Aug. 29, 1985, Salmon NF (ID) Butte Fire IMT Aerial Ignition Firing Operation Entrapped 118 WFs & FFs, 73 Required Fire Shelters. Erratic Fire Weather. Pre-Purchasing Cases of Military Body Bags? P1
- Aug 6
- 60 min read
Updated: Aug 7
Authors Fred J. Schoeffler, Jim Steele, and other contributing authors
Figure 1. Aug. 27, 1985, Butte Fire clear-cut aggressive to extreme fire behavior Snippet, mid-afternoon Source: Payson HS Jim Quinton (JQ)
Views expressed to "the public at large” and "of public concern"
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Abbreviations used: Wildland Firefighters (WFs) - Firefighters (FFs).
All emphasis is added unless otherwise noted.
For the good that I will to do, I do not do; but the evil I will not to do, that I practice. Now if I do what I will not to do, it is no longer I who do it, but sin that dwells in me. the fire came a gentle whisper.
Romans 7:19 (NKJV)
"Order up every helicopter we have in Idaho.
We have at least 140 fatalities."
OPS Bill Williams - Aug. 29, 1985
Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends
than that good men should look on and do nothing.
John Stuart Mill
1867 British philosopher - inaugural address at the Univ. of St Andrews
It is known that wildfires behave unpredictably - this is fundamental - but it is my experience that humans in the presence of wildfire are also likely to behave in aberrant and unpredictable ways. Falling down is a very big subject, and so is the concept of downfall.
Michael Leunig - an Australian cartoonist, writer, painter, philosopher, and poet.
This story needs to be told. This post is about a wildland fire that many FFs and WFs considered a historical near-death wildland fire, skirting near Biblical proportions. The time has finally come to reveal it after 40 years. On or about August 25, 1985, the renowned U.S. Forest Service (USFS) Southwestern Area (SWA) Payson, Flagstaff, and Mormon Lake Hot Shots were assigned to the Butte Fire on the Salmon NF near Salmon, Idaho. Upon landing in Boise, Idaho, this author recalls having a strong, strange, uncomfortable gut feeling about this fire from the get-go. We later received a concise, informative briefing at the Indianola Ranger Station. We were expressly told that the "trigger points were 20% RH (Relative Humidity) or 4:00 P.M., whichever came first." And so, for the following three days (Aug. 25-28, 1985), that is what we experienced and witnessed with fairly aggressive fire behavior each day. However, the fire weather changed dramatically on Aug. 29th when we got 20% RH at 1:30 PM, which then required a critical change in safety and tactics. The Payson HS and Flagstaff HS, the Lolo NF Engine Strike Team (E-ST), a Dozer, and a Water Tender would eventually utilize a clear-cut as our Safety Zone (SZ). The two HS Crew Bosses (before the eventual Supt. moniker) and the E-ST, for the most part, always ultimately considered the clear-cut as our true SZ! To the best of this author's memory, the Mormon Lake HS utilized a different area as a Safety Zone because they called us on the TAC channel and asked how we were doing as the fire behavior increased. This author then asked, "How is your weather?" He stated something to the effect of it being "crystal clear" so this author responded something to the effect of "Then you need to get the f**k out of there." He also stated that they "had to run for over a mile once a spot fire" increased in intensity and "took off." And that their "tool handles" eventually burned, as well as their "drip torches and fuel cans" that they left behind. See Schoeffler Declaration.
In the light of transparency, the following is a Google AI response to why there was a separate Regional investigation and a National review of the 1985 Butte Fire. "The 1985 Butte Fire in Idaho required both a Regional Investigation and a National Review due to the severity of the incident, particularly the entrapment and near-tragedy involving 73 firefighters who deployed fire shelters. This incident highlighted critical issues that demanded examination at multiple levels of wildland fire management. It was a significant event, emphasizing lessons learned, fire shelter effectiveness, Safety Zones, situational awareness, training, and mental health support. In summary, the regional investigation focused on the specifics of the incident. At the same time, the national review addressed broader implications and aimed to improve policies, training, and support for firefighters across the country based on the lessons learned from this life-threatening event." (end of AI)
It is wise to consider at this juncture the sage, almost prophetic, advice of Former El Cariso Hot Shot Superintendent, District Fire Management Officer, and Fire Behavior expert Doug Campbell (RiP) and respectfully remembered by CPS users online (Wildfire Intel Community Forum) regarding the importance and genius of trigger points and the associated "alignment of forces" term. And what would later famously become known, cherished, and utilized as the Campbell Prediction System (CPS). Consider this March 26, 2016, email, inquisitive and insightful CPS comments to this author: "My method or system is but one way to view the fire. What others are there? Is it to depend on the hair on your neck alerting you of something amiss? Is it an emotional response or logical? If there is none, then one cannot be in agreement with the order to base your tactics on expected fire behavior." And his online working paper titled: The Art of Wildland Firefighting. “I set out to discover how the experienced firefighters came to conclusions. I would have to explain, show, and prove how one could view the scene and arrive at a reliable prediction and tactic. Examining the training programs and literature over a period of years, I centered on the primary causes of fire behavior variations.” [CPS] provides the steps needed in a complete evaluation of a fire situation. The logic, information, and language used to evaluate and explain the fire situation are prerequisites to a good tactical plan." Here, he recounts his journey of how he arrived there: “I set out to discover how the experienced firefighters came to conclusions. I would have to explain, show, and prove how one could view the scene and arrive at a reliable prediction and tactic. Examining the training programs and literature over a period of years, I centered on the primary causes of fire behavior variations.” CPS distinctly defines a trigger point here while also mentioning the 1985 Butte Fire as "a place on the terrain where a change in the alignment of forces will change the fire behavior, creating either opportunity or danger. Trigger points are a time and/or place [where] the tactic or placement of resources needs to be changed to assure firefighter safety. There are two crucial trigger points to establish: one is where the fire will change; the other is when and where fire on the landscape triggers a decision to change tactics. Selecting a trigger point of change or the trigger point for tactical adjustment requires firsthand experience. Neither trigger point was established when the 1985 Butte Fire made an in-alignment run and drove firefighters into fire shelters."
And for all of you that may be critical and doubtful that this author's above phrase "always ultimately" is grammatically correct, please consider the little known June 15th, 1839, motto of the renowned, and rather divisive former Civil War General, ultimately becoming the seventh U.S. President Andrew Jackson: “Truth is mighty and will always ultimately prevail – it is the attribute of duty.” (RAAB Collection)
If anyone can refute me, show me I’m making a mistake or looking at things from the wrong perspective – I’ll gladly change.
It’s the truth I’m after, and the truth never harmed anyone.
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus - Roman emperor from 161-180. Stoic philosopher. Member of the Nerva–Antonine dynasty, the last of the rulers later known as the Five Good Emperors
Consider now several more Payson Hot Shot (PHS) Aug. 29, 1985, Butte Fire color photos exhibiting extremely aggressive fire behavior with impressive flame lengths far exceeding the 200 feet disingenuously stated by this author in the original 1985 Butte Fire Shelter video (Figure 2.). Because fire shelters were originally designed for grass and light brush wildfires, and used only for a few minutes, we would eventually call the video "The Beginning of the Fire Shelter Movement." In reality, these flame lengths are/were within the 800' to 1200' plus realm. This author and experienced others, with few exceptions, (WLF LLC, 1994) strongly believe that if one deploys their fire shelter and/or has to rely on "air support" to survive, then they have messed up because the tried-and-trued Rules of Engagement and Entrapment Avoidance Principles work - every time to keep you out of you out of those pesky fire shelter situations! So then, this author, aware that the 1985 Butte Fire Shelter video was going to include fire shelter deployments as necessary, intentionally lied in the original video, fully aware that it would become the ultimate "official" video that was slated to include the typical USFS-induced disingenuous and pre-determined conclusion discussions and information, albeit partially true "that the fire shelters worked and saved lives." This author contends that this so-called "official" 1985 Butte Fire Shelter statement is based on this author's overhearing a phone conversation between one of the "official" Investigators in the Communications tent with someone at some time after the fire shelter deployments, stating, (rephrasing) here: 'There was a lot of f**k-ups on this fire. And we are going to make sure that the Report says that the Overhead did a good job and that the fire shelters worked and saved lives.' See Schoeffler Declaration and/or Part 3. Regarding Fire Shelter Deployments. In a word, this author has always alleged that the fire and the original 1985 Butte Fire video started what we referred to as “The Fire Shelter Movement.”
