firefighter Foundation, they are taking point for the help that is given whereas with the Eric Marsh Foundation, AMANDA MARSH is the focal point for all contacts and she gets to be the star of the show and the center of attention and in complete control while she actively and continuously perpetrates the charade and fraud that Eric Marsh is a hero. Yeah...we don't need that...thanks anyway."
Some journalists, organizations, and even other academics use our YHFR post and Applied Human Factors & Ergonomics (AHFE) papers’ comments in ways that sometimes counter our original intent. For better or worse, we are unable to control what they say or how they say it. How they’re routinely amplified by industry goes beyond the bounds of normal scholarly conduct.
The Forbes (June 2024) online magazine author Adam Petrilli calls it “proactive reputation management,” entailing monitoring the internet for messaging opportunities. An industry top priority. Whoever reaches them best has the power to sway the balance of public opinion."Looking toward the future, proactive reputation management is about more than protecting and promoting your brand in the present—it's about crafting a legacy. A forward-thinking, ongoing approach to reputation management helps ensure your brand is respected and remains influential, regardless of the challenges that come. By investing in proactive measures today, you are setting the stage for sustained success and a reputation that can endure the tests of time and turbulence in the digital world." So then, does it follow that the GMHS’s Kool-Aid Drinkers will utilize the alleged virtual use of leaping into their no-blame, no-fault hero image whenever it’s advantageous?
Know that with truth-telling, diligence must always engage in a “defensive strategy.” Continual defensibility has the potential to become a crisis if left to the ignorant and apathetic masses to continue to address it. The Undemocratic Class Action, posted Feb. 22, 2023, by Nicholas Almendares, represents a fairly good proxy.
"Truth is not defined by authority,
tradition, or numbers
— but by reason and evidence."
Nicolaus Copernicus
Every man who knows how to read has it in his power to magnify himself, to multiply the ways in which he exists,
to make his life full, significant, and interesting
Aldous Huxley
Consider now the following 95.00% accurate Otter.ai recorded Mayhew CA PSC Fire Risk Management - Brad Mayhew YouTube Sep. 15, 2021, 1:24 PM, 1:16:32 in length. With Mr. Mayhew redundantly just-a-stammering-and-a-stuttering-along (j-a-s-a-a-s-a) in his session on his Fireline Factors Resources website link titled: Risk Communication Protocols - 2019 California Interagency Wildland Fire Risk Management Conference. Revealing this author's sincere sensitivity to Mr. Mayhew's alleged j-a-s-a-a-s condition, according to Speech Easy, "While you might think that there are more differences between stuttering and stammering, the differences are minimal. Other than the country or type of English being spoken, the only difference between the two terms is the spelling. Both represent disfluent speech and the conditions that come with it. There are no differences between stuttering vs stammering regarding the conditions or symptoms they represent."
Figure 2b. Mayhew teaching RCP Fire Risk Mgmt. image. Source: YouTube
In Fig. 2b. above, this author (black cap) is sitting in the front row middle with Joy A. Collura, one of the "two [YH Fire] local residents, avid hikers."
Brad Mayhew: "Thank you. So, can you hear me okay? We're good in the back. All right. First of all, it's, it's a real pleasure for me to be here. It's an honor from the list of things that, that were just read, you know, a lot of those things actually started here years ago. So it's, it's really an honor for me to be back in this room in 2019, and to share with you some of the latest sort of developments, and it's, I'm still nervous after, after all these years, much as, as I know a lot of folks in this room and trust you. First off, I'm just going to show you something quickly on my website. We're going to talk about this article rather than telling you where it is. I'm going to show you exactly where it is. ... And we went from a no-tech to a low-tech presentation today. If you go to FirelineFactors.com. If you click on this big red button - 'Access Training Downloads,' the first thing that you will see there on the upper left is this article on the Yarnell Hill Fire that's loading right now. Trust me. Anyway, right there, there's an article. Um, trust me. And what this article does, it introduces a way of approaching the Yarnell Hill Fire that I think can be very useful for Crews. So, one of the things we struggled with is there’s so much that we don't know about it. This component is unprecedented in our history of Wildland Fire Serious Accident Investigations. We’re all kinda used to the fact that things happen. There’s always these little pieces that you never quite know the whole story, but with Yarnell. Um, I’m glad I showed you how to get there. But it is there. Yeah, um, but, but with the Yarnell Hill Fire Serious Accident Investigation [YHF SAIT], one of the things we did in the Investigation is, we just said look, there are huge pieces of this that we don't have. We can’t build a context, we can’t tell you exactly who made which decision, how. How they made it, when they made it. We think we know, we have some good ideas, But there’s a lot that is not known. Um, and in this article, which is downloading. It'll be here any minute in this article. It shares a series of questions that you can use at a Crew level, to kind of think about what would it be like to put ourselves in their shoes and what could have happened even though we don't know the exact true certain historical facts of what happened when [With all due respect, in fact, this author alleges that he does know, and that is the issue and the basis within our post title], but still we can think about something like if I was in the black, if I'm sitting there and watching the fire do what we know they were seeing. I'm hearing this over the radio: structures, evacuations. What would that do to me? What would pull on me, what would motivate me to want to move? And I think that is the question that we can focus on today and for our future, that can help us find breakthroughs that can help us be more effective for tomorrow. And so I think the questions in the discussion of precisely and exactly what happened in this light could still be on, because most of what we're doing from here on will just be black and white. So, so for our future. ... Excuse me. So, for our future, the question is what would pull us out of the black, what would draw us into a situation like this? The discussions of exactly what happened that day will probably go on forever. Right then, there will probably be a lot of speculation. Because, in my own case, because of the role that I played. I have been a little bit of, ... of a Bulldog against some of the what I think is careless speculation. But, but I do think that there can be a role for that speculation. At, at a practical level, at a Crew level, if you can try to put yourself in that situation. You could try to feel, what would that be like? Because I can promise you this, for those 19 [GMHS], the decisions that they made, made more sense to them than any other option, and they felt more right than any other options. And we don't know all the context points. But I do know they’re just men, they’re just [FFs], they’re just like us. They, they saw, felt, and heard the kinds of things that we see, feel, and hear on fires that, that motivated us and compel us. It’s very easy to say we would never, or I would never. You know you, you’ve heard all that kind of dialogue. We would never make a decision like that. But they did. [Given Mayhew’s alleged bold justification statements and his SAIT-SAIR no blame, no fault conclusion, name me one wildland fire where the FFs and/or WFs followed all the Rules of Engagement and mitigated all the Entrapment Avoidance Principles and they all died. It's easy because there are none!].
"And the reasons that they did, we know that they were FFs just like us, so we know we can use this event sort of even if we don’t have all the facts, we can’t fill in the pictue, [With all due respect, in fact, he does know and has all the facts, and that is the issue and the basis within our post title] we can use his event sort of like a mirror, so we can look at ourselves and go okay, but what could pull me in that direction? How, how could it feel right to me to hike with 19 guys, or however the configuration was at any particular moment, and to make that same decision? And if you have that discussion, you have that discussion with your Crew, you will hear things that will surprise you. So, in this particular article. Um, and I showed you how to get there. In that article, it goes through, it’s kind of rehash of some of the basic facts. Um, it goes through a series of three questions that you can ask with your Crew. It is, it is truly meant as an exercise to go through those and have a discussion and just listen to what, what the people around you have to say. You might hear some things that might surprise you. And the view there is to be surprised around the dinner table, you want to be surprised at lunch, hearing your buddies where you go, what you really that would compel you, I, because we’re different, right? So, so, an article like this, the reason I’m sharing it with you. It’s free for you to download. There’s no, um, it’s a training tool to get those conversations going early. And to make those connections, have those discussions. So, with that said, I want to pivot now to the discussion of Risk Refusal. ... So, the article in FirelineFactors.com, I’m going to cover this up. [Whoa now! “I’m going to cover this up” This author alleges that this is a classic Freudian Slip, also called a parapraxis, when you make a small mistake in speech, writing, memory, or even action that may accidentally reveal a hidden thought, feeling, or desire. From Sigmund Freud, the father of psychoanalysis, who believed that these slips aren’t random at all. Instead, they’re clues to what’s really going on beneath the surface of our minds. So then, here he openly admitted that he, in fact, did “cover this up”]. One of the things that I have heard again and again as I've listened to [FFs] around the country, different agencies, different levels of different agencies, different experience levels, different perspectives and personalities, some with mustaches, some without, some with shiny buckles, some with dumb buckles, all across the board. What I've heard again, and again, are these various scenarios about what they think could have happened, right? And what they think, how they think they could have, what could have happened? Let's leave it at that. And there's a number of theories, right? One theory is that the Crew Superintendent may have been driving the decision making, another theory is that the Crew Assistant Superintendent, another theory is, is someone else on the fire or someone with Department or some Crew and the Supe or on the same level but the Crew, or excuse me, the Crew Supe and Assistant Supe were of one mind, but maybe the Crew didn't have this. So, there's all these different theories, all these different scenarios. The data is not conclusive. ... But here's what they all have in common. Every single one of those comes back to this, to this point, and that is communication, communication about risk communication across levels of authority, right all our scenarios, so we don't know exactly what happened that day. But we do know one way or another has something to do with how we think about risk, how we talk about risk, how we take action. ... So, to take a step back in history, in the late 90s, following South Canyon, and like cutting in and out, no solid, okay. In the late 90s, following South Canyon, there was this move in the Fire Service to improve upward communication. A lot of different terms for that, it was really driven by heavily driven by like two kinds of movements outside of fire. One was the Cockpit Resource Management movement, I suppose. The other one is the CRM. [CRM is Cockpit Resource Management. See (1991) ERAU, which eventually became Crew Resource Management. See also Findings from the Wildland Firefighters ... (USDA, CRM, HRO[. The other one was the High Reliability Organization movement, HRO, right? And the whole idea was, was really to drive home this idea that look, our operational environments are complex. And we can't just operate on a model where you have one person making decisions and everybody else following. We need to have a situation where folks can communicate up and down the chain of command, they can articulate their concerns that can forward information to the leaders, and the leaders want to hear. ... So that was a very clear movement that happened in the 90s. I may be a little biased, I think in the wildland world it was driven heavily by Hot Shot Superintendents and by Helitack folks, because that aviation component, of course, little parts of the Hot Shots, because that's my roots. So maybe the story is more complicated, but my version is that it was driven heavily by Hot Shot Superintendents, and then in the local Government world, it was, uh, Chief Brunacini had a significant role in around the 2000s, saying, Listen, we need to do something with CRM, Chief Brunacini from Phoenix Fire. So there was this huge stride, right? And the new mantra became, if you see something, what if you see something, say something. Right? And the idea was, that the reason that folks are not speaking up is because clearly, this seemed to be the obvious answer at that time, is because clearly, they do not have permission to speak up, that there's a culture of oppression or suppression or these Bosses or Tyrants are there, they will let the guy say what they wanted to only we could get kind of the senior folks to give the younger folks permission to talk, then they would do that and we would fix the communication problem. That was the, anybody ... does that sound familiar? I mean, if you took CRM training in the late 90s, the villain was the old guy who has all the answers and won't listen to anybody else. That's just that was the villain that was sort of in that training. Right? Well, I think we made some progress. Where am I wrong? ... No, right. That's yeah, he's the bad guy, the evil, not evil, but the, … the abusive, tyrannical, you might, … my Dad was a pilot. He got into safety, human factors, and so he, you know, he was, he was a pilot and whatever. And so he would tell me these stories of, you know, how CRM was, and it's this, this bad, you know, Senior Captain that doesn't want to hear it. Anybody else has to say, Well, I think we've made progress, right? So when I got interested in human factors, and I was a Hot Shot, I was a young guy, I was listening to my Boss, Stan Stewart [RiP], and he said; If you see something, say something. He wanted upward communication, and you know how much I talked? Not much. And I started getting interested in that, and I knew that he wanted that, and I knew that he was assertive in saying I want to hear what your questions are. And if you have a concern, say something about it.
"Um, early on, I started traveling around the country, to listen to what other Hot Shot Superintendents were saying to their Crews and some of the issues that they were bringing up, and I heard a consistent frustration. The frustration was, we want upward communication. But they're not doing it and started getting involved in investigations again, and again. In our investigations, you see these moments where somebody sees something, but they don't quite say something. Right? And the mantra has been, well, we're gonna go back and repeat this. This, this, this saying this monitor if you see something, say something, you see something, say something, right? ... Has it worked? Have we improved communication the way that we need to? Progress? Yes, it's worked. To a degree. It's working, right? So, how I'd suggest we could look at, is we could say, listen, about 20 years ago, we made this major stride. We as a profession, wildland and fire to local government Fire Department, side of the house, the American Fire Service recognized about 20 years ago, we need to do something to improve our communications between levels. So we made that huge breakthrough, and then, what progress has been made along those lines since then? So, we, I believe we did, we, we as a profession. Well, I'm an heir of them we're all heirs of this; I didn't do it. I started out ... to this began. So I inherited this incredible achievement, which was the recognition, fire's dangerous, fire is complex. [Are you kidding me? It took you all this time to realize that fire is dangerous, fire is complex?] We need to have good Crew communication. That was a huge achievement. And then how we build on it. ... And here's another question. Maybe the problem is not the closed-minded, Jerk Boss that won't listen. And that's the reason, maybe that's not our only problem with communication. Maybe there's a different issue. See, see the Myth of Risk Refusal was, if you just give people permission, they'll do it. They'll do it right. They'll say the right thing at the right time, and we'll get it right. But what's the reality?