“We didn't like the fact that there was no place to go if something went wrong,” [Operations Section Chief OPS] Bill [Williams] says. “So we needed safety zones for people and we had them go ahead and construct them. With the kind of conditions we had and the timber canopy we had, I wanted to be sure we didn't have somebody up there with no place to go but into the timber.” (Butte Fire Staff Ride Preliminary Study and Steele Declaration)
"Weather Forecast - At the August 29 morning briefing Bill remembers the meteorologist saying that the weather that day would be pretty much a carbon copy of the day before. And, of course, we didn't have any major runs the day before,” Bill says. “We had small runs down in the steep chimneys in Owl Creek—but no major runs.” ... That morning, Bill also recalls how the meteorologist said that the weather that day was going to be a little more unstable. “Well,” Bill acknowledges in retrospect, “neither he nor anybody else realized what that really meant for us that day.” ... Later that afternoon when the fire blew up, from Bill’s position in the helicopter, he could see eight other big smoke columns from ongoing fires on the adjacent National Forests. “All of them were standing up with strong columns.” ... Bill says that this change in atmospheric instability on the Butte Fire helped prompt the study that led to the establishment of the Haines Index, based on atmospheric instability. ... Sidetracked - In looking back at the events that occurred on the Butte Fire on August 29, 1985, Bill shares a personal insight. ... “In all honesty,” he confides, “I probably did get a little sidetracked from what was going on up on top because I was in that helicopter with Air Attack while we were burning out that bottom line.” But, after all, in the context of that morning, that was the priority—burning out the bottom line with the helitorch I walked the Division first thing [in t]he morning of August 29 and located both deployment sites—on the knob along Tin Cup Ridge above Drop Point 30, and on a bench about half way down the ridge to Drop Point 30 from the Tin Cup Ridge deployment site. ... 3. I met with Fred Schoeffler (Payson Hotshot Crew Supervisor) and Roy Hall (Flagstaff Hotshot Crew Supervisor) at approximately 1200 hours on the road at Drop Point 29. We talked about how we would burn out the lower fireline. We talked about having a few people below the road and how the burnout could progress upslope so the torch people could burn their way into the large clearcut and not have to retrace their steps through ground that was on fire. We talked about fire whirls where the Spring Creek Road right-of-way cut through the fire and burnout area. ... 4. The Engine Strike Team crews were working the lower timber areas along the fireline from the clearcut down to Spring Creek Road. We were using a widened area just above Drop Point 29 as a parking lot. There were approximately eight vehicles parked there. 5. Just after 1200 hours, Branch Director Schindler contacted me and said the Division A boundary was extended from Drop Point 30 up to [Hill 8010, where we started the Staff Ride stations. It is also where they extended DIV A from DP 30 to Hill 8010 at 1200 hr on the 29th. This added significant extra fireline responsibility for DIV A, plus both sides of the DP 30 saddle. When the major run started, there were FFs strung up along that fireline that headed for the SZ below Tin Cup Ridge] adding approximately another 0.8 miles. They were also sending me another Crew Strike Team (Jemez Eagles and Flame-n-Go fire crews) with Strike Team Leader (STL) Ron Yacomella. Branch Director Schindler asked if I needed additional personnel resources beyond this. I said no. I met them (Jemez Eagles, Flame-n-Go Inmate Crew, and STL Yacomella) at Drop Point 30, and we discussed what to do. This consisted of orchard work and cutting paths through the slash berm in case people were chasing spot fires. They would then have avenues to leave and regain the fireline. We talked about the burnout. Our biggest concern was having enough fusees because we anticipated difficulty lighting the beargrass with fusees. ... Fred Schoeffler, Superintendent of the Payson Hotshot Crew in 1985 [Starting at approximately 13:00 in the video] “I started taking weather readings around 1o’clock [on Aug. 29] and came up with RH’s in the high 20s. We decided to break for lunch and when we got RH’s around 20 percent we talked and decided it would be best to pull all the way out rather than to this safety zone that was below us, below Drop Point 28. ... We decided it would be better to pull out of the timber up into the clearcut to the north of Drop Point 28.” (Butte Fire Staff Ride Preliminary Study)
The following is fairly weak, however, it is the best concise summary of the August 29, 1985, briefing discussing weather, strategy, and tactics. Moreover, there will ultimately be a separate post strictly on the fire weather in Part 3. "An understanding of the fire control operations is essential to understanding many events during the 29th. Having had little success at close-in direct attack on the 26th and 27th, the overhead team had decided to use an indirect attack strategy. On the 28th and 29th, a tractor line was built along the main ridge on the north end of the fire, approximately 1.5 miles (2.4 km) north of the nearest spot fires in Wallace Creek (fig. 1 [Fig. 1a. above]). Fortunately, the line construction included several safety zones 300 to 400 feet (90–120 m) in diameter at approximately 1/4-mile (0.4-km) intervals. The plan for the 29th was to conduct a burnout operation in the late afternoon when humidity was expected to rise. An aerial drip torch [helitorch] would be used for center firing in the upper end of Wallace Creek. Crews were to be dispersed along the line to burn out from the line after a convection column was developed." Behavior of the Life-threatening Butte Fire August 27–29, 1985. Rothermel and Mutch
So, this author at this point questions the motivation for why OPS Williams uses the phrase “deployment site” several times. You’ll most definitely want to ask yourselves, is he doing it because he is attributing them to his after-the-fact knowledge? Or was it because they were pre-planned and used accordingly? Thus, it is extremely critical to consider, for complicity purposes regarding OPS Williams' knowledge and timing, whether he is genuinely referring to the August 29th factual Tin Cup Hill Deployment Zone and other deployment sites before the actual shelter deployments, which would then allegedly indicate his collusion and involvement in setting up the debacle. Or were they afterwards merely for the sake of clarification in the interview as stated in this sentence: "I walked the Division first thing [t]he morning of August 29 and located both deployment sites—on the knob along Tin Cup Ridge above Drop Point 30, and on a bench about half way down the ridge to Drop Point 30 from the Tin Cup Ridge deployment site. "
He who walks with integrity walks securely,
But he who perverts his ways will become known.
Proverbs 10:9 (NKJV)
Order up every troop flying helicopter we have in Idaho.
We have at least 140 fatalities
Operations (Line Boss) Bill Williams Aug. 29, 1985
One reason the best in the world make consistently good decisions is they rarely find themselves forced into a decision by circumstances.
Clear Thinking - Farnam Street
For the time will come when they will not endure sound doctrine, but according to their own desires, because they have itching ears,
they will heap up for themselves teachers; and they will turn their ears away from the truth, and be turned aside to fables.
2 Timothy 4:3-4 (NKJV)
Consider now a more detailed Butte Fire progression map. Arrows depict major fire runs on the afternoon of August 29, 1985. The 73 FFs deployed fire shelters at the lower shelter area and Tin Cup Hill shelter area. Areas A, B, C, and D indicate aerial ignition (helitorch) burnout operations conducted that afternoon. Sources: Alexander, Mutch, Rothermel (2003). And the "100 Fires Project" is "a timeline of the 100 fires that every wildland firefighter should know about. These fires tell the history of wildfire in this country. International Association of Wildland Fire (IAWF). 100 Fires Project.
Figure 1a. Butte Fire progression map. Arrows depict major fire runs on the afternoon of August 29, 1985. The 73 FFs deployed fire shelters at the lower shelter area and Tin Cup Hill shelter area. Areas A, B, C, and D indicate aerial ignition (helitorch) burnout operations conducted that afternoon. Sources: Alexander, Mutch, Rothermel (2003), 100 Fires Project
Figure 1b. Looking toward the East (Snippet) of the Aug. 29, 1985, Butte Fire. View of the fire as it reached upper Wallace Creek and overran the fire crews. The crews deployed their fire shelters in SZs similar to those shown in the center. Photo taken from a helicopter. Source: FMT 63, 2003
Consider the emotional histrionics associated with the FMT "forced into safety zones" verbiage in the statement below as if those WFs had no other choice when, in fact, retreating to a SZ is part and parcel of wildland firefighting. You are only "forced into safety zones" if and when you fail to apply the tried-and-trued Rules of Engagement and Entrapment Avoidance Principles. Additionally and instructively, Acting Flagstaff HS Supt. Roy Hall would correctly point out on the 2016 Butte Fire Staff Ride that deploying a fire shelter in a SZ negates it as such, thus qualifying instead as a Deployment Zone (DZ). So then, to clarify, to deploy their fire shelters to survive essentially matches one of the Investigator's verbiage on the phone with someone, as heard by this author in the Communication tent, at a point days after the shelter deployments. Paraphrasing: 'There was a lot of f**k-ups on this fire. And we are going to make sure that the Report says that the Overhead did a good job and that the fire shelters worked and saved lives.' Schoeffler Declaration
"Seventy-three firefighters were forced into safety zones; without escape zones and fire shelters, at least 60 of the 73 firefighters would likely have died."
Figure 2. Official 1985 Butte Fire Shelter Deployment Source: WLF LLC
Consider these comments by Agustin Gaba from Facebook three years ago (2022), who claims he was on the Butte Fire: "Agustin Goba - I was there, on the Flagstaff Hotshots. We were one of the crews that made it up to the large clear cut and didn't have to deploy our shelters. Watching the fire burn up to the edge of the clear cut was one of the most amazing and scary things I've ever seen. Those lodgepole pine you can see in the video average about 90 feet tall, and the flames were at least three times as tall. Plus the smoke above was being reignited by the heat. It was a miracle no one died."
The author's initial intent in this post, among other things, is to set a solid foundation for safe and effective wildland firefighting, hopefully while learning from past events; especially epic ones like the Butte Fire. And that will be accomplished by solidifying the absolute value of the established tried-and-trued Rules of Engagement and the associated solid Entrapment Avoidance Principles. The author and the highly experienced SWA Hot Shot Hannah Coolidge in her Rules and Risk in Wildland Firefighting article (2015) is spot on and boldly recognizes and supports this author's and several of the 1985 Butte Fire participants, reports, and related documents regarding the laudable Rules of Engagement stance stating: "Wildland firefighting is one dangerous game that is heavily mediated by rules of engagement. ... Following a predetermined set of rules encourages us to set aside our superstitions and our instincts (whether to run away in fear or to plow forward at all costs), and instead act according to lessons learned from past successes and failures. By creating a common standard for action and hopefully reducing unwanted deaths, rules increase both the sustainability of wildland firefighting as well as its respectability."
And now for the task at hand, the time has come after 40 years to finally reveal the truth about what occurred - and what could have occurred - including what the Incident Management Team (IMT) anticipated would occur on the August 1985 Salmon NF Butte Fire near Salmon, Idaho. This author and others performing tasks in various operational management and supervisory positions allege that the IMT had intentionally pre-purchased or was in the process of purchasing them after the burnovers and entrapments, cases of body bags from the military early on in the process, thus planning for the likelihood of FF and WF deaths. Among other things, this bold assertion is based on the statement made by the OPS Williams over the Command channel as we were being burned over to "Order up every helicopter we have in Idaho, we have at least 140 fatalities!" He never called any of us on the separate Tactical (TAC) Channel to ask us what was happening or if we were all okay. Because of the often professed Greater Good attitude and because none of us - to the best of this author's knowledge - has ever willingly renounced our solemn Oath of Office obligations; and most important of all, if this author and others involved that are privy to this information that know what occurred there and fail to reveal it and share it for its lessons learned value, then that places us squarely into the despicable category as the rest of those odious Kool-Aid Drinkers and Naysayers regarding the multitude of wildland fire cover-ups, lies, and whitewashes back to the 1949 Mann Gulch Fire, ey. The WLF LLC's mission is "Our mission is to promote learning in the wildland fire service by providing useful and relevant products and services that help to reveal the complexity and risk in the wildland fire environment." That squarely places us in the position of being both morally and professionally obligated to reveal it, as bizarre as the whole "cases of body bags" thing is going to be a tough one to accept.
A wholesome tongue is a tree of life,
but perverseness in it breaks the spirit.
Proverbs 15:4 (NKJV)
Vision without action is a daydream.
Action without vision is a nightmare.
Japanese proverb, FB
Indeed, among other things, the obvious "fact" supporting this is based on the following official pre-1980, term and/or phrase that the term "Safety Zone" was non-existent in the wildland firefighting lexicon with Fire Order No. 4 clearly stating "4. Have ESCAPE ROUTES for everyone and make them known" per the 76-page report screenshot in Figure 2. below from the "Preliminary report of task force on [the] study of fatal/near-fatal wildland fire accidents." Boise, ID: National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) (April 1980). This report is well worth your reading and research.
In other words, Fire Order No. 4. always implied and was understood to be to use their known Escape Route to go somewhere that was safe.
Consider now the circa "1980" so-called Present Ten Standard Firefighting Orders screenshot in Figure 2. below, with only ESCAPE ROUTES listed in No. 4. lacking any mention whatsoever regarding SAFETY ZONES! So, it's only natural for us to inquire when SAFETY ZONES became "official" and began to be defined and then listed as such within the Ten Standard Fire Orders is covered in more detail in Part 2.
Figure 2a. 1980 Present Ten Standard FF Orders Snippet Source: NIFC
This REPORT OF FIRE TASK FORCE was submitted to the Chief of the Forest Service by a task force including W.R. Moore, V.A. Parker, C.M. Countryman, L.K. Mays, and A.W. Greeley. This 1957 report marks the origin of the acclaimed "10 & 18" and of the research into and use of fire behavior knowledge in Wildland firefighting. It was also considered a milestone in the development of both the National Advanced Regional Training Center (NARTC) and the Incident Command System (ICS).
"Introduction - This report is submitted in response to the Chief's F-CONTROL Suppression memo of April 12, 1957. By that memo, the Chief appointed a task force to study ways the Forest Service may strengthen its efforts to prevent fire fatalities. ... 3. Standard Firefighting Orders. These orders are to be committed to memory by all personnel with fire control responsibilities. … General Orders, which all men of the unit are required to memorize. On some of the fires that we reviewed, men who knew better just did not pay adequate attention to good firefighting practices that seem like small details but could become the critical item in an emergency. The use of a form of standard orders starting immediately would be a long step in the direction of assuring attention to the fundamentals."
Consider the "Problem Identification" p. 9 of the Task Force document in Figure 3. It is apparent from past fatal and non-fatal incidents that there is substantial risk-taking which is not commensurate with the values threatened. ... There is no justification for risking firefighter lives in a wildland situation dealing with renewable resources. Firefighting is a paramilitary operation. However, the parallel stops at the point where casualties are acceptable." The author takes umbrage with the “paramilitary” definition, instead preferring the term “quasi-military.
Figure 3. Task Force Problem Identification page 9. Snippet Source: NIFC
Taking this Task Force Problem Identification operative phrase into perspective: "There is no justification for risking firefighter lives in a wildland situation with renewable resources" strongly suggests to this author that what occurred on the August 29, 1985, Butte Fire burnovers and fire shelter deployments was intentional, and that the IMT did do exactly what it intended by "risking firefighter lives in a wildland situation dealing with renewable resources." Therefore, this author alleges that certain IMT members knew full well that the fire shelter deployments and deaths were likely to occur, and that the IMT had pre-purchased cases of body bags from the military. This was fairly common knowledge, according to DIVS Steele's Declaration. Moreover, this author takes umbrage with the "paramilitary" designation, preferring instead for us to be identified as "quasi-military." Yes indeed, there is a notable difference.
"There is no justification for risking firefighter lives
in a wildland situation dealing with renewable resources."
Figure 3a. Aug. 28, 1985, Safety Message page Snippet Source: BFSRPS
What Almost Wasn't - The Butte Fire Shelter Deployment. Wildland Fire Leadership (WFL) (2015): "Obviously being caught in the position we were with an entire division in front of that run was not what was intended. We actually intended to pull anybody out from in front of anything. We just didn’t have time. By the time we knew we had a problem, it was too late to move anybody." Bill Williams, Operations Section Chief.
In this author's and others' professional opinions, this overt OPS William's statement above allegedly implies that the inevitable was the result of outcome pre-planning based on what we heard at our August 29th briefing. During the 2016 Butte Fire Staff Ride, we also learned that there were as many as three Spike Camps and three separate briefings in them. And also below, the Wildland Fire Leadership underscores the fire shelter focus rather than focusing on the tried-and-trued Rules of Engagement and Entrapment Avoidance Principles that work every time you recognize them and then utilize them to avoid such preventable occurrences. So saith the one-and-only remarkable non-Hindsight Bias Gordon Graham (Lexipol, 2020)
"August 29, 2015, marks the 30th anniversary of the Butte fire shelter deployment on the Salmon National Forest. In what could have been one of the deadliest days in wildland fire history, an entire division of 118 people walked away; 73 off (sic) those deployed their shelters. ... We challenge you to watch the Butte fire shelter deployment video, discuss the importance of fire shelters with your team, make a commitment to checking the status of your shelter, discuss updated [SZ] and escape route recommendations, ... What happens on the fireline affects our past and our future." (WFL)
Consider now this Northern Rockies Fire Science Network (NRFSN) excerpt below accessed May 18, 2025, regarding the 1985 Butte Fire and the 2016 Butte Fire Staff Ride as well as their sincere counsel to learn from past events, while their adverse emotional, strong, and serious promotion of the value of fire shelter deployments and fire shelters while tossing in some touchy-feely ecological nuggets to boot was clearly anticipated:
"On August 29th 1985, the Butte Fire blew up in the Salmon River canyon of central Idaho. The blow-up sent 73 firefighters into their fire shelters, where they spent a harrowing 1-2 hours. It was not a tragedy, but it was a close call. ... On June 28-30, 2016, the Salmon-Challis National Forest sponsored a 2-day Staff Ride to review and learn from the initial event. By 2016, many of those involved in the 1985 event held leadership positions in wildland fire management and were able to return, either as leaders of the Staff Ride or as participants to contribute their perspective and how the event has influenced their development and thinking. The staff ride stimulated individual and collective learning among the many survivors who returned, Forest leadership, and the Forest’s fire organization. ... The original event offers managers today the opportunity to consider successful decision-making and performance of fire shelters as well as to recognize how such events can trigger advances in agency culture and equipment. The ecological conditions, management actions, and result of the Butte Fire also continue to touch upon the most pressing issues the Forest Service faces today – fire behavior and ecosystem resilience, effective wildland fire strategy and tactics, acceptable risks to life, agency response to traumatic incidents, and how to learn from past events."
Consider now Steve Jobs (RiP) on why thinking without doing is incomplete: “My observation is that the doers are the major thinkers. The people that really create the things that change this industry are both the thinker and doer in one person. And if we really go back and we examine, you know, did Leonardo have a guy off to the side that was thinking five years out in the future what he would paint or the technology he would use to paint it? Of course not. Leonardo was the artist, but he also mixed all his own paints. He also was a fairly good chemist. He knew about pigments, knew about human anatomy. And combining all of those skills together, the art and the science, the thinking and the doing, was what resulted in the exceptional result. And there is no difference in our industry. The people that have really made the contributions have been the thinkers and the doers.” (Farnam Street Brain Food June 8, 2025 - #632)
The fire shelter and airtanker use to save you notion is merely another Attack of the Good Idea People ploy. There was a time many moons ago that the USFS hosted a human resources improvement session in the "off-season" on how to create diverse, successful team building and how one made decisions, and such. This was based on a questionnaire to determine one's individual decision-making skills, and then to assign corresponding colors to those individuals to have at least one individual from each group to build successful teams, e.g. analytical, creative, emotional, idea generator, etc. Unfortunately, yet predictably, what ultimately developed was what we referred to as "The Attack of the Good Idea People.” And somehow, they rose to the surface, taking over their respective teams, akin to the IRPG Hazardous Attitude of Groupthink. You've all heard it many times before: "Be a Team Player, Go Along to Get Along, Stop Rocking The Boat, etc." Hence, the USFS loved those Good Idea People. However, that's far afield of the answer we're seeking, right? In other words, is it really a good idea to have a GPS tracker "so we can find you," so they can supposedly send a helicopter or an airtanker to “save” you? If you need something like this to “save” you, then you have screwed up. Knowing, heeding, mitigating, and following the tried-and-true Wildland Fire Rules works every time.
"Problems scream for attention while successes only whisper. We're wired to chase whatever is loudest. Your biggest opportunity isn't hiding in what's broken; it's hiding in what's working that you've stopped noticing.