"What do you think is the reality? Do you think that’s the reality is that in the moment when things are starting to hit the fan I’m going have the exact right language that’s going to cut through the nonsense, is going to make sense. It’s going to be able to propagate effect. Is that how the world works? ... No. When you listen to why the people didn’t speak up, a lot of times, what they will say is they’ll say something like, I started to see that something was going wrong. But I wasn’t sure what was going wrong. I wasn’t sure that it was actually gonna go wrong. And let’s talk about that one early on. Our problems are generally vague, kind of ambiguous. That’s early, right? Late, our problems get very clear, very definitive, very in your face. You know this is an issue and at that point, what? It’s too late to do anything about it, right? ... If I keep my mouth shut, what are the chances it's all going to work out just fine? Odds are it's gonna work out just fine. Right? So, so my other option, let's stay early if I speak up early, so my other option is I can say something. And what's going to happen if I say something, in all likelihood, my Crew Leader has more knowledge, more experience than I do. He probably already sees the issue, or she probably already sees the issue. They've probably already figured it out. So I'm going to say something, the odds are, I'm wrong. ... Right? I mean, this is, this is kind of a wild thing to say, but, but really think about it. If you're a lower-ranking person with less experience on a Crew, whether it's an Engine Company or a Hand Crew, or whatever, the odds are that if you think your Boss is missing something statistically, probably you're wrong. Right? So do we want upward communication? ... But what if I'm wrong? What if me saying something means I'm wrong, or what if I'm right, but my experience, my history has taught me that if I keep quiet, the thing is going to work out just fine. So, do I want to say something? Take a social risk, it's probably gonna work out anyway. ... And then there's biology, there's a biological component too, right? So, what is, who watches Animal Planet? Right? Okay. So, if you watch Animal Planet, they see a bunch of Wildebeests, or whatever the animals are, and if you stay with the herd, even if the herd does kind of the dumb thing or the wrong thing, what happens? ... Right? See a Wildebeest, so what is our what is our, our, this is the becomes instinctual, right? What's our survival instinct is that it is safer and smarter to stay with the group than to do something that's in our that's, in our DNA, that's in our bones. It's in our blood, that is in our cells. This is an instinctual something that we know from birth. [Clearly. endorsing the Hazardous Attitude of Groupthink here!] We don't know that we know that, but we feel it feels way more dangerous to be different and separate yourself than to go with the flow. ... So the idea is, if we look at these things, if we look at human biology, human psychology, we look at you know, the probability that if I say something, it's actually going to be an issue. We look at our history, looking at our actual investigations, where people talk about why they didn't say something. ... It seems to me that we need to face something that it's kind of uncomfortable to face, and that is our default. We have believed a myth. [Whoa now, he’s taking us down his mythological path of what he believes, allegedly attempting to foist it on us that this is accurate, when in fact, many, if not most experienced FFs and WFs that work on wildland fires, in this author’s professional opinion, want to speak up and tell the truth] "The myth is that our default is if I have the permission, I will say something else at the right time in the right way. It'll be understood, and then that'll fix a problem that is mythological. And here is reality. Our default, most of us as [FFs], our default is we don't want to say something. We don't want to say something different. We don't want to, ... what's the other thing is, is if I say something, what am I doing? I'm messing up the whole momentum, right? We don't want to do that. That is not what makes us effective most of the time. Right? So when we talk about improving Crew communication, we made this huge stride by saying we need everybody to be engaged and paying attention, and communicating about what they see huge strides. About 20 years ago, the next step is to say okay, folks, in theory have permission to speak up, but are they doing it effectively? Probably not. So why are they not effectively? And so then here's the other piece, so we kind of talked about some of the barriers to speaking up early. But now let's look at some of the barriers to speaking up late. So just as a normal person, I'm going to go, I see some problem over there. Well, you know, might be a problem. There's also about 1000 other things that might be a problem. I don't like anything just yet. And then the problem is getting closer. No, there's a few things in my stomach starting to ... am I gonna say something now or not? But I don't know exactly how to.
"Then now we're getting closer and closer in that Time Wedge, right? And now we're getting closer and closer to the problem. And now the problem is very clearly defined. Very clearly, resinous is very clearly a bad idea. And what, what else is going on at the moment that it becomes crystal clear what's happening. Let me ask you this. Is everybody else in the situation sort of sitting there? ... Pouring a cup of tea, one lump or two to please. So how do you feel about the fire today? You know what I feel is let's see. Does anybody else have any? No, that's not how it is at the moment when you need to say something's wrong because it's obviously wrong. There's a million other things going wrong, right? That's when there's a ton of radio traffic. That's when the Crew is already moving in a certain direction, right? There's momentum. There's and, and you trying to just say something may show up as noise, right? So we have this sort of this, this ... Um, it's something like a dilemma. We have this dilemma. Where do I say something early, that I'm probably going to be wrong? Do I say something late, but it's probably not going to be effective? How do you figure that out? So the issue of, if you see something, say something, but what if, what if I'm not sure what that something is? And what if it's not about saying something because you hear a lot of people will say, well, I said something. Well, what did you say? Well, and then they tell you what they say you ask the other people in the situation, they go I didn't hear any of that. Right? So maybe it's not just if you see something, say something, maybe it's about saying something effectively. ... Is this ringing true? You following so far, all right? So I would suggest that for Leaders, the reason that the phrase 'if you see something, say something' kind of caught on it seems like, like the answer is, because if you have experience, is very clear to you. What's ah, something, what somebody should say? Right? So, from the perspective of experience, it seems very clear. ... I would suggest that the folks that you're working with have many different perspectives. So my suggestion is and let me see if I can. My suggestion is this. One of the things that would help is to have absolute crystal clarity on when to say something, right? So I would suggest this. Let's take 60 seconds.
"We're going to go through part one of an exercise. This is a four-part exercise. By the time we're done with this exercise today, you are going to have a draft of a Crew communication protocol that addresses all the main issues that we just talked about. It's just gonna be a draft. You're probably going to drive home, and as you're driving home, you're gonna go out and do this, this otherwise, that's okay, it's yours. It's your draft. We will address these key components. And then you can adjust it and adapt it on your own. So the first question is, say something went, ... And the idea here is that as a Leader, and by the way, so, so we start off by saying all these different possibilities, and these various events all involve communication, communication about risk communication, across levels. I think that when we think about communication across levels, it's kind of the same set of issues again, and again, and again. For our purposes, we'll just focus on the Crew level communication within the Crew. So just to kind of keep it a little streamlined, we'll focus at that level. So, putting yourself in the position of a Crew or Company Officer. I want to suggest that you are the Leader looking for that upward communication. In other words, another thing that I would suggest CRM, I love CRM, I love HRO, but there's this kind of this, this, it's almost this energy that, that, that it's it's the younger folks have the answers and the older folks need to learn to listen, but they don't want to say they have to be told to but that's not what I see. What I see are experienced [FFs]s, they want good communication in the right way, effective that they can use that's what I see happening. So we should think of this Crew communication risk, risk refusal as a collaborative process. So rather than saying when you see something, say something of it, like this, from the perspective of a Crew Leader, when do you want people on your Crew, your followers, to speak up?
"Do you want them to speak up early? When it looks like there kind of might be something wrong? If you haven't spoken up early? You're gonna get a bunch of Garbo that isn't real, isn't a real problem, is because they don't know. Right? That's it. If I don't have the experience, I'm going to tell you my ... I don't know what I'm talking about. Right? So if you want me to speak up early, I'm going to give you a bunch of stuff. It's the best I can do. But I'm going to be wrong. Right? So do you want to speak up? Or do you want him to speak up, like tell me when you see a problem? So think for yourself? Where do you want, when do you want people to speak up? And my suggestion, the exercise that we're going to do is to finish the sentence, say something, when? And define that term. To find that when in a way that's absolutely crystal clear. So the perspective of somebody in a stressful situation that's uncomfortable, they're on a fire, there's other stuff going on, that they would know that they would have as objective as possible, a way to know inside themselves. Yeah, this is it. I hit my Trigger Point to say something. So finish this sentence. Say something. When, when do you want folks to speak up? ... I'm gonna give you 60 seconds. I'm gonna suggest kind of clump up with whoever's around you. You do big groups, you can do small groups, and be one-of-one, one-on-one. Don't be a loner for this round. Uh, 60 seconds. Just bat around some ideas. I'm gonna ask you afterwards. It doesn't have to be a good answer. It just has to be an answer. Say something when? Uh, go.
"Got it, yes Sir, thank you, right? Hmm ... You know what, as I'm looking at this. Let me try this one last little thing. Right? Perfect. Awesome. Thank you very rock, thanks Dude. Thank you very much. Thanks everyone. All right. Okay. Thank you. ... Okay, so I'm just gonna lightning round kind of call on folks. What did you come up with when, if you're going to give direction to a follower, I want you to speak up when? What's the Tripwire? What's, what's the Trigger? What did you come up with Sir? when you come up with what he says? And also, okay, I'm gonna focus outside, so don't understand communication. So you're given direction, or here's something going on, and it's not, it's not clear to you. That's a Trigger to speak up. Okay. Other and again, um. ... Yeah, I know, this isn't necessarily the right answer. I think this is going to be different for each Leader where you want to put, where you want to give this direction. I also think if you make this decision, and then you're working with your folks, after a while, you're going to fine-tune it and tweak it as you practice. Right? So our purpose today is just to get some ideas out there to work through these four questions. And then, um, and then you'll have a tool that you can develop for your folks in your own way. That's perfect for the communication that you want. Okay, so what are some other ideas? Say something when so, I'm a young [FFs]. I know that my Boss wants me to speak up when you feel something's wrong. What else? When you're unsure, unsure in this situation. What else when you drop fire on the ground? ... Okay, what else? We got a pretty good discussion back here. No more? Great question. Speak up when you have a question or you want to learn more about it. Exactly. And that's an excellent point, um, um. That's, that's kind of an advanced point, actually. Which is that we have exactly as you said, in general, when we talk about this kind of stuff, we see speaking up in some ways as a power struggle, in some ways as a risk refusal. It's about, it's a negative. But in fact, it could also be framed as a positive because if I'm wrong, but I say something, could that be a learning opportunity? If I said in the right way at the appropriate time, it could be right.
"So thank you for that. We kind of discussed. It starts out at briefing the open line of communication up and down, should, should begin actually before breaking, but officially begin a briefing, continue in route to the incident, um, talking to 10 and 18's [Rules of Engagement & Entrapment and Avoidance Principles that consistently save lives!] situations, and ideas. And this and that, and I think it should continue up until this hits the fan. And at that point, I'm going to tell my guys, hey, unless, at that point. I started listening to what I said. You know, it's unless, unless you see there’s something that you see that’s going to kill us, that there's something really wrong, then it's time to focus about the focus. Okay, but that communication needs right from the beginning all the way up until I learned I got some real good guys I work with yeah, and I tell them all the time, hey look, you know ego is left out the door. I'm open, so just to, just to quickly try to summarize what you just described, what I heard you say is during briefing and before we get engaged, speak up when you have a question. It's a little unclear. You don't like something, you have an idea. Once we pull the trigger, speak up when 'what did you say, you see something that could kill you. Right? That's right, okay. And so then we could, so as you think about this in your own ways, you could keep at it. You could back at the station say say it if you see something that's relevant to our assignment from the time we hit Fire Camp. Say it if you see something that's a direct threat to us by the time we're engaged, then say, "So, I don't have the right answer I'm just sharing with you.I think it's up to you to think about how you want to define that in a way that's appropriate to you folks
"Then you need to start listening to what I said. You know, it’s I, it’s unless there’s something real obvious, then it’s time. Okay, let's definitely recommend getting all the way up until I learned I got real good guideline. Work when. I hope so, just to, just to quickly, try to summarize what you just described. What I heard you say is during briefing, and before we get engaged, speak up when you have a question. It's a little unclear, you know, like something you have an idea once we pull the trigger, speak up. When, what did you say, you see something that could kill you? Right? That's right. Okay. So, and then we could, so as you think about this, in your own ways, you could keep at it. You could say, well, speak up, back at the station. ... Right? So you could have different ideas for how you want people to speak up, what the point is to see that the phrase ... have you seen someone say something that doesn't help me know, as a young person, you know? ... Well, no, the answer is if you see something that could be good to talk about at the station, say it if you see something that's relevant to our assignment, for the time we hit Fire Camp, say, if you see something that's a direct threat to us, by the time we're engaged, then say, so I don't have the right answer. I'm just sharing with you. I think it's up to you to think about how you want to define that in a way that's appropriate for your phone. You're telling them when they're thinking, do I say something? They're not asking, should I, shouldn't, do I don't. They're going, hey, my Boss said to speak up at this time to say something went well. This is that one. So that's the idea. So you're leading. It's you're, you're steering this, this Ship. One more suggestion: speak up when? Finish that, yes, you feel fear. So this is really interesting. That is a very, very subjective trigger, right? I feel fear, but in a lot of our training, we are taught to think through things in a very conceptual way, like what does the Risk Refusal thing say? What is that list, right? And that is one way of making decisions and assessing our safety, our lists. Another, another component of that, as human beings, is we feel discomfort, fear, right? That intuition is a part of our decision-making. It informs our decision-making. So one trigger could be totally subjective. Hey, if it doesn't feel right, say something. Right? Yes. [Okay Brad, however, if we do say something as you say, then you shut us down like you did in San Diego!], ... When I started out by the Captain, he said, you ride backwards for a reason. Yes, look at something different than what we're seeing, and that was at least my organization, we just bought five new Engines, and I preach, all these I, I would imagine going forward, they're probably all, not all of them are inspected for, but they're all riding, facing forward. And so we, I feel that from my organization, we kind of took a step backward because now we have three people all looking the same direction. Yeah. And I always tell our FFs, I need someone to be that guy, that guy, around that guy, right across to give me that, that other point of view. Excellent, excellent. And there was one other in the back that was very enthusiastic. Yes Sir. When you see something, when you see a safer, more efficient way to do something, speak up. If I tell you we're going to do it my way when, when we get I'll explain to you why I said my way. Right, right. So, again, that's another facet of this is, how about say something when you have another idea that might work, but then again, you would kinda want to fine-tune that, you know, we're not going to necessarily going to do that when we're cutting a hotline on the side of the I-5, you know, maybe not, but so. so you, you define that for your folks is, hey, I want to hear your ideas, your suggestions, and here's the appropriate context. So that, so that as you pick the default is folks don't want to speak up, right? They don't want to stand out. They don't want to look foolish. They don't want to say the wrong thing. They don't want to say the right thing, that their buddies are still gonna give him a hard time about, because the default is not speaking up. But if I know, Hey, I've been asked to speak up, this is when this is my trigger, Guy. I got an excellent point. Yes, sir.
"I just want to make a point that learning how to express yourself is not necessarily only to the Leader, to say hey, ... but it's more of a practice or a habit to manage yourself or others. Yes. Self-leadership. Yes. Meaning like partner, Saw Partner, or whatever. And you find out, you say, Hey, I'm not comfortable with this, what's going on? Because I haven't heard from anybody, I don't have a radio. Right. Uh, and we're out of communications. What's going on? It starts there, you're surely ... express yourself between one another. I think you're able to share that even better spatially down the line/ Absolutely. Yes Sir. One last more. Yes, I just want to say ... Absolutely. Yes, sir. One last vote. Yes. It’s great that we have this movement of conversation that everybody has every right, yes, that's exactly it. So that's the other challenge is the idea that the instinct was, well, if we just get everybody talking, then we'll get good information. But that's not true. We have to accept, if we want to get better, more effective dialogue. We got to accept that some of those suggestions won't be good suggestions. So if you're a Leader, and you say, only bring me good suggestions. How many suggestions are you gonna get? Zero, right?