“We think conscious thought is somehow better, when in fact, intuition is soaring flight compared to the plodding of logic. Nature’s greatest accomplishment, the human brain, is never more efficient or invested than when its host is at risk. Then, intuition is catapulted to another level entirely, a height at which it can accurately be called graceful, even miraculous. Intuition is the journey from A to Z without stopping at any other letter along the way. It is knowing without knowing why.”
Gavin de Becker - American security specialist and author, notably The Gift of Fear (1997).
It has now taken this author and a few others that worked on that fire over 40 years to finally satisfy the essential need to reveal the hidden truths about this epic August 1985 Butte Fire that by the Grace of God never killed anyone - even though the IMT and the USFS had allegedly done their level best. They had allegedly pre-planned matters to accomplish exactly that having pre-purchased "cases of body bags from the military." Butte Fire (ID-1985) Schoeffler and Steele Declarations (2025)
Accident Investigation Concerns - Consider directly below several relevant and worthwhile excerpts from Dr. Ted Putnam's until now virtually unknown Accidents, accident guides, stories and the truth paper located in the Proceedings of the 11th International Wildland Fire Safety Summit, April 4-8, 2011, Missoula, MT, USA, Published by the IAWF.
"Although it seems obvious that accident investigations should strive to uncover the actual causes and conditions that led to the accident, this is seldom attempted let alone advocated in the relevant agency investigation guides used by wildland fire and other organizational (Airlines, NASA, Military, etc.) accident investigators. Failure to look for all discoverable causes and conditions leads to accident reports that are superficial in understanding or missing vital information on what really occurred as well as why it occurred. It is relevant for individuals and organizations to look at what accident guides investigations are focusing on compared to what they could and ought to be focusing on. Specifically, we ignore the impact of the individual’s cognitive processing on accident causation." (IAWF, 2011)
Figure 4. August 29, 1985, Butte Fire clear-cut aggressive to extreme behavior image approx. mid-afternoon. Source: PHS JQ
Figure 5. August 29, 1985, PHS E.E. (RiP) in the Butte Fire clear-cut experiencing aggressive to extreme behavior approx. mid-afternoon. Source: PHS JQ
Figure 5a. August 29, 1985, two PHS without hardhats observing aggressive to extreme behavior approx. mid-afternoon. Source: PHS JQ
Figure 5b. August 29, 1985, two PHS without hardhats observing aggressive to extreme behavior approx. mid-afternoon. Source: PHS JQ
Figure 6. August 29, 1985, Butte Fire clear-cut aggressive to extreme behavior image approx. mid-afternoon. Source: PHS JQ
Figure 7. August 29, 1985, Butte Fire clear-cut aggressive to extreme behavior image approx. mid-afternoon. Source: PHS JQ
Figure 8. Aug. 29, 1985, Butte Fire late-PM inversion. Source: PHS JQ
Nobody trashes your name better than
someone who’s afraid you’ll tell people the truth.
Terrence Howard (FaceBook)
Consider the 1993 Look Up, Look Down, Look Around video containing the 1985 Butte Fire footage under the Seasonal Drying heading, which includes the Flagstaff and Payson HS Supt. interviews starting at 10:37
Figure 9. Look Up, Down, and Around (1993) Source: YouTube, WLF LLC
Consider now this insightful FMT 67, 1. (2007) article titled: Appearances, reality, and the rhetoric of fighting wildfires. An opportunity to refresh that which is good and to modify that which could be better. A Serious Student of Wildland Fire. Alan P. Church. "I do not have the experience or qualifications of the most formative and cherished benefited from their years of experience qualifications of dedicated fire management professionals like John Krebs, Karl Brauneis, Craig Goodell (all referred to in the accompanying article). I have only 7 years of seasonal experience. The highest qualification I have achieved is Squad Boss. Although I have a Ph.D. and nearly 20 years of college teaching experience experiences of my life. I approached experience, being a professor is not likely to carry the same ethical appeal to many in the fire community. After all, my area of specialization is not fire science but literature and rhetoric. Nevertheless, my years as a seasonal firefighter provided me with some of the most formative and cherished experiences of my life. I approached my duties as a wildland firefighter as a serious student of fire. I was surprised when criticism first arose about the acrostic Standard Firefighting Orders, for I, myself, the acrostic Standard Firefighting for I myself had never experienced difficulty how they functioned on the fireline. Krebs, Brauneis, and Goodell are not only experienced firefighters who love the culture of wildland fire, but they are also dedicated teachers in their own right. This explains their motivation to help shape the current culture of wildland fire by sharing their ideas in print and elsewhere. I imagine that the firefighters that served under these men have benefited from their years of experience and love of what they do. I say all this to make it clear that I am not arguing against these men, nor am I arguing for a reversal in the recent decision to abandon the acrostic Standard Firefighting Orders. Instead, I see in this discussion an opportunity for further thinking about the relationship between training and experience – an opportunity to refresh that which is good and to modify that which could be better.”
Consider some "official" insight into the Butte Fire allegation that it may have been arson, reignited by one of the out-of-work loggers and/or miners because their economies were in the toilet. Based on conversations in the Finance Section, doing equipment time and shift tickets. Schoeffler Declaration."The Butte Fire was one of four fires in the Long Tom Complex ignited by lightning on July 7, 1985, on the Salmon National Forest, Idaho. The Butte Fire experienced a significant growth day on July 20, and from then made daily afternoon crown fire runs, until precipitation fell over the fire in August. By the end of August, a return to dry weather caused an increase in fire behavior, returning to the pattern of daily afternoon runs. On August 29, the fire made a major run, significantly larger than previous days', of 3000 acres. During this sustained crown fire run, 118 firefighters disengaged from the fireline and made their way to safety zones scattered along the ridge. 73 firefighters deployed fire shelters." The 1985 Butte Fire Shelter Deployment video, filmed shortly after the events of August 1985, is available here. The 2016 Butte Fire Staff Ride video link is available here. And the Butte Fire Staff Ride is described here: "Over 30 years after the entrapment and shelter deployments on the Butte Fire, a group of those who were there went back to that fireground with a group of students to walk through the events and their lessons learned on that day. After the site visit, the entire group discussed the experience, including their takeaways to carry forward." Consider now the WLF LLC 2016 Butte Fire Staff Ride video in Figure 11. below.
Figure 11. 2016 Butte Fire Staff Ride video Source: WLF LLC, YouTube
"That all the firefighters in the escape zones survived without serious injury borders on the miraculous." Fire Management Today (FMT). Butte Fire Staff Ride Preliminary Report (BFSRPR) Vol. 3. (2003)
Consider now the Butte Fire Staff Ride Preliminary Study excerpts.
H. Hotshot Superintendents’ Heads-Up Observations and Actions that Preceded the Fire Run. There are quotes from two of the Southwest Area Hot Shot Crew Supts. in the 1993 “Look Up, Look Down, Look Around” video. And some very impressive time-lapse video of an Inversion Lifting on August 26, 1979, Ship Island Fire on the deadly Salmon NF, where one USFS WF Line Scout (Kyle Pattee, RiP) was killed when two of the WFs deployed fire shelters on a helispot after mysteriously stacking all the flammable gear around themselves. The one WF Overhead that perished had no gloves and was unable to hold down his fire shelter, according to the WF LLC Incident Review. And even though there was a fatality, the WLF LLC still labeled it as an "entrapment." According to the NWCG Glossary. Entrapment is defined as "A situation where personnel are unexpectedly caught in a fire behavior-related, life-threatening position where planned escape routes or safety zones are absent, inadequate, or compromised. An entrapment may or may not include deployment of a fire shelter for its intended purpose." And so it was because of that Ship Island Fire fatality that gloves became mandatory on every wildfire.
Consider now the "Pattee Fatality Investigation Report - Compliance with the Ten Standard Fire Fighting Orders - Fire Order No. 4 - Plan Escape Routes For Everyone And Make Them Known" Snippet below in Figure 12. This supports our contention that Fire Order No. 4 had NO Safety Zones listed as of 1979. Consider the Pattee Fatality SAIT-SAIR Human Factors re: "safe areas" and "fire shelter reliance as an escape device" in Figure 12.
Figure 12. Ship Island Fire SAIT-SAIR F/O No. 4 Snippet Source: WLF LLC
Figure 12a. Ship Island Fire SAIT-SAIR Human Factors re: "safe areas" and "fire shelter reliance as an escape device" Snippet Source: WLF LLC
Consider this quote from the FMT 63, 4, 2003, Wildland Fire Behavior Case Studies and Analyses Part 2, "The Race That Couldn't Be Won research paper by Richard C. Rothermel and Hutch Brown about the 1985 Butte Fire. Lessons Learned - "Deeply shocked by the Mann Gulch tragedy and subsequent firefighter fatalities in [CA], the Forest Service initiated reforms to prevent future disasters. Thanks to improved training, equipment, and safety techniques, another tragedy was averted on August 29, 1985, during the Butte Fire on the Salmon [NF], ID. Seventy-three firefighters were entrapped for up to 2 hours by a severe crown fire. By calmly moving to preestablished safety zones and deploying their fire shelters, all 73 firefighters escaped serious injury. In part, they owe their lives to the lessons learned from the Mann Gulch Fire."