"If you say, tell me everything that comes to your mind, whenever it comes to your mind, how many are you gonna get? You're gonna get a bunch. So how do you want to define that for your folks? I don't know the answer. What I do know is, if it's not clear in your mind, that it's not going to be clear in the minds of your followers. And if it's not clear in the minds of your followers, in ordinary kind of doing stuff, situation, it's not going to be clear when it hits the fan. So, so get clear on when do I want folks to speak up, question to, or the second pieces, so now I know. I know as a follower can supposed to say something. This is a situation where I want to say something. The next question is, so what's one of the things that we see is that you'll see folks speaking up, but they speak up in a way that is not effective. ... So, we expect and hope that in the moment, you're going to know the right way to communicate. It's going to cut through the noise, it's going to cut through the momentum, it's going to cut through the stress, gonna cut through all that. Is that realistic? How much, how many of our situations have somebody trying to say something, but it doesn't break through? Right? And so, so, Question Two is this, and we're going to break up into little groups again. ... The question that you want to give your followers clarity on is exactly what to say. What should they say? Should they say I have a concern? I have a question. I don't like it. We shouldn't do this. Ask that question on a County ... with a, with a group of County Firefighters, go do a class, two Leaders, two Captains sitting next to each other, same Battalion, neighboring stations, one of them was a Truck Captain, and one was an Engine Captain, Paramedic. ... One of them said, the way that I want my folks to approach me is to say, and this is almost an exact quote: 'Boss, I don't F'ing like this.' That's how he wanted his folks .... Don't, don't, don't, don't be delicate. Don't be friendly. Tell me, you know, and that's how they talked. Because I was around his guys. I listened to him as we got lunch. That's how they talk to each other, right? And then another, another person sitting next to him. He's I'll let you guess which one was the Paramedic or which one was the Truck [Captain]. ... But one of them said, you know, when we're doing what we're doing, a lot of what we're doing, it's not a bunch of noisy stuff going on and and clashing and breaking stuff, it's, you know, more delicate situations, and I don't want you to be a bull in a china shop in Grandma's living room, and so for him, the trigger was, 'Hey Cap,' that was his trigger, he wanted his folks to approach him that way. If you say, Hey Cap , you're not just making a joke, you're not ... You got something serious? And it's going to be clear to me, and it's not going to upset everybody else around us. So now consider that, consider those two very, very different extremes. One Leader says, I want you to, you know, verbally grab me by the lapels and shake me, you know, because that's how they like to talk. And the other guy says, you know, I want you to like, Hi Cap, right? So now here's the thing, if I'm used to working for ... Guess which one was the Truck and I'm used to working for the Truck Captain, and then I'm running a call or I'm working with the Captain with a different, different mindset, different styles and we're going into situations, I don't know, well, how's he going to react to that? He's going to be totally turned off. You're a bull in a china shop. This isn't working, right? On the other hand, if I'm with a Leader that wants you to be very abrasive, very direct, don't let it, don't let it, don't let it go. And I say, hey, Cap. I can hear a Cap all day long about my very valid concerns. Is he going to hear that? No, he's not going to hear that because it's not in the format that works for him. So here's the point. There's a lot of different personality types out there, right? And instead of having the guesswork of how I will you, but he said, but then the other time that I said this one thing, and then you know, those are the kinds of things that people say in their heads, right? Cut through all of it. Make it very, very simple for your followers, so they know when to say something, and then they know.
"Start like this. Remove 100% of the ambiguity. Start like this. And when you see these quotes, what this means is you're giving them the beginning of the script, whatever you want it to be. I have a question. However, you want your folks to approach you. Let's take 60 seconds and just talk about your script. Ideas. Go Guys. Right, right after I just missed of yeah. Okay. All right. So, real quickly, we're gonna do a lightning round. And again, the purpose, what we're trying to do today is just to get some answers, not necessarily the right answer. So what did you come up with? What were some ideas? I asked. I have to say, what else, I don't know. That's the beginning. I don't feel it. Excellent. Yes. So just to point out, you're framing that as a question, and you're framing it as ... Is anybody else seeing this? ... "Kind of brilliant thing about that approach is new. They weren't before, but now that you said it, they're gonna go. I don't want to be the guy. That's right. So, so, so, so I know if I'm working for you. I'm gonna go, Hey, am I the only one that sees whatever if I'm working for Doug, I'm gonna go, hey, I'm concerned, or I feel concerned, or I see. Okay. And if I'm working for you, and I go, I see this. I might not be the perfect way to communicate with you. And same with Doug, if I'm going, Hey, as anybody else in his notes going, tell me what you tell them what you're seeing. Right? So I need to know, I want to know from my Leader, what do you want me to say? When do you want me to say it's number one, number two? How do you want me to say it is up to you? Next question or next? Just some ideas. How, what do you want your followers to say? ... I have a concern. I have an Intel update. Ooh, an Intel update, and we have started to find this information. Right. And at some levels, the phrase I have an Intel update might be an appropriate way to get the Boss's attention. That doesn't send waves of we're in, in certain situations, saying I have a safety concern is going to be, you know, not necessarily ... it depends on the situation. Okay. We have, Sir, are already tracking, already tracking. ... But if we keep it in the framework of the mantra, Cap, I see something, I'd like to say something. I see something I'd like to say, so I know if I'm working for you. That is the way that I'm going to say that, and I know that when you hear me say that. I'm not just joking about the ham sandwiches that day. This is serious. Excellent. Any other ... anybody else? Yes, sir. ... You're around the truck, looking at a map ... . Short question. Question. I have questions that don't say, like ... Right. So, if I'm working for you, the way I'm going to approach you is that I have a question that says like, What else? What else? ...
In Fig. 2b. above, this author, sitting in the middle front row with Joy A. Collura, one of the "two local residents, avid hikers who are familiar with the area," poses these aircraft accident comments about hazardous icicles directly to Mayhew without any issues: "I have some from a communication perspective. Like a direct, direct communication versus hinting or mitigating. More incidents in human factors are where the Chief Pilot is flying, and there's deference to authority from the Junior Pilot. Or, they'll say things like, 'Did you see the icicles? Those icicles are getting kinda big. So then, we need to stop what we're doing.' So, for many Leaders, if you say, Did you see the icicles? They're gonna go, why are you asking me about that? What the hell are you asking, right?"
Consider this specific "icicle" subject article: Into the Valley of Death: The crash of American Eagle flight 4184 and the ATR icing story. (Medium, 2024) See also Mitigated Speech and Plane Crashes. What's Best Next (2009). See also Malcolm Gladwell's "Outliers - 2008, The Story of Success. discussing “mitigated speech” when we speak in a deferential way to be polite or show deference to authority. This “mitigated speech” is what GMHS Steed (RiP) was using on the YouTube "Granite Mountain Hotshots last video" by GMHS Christopher MacKenzie (RiP), describing what fire behavior he was seeing instead of addressing the much more serious issues of ignoring Marsh’s alleged threats and the critical potential and eventual fatal mistake of leaving their SZ at the worst possible time to hike downhill into unburned chaparral into a deadly bowl!
"Right. But if you're that, if I'm working for you, I know that's how you want me to phrase it is did you see? And you know, and I know, and we've trained on this, that's a cue that I got something serious, I'm trying to say right. So, so there are many different protocols, absolutely agree with what you're saying? What I mean is to define that so it's crystal clear in the minds of your followers. This is how I want you to approach it, say it like this. Start like this. Okay. The next question is this. So now, if your follower says something to you, what are the chances ... Let me ask you this. Kinda, when, when you speak up ... how many of you have had a situation where you felt compelled to say something? You said something ... Okay. Yeah. Think about that moment. How did the Leader or the person who you're communicating with, how did they react? Just think about that for a moment? And now let me ask you this. Were you confident they understood what you said? ... See, this is another thing that happens, we have all these different personality types, right? We react different ways to do this. We do that there are some people you tell them something serious, and it's Poker Face all day long, but they're like a steel trap. Right? There are some folks that, they you don't know. Right? So here's, here's the idea. The idea is for you as a Leader, and this is a little bit of naked common agreement with your folks, is when you say something, the way that I wanted you to say it. Here's what you can expect me to do.
Mayhew addresses this author's "icicles" subject again here on his own: "Is range of answers to this. I'm going to answer your question. I'm going to address it. I'm not going to address it. I'll take note of that, because I have every whatever you want to come up with, but it needs to be clear in your mind. When you approach me, this is how I'm going to respond. So I say hey, did anybody else notice the icicles? If you go, no dummy. Well, that's, that's probably the wrong answer. There's not a lot of real yesterday, that's a wrong answer. No dummy, that you could expect me to make fun of you, probably not the right answer, but what can you expect me to do? ... So that's the third question. Talk in your groups. When you say something. While I want you to expect me to be very crystal clear, what should they expect from you? 60 seconds. Everyone, everyone. Not a good shelter on the urinal help, yes, yeah. He was already used to, so good to have him out. There is his feet on the ground, you know, solid guy, okay. All right. So quick lightning round. ... You're going to inform, educate. Okay, so I can expect ,so if I say, 'Hey, I'm concerned about this,' and you go "Copy." I know. We didn't get through that. Right. Right. Okay. What else? Yes.
"I'm not a good shouter, ya know. On the Yarnell Hill, yes. Okay, I'm going to stop. I'm going to listen, I'm going to acknowledge, which doesn't mean not, and I'm not disagreeing with you, doesn't necessarily mean I'm gonna validate. It doesn't necessarily mean I'm gonna process it, doesn't mean I'm necessarily gonna even answer it. You might add that stuff. But all I need to know if I say something to you. You're gonna stop a moment. You're gonna hear it, and you're gonna acknowledge that you heard it. Okay, I got so you're gonna say 'I copy.' Probably repeat it back. From the Military house, right. the who I think the Military, you know, heard, understood, and acknowledged. Yeah. You know, I would tell my Lieutenant whether he was copying the polish. Yep, no, it's not. ... It's a war. I said back to him. I understood you know, you get back. Excellent. Yeah. So different Leaders have different styles. And I think some of those different styles actually have to do with what parts of the country work in what operational environments. If you're running a bunch of medical calls, you may have a different style than if you work up in, you know, big tree country. In Oregon versus Southern California brush fires constantly. So the point is, is to have it clear in your mind, clear the people that are serving you by bringing you their information, that when I talk to you, here's what I can expect that any other thoughts of what your answer might be, you can expect me to ...
"Okay, so now let me ask you this. What are the chances from your own personal experience? What are the chances that when someone brings a concern to you, and they do everything right? But you're in a gnarly situation, what are the chances that you're going to hear it the right way, understand it the right way, and do the right thing the first time? What's the odds of that happening? ... Probably, probably not great, right? The odds are even if I do everything right, when I speak up, this is just reality. It's not how it should, it's just how it is, right? It's probably not going to connect the first time. Right? So, so my speaking up system is I'm going to say something and, and then I'm gonna go, well, I said, I said that doesn't cut it, right? Because the odds are the first time you speak, it's not going to connect. We know that, right? How many times do you have to say something before it gets through? Sometimes a lot, right? So, so the next step is if you speak up in the way that I ask you to and I don't do what you expected me to do which in all reality is probably that's what's going to happen. Right? In all reality, I'm not going to get it the first time you say it to me, right? So, here's what I want you to do when. So, have absolute crystal clarity so that when the person is trying to say, Okay, what do I do next? They're not going to 'Oh gosh, am I going, is it, am I defying their authority, well, they kind of did say this, but I don't want to rock the boat. No, no, my Boss told me to speak up in this way, I did the thing that he said to do now. He said he was going to respond this way. I know because he didn't respond it's not that he's ignoring me, it's not that he's a jerk, not that he doesn't care about my safety, it's just that it doesn't connect at that moment. So I know here's my next step. Is the next step, say it, say it again is the next step?
"In the Winter, I asked you to, when I asked you to, and I don't do what you expected me to do, which in all reality is probably what's going to happen, right? In all reality, it is probably not. I'm not going to get the first time you say right, so here's what I want you to do next. So have absolute crystal clarity so that when the person is trying to say okay, what do I do next? They're not going, Oh gosh, am I going? Isn't it my definer authority when I kind of did say this, but I don't want to rock the boat. My Boss told me to speak up in this way. I did the thing that he said to do. Now, he said he was going to respond this way. I know, because he didn't. It's not that he's ignoring me. It's not that he's a jerk because he doesn't care about my safety. It just didn't connect at that moment. So I know here's my next step. What's the next step is the next step. Say it again? Is the next step, talk to the person next to me? And checking in with them is the next step. Rephrase it is the next step. Pull out your IRPG and point to a line is the next step. Go above my head is the next step. What is the next step? So what should I do? So, try to put yourself there as one of your followers. They say something to you that they think is real. And by the way, I just want to kind of, kind of rewind on this, one of the reasons that Leaders will filter out the information that's coming to them. What's one of the reasons that you're going to filter it out? Is because you already dealt with that, and you know, that's not an issue, so this person ... this is reality, isn't like a nice thing to say, this is reality is you're in the field making decisions. Somebody is bringing you a concern, but you already thought about that, you already dealt with. So what does that sound like? It sounds like noise, right? So we need to be efficient. We have habits to be efficient. So the most efficient thing to do when somebody says something to you that you know is worthless information to your perspective is to do ... is can't keep going right, that Leaders do that all the time. It's not malicious.
"It's just what happens, right? So I need to know as a follower, if I say the thing I know how you're supposed to respond, because you told me how you want it, to write, and you're not doing that. What do you want me to do next? So I'm still following your directions. So what's the next step? If you don't get the response you expect, the next step is, take 60 seconds and just kind of brainstorm what the next step might be. ... It's a great system. ... Alright. ... Hold on just a moment, I'm gonna call on you in just a second. No, I'm calling on you. You're up Boss. So, I just want to, I want to briefly point out different answers to these various questions. And, and, there are various different groups that have, so we'll have a lot of times you'll have somebody in the room that would say, you know, in where I served in the Military, here was our pattern. Here's how we answer those questions. And then in other industries, you know, these are not, these are not unique questions that have never been thought about before. They're different in different industries. What I'm, what I'm suggesting is for you, on your Crew, with your folks, you need to have clarity on these four things. And they need to have clarity on those four things. And you may find that there's a system you're already using that satisfies that. So that's, that's kind of the point. So, so we're just getting some ideas on the table, and maybe we'll come back sometime in the future and brainstorm what answers to those questions are most effective for the most people. That could be a future step, but for now, the focus on the issue. Yes Sir, either an anomaly, or, um, a failure in your ability to lea effectively because you should never get to them before you deal with, even in emergency situations, you'll be able to deal with the concerns as you're moving along though your process of leadership style or, um, a failure or no. A failure in your ability to deal with emergency situations, you will have concerns as you're moving along to your process of communication. ... Absolutely. And, and as much as that resonates for me, it's also true that we put in a lot of our events, people do speak up, and the Bosses are willing, touching you, you interviewed. Somebody supervising for ... something bad happened there close to it. Everybody loves to attack a supervisor because, supposedly, she was in charge. She should. But the reality is, I see a lot of well-intentioned supervisors that information gets dropped between them, and so I don't. I'm agreeing with you, and I'm saying the reality of many of our events is that pieces do get missed, so, so what, what would you do?