Consider now August 1985 Butte Fire Division Supervisor (DIVS) Jim Steele's "The Butte Fire Experience ‘Destroyed’ Many Fire Careers" excerpts that is well worth delving into, especially if you are an ongoing FF, WF, or even an interested reader and/or a Supervisor: "Division A Supervisor on the Butte Fire - What I find truly interesting is the fire culture paradox that exists today compared to 1985. We participated in two reviews. The first was the “Bob Mutch group” [who put together the September 1985 “Fire Entrapment Incident, Butte Fire” Report]. We [Division A] spoke with Art Jukala [of the Missoula Equipment and Development Center] regarding the performance of the fire shelters. He stressed the point that he was fact-finding regarding fire shelters. During this discussion, people would consistently revert to questions of “why and how” regarding the Butte Fire and the IMT. There was anger, frustration, and disbelief. Nonetheless, Art continued to try to keep us on task: Focusing on “the fire shelters”. During this discussion, people would consistently revert to questions of “why and how” regarding the Butte Fire and the IMT. There was anger, frustration, and disbelief. The second was the Jerry Monesmith review. The January 1986 “Long Tom Complex Fire Review,” whose review team leader was Monesmith, the Safety and Training Officer for the Forest Service’s Fire and Aviation Management Program’s National Office. Jerry rode with me to my Division and we discussed the Ten Standard Orders and Thirteen Situations That Shout Watch Out [Footnote 1]. Again, this inquiry had a very specific agenda that had nothing to do with how people were following the burnover. In addition, the shelter deployment overshadowed other close encounters such as Dozer Operators surrounded by fire being plucked out of harm’s way by a helicopter and gutsy pilot. A crew deciding to run for safety rather than deploy their shelters ran off the ridge to an escape route, which was a road. They finished their run to safety, bent over with fire shooting over their backs. Overhead, crews, and equipment operators watched the burnover on Tin Cup Ridge from Hill 8010. They were preparing to deploy their shelters. A little more fire intensity to the west could have invited the fire to burn up the west fork of Wallace Creek and to them. They continued to improve their position as the burnover occurred. Payson and Flagstaff hotshots were flown out of the large clearcut at dusk to Sourdough Camp. The last crew members were picked up in the dark - pilots were landing using experience and instruments. At no time did anyone - then or later - inquire into the effects of this experience on firefighters. The few Butte Fire people I have tracked down have all indicated how this incident had profound negative impacts on their lives. At no time did anyone - then or later - inquire into the effects of this experience on firefighters. The few Butte Fire people I have tracked down have all indicated how this incident had profound negative impacts on their lives. The initial report that was published within a few days of the deployment mentioned the potential for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. ... The Butte Fire experience and its aftermath destroyed many careers in fire. Several people abandoned participating in fire altogether. Who knows the impacts to their personal lives? [Footnote 1] “The 13 Situations That Shout Watch Out” was in effect through 1987, when this list increased to 'The 18 Situations That Shout Watch Out'.
Consider now the " We’ve Come a Long Way Since 1985" portion of the 1985 Preliminary Report that is also well worth reading by Tracy Dunford, Crew Boss, Flame’n’Go Utah State Forestry Inmate Fire Crew, on the Butte Fire. "When I talk to firefighters, especially new firefighters, about this incident I like to focus on improvements that have been made to the wildland firefighting culture/community since 1985 when the Butte Fire occurred. I think there are lessons to be learned and valuable discussion to be had, especially on two key topics: the refusal of risk protocol and critical incident follow-up. Refused Assignment - The Payson and Flagstaff hotshot crews refused the assignment that day based on good situational awareness, evaluation of environmental conditions, and risk management [see page 17]. They made the right call and retreated to an adequate safety zone. While there are valuable lessons to be learned from the performance of the fire shelter on this incident, it is more important to point out that these two crews did not have to resort to this “last option”. At the time, assignment based on safety concerns. To do so was at least culturally awkward and, at most, professionally risky. Events like this have changed this paradigm. Today, every individual is encouraged to speak up if they see a problem; supervisors are encouraged to listen. New firefighters should be familiar with this process and be prepared to use it if needed. At the time, there was no protocol for refusing an assignment based on safety concerns. To do so was at least culturally awkward and, at most, professionally risky. Important to Note How People were Managed After This Entrapment. It is also important - once again, especially for today’s new firefighters - to look at how the people were managed following this incident. We had all experienced what most would consider a traumatic event. Once we finally made it off the line we learned that our spike camp had been evacuated - along with all of our gear. Everything had been moved to a new location. It was a very late night getting people taken care of, fed, and locating all of our gear. Originally, we were on the plan for the next operational period. However, someone in the planning section suggested that - given our circumstances some rest was in order for our crew and for everyone who had been entrapped. We were given a day off in camp and went back to work the following day. This type of treatment would be considered unacceptable today. I think we are much better at accepting that events like this can have an adverse effect on people and organizations. We have better tools and procedures to manage the outcomes from events like this and we are better at recognizing when to use them. Complacency Contributed to this Incident - I think complacency is another factor that contributed to this incident. As I previously pointed out [see page 20], during the previous days on this incident, it was commonplace for fire activity to increase significantly in the afternoon. I believe we became somewhat desensitized by the regularity of these events. When the fire activity picked up, resources retreated or moved to safety zones. We would then regroup and pick the fire up on the next ridge the following day. It was all kind of predictable. But rather than plan and act on this predictability, everyone seemed to drop their collective guard. Base all actions on current and expected behavior of the fire."
Dunford’s comments are especially noteworthy because this author was also deeply affected by this incident. It became instrumental in the decision to never trust any of the alleged “official” investigations after working on the 1985 Butte Fire and then the June 26, 1990, Dude Fire, where six fatalities occurred on the Tonto NF in Arizona. From then on, this author committed to doing his own investigations and getting them about 85% accurate. And for this reason, our eventual, literal world-renowned Yarnell Hill Fire Revelations website.
Consider now the relevant and noteworthy Black Sheep verbiage and image below in Figure 13. from Marvin Coronel's Facebook. This would apply to those who have ever been assigned to Division Siberia (i.e., a portion of the fire that has been cold and mopped up already, and then you are eventually demobbed) for turning down an unsafe assignment or opting for the true Safety Zones that require NO fire shelters.
"They called you the black sheep. Not because you were wrong - but because you were different. While the herd followed the path without question, you paused. Looked up. Listened to the wind. And whispered, “There must be another way.” The black sheep doesn’t blend in. Not because they can’t… But because they won’t. They’ve seen too many cliffs disguised as traditions. Too many cages called “normal.” So they step out. Alone, maybe. But awake. They ruffle feathers. Stir waters. Break silence. And sometimes - they build the bridges the flock never knew it needed. To every black sheep out there: You are the quiet revolution. The shift in the pattern. The wild note in the chorus. You don’t need to fit in. You were born to stand out - and lead forward."
Figure 13. Black Sheep Screenshot Source: Marvin Coronel, Facebook
Aligning with the spot-on Black Sheep maxim above, consider now the lessons learned statement of Steve Karkanen performing as a USFS Lolo NF Engine Strike Team Crewmember & Sawyer on the 1985 Butte Fire before his subsequent promotion and life-changing experience as the eventual Montana USFS Lolo Hot Shot Superintendent (1990-2011):
"I think I got religion early on in my career, even before I was a superintendent. I got involved in a burnover on the Butte Fire. I rode it out in a safety zone. …We still had to deal with an ugly situation for eight hours: … we were trapped. It was a crown fire, 300-foot flame lengths rolling around us. We were stuck in a good spot, thankfully, but it was uncomfortable: and it was a situation where we told by a strike team leader that we would be fine, when the reality of it was, had we had our act together and had good lookouts posted we [could] have driven or walked away and within 15 minutes been completely out of the fire area. There was no reason for us to have been there, for any of those folks to have been there. From that day on, I swore I would never put the people I was responsible for – and I was just a firefighter at the time, in 1985 – I never wanted to be in that position where I was going to be burned over. Never." Source: Angie Tom (Goodreads) The Supe's Handbook – Leadership Lessons From America’s Hotshot Crews. pp. 168-169.
Karkanen stated early on in the Staff Ride video: "It did leave me with a deep mistrust of overhead Teams," which generated some deep management discussions about whether his "controversial" statement should even be allowed in the video. This author made a similar comment at the time, however, the powers-to-be felt it was unworthy for video inclusion. Karkanen comments later in the video discussion about the intensifying fire weather, fire behavior, and human factors, also well worth viewing, when he states: "I've been all over the country in my career as a HS Supt. and seen some tremendous fire behavior, but never experienced anything quite like what we experienced in that clearcut on that Butte Fire."
Figure 14. Former Lolo NF Engine Strike Team Leader Steve Karkanen's mistrust of IMTs Screenshot Source: WLF LLC, YouTube
Gordon Graham shares his renowned views and expertise on
critical public safety issues and truisms that were practiced and applied by those of us who failed to deploy fire shelters that day and beyond
"What’s predictable is preventable"
Leading Up In Public - Lexipol - Gordon Graham
Trust in the LORD with all your heart
and lean not on your own understanding;
in all your ways submit to him,
and he will make your paths straight.
Proverbs 3: 5-6 (NKJV)
[National Wildfire Coordination Group] (NWCG) defines Entrapment as: A situation where personnel are unexpectedly caught in a fire behavior-related, life-threatening position where planned escape routes or safety zones are absent, inadequate, or compromised. An entrapment may or may not include deployment of a fire shelter for its intended purpose. These situations may or may not result in injury. They include “near misses.” In this author's professional opinion, the operative word here in this official definition is "unexpected." So then, as long as one retreats to a safe place in anticipation of evident increased fire behavior, which is what those who retreated to the Clear Cut did, it should be considered as a key part of acceptable and safe wildland firefighting. Right?
Mull over the WFT statement below regarding FF "escape zones" about how they saved lives and prevented serious injuries bordering on "miraculous" when utilizing an Escape Route to a Safety Zone as established above as an integral part of wildland firefighting when it appears that the entire article's intent was regarding Safety Zones and Fire Shelters.
That all the firefighters in the escape zones survived without serious injury borders on the miraculous.
Military Body Bag conversations and mentions: (1) (1985) Butte Fire, Carson Hot Shot Crew EMT comments about witnessing cases of body bags at the Salmon Hospital when they were sent there to be treated for smoke inhalation; (2) the BLM Medical Unit Leader stated that normally "a hospital the size of Salmon would only have one or two of them:" (3) A DIVS we worked for on a wildland fire in Washington state on the Wenatchee NF near Lake Chelan recognized us and said "You worked on the Butte Fire ... I was your DIVS." This author inquired about the "cases of body bags," and the DIVS acknowledged that their IMT had "purchased cases of them from the military." See this author's and Jim Steele's Declarations.
Figure 14a. PHS Supt. Schoeffler lying about the alleged "200 feet" flame lengths Snippet. Source: Salmon-Challis NF Preliminary Study (SCNF PS)
Figure 14b. Jemez Eagles Squad Boss Source: SCNF PS
E. Prior to Butte Fire, 85 Shelters Deployed - on the Lake Mountain Fire
Approximately eight weeks before the Butte Fire shelter deployment incident, another multiple-shelter incident had occurred on the Salmon National Forest. ... On July 4, on the Lake Mountain Fire, a rapidly moving
fire front—“driven by unpredicted 20-30 mph winds from the south” according to the “Lake Mountain Incident Fire Shelter Deployment” report jumped fire lines. Personnel on the fire were forced into two predesignated safety zones—a rock slide area and a dozer-cleared area. ... Four hand crews deployed shelters. Two contract fallers—with only one shelter between them—had to share it. These men said that as the fire and intense heat passed directly over them they thought they were going to die. ... A dozer operator dug a trench beneath his machine and sought refuge there. ... A total of 85 firefighters entered their shelters at about 1730. The intense heat and smoke kept these people in their shelters for about two hours. (Due to smoke, dust, and strong winds, some firefighters stayed in their shelters for up to three and ½ hours.) ... The Division Supervisor said the people in the rock slide - due to its “marginal size” -experienced more heat. “One shelter was scorched yellow. Plastic canteens melted. One person’s shoelaces melted where they touched the shelter. The shelters probably saved lives,” the Division Supervisor informed. ... In the dozer-cleared safety zone, this Division Supervisor and two Strike Team Leaders did not deploy their shelters. Because the two 20-person hand crews in this safety zone were inexperienced younger (16- to 20-year-old) firefighters, these supervisory personnel realized the importance of circulating among the deployed shelters to talk and encourage these younger firefighters in an effort to keep them calm. ... “It is my opinion that the deployment of all the shelters was necessary,” the Division Supervisor told the incident’s review team. “I don’t think the panic of some of the crew members could have been controlled if they hadn’t been in their shelters. I think we would have also had some cases of smoke illness and burns from sparks and radiant heat. I experienced a sunburn-like burn on my face - which still burns some, one day later.” ... As an indication of the wildland fire culture in 1985, the “Fire Shelter Deployment, Lake Mountain Fire” review report opened with the following quote in big bold capital letters: “A DEPLOYED FIRE SHELTER
IS THE END RESULT OF AN EARLIER MISTAKE!” To see the released Lake Mountain Fire Review Report: (WLF LLC link)
"A New Problem with the Original Plan: Two Surprises
Continuing with the Butte Fire Staff Ride Preliminary Study, consider this excerpt: “But that morning we had two surprises,” Bill [Williams] explains. “First, when we flew the fire we discovered that the bottom fire line was in jeopardy. The fire was getting very active down there. It was obvious that we were going to lose that line if we didn't burn it out quickly. So that threw things off from our original plan.” ... Due to this discovery, they shifted their priorities and decided to burn out the bottom line first with the helicopter and helitorch. “That burnout operation successfully cleaned everything up. It worked great,” Bill remembers. ... He points out that the second problem that morning was the fact that one of their aerial ignition helicopter pilots quit. “He said ‘I've had it’ and just walked off,” Bill recalls. “I think he’d had a long season. So now we’re down to one helicopter instead of two—with only one helicopter to fire with. That kept us from being able to go ahead and start firing on the top line. Now, we didn’t have the option to use one ship up on top to create heat while we’re using the other one to take care of the bottom. That’s why we were still working to secure that bottom line when everything went sour.” Weather Forecast - At the August 29 morning briefing Bill remembers the meteorologist saying that the weather that day would be pretty much a carbon copy of the day before. “And, of course, we didn't have any major runs the day before,” ... Bill says. “We had small runs down in the steep chimneys in Owl Creek—but no major runs.” ... That morning, Bill also recalls how the meteorologist said that the weather that day was going to be a little more unstable. “Well,” Bill acknowledges in retrospect, “neither he nor anybody else realized what that really meant for us that day.” Later that afternoon when the fire blew-up, from Bill’s position in the helicopter, he could see eight other big smoke columns from ongoing fires on the adjacent National Forests. “All of them were standing up with strong columns.” ... Bill says that this change in atmospheric instability on the Butte Fire helped prompt the study that led to the establishment of the Haines Index, based on atmospheric instability. Sidetracked - In looking back at the events that occurred on the Butte Fire on August 29, 1985, Bill shares a personal insight. ... “In all honesty,” he confides, “I probably did get a little sidetracked from what was going on up on top because I was in that helicopter with Air Attack while we were burning out that bottom line.” ... But, after all, in the context of that morning, that was the priority—burning out the bottom line with the helitorch." Butte Fire Staff Ride Preliminary Study.
The Haines Index mentioned above has since been discredited and replaced with the Hot-Dry-Windy (HDW) standard at the behest of several notable Meteorologists and Researchers, e.g., Watts, Charney, Potter, and Srok. A New Tool For Forecasting Fire Weather. (USDA, Pacific Northwest Research Station (2020). Moreover, Darren Clabo, the State Fire Meteorologist for South Dakota, a key figure in this transition, has also publicly advocated using the Hot-Dry-Windy Index.
To be sure, this author and the Flagstaff Hot Shots were aware of the Butte Fire meteorologist's briefing on atmospheric instability and what he was referring to based on our previous wildland fire weather, fire behavior, human factors, lessons learned, from prior and ensuing experiences on several fires in 1985; that year becoming an exceptional and instructive one. During the aerial ignition operation, and once the ensuing three fire columns eventually took hold and came together as one advancing upslope column, this author called the Carson HS Crew Boss several times on the tactical frequency (TAC) and warned them of the advancing fireline coming toward them as they were preparing their alleged eventual 400' diameter dozer-constructed Safety Zone on Tin Cup Hill. The Carson HS Crew Boss responded progressively as the fire behavior increased below them: "We are improving our SZ, we are removing our shelters, and deploy, deploy." This conversation was very likely heard by most anyone and everyone on our Division monitoring that Tactical (TAC) frequency, especially the OPS (Line Boss) Bill Williams, who was flying the firelines on a helicopter recon. So then, it is most likely the case that the OPS would have known what was occurring with the increasing and advancing fire behavior and fire front, right? So then, we need to inquire: (1) Why did he fail to ask the Fireline Overhead and Crew Leaders? (2) What was going on with the visibly increasing fire behavior and Carson HS's TAC channel conversation with this author, right? Instead, you would have to ask yourselves why he would say, on the Command Channel for all to hear: "Order up every troop flying helicopter we have in Idaho. We have at least 140 fatalities?" when it was or should have been readily clear what was happening. Or was it because he knew what the overall plan was all along, including pre-planned purchase of cases of body bags from the military for the alleged deliberate intention of fire shelter deployments and possible fatalities? Do you want to believe that or would you rather perish that thought? See Schoeffler and Steele Declarations
Moreover, for those who later walked through the 400-foot diameter Tin Cup Hill Safety Zone after the turnover, they discovered that neither the wooden Tin Cup Hill sign, wooden fire tool handles, nor the grass on Tin Cup Hill ever burned. So then, all those who deployed fire shelters there could have (and should have) merely moved around to different areas of the SZ to avoid the heat pulses. Or is that Hindsight Bias and that pesky wished I-wouda-coulda thinking?
Be of the same mind towards one another.
Do not set your mind on high things, but associate with the humble.
Do not be wise in your own opinion.
Romans 12:16 (NKJV)
Problems scream for attention while successes only whisper.
We're wired to chase whatever is loudest.
Farnam Street Insights
Your biggest opportunity isn't hiding in what's broken;
it's hiding in what's working that you've stopped noticing.
Farnam Street Insights
On August 30, 1985, the day after the fire shelter deployments, this author injured his knee, went to the hospital, was x-rayed, and diagnosed with a knee injury, which provided a veiled opportunity to remain on the fire and wrangle a position in Equipment timekeeping after ducking out of three scheduled flights back to the Southwest Region. During that time, and a few days after the fire shelter deployments, this author was asked to go to the IMT Communications tent for something. During that time, this author overheard one of the Investigators on the phone with someone else, stating something to the effect of, i.e., paraphrasing: 'There were a lot of f**k-ups on this fire. And we are going to make sure that the Report says that the Overhead did a good job and that the fire shelters worked and saved lives.' Interestingly, and allegedly intentionally, that phrase and portions of it would become an integral part of the overall Regional SAIT-SAIR Investigation, National Review, and other related documentation about the fire. See Schoeffler Declaration.
Consider now Figure 15. below regarding the Forest Fire Shelters Save Lives Snippets from the three-page Fire Management Notes article by Missoula Equipment Development Center Foresters & Equipment Specialists Art Jukala and Ted Putnam (1986). And they also mention the little-known July 4, 1985, Lake Mountain Fire (WLF LLC), where 82 FFs deployed fire shelters under "non-life threatening ... saving a few lives" circumstances, and yet it's important to know that we were never informed about this earlier Lake Mountain Fire at any of the several Butte Fire briefings. In contrast, we were a major part of the August 29, 1985, Butte Fire, when and where several of those WFs who deployed fire shelters adamantly stated: "The shelters saved our lives. We had no alternative ... we would've never made it without the shelter. shelters ... No question about it. No shelter, no walk out of there ... Mortality might have been 75% or more without the shelter ... "We have learned a lot from our investigation of the Butte Fire entrapments and want [FFs] to know the role fire shelters played and how they can increase their chance of survival."