"What would you want me to do if I was working for you? And I said, I said, Boss, I got a, I got a, my problem. Reiterate your concern. Excellent. That's how Stan, how Stan would have said I had a continuous conversation to resolve it at that time. I would, I would not accept a walk-away answer, you know. Right. Yes, but that's not the style that I would promote and use, and that's not the style of promoting the, but for whatever reason it didn't catch for you. You want them to reiterate their concern. Yeah, got it, I agree. And now does everybody, would everybody want to do the exact same thing? Or woud some leaders want a different approach? What woukd you want? I would want to walk, not a far a walk but typically like the last house that was saying what I said was not a safe station. Walk away, right? Yes, that's right. ... So, in your Command, you want somebody to bring you a concern. And the ... want to, you would ask them if they don't get the response they want. It's not to fault you, but for whatever reason, it didn't catch for you. You want them to reiterate their concern, got it. I agree. Now does every, what everybody wants to do the exact same thing, or with some Leaders want a different approach?
"Would you ... not far off? Okay, so working for you. If I express a concern, and it doesn't get through, the expectation is, my next step is okay, number 41. Are you going to face the name, or I'm trying to do this communication via different handling situations? ... You're trying to do it ... radio, you may have no one that wants to deal with draft, right? You might be back at work, as they say, you know the world or anyone, right? So I think number four on the situation depends on the situation. And just to just to kind of underline an observation. ... If I was working for you, I share a concern, and it didn't register because it was noise, let's say purely innocent. There was other noise, and I didn't say it effectively and strong. And it happened. And I said the next thing you hear from me is I go, 'hey, go for a walk.' What would you think of that? You will go okay, yeah, you would say let's go in a different environment. If I'm working for you, and I say I have a concern. And, and I keep hammering it. What are you going to ... is that going to be an effective way to make that information connect? Probably not from what you just said. So, what I need to know if I'm working for you, is you want me to stand there and be persistent because I care about what I'm saying. I need to communicate with you. If I'm working for you and it's not connecting, I need to shift gears a little bit so that we can kind of reset and so and those are gonna be different for different operational environments. I'm not taking sides on which would be the most effective. I'm just observing that if I took now put yourself in the position of the follower, who's going, I said, So what suppose ... am I supposed to? Am I supposed to what am I supposed to do? You can clear up all that confusion. But you tell them you're the Leader. You're leading them, you're telling them how you want them to serve you. Next, next any other ideas? Yes, reemphasize, but also offer up a mitigating action.
"For example, if you're on the road, hey, there's traffic. There's traffic. Or if you're on the line, aah, frequent spots, can we stop this. Do you mind by Time-Tag or ER, or can we stop? Our ER. Just throw something extra to reemphasize your original concern. Other ideas. Yes, same thing, reemphasize, but I'll also offer up a possible mitigating action. For example, you're on the road and there's traffic. Nothing, hey, there's traffic lights, lay out a cone pattern. Or if you're on the line , um, you know frequent spots. Hey, do you mind by Time-Tag or ER. Or can we stop? our ER. Just throw something extra to reemphasize your original concern. So, so, um, I want to repeat that because that's a key thing. Your approach if I articulate a concern. You're saying, say it again. And rephrase it, say it again and and throw in a mitigating effort . Right, right, yeah. Add a solution. What else, what are some other. Yes. ... Where's credibility in your Team coming to the center and the listener on that thing? So, maybe got away not your group, just tired of hearing that person. Right, and or just talk a lot, or you have the quiet person that you trust and round and experience, right, like I just whispered to? You just know you get to listen. Right? And I think that's exactly the point, is how you answer these questions is going to depend upon so this is, this is, let me just first talk about this and then address your question. So I would suggest whatever protocols you want to use, think of it as a draft. Think about these four questions. Keep it simple, say something when you want to give clear, a clear trigger that a follower of yours, but they're not sure exactly what's going on. They're probably going to be wrong. They don't know. You know, all that stuff. But this is the clear trigger. This is a Tripwire ... is, say something when it's clear in their mind. Number one, Number two start like this. So you know, so I know what my Boss wants me to say and how, how he or she wants me to say, ... expect me to. So now your follower knows when they pray a concern. This is your appropriate response, whatever that is, whether it's I copy to whatever. And then finally, if you don't get the response you expect, the next step is what's the next step that they will have to worry Oh, am I challenging is the next step. So the goal of an approach, so then, so the idea is you start with something like this as a draft, think about it, and then try it out, and then you can tweak it over time. It might change depending on the operational environment, depending on who's on your Crew dependent right? You can, you can adjust and adapt this over time. That's up to you. The intent is that it's clear in the minds of your followers. And I'd also suggest, where do you want to figure this out? You want to figure this out during a critical moment. You want to figure it out in the Training Room, and then practice it on the Sand Tables, on Drills, on other exercises. So that, what so that your followers know how you want them to speak up, and so that it's not this big, dramatic moment, you know, when you listen to people talk about why they didn't speak up or why they didn't speak up more? You know, there's this confusion and confusion confuses me because I thought our training was very clear about how to speak up right, and, and I know a lot of you are going, Gosh, why aren't these folks speaking up? But I'm telling you that we've interviewed folks who describe exactly why they don't speak up. They have all this confusion. They don't want to say the wrong thing. They don't want to look dumb, they don't want to create problems. They don't want to embarrass themselves. They don't, and how about this one? What if I'm right and the Boss is wrong? And is that going to embarrass the Boss. Right? All that stuff cut through all of that. So that the idea is that this process is natural. It's easy. I know how to be a good follower and get you the information you want, the way you want, when you want it, and how you get there is by drilling and practicing through your exercises. Um, we have about one minute for questions, comments, and smart remarks. [This is the same comment that Mayhew made at the 2023 San Diego Wildland Fire Safety Summit, where he ignored Joy Collura and shut this author and the conference down when I merely raised my hand in response to his comment.] Yes Sir. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Say something when? But I understand the true environment. But I was also in Team environments. And I've also been on Divisions. And all different types of dynamics of people you're going to run into. You're not going to have this ability to have this training session with the Division just today. Right on. On how you're going to communicate with him. Right. I think, really, he has to start training people from the beginning to enable themselves to communicate. Yeah. From the beginning, with using some sound practices, and not, not being afraid, because I see groups, people come into a Division meeting, and they won't say a word. Right. And then I see guys like me, who you can't stop me as I'm saying, asking. I mean, we can start asking the question, so I have everything clear in my mind how we're going to participate. Right. And then it changes and stuff like that. So, I think it's a cultural thing to have to start from the beginning. Up from, uh, where you got your first year Crewman and start teaching them how to interact, and they're going to be uncertain of themselves, and they're, they're not going to speak up right away. Right. And you're going to have to, you're going to have to grow them right from the beginning, right? And you should try to make it a cultural change to exercise that to the end. But you know, like I heard somebody say, you've got some people out there that are weak ones, right? Yes, absolutely agree.
"Excellent points. Closing comments. I'm hoping to, to create a little training document out of this that I can share, maybe publish an article if you go to the website that I showed you at the beginning, Fireline Factors. There's a place you can put in your email if you want to be in the loop. We got some other kinds of cool stuff coming out. Again, it's a real honor for me to be here. Thank you so much for sharing your morning with me. Thank you." (End of Mayhew session)
Figure 2c. The one-and-only Dr. Ted Putnam Source: InvestigativMEDIA
The authors will always allege that the YH Fire SAIR was deceptively labeled as “Factual” by the Serious Accident Investigation Team (SAIT-SAIR), which clearly included Lead Investigator Mayhew's contributions. A noted Human Factors expert, Dr. Ted Putnam, says: “Generally[,] the goal of accident reports is to convey as much of the truth of an event that is discoverable. … Sometimes investigators deliberately distort or do not report all the causal elements. Such biases lead firefighters to distrust the resulting reports, which can hamper our efforts to stay safe.” ... The authors will persistently seek the truth in the matter despite SAIT-SAIR “factual conclusions.” (Formerly Unrevealed Public Records Should Change the Account of What Occurred on June 30, 2013, Fred J. Schoeffler, Lance Honda (RiP), and Joy A. Collura, Academia.edu, 2020 ) "Dr. Putnam and others argue that a lack of honest examination of the Human Factors influencing wildfire fatalities is endemic to all SAITs and Reviews dating back to the 1949 Mann Gulch Fire in Montana." It Could Not Be Seen Because It Could Not Be Believed on June 30, 2013. Schoeffler and Honda (RiP), Research Gate (2019).
“Institutional trust is a built-in feature of the organization -
but implicit trust must come from a shared sense of vision,
and that vision is lacking at this point.”
USMC Lt. Cols. G.P. Gordon & Aaron Lloyd
Dropping Your Tools
Organizational adaptability and making sense of change
Considering the following germane SAIT-SAIR Human Factors, etc. excerpts edited for clarity, conciseness, consolidation, and constant space-reduction necessity, should clearly assist you, on-the-fence, skeptical, and/or undecided readers, in validating and thus attempting to make sense of and endeavoring to understand the USFS-funded SAIT's "conclusion first, then facts" and "we will never know" (stated at least seven times) and no-blame, no-fault logical fallacies and falsehoods listed on several of our YHFR website posts and in our AHFE papers. With the exceptions listed above, quoting here the USFS-funded SAIR Pp. 51-54: "Some Questions for Researchers in Human Factors, Organizations, Fire Behavior, etc. How might emotion trigger “automatic” movement, and how can we interrupt this circuit to engage in reflection that leads to more purposeful action? How might [FFs] stay alert to changing conditions when message repetition might encourage desensitization (e.g., working in day after day of extremely hot weather and low humidity with thunderstorms predicted)? How might emotion trigger “automatic” movement, and how can we interrupt this circuit to engage in reflection that leads to more purposeful action? How might [FFs] stay alert to changing conditions when message repetition might encourage desensitization (e.g., working in day after day of extremely hot weather and low humidity with thunderstorms predicted)?
"Fireline Safety - The [YH Fire] also points to issues of fireline safety and risk management while on the move. As noted in the Conclusions section: We found no indication that the [GMHS] doubted that the black was a valid [SZ], or that they moved towards the Boulder Springs Ranch [BSR] because they feared for their safety if they stayed in the black. The [GMHS] did not perceive excessive risk in repositioning to [BSR]. The intent of discussing fireline safety is not to second-guess the crew’s actions on this incident. Rather, the intent is to point to issues regarding fireline safety that this fire leads us to contemplate regarding all fires.
"Safety Zones [SZ] - The [YH Fire] calls attention to how the phrase “good black” conveys a measure of one crew’s safety to other resources on the fire. In generally chaotic conditions when a fire is expanding rapidly and organizational complexity is increasing, if an experienced crew like an IHC reports that they are “good” and “in the black,” this relieves Operations from having to attend to another detail on an already busy fire. Anyone hearing such a report from a crew would automatically consider that they are about as safe as it is possible to be in such a situation. In terms of collective sensemaking and inquiry, one aspect of the crew’s communication stands out. The crew communicated that they were moving along their [ER] to a [SZ], yet others on the fire believed their location was in a [SZ] (the black). Personnel in a [SZ] do not need an [ER]. Others on the fire inquired with the [GMHS] about their status and location, yet that inquiry did not lead to mutually accurate understanding. The [YH Fire] also calls attention to [FF] sensemaking about the “green,” including whether there is such a thing as “good green.” [FFs] know that being “in the green” on a fire, surrounded by unburned vegetation, can be unsafe. During indirect attack, there is always unburned fuel between the [FF] and the fire. But consider that prior to 1604 on this incident, all ground personnel assigned to the [YH Fire] except for the [GMHS] were in the green. Only the [GMHS] was in the black, normally considered a “safe” location, potentially leading others on the fire to have greater concern for people working in the green than for the [GMHS]. We considered what provided for the safety of all the other personnel: possibly distance from the fire, mobility, ability to make sense of what the fire was doing and react appropriately, or a combination of these factors. Members of the Blue Ridge IHC moved through the green all day in areas that subsequently burned. It is conjecture, but possible, that their actions may have assisted in saving the life of GM Lookout as well as preventing the [GMHS’s] trucks from burning. Obviously, decisions to operate in the green are laden with a variety of assessments of the relative risk of doing so. We will never know for sure, but we wondered whether the [GMHS's] decision to hike through the green might have seemed to them to be a decision to operate in the green just like everyone else. For the crew, this would have meant moving away from a safe location at the time of day when the fire would be most active. Decision makers base such decisions on what they know at the time and their assessment of the risks associated with various courses of action. Regarding their intended destination, the 0700 briefing on June 30 included identification of the [BSR] as a [SZ]. SPGS1 (who had just arrived the evening before) described it as “bomb proof,” a label indicating the [BSR] was not only a [SZ], but that it seemed to be an especially good [SZ] that could withstand extreme fire behavior. Because identifying a [SZ] requires judgment and is therefore subjective, [FFs] often know the actual effectiveness of a [SZ] only in retrospect. If a fire never affects a [SZ] with [FFs] in it, Fs may never know whether it would have proven safe. In this case, fire progression maps and aerial photos taken after the fact demonstrate that the large Ranch was well prepared to act as a fuel break in the hills above Yarnell. Inside the perimeter of the Ranch, the preparation and arrangement of the buildings proved effective to minimize damage to the home, livestock, and other values on the property. For these reasons, the label “bomb proof safety zone” seems to have accurately described the [BSR]."