Figure 15. Fire Shelters Save Lives Screenshot from the Fire Management Notes Source: Missoula Equipment Development Center (MTDC)
Ted Putnam and Art Jukala Figure 15. excerpts regarding fire shelters: “We estimate that the fire shelter has saved more than 140 lives since its introduction in the early 1960s. The main reason the fire shelter saves lives is because it gives firefighters a way to protect face and airways. Breathing flames and hot gases is the greatest hazard in fire entrapment; thus protecting face and airways is vital. This cannot be stressed enough.” ... We also believe the more you know about the fire shelter, the more confidence you’ll have in it, and the better prepared you’ll be to stay put in your shelter should you ever become entrapped.” ... “We have learned a lot from our investigation of the Butte Fire entrapments and want firefighters to know about the role the fire shelter played and how they can increase their chance of survival. ... The shelter clearly demonstrated its value in this and other recent incidents. However, investigation of this incident, together with other known problems, reinforces the need for development work to further improve the shelter. ... Steps need to be taken to ensure that contract sawyers, dozer operators, National Guard truck drivers, and others who are required to carry them, know how to deploy and use the fire shelter.”
Unlike the masses, intellectuals have a taste for rationality and interest in facts. Their critical habit of mind makes them resistant to the kind of propaganda that works so well on the majority.
~ Aldous Huxley
Consider now the Figures 16-22 series of nine Snippets below of the Jan. 3, 1986, USFS Toiyabe NF "Long Tom Complex Fire Review" from the Deputy Forest Supervisor and Review Team Leader James A. Lawrence with a "C.C." to Jerry Monesmith [Washington Office] (WO), Dick Flannely (WO), and Bert Strom, Boise NF, containing the "Objectives, Situation, Issue No. 5: Fire spread prediction did not come close to actual spread on Aug. 29, Issue No. 6: fire spread analysis did not project a burnover. Issue No. 7: The crews were not warned in sufficient time to evacuate. Issue No. 9: Qualifications and performance requirements of the Medical Unit Leader are not adequate. Issue No. 11. Inadequate information exists on the human physiological effects of firefighting."
On the contrary, regarding the Issue No. 7 above, the Payson, Flagstaff, Carson, and Mormon Lake Hot Shots, and our STL were, in fact, "warned in insufficient time" regarding the obvious developing fire weather and ensuing fire behavior "in time to evacuate."
Definitely look into and earnestly ask yourselves and others about their Cause 3. "Forest Supervisors remind overhead teams to carefully monitor weather conditions throughout the burning periods to determine any necessary adjustments to fire behavior predictions" and for sure the Cause 4. Alternative 1. regarding this one: "Forest Supervisors ensure fire teams follow 10 standard fire orders at all times."
It is this author's personal and professional opinion that the Butte Fire Medical Unit Leader, Jan Henderson (Peterson) (RiP) did an exceptional all-around job under the circumstances.
Please ensure that you and those that you supervise seriously question Commendation No. 5. regarding "Outstanding decision making and independent action was taken by Strike Team Leaders (STL) and Crew Bosses involved in deployment of fire shelters" especially since one of the STLs admitted in his interviews and statements that it was his second time in a fire shelter and the Jemez Eagles Crew Boss admitted to four times in a fire shelter; and wanting them redesigned with small windows so that supervisors could more easily check on their Crews. And that this author warned the Carson HS several times to come down to the Clear Cut and the STL to stay in the clear cut because the fire was going to come out. And they ignored our warnings and went on up to their eventual respective Deployment Zones.
Be sure to note the Other Comments - Item 4. regarding the personnel placing themselves where shelters would be relied upon as safety factors, when, in fact, they did just that. And of course Item 5. "All shelter deployments were necessary, not precautionary" assertion, and then seriously ask rhetorically, and then question yourselves how accurate that conclusion is based on the several comments of those that deployed. And then ask whether it is legitimate or merely rhetorical legerdemain?
Figures 16. - 24. Long Tom Complex Fire Review Snippets Source: WLF LLC
All shelter deployments were necessary,
not precautionary
A Safety Zone is "officially" defined as an area where no fire shelter is needed. See Butler's (2014) in-depth International Journal of Wildland Fire research paper titled: Wildland firefighter safety zones: a review of past science and summary of future needs
The Butte Fire Investigation Team member paraphrased necessary shelter deployments quote above and this author's Declaration while he was overheard talking on the phone in the IMT Communications tent mirrors the FRAMES (1986) conclusion here: "Thanks to preparation of safety zones, the effectiveness of the fire shelters, and the sensible behavior of the firefighters themselves, disaster was averted indicates the crucial role of preparedness and firefighter actions in preventing a more significant disaster." Indeed, that mirroring of statements should alert the majority of you FFs and WFs that are somewhat-informed or well-informed truth seekers regarding the establishment of the conclusion first, and then - and only then - the alleged "facts" to fit pattern of the faux investigations as Dr. Curt Braun, the Human Factors individual on the 1996 Hochderffer Hills Fire on the Coconino NF, shelter deployment investigator told us. The author was performing as the OPS on this investigation and responded that we could write anything we wanted based on that logical fallacy.
"Order up every troop-flying helicopter we have in Idaho.
We have at least 140 fatalities."
Operations (OPS) Bill Williams Aug. 29, 1985, afternoon on the Command Channel
Any one of you with wildland fire experience would think that OPS Bill Williams must have heard us talking on the Tactical Channel (TAC) all day long. So then, why did he fail to ask those of us on the firelines, e.g. Fireline Overhead or any of us on the firelines, about what we were seeing and talking about and what was going on with the obviously increasing fire behavior that he and the rest of us had been observing, right? You would clearly be thinking and have to ask yourselves why he would have to say "Order up every troop-flying helicopter we have in Idaho. We have at least 140 fatalities" when it was - or should have been - extremely clear what was happening.
Figure 17. Albert Einstein enemy of truth quote Snippet. Source FaceBook
Behavior of the Life Threatening 1985 Butte Fire - Richard Rothermel & Robert W. Mutch (FMT link)
Alexander, M. E. 1991. The 1985 Butte fire in central Idaho: a Canadian perspective on the associated burning conditions. In: Nodvin, S. C.; Waldrop, T. A., eds. Fire and the environment: ecological and cultural perspectives, proceedings of an international symposium; 1990 March 20-24; Knoxville, TN. Gen. Tech. Rep. GTR-SE-69. Asheville, NC: USDA Forest Service, Southeastern Forest Experiment Station. p. 334-343.
Consider now select Screenshots from the following in-depth Canadian research paper: The 1985 Butte fire in central Idaho: a Canadian perspective on the associated burning conditions - M. Alexander (1991)
Figure 18. The 1985 Butte Fire in Central Idaho: A Canadian Perspective on the Burning Conditions Screenshot Source: Alexander, Canadian Fire
1985 Butte Fire Entrapment Summary of Findings (Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center link)
Butte Fire Entrapment (Amazon Web Services)
1985 Long Tom Complex Fire Review (Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center link)
Forest Fire Shelters Save Lives - Fire Management Notes article - Ted Putnam and Art Jukala (Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center link) (1986)
"Experienced firefighters know the best way to ensure their safety on a wildfire is to avoid entrapment. But when drought conditions and severe fire weather combine, as they did on the Butte Fire, avoiding entrapment is not always possible. Several people we interviewed said that before being trapped on the Butte Fire, they felt they would never let themselves get into such a situation and need a fire shelter." Researchers M. M. Omodei, J. McLennan, C. Reynolds noted in their research paper: "However, in light of the interview requirements for eliciting detailed information on human factors (outlined in this paper) it is unlikely that the protracted and formal nature of such investigations allow the underlying psychological states and processes to be adequately identified, let alone investigated."
A review of US wildland firefighter entrapments: trends, important environmental factors and research needs. Page, Freeborn, Butler, and Jolly. International Journal of Wildland Fire (2019) 28, 551–569
Findings from the Wildland Firefighters Human Factors Workshop: Improving Wildland Firefighter Performance Under Stressful, Risky Conditions: Toward Better Decisions on the Firelines and More Resilient Organizations. Dr. Ted Punam, et al (1995)
Naturalistic Decision Making and Wildland Firefighting (aka Slides)
Klein et al audio clips on RPDM, critical thinking, and intuition.
Gary Klein, Ph.D., Klein Associates Inc. 582 E. Dayton-Yellow Springs Road. Fairborn, OH 45324; (513) 873-8166.