"Escape Routes [ER] - Fireline Safety - Continuing from this previous point, the [YH Fire] also prompts us to think about the connections that [FF] make between [ER] and [SZ]. As noted above, we believe the [GMHS] did not perceive their route as overly risky, or they would not have taken it. [WF] should consider to what extent a strong vote of confidence about the effectiveness of a [SZ] might be interpreted as a strong vote of confidence about potential [ER] for getting there. Conversely, is there some implied measure of the safety along an [ER] because it leads to a [SZ]? One might view traveling through an escape route to a [SZ] as making educated guesses as to the route and anticipated travel speed while running to a specific point. The educated guess is that the crew can reach the [SZ] before the fire reaches them. There are many variables involved in this equation but perhaps the most important one is speed. If the fire can travel at a faster rate than the [FF], they will lose the race. If they can travel faster than the fire, they will win the race. [ In order for the educated guess to prove out, the [FF] must predict three things with some degree of accuracy: how fast the fire will travel, which direction the fire will travel, and how fast they will travel. It is possible to misestimate all these factors and suffer no consequences, for example if the [FF] misestimate the fire’s direction of travel but it moves away from their position. However, misestimating any of these variables could cause serious trouble and [FF] misestimating them all may pay the ultimate price. Unfortunately, all three of these variables are difficult to estimate accurately. Estimating how fast a fire will travel, along with its direction of travel, involves making an accurate fire behavior prediction while also doing a number of other things. Even in hindsight, knowing what the fire actually did and using the best available hardware and software, fire behavior analysts can still only approximate how a fire behaved in a blowup situation. [FF] in the field must use available information and their own sensemaking to estimate both what the fire is likely to do, and what it could do under a worst-case scenario. Estimates of how fast [FF] can travel can also be problematic. A crew can only move as fast as its slowest member, and unexpected barriers in the route of travel such as rocks, thick vegetation or cliffs, can significantly change the amount of time required to cover a piece of ground. This points to a key dilemma of wildland firefighting: [FF] on a fire are one educated guess away from potential entrapment. Increased mobility increases the tolerable margin of error; decreased mobility decreases it in terms of how fast a person can travel versus how fast the fire can travel. [FF] on foot are perhaps the most vulnerable, but many [FF] have become entrapped in vehicles as well. [WF[ often discuss the need to have multiple [SZ] many [FF] also identify multiple [ER] to the same [SZ], if they exist, although this can require extensive scouting. In hindsight, we know that the [GMHS] might have arrived at the [BSR] if they had stayed on the two-track road, although it is unclear whether the crew knew that, or how long it might have taken to get there. This highlights another problem posed by limited mobility: because the [GMHS] was on foot, their ability to scout potential [ER] was limited."
This author contends that our basic S-130 training teaches us that recognizing and mitigating Watch Out No. 17, which warns us: "Terrain and fuels make escape to SZ difficult.” Both (in)experienced WFs and Crews instinctively know they need to cut a "P-Line" along their Escape Route to open it up for easier travel. There has always been talk (and some evidence) of cut brush stobs along an alleged GMHS Escape/Travel Route from the GMHS’s perfectly good SZ down to the Boulder Springs Ranch (BSR) area. Consider this author's IM post of the issue: "Robert the Second says Jan. 7, 2014 Having been on the site itself, I noticed very little evidence of saw cuts, stobs, etc. I can’t tell you how long they cut, but it wasn’t much based on what I saw. Not much help here. CUTTING a SZ in any fuel type is very, very inefficient, especially in chaparral. You build SZ’s with DOZERS and DRIP TORCHES, NOT with chainsaws. And for them to attempt to fire out around themselves with fusees and chainsaw gas from their SIGG bottles is also very, very inefficient in the chaparral. I didn’t notice any drip torch(es) in the photo with the investigators, not that it made (or would have made) a difference. As far as efficiently firing out their SZ, it should have been about a half-hour to hour BEFORE they needed it, NOT MERE MINUTES! As I’ve said before, they would have been much better off ESCAPING (RUNNING) toward the Ranch and toward lighter fuels." In other words, in the time they spent cutting their alleged SZ, they could have easily and safely RUN to the BSR.
"Lookouts - Lookouts, Communications, Escape Routes, and Safety Zones (LCES) is an interconnected system approach to fireline safety, so it is difficult to discuss safety zones and escape routes without also addressing lookouts. The [GMHS] had a designated lookout for most of the day, until the advancing fire threatened the lookout’s location and forced him to withdraw. This points to one paradox of firefighting: Crews post lookouts to increase safety, but there is no guarantee of the lookout’s own safety. The [GMHS] never took explicit action to replace this lookout after he was forced to withdraw, but it is likely that DIVS A was serving as a lookout for the crew and that the crew was also exercising their own vigilance. In all the photos of the crew at the lunch spot, they appear focused on the active fire. Ground resources can also use aviation resources to gather information, but crews are cautioned not to rely on them because aircraft move around, have to land to refuel, and are diverted to other missions. When both airtankers and helicopters are conducting operations in the same airspace, the complexity of the air operations and the communications necessary to accomplish this may preclude routine requests by ground resources for situation updates. While aircraft might have provided situation updates to the [GMHS] during the time they were hiking and prior to their shelter deployment, there is no evidence that communication occurred. In the current system, ground resources would have to request such an update. We contemplated a key question arising from the Yarnell Hill Fire that also likely applies to many other fires: Is it necessary to post a lookout when a crew is moving? In some situations, it may not be feasible to post a lookout while a crew is moving due to time and distance considerations. This raises the question of whether a crew can perform its own lookout functions without designating and posting a lookout in a separate location. It is likely that the [GMHS] was very vigilant to their surrounding environment as they hiked southeast along the two-track road. Because the crew was moving quickly between two safety zones, it was likely not feasible to post a lookout from the crew at another location. Given previous events that day, the crew was likely very aware that posting a lookout in such a dynamic fire environment can pose challenges to the lookout’s own safety and may serve only to separate a crewmember from the rest of the crew. Whether the crew recognized it or not, their decision to go down the hillside from the Descent Point was a decision to sacrifice some of their effectiveness in serving as their own lookouts. Taking a more direct escape route to minimize exposure in the green generally means traveling a shorter distance and potentially reaching the safety zone more quickly. Moving down the slope into the box canyon meant the [GMHS] would no longer be able to see the fire. We wondered: Is it possible that they relied on the rock outcropping as a barrier to fire spread? But is it also possible that the outcropping blocked their view of the fire. We will never know if the crew understood that this route of travel required that they sacrifice some of their capacity to serve as their own lookouts. We will also never know if they understood the calculated risk involved in traversing the final distance to the Ranch without the level of situational awareness that a different vantage point might have afforded. With the help of our SMEs, we developed the following questions for discussion by various fire resources regarding fireline safety."
And please note this author's Research Gate (2020), Formerly Unrevealed Public Records Should Change The Account of What Occurred on June 30, 2013. Schoeffler, Honda (RiP), and Collura's post segment: "Figure 5. photo of the two GMHS Crew Carriers in the clearing on the lower left on June 30, 2013, 1544 hrs. Note that the SAIT photo caption along the bottom, regarding the specific details on times, posted as a SAIR exhibit, but it was never used or mentioned in the SAIR," This is at the bottom of this post. Ask yourselves, was Investigator Mayhew aware of these, and were these available to him, and he allegedly failed to publicly address them.
Academia.edu, 2020 continuing: "Unaccounted for YH Fire and GMHS Evidence - An AZ Dept. of Public Safety Officer and a Yavapai County Sheriff’s Deputy took late-day June 30, 2013, ‘aerial photos’ of the fatality site with two ‘cellphones’ for still shots and videos. SAIT Human Factors Investigator Brad Mayhew and other SAIT members were given a photo disk from YCSO. These photos/videos have always been known to be in the possession of the SAIT. Unethically, none of them were granted in response to records’ requests for this evidence by this author and Collura's FOIA and/or Public Records Requests, nor did they supply them to ADOSH." Was Investigator Mayhew aware of these, and were these thus available to him as well?
Academia.edu, 2020 continuing: "At least four of the GMHS GPS units they always carried, plus the one Caldwell wore on his pack strap, seen in numerous photos/videos, have been unaccounted for, foiling any chance of GPS track evidence. Nor has the “checking on your comfort level” Mackenzie video, where you hear one GMHS saying something to the effect of “we haven’t felt comfortable all day.” [YouTube Sept. 13, 2013] That was altered from two nine-point-two-four-second (9.24-second) video clips, 34 seconds apart; "less than 30-s from the end of the first video and the start of the second one; exactly 16:01:40.24 to 16:02:10.00. Nobody takes nine-second video clips on a fire." ... Moreover, Former Peeples Valley FD FF (now Chief) Brandon wrote of his missing June 30, 2013, records: “… on [July 2, 2013] they [SAIT] … debriefed us. This was two days after the incident with the 19. They went through and looked at my pictures and took a flash card of them. And I don’t know what they did with them, … because my pictures had timelines on them, so they could see what happened at what time. Then they took information off our cellphones … And those had timelines on them, too." Ask yourselves - Was Investigator Mayhew aware of these, and were these thus available to him as well?
IM WantsToKnowTheTruth says Dec. 21, 2013, THE DEPLOYMENT SITE PHOTO SHOWING SAIT INVESTIGATORS, CREW EQUIPMENT, The SAIT investigator that is hunched over has a notebook tucked under his right arm. If you zoom down it says this on the cover … Memorandum Book. Spiral Bound. 50 Sheet. I wonder where that ‘notebook’ is now… and what information it has in it? Were copies of pages from that notebook anywhere to be found in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL release packages? Note all the scattered burned and/or melted hand tools, radios, fire shelters, plastic water containers, and chainsaw gas Sigg bottles. View the relevant SAIT-SAIR link here and the above-referenced SAIT Investigator photo below in Fig. 3.
Figure 3. SAIT Investigators at GMHS Fatality Site Source: SAIT-SAIR, IM
Reference Part 1 here for this - "Consider below in Figure 4a, the classic June 30, 2013, 1629 hrs. photo image Snippet with Google Earth Overlay by the one-and-only WantsToKnowTheTruth (WTKTT) of the YH Fire, GMHS locations, Boulder Springs Ranch (BSR), GMHS travel routes, and eventual Deployment Zone (DZ) and Fatality Site based on GMHS Christopher MacKenzie's (RiP) June 30, 2013, photo. His photo was given a YH Fire SAIT evidence number (IMG_1334.JPG) and posted in one of our 2018 YHFR posts. However, it was never utilized by the Lead Investigator Brad Mayhew, in the SAIT-SAIR, who, in its place, allegedly chose to use the idealized image in the SAIT-SAIR Figure 16. instead of the factual IMT Plans Chief Brian Lauber's image shown in Figure 4a. immediately below to support the PFD Wildland Battalion Chief (WBC) Willis' literal bogus contention of fire above and fire below the GMHS during his July 2013, YH Fire and GMHS DZ News Conference Part One (YouTube - July 2013) partially cited here: "... they were committed to go downhill. ... they knew that they had fire on both sides of them, they knew they had fire behind them and now they had fire ahead of them." Investigator Mayhew was well aware of these, because they were clearly available to him!
Because a body of men, holding themselves accountable
to nobody, ought not to be trusted by anybody.
The Rights of Man - Thomas Paine
"What truly separates people isn’t some magical talent, but an almost irrational commitment to pushing through pain that would break most people. ... Everything around you - every convenience you enjoy, every space you inhabit, every service you use - was one person’s refusal to accept the world as it was. The world progresses from a collection of irrational dedication."
Read Farnam Street Media's Irrational Dedication
Reality cannot be ignored except at a price;
and the longer the ignorance is persisted in,
the higher and more terrible
becomes the price that must be paid.
Aldous Huxley
Figure 4. IRPG Rules of Engagement Source: NWCG
Figure 4a. IRPG Hazardous Attitudes Source: NWCG
“For the time will come when they will not endure sound doctrine;
but after their own lusts shall they heap to themselves teachers,
having itching ears;”
II Timothy 4:3 KJV
Consider now Todd Conklin's July 2020 PA Pod 297 - Brad Mayhew - An Investigator Works at Moving Forward interview podcast. Transcribed using the amazing, 98% accurate Otter.ai app. You will readily notice that Mayhew does his usual alleged stammering and stuttering and appears to allude to others here, including himself that: "some of us are a little, you know, have attention problems." However, you may find that he was actually referring to himself as well. What should be even more obvious is his alleged consistent pattern of speaking in the negative during this interview, e.g., "I don't know" at least 21 times! "They have the truth but they’d rather cover their asses than be stand-up people and do the right thing. We will never know the truth, and that is really personal for 19 families" – Shari ( Turbyfill ) (National Assoc. Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL, 2022). Willful Blindness, also known as Conscious Avoidance, is a judicially-made doctrine that expands the definition of knowledge to include closing one's eyes to the high probability that a fact exists.
"Hi everybody. Todd Conklin, free Accident Investigation podcast. How are you? In the midst of all this crap that we're living through, holy cow. … It was about seven years ago … 2013 when this event happened … it’s called in the business, the Yarnell Hill Fire, and it took 19 FFs that were serving on the GMHS Crew and their lives were lost and they were lost in fighting a wildland fire. … a horrible event. … That event investigation was led by a guy named Brad Mayhew … we’ve known each other since we were little, tiny little human factors babies … Brad and I are going to talk about the YH Fire because that’s what his new expedition of books is about. He’s got a series of books that he’s created, and the first one is called Origins … that’s what it’s like to be an investigator … Could you start off by telling me a bit about yourself and your organization? … It is completely appreciated, because I if I know nothing, I know this, having the opportunity to listen to what we talk about, it's pretty special, and I'm glad you can find some time to do that. I think this one will have huge payoff. So without any more fanfare, …. Brad and I are going to chat about life, love, and investigation.
Mayhew: "I'm Brad Mayhew, and in a nutshell, basically, I was going to college studying history when I did the Indiana Jones, that was my dream. And my senior year, 9-11 happened, and I had to find a new path that felt would feel to me like it was serving my country the best I could. And I thought about joining the military, becoming a cop, or becoming a FF, and there was already cops and military guys in the family, and so I fell home, maybe I'll be a FF. I had friends that were Hot Shots, and I wanted to do what they had done. And got fortunate enough eventually to end up as a Hot Shot here in Southern California, was really interested in, you know, as a young, new FF, your whole purpose in life is really to be, you know, like the best, the best FF you can, you know, so I was really interested in studying fire behavior tactics. And there was this, this sticking point where there was a limit to how good you could get. And one of our, you know, most senior guys our retired Superintendent came over after work one day and was drinking a beer with, with the fellas. And, you know, I was asking him what his thoughts were, you know, this guy was, you know, this Ultra, super-human figure. And he said, Brad, you've got to study human factors. If you really want to get take this to a new level, you have to study human factors. And I didn't want to do that. I didn't care because that was kind of soft to me. That was the sort of soft stuff that I avoided in college. You know, I went to study history, and ancient languages, and archeology, and dig in the dirt someday. And here's somebody telling me I got to study sociology and psychology. And I ignored him promptly and had another beer. Both laughing. ... And a few months later, I realized he was right, and that was the beginning of this journey for me that really transformed the rest of my life. So got into studying human factors, building Human Factors training programs for the Fire Crews. It kind of took off in the, in the Hot Shot world, and then had the opportunity to participate in accident investigations, which was not again, one of those things that I really didn't want to do this. This is a young [FF] mentality that I didn't see. ... I mean, this is probably not like an appropriate thing to say, but I just didn't see what I didn't, I didn't think, … my attitude as a young guy was it's my job and my Crew's job to keep ourselves safe. What, what's the Agency going to do? And now I say that it doesn't make sense to think about improving, it doesn't make sense that I was so cynical about the importance of improving the system, but I was as a very young guy, so I didn't see the point even of doing investigations. I know that doesn't, that isn't logical, but that's how I thought. Anyway, I got drawn into some investigations and had the opportunity to do some really, really meaningful work. It was personally meaningful and professionally, and then ended up serving as the lead investigator on the Yarnell Hill Fire in 2013, and felt that we had done what we came to do. And about a few years later, I was back working as a [FF]. ... And I came to the conclusion that we really hadn't learned what we need to learn from this event. I think that's the most tactful way to say that specifically, and that started this new mission that I was learning from Granite Mountain, and that's been the center of my world for the last few years. [And Mayhew's "new mission that I was learning from Granite Mountain, and that's been the center of my world ... I came to the conclusion that we really hadn't learned what we need to learn from this event" comments are merely more alleged Mayhew statements supporting this YHFR’s post title]
Figure 4b. GMHS Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation Source: James Reason, Sheff LLC - Human Factors Influenced the 30 June 2013 YH Fire Fatalities.pptx for 2016 CAZ Wildfire Response Team RT-130 Refresher
Conklin: "And so you started writing one book. What did you think this will be a series of smaller books, not one gigantic you know, tome of information. What led you in that direction. But I think that's really a clever idea.
<
<
Mayhew: "So, there's a couple reasons. The pure like writing reason is that this started off, I really, when I started I thought I basically do something like an intent, I wouldn't have called it this, and it's, I'm not doing any of this in any sort of official capacity. This is a, you know, one man kind of adventure, and I'm 100% responsible for every mistake that is made in this process. But I really was thinking in terms of just building something like an little accident investigation report, you know, we'll go in and correct some pieces of, you know, maybe some misunderstandings that people have about the accident, round up a few recommendations and some insights, and it'll be that short, little, short and sweet, little, you know, little report. We get it done in a few months and then hit the road and talk about what I discovered, I came to see was that the issues that have emerged after this tragedy touch everything that we care about in the fire service, from human factors to interagency dynamics to individual judgment decision making, to how we investigate, how we deal with critical incident stress issues, all of these huge issues. And then what I came to see was, it wasn't just that there was, like a simple bullet point recommendation. It was, just a moment we're looking at these things in the wrong way, and it's time for us to take the next step. And in some cases, I have a pretty clear idea what I think that next step should be or could be, but then I realized that, that what really matters is inspiring other FFs and other Thinkers and other Leaders who are out there right now, who have answers, have skill, they have the energy in themselves now to bring that to bear on those problems. It's really my role is to equip them and empower them to lead and innovate and offer what they have to offer ... And what I really saw, what I began to see, is it appeared to me that our struggle isn't just that, okay, we have this one piece of the system we need to fix, or even we have these 100 things that we just need to fix this. But more importantly is, how do I equip and inspire others, and so, and so that was like this major shift in how I approached what I was doing. ... And I kind of wrote it all up and had this nice, you know, very, I thought, very clear, you know, well-written, sort of report style approach. And I started working with the, with a different editor who, kind of, you know, sat me down and said, listen, this is, this is great stuff. And how effective do you think you're going to be laying out your information this way? And we kind of talked about it, and he really persuaded me that what needed to happen. He was part, he was one of the influences. He persuaded me that if we want to serve the people we're trying to serve, we need to figure out how to take them on a journey, right? We're trying to take them from one place and introduce something new, and take them there so they can experience it, and … and, so as soon as you, as soon as you take that approach, it's like, well, I can't just rush through a bunch of bullet points that, that concisely and clearly make the point I want to make. I gotta show you ... How do we get there, and what does that mean for you, and what can you do with it? So that, so suddenly we went from kind of a little book to kind of a longer book, to how the heck do you do that? And so we reconceptualize it as well. Wait a minute. Let's just take, let's take each of these pieces that we can see, and let's turn that into an experience for the reader, unless they'll call it a book. We actually call this series now … it's an expedition, and we're going to roll up our sleeves, and we're going to start hiking together, and I'm going to show you what I've seen and what I know, and, you know, some, some adventures, you know, back, back country, you know, and, and the whole intent is for the people who want to go on this journey, who are ready to go on this journey, you're going to see your world in a new way, and you're going to see yourself in a new way, and, and, you're going to be empowered and equipped to take action. The reason why I know that's going to happen is because our history is the history of firefighting in America. The history of the American Fire Service is that you have a problem, you have a group of FFs that look at that problem, roll up their sleeves and start taking action, and they end up doing something good. And if you look at our major tragedies through the history of firefighting, in particular, just to focus the history of wildland firefighting, we had major tragedies for the last century, and each of those tragedies prompted a group of FFs to find ways to really transform the profession, to take it to the next level, so we just keep getting better and better and better. And the fact that that has not happened yet after the YH Fire, I think, is I don't, I, when I started, I took that as well. There's something wrong here. Something's totally wrong here. Now I see this. No, no, no, we have what we need. We are what we need. We can do this. We can get there. We just need some new tools. We need some new, a new way of thinking. ... And the people whom I'm trying to serve, you know, are, some of us are, a little, you know, have attention problems, you have short attention spans. That's a good way to say that. Well, it was a polite way to say, and so I figured, you know, if I try to dump some 3000-page tome on people, you know, what are you going to do with it? I don't know, but how it is now is, these are short, sweet little books. You can read them in about an hour. That's the vision. At least. It can stash in your cargo pocket. You can take it with you on a fire, you know, I remember so many days, you know, sitting on some, some, little wildland fire where nothing's happening, there's nothing you can do, and pulling out a book and, and, reading it. Sometimes there was practical stuff, and sometimes it was, you know, Harry Potter, or something playful. And I envision people reading these books and, you know, being out in the middle of …, so you got to make them small enough for folks to do that, and to take them on a journey, and to let them digest each stage of this journey, one step at a time and to accomplish something. Then, you get to the end of the book, you achieve something that was kind of a vision." [Mayhew’s vision statements]
Conklin: "It strikes me that you're also kind of describing the way you do an investigation.
Mayhew: "I think so, yeah, I think so. And in a way, you could say this is, yes, I agree with that. Well, if I had to, if I had to describe it, I would say it's, it's an investigator looking at how investigations cause positive change. Work can cause positive change, or should cause positive change. Man, I think that, that's what I heard you say. It just sounds super interesting. ... I think I might add to that, it's an investigator looking at how your work could cause positive change, minus the usual constraints on your time and the usual organizational and normal social and political constraints that go with doing an investigation. This is just kind of me going, okay, we completed the official investigation, and now it's been seven years. What can we do?"
In this author’s professional opinion, based on Mayhew's statements above and following this sentence, it seems at this point as if this is some allegedly "dangerous ... complex" new revelations to Mr. Mayhew, and this is likely the first time that he’s heard of this or even thought of it - twelve years later! "So I inherited this incredible achievement, which was the recognition fire's dangerous, fire is complex."
Mayhew continues: "And so, there's a lot of things that you really can't do in a formal capacity, you can't get done in a two-month or three-month or two-year investigation, that you know when you have the time to spread your wings and question your assumptions and talk to different people. You go, well, what? What happened if we tried this, you know, and a lot of it doesn't work, but I'm trying to share with readers things that I found, it did work.
Conklin: "That sounds, I mean, it's just fascinating. It's so I know something, and that is that generally, people are really, really interested in investigations. They're interested in how investigations happen, how we get to the investigation, having an opportunity, and it is being an investigator, especially. It's kind of a sacred duty, smallest, not largest, but it's a, it's really, it's, I don't know another, I can't think of a better word than say it's, there's, there's this tremendous amount of responsibility, and it's an important task to have the opportunity in an unencumbered way to think through that process, and to think through your process, that's, that's important for you. It's important. It sounds it sounds good. How do, how do we get them? How are they available?
Mayhew: "He … Book One is available right now, on Kindle, on Amazon.
Conklin: "Gotcha.
Mayhew: "I have not 100% lockdown schedule for when each feature book will be released, but we're going to do it as quick as you can. Yeah, and that's fine. I mean, we can, we can follow up and people can. I mean, I think it'll build its own interest. So I wouldn't worry too much about locking down the schedule, and right now during the current pandemic, schedule seems to be something that are very, very, very, yeah. Yes, I have found that things that I thought were going to take a couple days take a couple weeks, and there's no one thing You can point to. It's just every kind of detail here, and I don't know how much of that is. You know that this is publishing, which is a new world for me, and how much of that is just some of what's happening in the world right now. But in answering your question, Book One is available as a Kindle on Amazon right now. Number one, number two, we are working like, like mad men to get the paperback version of book one up on Amazon by the time this airs, it should be available, or at least available for pre-order. So it'll get shipped as soon as, as it drops.
"And we should be getting books two and three up with three over two. And then finally, the most important thing is, if you go to my website, it's fireline factors.com, and there's a bunch of articles that I wrote for Firehouse Magazine, the old, the other investigations that I've done, the Yarnell Hill Fire investigation, is up there, human factors articles. You know, that's all available, and that'll be a good resource for finding the books, as well as getting ready to launch an email newsletter, as well as getting ready to launch my own podcast. So it's all, it's all a really exciting time for me because, you know, I feel like I've been, you know, secret, not, not secretly, but, but withdrawn and trying to build all these things, and finally, bringing it to the world is very exciting. And so there's, I'm going to make a lot of mistakes. There's a comment in book one about how watching me try to figure out technology and publishing is caveman slapstick. I hope that some of your audience will smile with amusement at the mistakes that I will be making here, but, but the intent is to offer to you.
Conklin: "Between you, and I think I was pretty worried about you after the investigation, and I think this is a really, very effective way to manage this post-investigation, PTSD, and path forward, I think. This is really healthy for you.
Mayhew: "Yeah, really, tell me how you tell me how you think you shared that with you before.
Conklin: "Um, it I realized, especially when we met at 29 Palms. Yeah, whatever that place, what's new that Park?
Mayhew: "Joshua Tree. Joshua Tree.
Conklin: "That's what I just need to remember, the YouTube album. It seemed like you were really feeling low, and that the investigation had really dramatic impact on you, and you were thinking desperately to kind of recover from it.
Mayhew: "Wow! That's fascinating. I don't, you know it's, it's, it's interesting that you say that I in, in building all this, I started, I reached out to other, other folks that had led other investigations, and almost all of them, basically, if it was a big investigation, their lives kind of fell apart after, yeah, and consistent. I mean, you know, suddenly they felt their Agency turned against them. Their family fell apart. You know, just all these different problems with consistent advice that folks gave me was just walk away from this Yarnell thing, don't, don't, don't look back, don't touch it. You gotta drop it. And that was how they recovered. And in my own case, I felt that, and I, you know, we'll see, we'll see what's, we'll see. We'll see how it all shakes out. For me, I hope that you know, the most meaningful thing that I could do is find a way to make this meaningful, that, that will be the most meaningful thing that I could do. [This author alleges that, besides being amazed by his new revelation responding to Conklin's comment, Mayhew also used the classic Logical Fallacy of Circular Reasoning or Begging the Question here] "The fallacy of begging the question occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion, instead of supporting it. In other words, you assume without proof the stand/position, or a significant part of the stand, that is in question. Begging the question is also called arguing in a circle." Texas State University
Conklin: "You sound better. You sound a million times better than you sounded. That's really, really quick.
Mayhew: "Yeah, thank you for saying that. I appreciate you saying that. I would add. I would add. Not only do I not think that's what's best for well, I don't know what's best for other Investigators, it sure as hell is not best for the communities we're trying to serve. Because what happens is you get these individuals and small Teams that are the world's experts on some issue or collection of issues, and they're the only people that are going to be the experts, because nobody can redo the investigation or the, the interviews that happen the day after.
"So, that knowledge then immediately disappears, because it's part of our professional candor, or whatever you want to call it, a professional etiquette that we don't, you know, we don't regard it as appropriate and polite to go out and talk about this thing outside of an official capacity. When you did a job within a, I an within, an official capacity, you don't think that's appropriate. We need to get over that, because, again, you know this accident, if you look at the history of what evolved after this accident, there's a, there is a cascading, there are cascading tragedies of trauma leading to trauma. Leading to trauma at a community level, and a … any a huge set of those are things that I look at and I go, Well, there's just misinformation that got circulated, and we didn't have a system that could fix that. And there is a part of me that I feel like, you know, I wasn't involved. I didn't know all these things that were going on in the community, but, but we gotta do better. We gotta find a way to connect the community with the expertise over time. And even though I don't have all the answers, I think there is something that could be done, and there should be a different model where there's a long-term relationship, and long-term growth. Learning is active and it's interactive, and it unfolds over time. And we need to find a model that, where we can do that and just, hey, I'm going to show up for a couple months and do my best, write a report, throw it over the, the wall, and, you know, until the end of time, you guys just have to deal with it. That is the model that's in place now. ... Ah, whether anybody decided elegant on purpose, that's pretty much how it is. And I don't think that's, you know, I don't think that's our most important stakeholder is the next generation of [FFs]. ... And if you measure it by them, if you measure it by, how much good does that do for the Rookie you started tomorrow. How much good have we done for them? ... You can see that, that long work learning that we have in place now is not serving the people who we should be most concerned about serving, so …
Conklin: "And that, my friends, is the podcast. That's the conversation that Brad and I enjoyed with one another, and I, I'm glad you listened to it. It was, really was a big lesson for me. I learned a lot talking to Brad at Joshua Tree. I learned that the post-traumatic harm that exists in an accident carries its way through to the Investigation Team. And I think I knew that academically, but I don't think I really realized that practically.
"And Brad helped me realize that by showing me how much he was struggling and, and how the struggle was pretty significant, and it wasn't just the struggle of emotions, although they were lots of emotions, it was the struggle of helplessness, and the feeling that you've learned so much with the Agency or the Organization or Company or whoever you work for is not willing to hear the truth, or doesn't have the ability to hear the truth, or can't hear the truth. I don’t know, but that's, that's what I saw.
In this author’s and knowledgeable others' professional and personal opinions, we believe we have shown several times that the incredible “official” truth has been foisted upon us en masse. However, the "real, honest" truth has been avoided, distorted, hidden, obscured, and/or removed from the public view for over 12 years now.
Consider viewing the entire Human Factors Influenced the 30 June 2013 YH Fire Fatalities.pptx for 2016 CAZ Wildfire Response Team RT-130 Refresher here: (Academia.edu (2016) ). Unfortunately, and inexplicably, the “we saved the [GMHS] buggies” VIMEO video appears to have been permanently removed from VIMEO, YouTube, etc., and even from the amazing Internet Archive Wayback Machine access as well. This author was on a 2017 NV (USFS, BLM, NDF) wildfire as a Safety Officer for only one shift and was demobbed for refusing to falsify my time and "show" a meal period. And unable to recall the name and wildfire location, and also unable to find any of my records. Here are some recalled points. Our young DIVS was the IC's son. It was pretty radical fire behavior before arriving, according to the IA and Extended Attack folks. The fuels were timber up high and brush and grass down low. These WFs and FFs were on the 2012 Holloway Fire (WLF LLC Incident Review) (DIVS, HECM, Dozer Bosses, dozer operators, etc.) And they recall the GMHS being told to back off and go indirect, etc. They stated Marsh gave them his typical "we're GMHS and we have to prove ourselves," etc. The GMHS committed to an assignment even though they were warned otherwise. These WFs and FFs all left, then stood by because they waited to help if needed. The fire took off, and the GMHS came bailing out. The WFs and FFs told them, "we told you so" ... Marsh gave them his typical "we're GMHS and we thought we could pull it off ..." The Vimeo video (since removed) by a contract Oregon Natural Resources Department Manager, Colby Drake, as an Engine Boss, excerpted: “We saved the Granite Mt. Hotshot buggies from burning up!” Consider below the cut-and-pasted original InvestigativeMEDIA (IM) post from this author's avatar: Robert the Second (RTS), December 9, 2015.
"Here is the link for the Contract Engine Crew VIMEO video clip of them saving the GMHS Crew Carriers from burning up on the 2012 Holloway Fire in NV and OR. This video has been REMOVED from the site by VIMEO, so one is unable to ‘search’ for it and find it on their site, AND you cannot even view this one now. All you’ll see is a color photo of a fire scene, e.g. smoke column and helicopter bucket work. ... The GMHS Crew Carriers were parked in the green, and so someone else had to save their buggies that day. Sound familiar? (“we saved the Granite Mt. Hotshot buggies from burning up!”). ... When you go to about mid-video, is when the Engine Crew is knocking down flames within about 20 feet of the GMHS carriers after it jumped the control line. You notice the GMHS (black helmet) running down the hill and handline about mid-image, then freeze-frame through it so you can see him running down the slope toward the GMHS buggies. NO GMHS were left behind to monitor and/or secure their carriers left in the unburned. WTF!? Presumably, this was a Lookout? This is also the ‘Nevada Fire’ incident discussed in IM when the GMHS was interviewing candidates for a Squad Boss position, and the ‘Nevada Fire’ came up as a leadership example. The ‘Nevada Fire’ was the one where the fire suddenly crested the ridge without them being aware of it (NO LOOKOUT), their buggies were threatened, they had to quickly burn out around themselves, and concluded ‘it all turned out okay in the end’ or something like that. Bad Decisions With Good Outcomes and possibly even one (or more?) of the GMHS fires B/C Willis was referring to in the July 2013, YH Fire News Conference video when replying that it was “a very common occurrence to backfire around yourselves” to create a Safety Zone in response to NYT Reporter Fernada Santos' question on the subject."
Courtesy of IM Bob Powers: "Granite Mountain’s two white crew buggies were nearly destroyed in 2012 during the Holloway Fire along the Oregon-Nevada border. An online video taken by an engine crew shows two firefighters using a water hose to control an aggressive brush fire rapidly approaching Granite Mountain’s carriers. No Granite Mountain crew member remained on the site to move the vehicles if necessary. The same situation occurred in Yarnell. Granite Mountain left its crew carriers, a chase truck, and Marsh’s truck, at the base of the Weaver Mountains. The fire was moving away from the area all day. The crew apparently didn’t anticipate that the fire could reverse direction, even though the monsoon season was under way and lightning from a thunderstorm had ignited the fire two days earlier. Repositioning Granite Mountain’s vehicles became a major priority that fateful afternoon and required Blue Ridge to devote considerable time and resources during a chaotic time to make sure they were safe, along with lookout Brendan McDonough. "If [Blue Ridge Supt. Frisby] hadn’t come around the corner at the time that he did, [McDonough] would’ve been the first fatality. Guaranteed,” Dudley told the Utah firefighters. “There was no place for that lookout to have safely deployed, and he was way too close when he decided to bail out from where the fire was.”
And as a reminder that the reason GMHS Lookout Brendan McDonough (McDid-Not) was the GMHS Lookout, allegedly because he was the most hungover of the bunch and never tested as a "control." Consider the following IM post: After years of delay, the Granite Mountain Hotshot autopsy records are released, December 9, 2014. The GMHS were drinking “at the Whiskey Row Pub, a dive in Prescott’s historic downtown,” according to a 2013 story in Outside Magazine. “When the hotshots came to drink in groups, as they often did on rare days off, bartender Jeff Bunch gave them a discount. His son was a former crew member.” And former GMHS Brandon Bunch allegedly quit them a month or two before the YH Fire because he was tired of Marsh always trying to prove himself.
Consider Brad Mayhew's, Yarnell Hill Fire - What Have We Learned? | FIRExTalk SoCal 2, Oct. 3, 2024, YouTube video trenchant comments made by the Commenter named skunkape and this author's comments that follow, which have been hidden from view. "@skunkape2.'What a blowhard. He spent 27 minutes saying Jack shit.'" Here are this author's two comments from the same video: "fredschoeffler1425: "This Self-proclaimed YH Fire & GMHS Lead Investigator is the author of the biggest cover-up, lie, and whitewash in wildland fire history! The SAIT-SAIR found "no indications of negligence, reckless actions, or policy, protocol, or procedure." So then, how is it possible to do everything right and kill 19 PFD WFs in one fell swoop? He forbids anyone from disagreeing with him at conferences while MAKING A PROFIT ON THEIR DEATHS! ... I allege that he continues to lie & deceive us while taking a hardline Kool-Aid Drinker & Party Liner stance!"
This author holds that Mayhew's Federally-funded alleged YH Fire Investigation was merely a slick narrative about a fairly tall tale of no blame, no fault when 19 trained, and mostly experienced WFs died when they left their perfectly good Safety Zone in 'the black' - at the worst possible time - and traveled through dense unburned fuels in chutes and chimneys, ultimately deploying their fire shelters in a deadly bowl during obvious, radically increasing fire behavior." Mayhew allegedly knows all this and helped lead, write, and approve the USFS-funded, highly questionable cock-and-bull Fairy Tale story predetermined SAIT-SAIR conclusion, arrogantly and boldly declaring "no indications of negligence, reckless actions, or policy, protocol, or procedure."
Figure 5. Decisions and Outcomes matrix Source: Schoeffler
Concerning Figure 5. above, with about 24 current and former SWA Hot Shot Crew Supts., Squad Bosses, and Senior Crewmembers present during the Integration Phase, a Senior NM HS Supt. stated: “This was the final, fatal link in a long chain of bad decisions with good outcomes.” With several others stating that they had attempted to use peer pressure to get the GMHS to comply, to no avail. October 2013, Southwest Area Hot Shot Crew YH Fire Site Visit.
The author of this VIMEO video, removed from the Internet, posted on IM as Methods. His IM threads (below) are well worth reading. "Methods says July 2, 2019, "I am the person who recorded the 2012 Holloway Fire in Nevada when GMIH buggies were saved. They were located/working up the hill building handline and putting out spots with a helicopter. Marsh was acting DIV and managing other resources. After saving their buggies (what is caught on film), we were asked to bed down for the night (spike out) on the line and GM, as hotshots tend to do, went off and bedded down by themselves. They didn’t bed down in the green watered pasture with the other resources but instead in dry grass and had to wake up to fire out around themselves during the night. ... That’s two incidents within a 24-hour period that I personally saw on the Holloway Fire in 2012.” ... Thank you very much for that. All of this is extremely important! ... "In my opinion, Hotshots don’t sleep or associate with other resources, even when spiking out. They are a self-contained resource that rarely needs any assistance from other resources so they stick to themselves. Plus, the watered green pasture had lots of cow pies so maybe they didn’t like the smell."
Woodsman says - July 2, 2019, "Thank you, Methods. "Did Marsh work as a DIV on the same division as GM? Was your engine assigned to the same division? "How did you hear about the fire creeping into GMs sleeping area? That’s really interesting. Appreciate it."
Methods says on July 3, 2019, "Yes, Marsh worked on the same division as GM. I was an ENGB assigned to the same DIV and was working with them during the first 3-4 days before an IMT showed up. We slept on the other side of the creek from them and heard them wake up that night."
WTKTT says on July 2, 2019, Reply to Methods post on July 2, 2019, at 2:40 pm. "One of the things we’ve been scratching our heads about here for some time now is that there appears to have been a THIRD ‘incident’ involving Granite Mountain on that same 2012 Holloway fire. Just before the start of their 2013 season ( which would become their last season ), one of GM’s Squad Bosses suddenly took another job and GM had to quickly fill that position. FOUR current GM came under consideration for that open ‘Squad Boss’ position and then went through a standard City of Prescott Human Resources ‘job interview’ process. "All the documents associated with those interviews are still sitting online at the following PUBLIC link via the WayBack Machine. (Prescott News, 2015) "In those ‘job interviews’… ALL FOUR of the GM crew members talked about an ‘incident’ on the same 2012 Holloway Fire that involved suddenly having to RUN, and traverse drainages, and then ARRIVE at a Safety Zone and THEN still needing to ‘burn it out’, apparently to protect themselves AND their vehicles. "ALL of the candidates told the job interviewers that the fact that they were able to “keep their heads” during this Holloway Fire incident should count towards them being considered for the open ‘Squad Boss’ position. Does that ‘ring any bells’ with you? "The ‘incident’ at the 2012 Holloway fire that ALL of the GM Squad Boss candidates were mentioning does NOT sound like the same ‘incident’ were they simply ‘woke up’ and had to burn out around themselves. "So we’ve been wondering if there were actually THREE ( separate ) ‘incidents’ involving Granite Mountain at this one single 2012 Holloway Fire.
Methods says on July 3, 2019, "IMO, it sounds similar to the event that I caught on the video. Multiple members were running down the slope to get to their buggies; fire crossed drainages; I believe the crew members that made it down to the buggies ended up firing off around them. They may have assumed that they parked in a safety zone but it was literally in the green in a “V” drainage. Just my guess, but I can definitely account for two “bad decisions, with good outcomes” just on the 2012 Holloway Fire in Nevada."
WTKTT says - July 3, 2019, "Thank you, Methods. Yes. I agree. Looking at your video again at the following link… ( http://vimeo.com/48411010 ) …there are a number of similarities between what you filmed and the ‘story’ that all 4 of the GM Squad Boss candidates were saying in their 2013 job interviews. They all described it more like an event that involved the ENTIRE crew having to ‘make it to safety’ and then ‘burn out the Safety Zone’… but there’s no doubt that other details match what YOU filmed. ... Regarding your statement… Multiple members were running down the slope to get to their buggies; Again… yes. At least one (the first?) GM crew member to come ‘running down’ is clearly seen in YOUR video, on the left side of the frame, hauling ass down that ‘path’ and towards your location while you saved their vehicles. ... Based on how fast he was running… it looks like he would have reached your position right about the time you stopped filming. Do you, by chance, remember WHO that ‘first’ GM crew member you filmed running towards you was? Did he SAY anything when he reached your position? You know… like “Thank you”… or anything else? ... Regarding at least one of the ‘bad decision with a good outcome’ on GM’s part that you FILMED… I’m just curious about the circumstances there. ... Was that basically a fireline that ‘backed into’ that location ( since the wind was blowing AWAY from your position as you filmed )… or was it a ‘spot fire’ from something else that had been happening off-camera, out to the left? ... I’m trying to figure out how the hell that fire could have gotten that close to those $150,000 ( each ) vehicles without GM even frickin’ NOTICING. Method, In your opinion, what do you believe was the reasoning behind them not choosing a safer place to bed down? Thanks!"
Figure 6. VIMEO video image of GMHS buggies, removed from VIMEO. Source: Sheff LLC - Human Factors Influenced the 30 June 2013 YH Fire Fatalities.pptx for 2016 CAZ Wildfire Response Team RT-130 Refresher
This Holloway Fire (NV, 2012) wildland fire was the second time that someone other than themselves saved the GMHS Crew Carriers. The Holloway Fire Entrapment / Shelter Deployment. The first was when the Prescott HS warned them about a bowl heating up below them on the 2012 Sunflower Fire on the Tonto NF, and the third time was the 2013 YH Fire when the Blue Ridge HS had to “save their Crew Carriers.” Clearly, The Normalization of Deviance or Bad Decisions With Good Outcomes!
Consider now this author's relevant IM post: Robert the Second says
(Jan. 16, 2014 ) I know you’ll find this one interesting and informative.
"The following August 2012 Holloway Fire entrapment report deals with the Zuni HS. Several Southwest Area HS Crews were on this fire, INCLUDING the GMHS. Several Superintendents made the comment that they were convinced her fire shelter definitely saved her life, and the fire shelter performed exceptionally well under the circumstances. In other words, the fire shelter performed better than it was supposed to in that fuel type and in that fire behavior. Fire shelters were originally designed for light, flash fuels like grass or very light brush NOT as on this fire and CERTAINLY NOT as on the YHF."
Figure 6a. (left) Zuni HS Shelter Deployment Holloway Fire Source: WLF LLC
Figure 6b. (below) Zuni HS Deployed Shelter Holloway Fire Source: WLF LLC
"She was a ‘filler’ on the Crew (not a regular Zuni HS Crewmember) and for whatever reason, she removed her gloves and did NOT wear them during her deployment (She claims she did not know why she removed them). They were performing an afternoon firing operation, had a wind shift, increased fire behavior, spotting, and a dust devil that progressed into fire whirl(s). ... Once you see the photo of the deployment site on the cover page, and on p. 22, 26-27 you’ll see that she deployed IN THE BRUSH, in a very small opening. Her deployment site was survivable ONLY because the brush did NOT burn as intensely as on the YHF. This brush was MUCH LESS than the YHF brush. ... Marti – there is a good photo of a RHINO on p. 27, upper left photo. ... Similar to the YHF? Only in the fact that she deployed in the brush. You’ll notice that the Holloway Fire fuels did NOT consume as much as the YHF fuels. Therefore, the fire behavior was definitely NOT as intense. ... “On August 12, 2012, at approximately 1800 hrs, a significant event occurred on the Holloway Incident in Division W. During a burnout operation, a crew member became separated from her crew and walked into an unburned area of the fire. The separation was partially due to a weather event resulting in a 180 degree wind switch along with high winds that spread fire outside of control lines and reduced visibility to near zero. Realizing she was lost, with the fire gaining on her, physical and environmental factors were reducing her ability to stay ahead of the advancing fire. Unable to return to the safety zone, she was forced to deploy her fire shelter and was quickly overrun by the fire. She remained in the fire shelter for approximately 30 minutes and survived. … She received a few minor second-degree burns …” So, it’s VERY POSSIBLE that this incident MAY have convinced at least SOME of the GMHS overhead that fire shelters would perform as well on the YHF as on the Holloway Fire. If they would have continued running towards The Ranch and lighter fuels, …"
And then comparing and contrasting the Zuni HS Deployment Site with the GMHS Deployment Zone, please consider delving into the Holloway Fire Entrapment / Shelter Deployment BLM Nevada and Oregon. August 12, 2012. (WLF LLC Incident Reviews)
Consider now RTS’s July 2019 IM statements regarding the Saddleback Tree Fatality 2013 Learning Review, where Mayhew was one of the Saddleback Fire Investigators utilizing their alleged word salad methods: Robert the Second says (July 17, 2019) This alleged 'Investigation or Learning Review' Orwellian Doublespeak regarding 'decisions and actions' meaning the same thing even though – in the real world – they are clearly two separate and distinct words with separate and distinct meanings. ... And remember that these alleged “Investigators” and “Factual” Investigation Reports move about in the fictional world of the imaginary, illusory, or unrealistic here: ... "[Foot Note 9] There were occasions in the Review where the difference between actions and decisions could not be separated, thus the term actions/decisions was used, as it could have been either one, or a combination of both.” (Saddleback Tree Fatality 2013) [WLF LLC, 2013], consisting of six separate and distinct Final Reports and Final Versions. "Actions and decisions are consequences, not causes. The goal is to understand why actions or decisions made sense to those involved at the time. … This Orwellian Doublespeak is also covered in the Coordinated Response Protocol (CRP) Guide Coordinated Response Protocol Learning Review. ... The originator of this new CraP [This author's acronym] Process and his “Evolving Role”: Tilburg University – The transformation of accident investigation Pupulidy, Ivan – Document version: Publisher’s PDF, also known as Version of record Publication date: 2015 – Link to publication – Citation for published version (APA): Pupulidy, I. (2015). ... Chapter 9: The Saddleback Case Study represents the first attempt to use the Learning Review process concerning a tree-‐strike fatality on the Modoc National Forest in northern California. This case study represents the first experimental application of a process that ultimately became the Learning Review. This was the first time that the learning needs of the organization and the field were addressed in separate products. It integrated the major concepts developed to this point, even before a guide had been created. It also represented an example of a shift from the previously accepted realist models based on causality and mechanical process to an approach designed to make information available, so that all levels of the organization could engage in their own sensemaking. ... Bringing this back around to the June 30, 2013, YH Fire – the SAIT found “NO INDICATION OF NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESS ACTIONS, OR VIOLATIONS OF POLICY OR PROTOCOL” (emphasis added) (Sept. 2013) page 4. ... So then, how is it possible to do everything right and yet kill 19 Hot Shots in one fell swoop?"
Pupulidy, I (2015). The transformation of accident investigation: From finding cause to sensemaking. Doctor of Philosophy, Tilburg Univ. S.l.
“Following the YH Fire in 2013, a ‘grassroots movement’ of wildland fire managers, practitioners, and researchers came together ‘to engage in a sense-making journey, trying to understand the conditions, cultural practices, mental models, and examining our own vulnerabilities…”
Robert Palmer, National Wildland Fire Reform, “The Palmer Perspective”
There were occasions in the Review where the difference
between actions and decisions could not be separated,
thus the term actions/decisions was used,
as it could have been either one,
or a combination of both.
Saddleback Tree Fatality 2013 Learning Review
"Incidental learning occurs unintentionally, during activities where it’s not a conscious goal for the learner. Examples of incidental learning include someone learning new words while reading a book for fun and someone learning social skills while playing a sport. It can be more effective, efficient, and enjoyable than intentional learning, but this is highly dependent on situational and personal factors, and there are cases where intentional learning may be better in one or more ways. To engage in incidental learning, place yourself in situations where you can learn without actively trying to, and eliminate potential obstacles to learning (like background distractions). You can promote incidental learning in others by doing things like teaching them directly, asking them questions that lead to learning, pushing them toward situations where learning can take place, and explaining how they can use incidental learning themselves." Effectivology. (October 2025
And now to finally answer the YHFR post question: How and why is the 2013 Yarnell Hill Fire SAIT Investigator allegedly unethically continuing to attempt to foist his vision quest upon us while making a profit from the 19 GMHS deaths in 2025? Pts. 1-3
Frustratingly and objectionably, in this author’s professional opinion, YH Fire Investigator Mayhew is, and has been allegedly doing his level best to attempt to foist his vision quest upon us while making a profit from the 19 GMHS deaths in 2025. The June 30, 2013, Yarnell Hill Fire, as tragic as it was, should have been informing and teaching us something other than his alleged bogus SAIT-SAIR, which was, in fact, Federally-funded. His alleged "lessons learned" instead of the never-revealed multitude of truthful lessons learned, and telling the truth of what happened and why, which is, and should have been absolutely paramount in an honest, forthright investigation. In the case of the YH Fire and GMHS debacle, and in many other fatal incidents, their lives were taken from them by incompetent supervisors or, in the bizarre GMHS case, by an alleged vengeful Superintendent. Given that, the practice of first establishing a "conclusion" and then supporting it with "facts" reaches all the way to the USFS Washington Office, even though the YH Fire was basically a State wildfire. This must stop immediately and return to investigating the facts leading us to honest and truthful conclusions. The notion of municipal FFs as "heroes" and "heroism" is acceptable and expected. However, the FFs "sacrificed their lives" or "willingly gave their lives" comments needs to stop immediately. In the GMHS case, their lives were taken from them! WFs are also put into that municipal FF category, and then considered as "heroes if when they died in the course of their duties, because in most cases, they likely died from refusing or failing to follow the Ten Standard Fire Orders and/or ignoring one or more of the Watch Out Situations, while failing to recognize, mitigate, and heed them. In addition, drop the practice of focusing on fire shelter use and Deployment Zones to save lives. If you have to deploy your fire shelter or rely on air support as the GMHS did, then you have royally f**ked up! The practice of allowing surviving loved ones to determine where the investigation leads rather than follow relevant evidence needs to cease. Moreover, we need to know the causal human factors of why they died, where they messed up, the error chain that led up to their deaths, and the like. Allow the Arizona Wildfire and Incident Management Academy (AWIMA) cadre, many of whom were the initial Type 3 Organization on June 30, 2013, many of them have since been “rewarded” with full-time DFFM positions for their alleged ”loyalty.” Also, to allow the Students and Instructors to openly discuss the YH Fire and GMHS debacle instead of chastizing, punishing, or restricting those who speak up and/or inquire about it.
The notion of the SAIT being allowed to determine their own conclusions based on an allegedly dishonest investigation resulting in a bogus report, as was the case on the YH Fire, should be dropped because it results in FFs and WFs coming away with a false view of the alleged “Lessons Learned.” For the epic wildland fire that the YH Fire and GMHS debacle became, there are unlimited valuable, life-saving lessons to be learned. Please take the time to read and review our YHFR website, which is always best viewed on a laptop or PC, for a plethora of valuable wildland fire information and revelations.
Definition of a Conflict of Interest - "A conflict of interest involves the abuse -- actual, apparent, or potential -- of the trust that people have in professionals. The simplest working definition states: A conflict of interest is a situation in which financial or other personal considerations have the potential to compromise or bias professional judgment and objectivity. ... Joseph E. Murphy, JD, CCEP. Cosmos.
Figure 6. (Part 1) Blowup to Burnover poster Source: NWCG
The WF Basics, e.g., Rules of Engagement and Entrapment Avoidance Principles: Ten Standard Fire Orders; Eighteen Watch Out Situations; Lookouts - Communications - Escape Routes – Safety Zones (LCES); Downhill Checklist; Common Denominators of Fire Behavior on Tragedy/Near-Miss Fires; and Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) Watch Outs.
"There were occasions in the Review where the difference between actions and decisions could not be separated, thus the term actions/decisions was used, as it could have been either one, or a combination of both.” Saddleback Learning Review (2013) This author and conventional logic clearly hold that the words, “actions and decisions” are two separate words with two separate meanings! Therefore, this author alleges this is even more evidence of Mayhew’s smoke and mirrors attempts to justify their Orwellian Learning Review logic, which carried over to the 2013 YH Fire Investigation!
Consider these three nebulous questions that many FFs and WFs working the fire that day know the answers to. Many had cell phone conversations with GMHS, or cell phone or other recordings of what's often referred to as the ongoing GMHS "discussing our options" GMHS Crew Net radio conversation: Why are they moving? Because it's well known that DIVS A Marsh was basically browbeating Steed to leave their Safety Zone in the black to head down to the Boulder Springs Ranch (BSR). Where are they going? Same answer. What are they doing? Minus the benefit of a required Lookout, the GMHS and DIVS A Marsh also failed to notify Air Attack, or their respective supervisors, of their location, intentions, and end state, while leaving good black at the worst possible time with fire and weather environment factors coming into deadly and ultimately fatal alignment.
It should be unmistakably self-evident at this juncture that the 2013 Yarnell Hill Fire SAIT Investigator, Mr. Mayhew, has allegedly continued to "unethically continuing to attempt to foist his vision quest upon us, avoiding the truth of the matter, failing to utilize all the available evidence at his disposal, all while making a profit from the 19 GMHS deaths" based on the evidence provided on this post and from your personal and/or professional knowledge conclusions. Even if you have no experience with wildland fires at all, it allegedly appears that he unethically attempts to foist his vision quest upon us while profiting from the 19 GMHS deaths in 2025 with statements like these below:
"I don't know, but how it is now is, these are short, sweet little books. You can read them in about an hour. That's the vision."
"And I envision people reading these books and, you know, being out in the middle of …, so you got to make them small enough for folks to do that, and to take them on a journey, and to let them digest each stage of this journey, one step at a time and to accomplish something. Then, you get to the end of the book, you achieve something that was kind of a vision."
And the following evidence, YHFR posts, and/or links as well:
Why Is There No Yarnell Hill Fire Site Visit and/or Staff Ride At The Annual March ERAU Wildfire Management Academy Of This Fatal June 2013 Epic Event?" (April 2025).
Author John Maclean and His alleged “Investigator” and firm GMHS defender, Holly Neill, were the keynote speakers at the Southern California Foresters and Fire Wardens (SCFFW) conference (see Part 1. Figure 5c. 2018 Safety and Training Conference agenda image) regarding their May 2018, Yarnell Hill 5 Years Later presentation attempt, when Mayhew bolted forward, insisting that the alleged “GMHS 30-minute communication gap” claim was a lie.
Consider also, InvestigativeMEDIA (2013) post titled: Yarnell Hill Fire Investigation Ignored Major Mistakes by the State. Former Yarnell Fire Chief Peter Andersen sat under a tree in his front yard having his morning coffee on Sunday, June 30, when the Granite Mountain Hotshots drove past his Glen Ilah home.
The following several links of YHF Investigation photos from Mayhew and others. "A-36 Brad Mayhew, member of the Accident Investigation Team, took these 19 photos on July 3, 2013." It includes the Deployment Zone (DZ), a hand tool, etc.
A13-Brian Lauber Photos: "Brian Lauber took these photos on June 30, 2013 photos and provided them to Brad Mayhew, member of the [SAIT]. His photos correlate to his kmz file showing photo points: Photo Point 1: next to the Assemblies of God church (img1334, taken 1629 based on cell phone metadata), Photo Point 2: back end of the church, the fire is rolling in, you can see what it's doing, Photo Point 3: a little further up the road, just as you're leaving Yarnell just before turnoff to Peeples Valley (taken 1633)." (SAIT-SAIR Dropbox, June 30, 2013)
A-38 YCSO Evidence Technician Kattie Waldock GMHS DZ, (July 3, 2013), Dropbox containing 108 somewhat disturbing photos.
A45-Mayhew Site Visit Photos, consisting of 25 photos, including the bizarre puzzling one in Fig. 6a. below by Mayhew (7/05/2013).
A44 and A49-Shelters, some clothing, and PPE Photos: 73 photos (7/05-13). (Warning — Viewer discretion advised.)
Joy A. Collura, Daily Courier photos (7/21/13) Heroes off to battle: Hikers' photos capture Hot Shots' final hours
YH Fire Hiker's seven videos (June 30, 2013)
Comparing and contrasting the palpable reality of Part 1. Fig. 5. (below, left) versus the obvious fiction of Mayhew's SAIT-SAIR idealized Fig. 18. image (below, right) from Part 1. Fig. 5a.
turned Grok's tone to those times Brad says anyone have some "snarky" remarks:
1. Oh, Brad, with your "vision quest" books turning tragedy into a tidy profit??? are you?—did you fail to remember the part where evidence from June-July 2013 vanished faster than a hotshot's escape route? Why were specific things left out - critical: Unaccounted GPS and Tracking Data, Ignored Cell Phone Records and Communications, Suppressed Photos and Videos from Deployment Zone, Dismissal of Friendly Fire and Rogue Firing Operations, Failure to Interview Key Personnel, Neglect of Historical and Operational Context, Omission of Medical Examiner and Autopsy Artifacts, Potential inadequate Analysis of Weather and Fire Behavior Forecasts, Exclusion of Interagency and Resource Allocation Details, Suppression of Eyewitness and Audio…
1. What did ya learn: Investigators often face personal fallout after major tragedies. I know it is hard. I will call out any person though that failed to put evidence into the report which shows was there June-July 2013.
2. What did ya learn: Post-investigation PTSD is common among wildfire probe leaders, requiring better support systems. They need to also keep a ledger of all activities they do/gather since they sign a document that they gave back "everything" from YHF 13 and its aftermath.
3. What did ya learn: Official reports can miss cascading community traumas, needing long-term engagement models.Amen.
4. What did ya learn: Turning investigations into book series helps process experiences and share broader lessons. Just pray all…
1. What did ya learn: Safety comes first during blowup fires, and some homes may be lost to prioritize lives.
2. What did ya learn: Always maintain situational awareness and have multiple escape routes planned.
3. What did ya learn: Communication breakdowns can lead to tragedies; ensure clear upward voice protocols.
4. What did ya learn: Learn from past accidents to innovate tools and tactics, like after the 1910 Big Burn.
5. What did ya learn: Fire shelters are last resorts; focus on avoidance through better risk assessment.
6. What did ya learn: Human factors, like desensitization to warnings, contribute to errors.
7. What did ya learn: Update disaster frameworks with real-time tools for better weather monitoring.
8. What did…
Disclaimer:
The content presented in this three-part blog post series, authored by Fred J. Schoeffler with contributions from others, [Joy A. Collura has minimal presence except some records are intertwined in other posts and the Medical Declaration. It is their professional opinions and judgments derived from available public evidence, scholarly analyses, and personal experiences related to the 2013 Yarnell Hill Fire. All views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and are intended for educational and discursive purposes on matters of public concern, as protected under the First Amendment and affirmed in Crystal Cox v. Obsidian Finance Group, LLC, 646 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2011) (extending journalistic protections to bloggers). No statements are asserted as verifiable facts beyond those…