Klein states: "The Recognition-Primed Decision Model [RPDM] describes what people actually do when they make difficult decisions. ... This has many implications for training and helping people make decisions under stressful situations. It can also help explain the factors behind bad decisions. ... The standard method of decision making is the rational choice model. Under this model, the decision maker generates a range of options and a set of criteria for evaluating each option, assigns weights to the criteria, rates each option, and calculates which option is best. This is a general, comprehensive, and quantitative model which can be applied reliably to many situations. ... Unfortunately, this model is impractical. People making decisions under time pressure, such as fire fighters, don’t have the time or information to generate options and the criteria to rate each option. ... The rational choice model is also too general. It fits each situation vaguely, but no situation exactly. The worst news is that in studies in which people have been asked to follow the rational choice model exactly, the decisions they come up with have been worse than decisions they make when they simply use their own experience base. This model is of little value to training because it does not apply to most naturalistic settings or to how people actually make decisions when faced with complex situations under time pressure. Decision aids which have been produced to assist with the application of the rational choice model have been largely ineffective. ... Because of these drawbacks, a field emerged called Naturalistic Decision Making (see Table 1). This field emerged because governmental sponsors such as NASA, FAA, the military, and others realized that they had spent a lot of money and built decision models that did not work in the field. They wanted to get away from building analytical models which didn’t work when they were brought into action. Naturalistic Decision Making uses expert decision makers, and tries to find out what they actually go through in their decision making process. ... Instead of restricting decision making to the “moment of choice,” experts are asked about planning, situational awareness, and problem solving to find out how these all fit together. This model is used to understand how people face decisions in shifting and unclear situations and under high stakes. Team interactions and organizational constraints with high stakes are also used as factors. For years, researchers had been simply asking college sophomores what they would do given a set of options, and a clear goal. ... For Naturalistic Decisionmaking research, experts are asked to size up actual situations, using all cues and constraints to set goals and make decisions. ... The first study I performed to generate models and training recommendations for decision making under pressure and certainty was a study for the Army. The Army Research Institute wanted some data on decision making in real, stressful situations, and I thought that urban firefighters would be a good example of people who had become experts at making such decisions. We studied commanders who had about 20 years of experience, and studied the most difficult cases they had. Of the cases we studied, there was an average of five changes in the fire and in the way it had to be handled. About 80 percent of the decisions were made in less than a minute. As we started the study, we found that each expert firefighter told us that they had never made any decisions. ... They explained that they simply followed procedures. But as we listened, we realized that in each case, there was one option which they thought of quickly. ... They evaluated that one option, and if it seemed viable, they went ahead with it. We began to wonder how they came up with that first option and how they were able to evaluate one option without others for comparison. The strategy used by the firefighters is the basis for the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) Model (see Figure 1). consists of a simple match, where decision makers experience a situation and match it to a typical situation with which they already have experience. … Because of this, they know what to expect. They know what’s going to happen, they know what the relevant cues are, what the plausible goals are, and a typical action. They are able to do all of this because of their experience base. Experience buys them the ability to size up a situation and know what is going on and how to react. That’s what decision researchers weren’t learning when they studied college sophomores who didn’t have an experience base. … An example of the first level of the RPD model is a firefighter I interviewed early in the process. He explained to me that he never made decisions. After trying to press him on the issue, I asked him to describe the last fire he was in. He told a story of a fairly conventional fire. … He described parking the truck, getting out his hoses, and going into the house. … I asked him why he went into the house instead of simply working from outside, as I would have been tempted to do. … He explained that he obviously had to go in because if he [attacked] it from the outside, he would just spread it deeper inside the house. He took into account the nature of the fire, the distance of the house from other buildings, and the structure of the house. But, even while he was attending to these conditions, he never saw himself as making a decision. … He never experienced that there was another option. He immediately saw what needed to be done and did it. … The second level of the model includes diagnosing the situation. On this level, expectancies are violated. The firefighter is trying to build a story to diagnose the event, and when evidence doesn’t fit the story, the firefighter has to come up with a new scenario which fits the new evidence. There is still no comparing of options. … On the third level, decision makers evaluate the course of action they have chosen. Originally, we weren’t sure how people could evaluate single options if they had no other options to compare it to. As we looked through the materials we were getting, we found that a decision maker would evaluate an option by playing it out in his/her head. If it worked, they would do it, if it didn’t, they would modify it, and if modifications failed, they would throw it out. In the incidents we studied, commanders simply generated each option and then evaluated it for viability. Usually the first option an experienced firefighter generated was a viable option, but they understand that they should simply be satisfying, not optimizing. They will not necessarily pick the best option. … They will pick the first one which is possible and involves minimal risk. … The first viable option is chosen and improved upon, if necessary. It is not compared with all other options to see which one will be best. As soon as it is deemed viable, it is chosen and applied. … Naturalistic Decision Making has implications for training.Decision training needs to teach people to deal with ambiguous, confusing situations, with time stress and conflicting information. Situation awareness, pattern matching, cue learning, and typical cases and anomalies can be taught by giving people a bigger experience base. Training could teach decision makers how to construct effective mental models and time horizons and how to manage under conditions of uncertainty and time pressure. … Methods for providing better training include changes in such things as ways of designing training scenarios. Another strategy is to provide cognitive feedback within After-Action Reviews. This would do more than point out the mistakes which were made in an exercise. It would be an attempt to show decision makers what went wrong with their size up, and why. Another method would include cognitive modeling and showing expert/novice contrasts. This would be done by allowing novice decision makers to watch experts. Novice decision makers would also benefit by learning about common decision failures. On the Job Training should be emphasized rather than simply assuming that once the traditional training is finished, decision makers are ready to begin to function proficiently. Test and evaluation techniques and training device specification could also be improved. All of these might have an effect on the ability of firefighters to deal with stressful situations. … Why is it that people do make bad decisions? I looked through a database of decisions to identify reasons behind bad decisions. We came up with 25 decisions which were labeled as poor. … Of those, three main reasons for bad decisions emerged. By far, the most prominent reason was lack of experience. A smaller number of poor decisions were due to a lack of timely information. The third factor was a de minimus explanation. In this situation, the decision maker misinterprets the situation, all the information is available, but the decision maker finds ways to explain each clue away, and persists in the mistaken belief. … The problem of lack of experience has many effects (see Figure 2). … Inexperienced decision makers lack the understanding of situations to be able to see problems and judge the urgency of a situation, and properly judge the feasibility of a course of action. These are skills which could be developed to improve decision making. … The field of Naturalistic Decision Making research is more appropriate than traditional decision making models for understanding how crisis managers, such as firefighters, handle difficult conditions such as time pressure and uncertainty. We have broadened our focus from the moment of choice, to take into account situation awareness, planning, and problem solving. By so doing, we have gained a stronger vantage point for understanding errors and for designing training interventions."
An Analysis of Decision Making in Wildland Firefighting. FEMA (1997)
The Naturalistic Decision Making Approach. What we have learned by studying cognition in the wild. Psychology Today. Gary Klein PhD. (2016)
Identifying Why Even Well-Trained Firefighters Make Unsafe Decisions: A Human Factors Interview Protocol - Eighth International Wildland Fire Safety Summit (April 26-28, 2005) Missoula, MT.
Behavior of the life-threatening Butte Fire: August 27-29, 1985. Fire Research & Management Exchange System (FRAMES) Authors Richard C. Rothermel & Robert W. Mutch (1986) On August 29, 1985, 73 firefighters were forced into safety zones, where they took refuge in their fire shelters for 1 to 2 hours while a very severe crown fire burned over them. The incident took place on the Butte Fire on the Salmon National Forest in Idaho. Five firefighters were hospitalized overnight for heat exhaustion, smoke inhalation, and dehydration; the others escaped uninjured.
"Investigators estimated that without the protection of the escape zones and the fire shelters, at least 60 of the 73 firefighters would have died. Thanks to preparation of safety zones, the effectiveness of the fire shelters, and the sensible behavior of the firefighters themselves, disaster was averted. It is referenced within the FRAMES link under "Synthesis of Knowledge of Extreme Fire Behavior: Volume I for Fire Managers" (Werth et al, 2011).
A Google AI search somewhat misplaced response to "That all the firefighters in the escape zones survived without serious injury borders on the miraculous," referring to Escape Zones instead of Safety Zones. Of course, you will always need to follow your Escape Routes to your Safety Zones. However, the whole Butte Fire Shelter Deployment issue was about Safety Zones and fire shelters saving lives. The statement suggests that the Butte Fire incident was unusually survivable, bordering on miraculous, for the firefighters who sought refuge in escape zones, especially considering the severity of the fire. While no specific details about the Butte Fire incident are mentioned, the statement implies a near-miraculous outcome of firefighters surviving without serious injuries in what would normally be a high-risk situation." The statement is from the Butte Fire Staff Ride Preliminary Report. FMT Vol. 3 (2003), indicating a discussion about the Butte Fire. Consider now the renowned rabble-rouser Butte Fire Branch Director J.D. Shindler and his hard-to-find to find in-depth paper titled: Evaluating the Potential Risk Communication with the New Generation Fire Shelter. He would often refer to the daily fire behavior as "The charge of the Rhino." Based on FF and WF interviews regarding fire shelters and human factors, he also admonished us to "Tell the truth. The truth is what we teach. Instruct and train our firefighters to avoid deployment situations."
Figure 19. Evaluating the Potential Risk Communication with the New Generation Fire Shelter Snippet. Source: USFS, Dan Shindler
Consider now several worthy quotes just below from the distinguished authors Tarvis, C. & Aronso, E. (2000) Mistakes Were Made (But Not By Me) Why We Justify Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions, and Hurtful Acts.
“Most people, when directly confronted by evidence that they are wrong, do not change their point of view or course of action but justify it even more tenaciously. Even irrefutable evidence is rarely enough to pierce the mental armor of self-justification. ... We need a few trusted naysayers in our lives, critics who are willing to puncture our protective bubble of self-justifications and yank us back to reality if we veer too far off. This is especially important for people in positions of power. ... In the horrifying calculus of self-deception, the greater the pain we inflict on others, the greater the need to justify it to maintain our feelings of decency and self-worth. ... When two people produce entirely different memories of the same event, observers usually assume that one of them is lying. […] But most of us, most of the time, are neither telling the whole truth nor intentionally deceiving. We aren’t lying; we are self-justifying. All of us, as we tell our stories, add details and omit inconvenient facts; we give the tale a small, self-enhancing spin; that spin goes over so well that the next time we add a slightly more dramatic embellishment; we justify that little white lie as making the story better and clearer – until what we remember may not have happened that way, or even may not have happened at all. […] History is written by the victors, and when we write our own histories, we do so just as the conquerors of nations do: to justify our actions and make us look and feel good about ourselves and what we did or what we failed to do. If mistakes were made, memory helps us remember that they were made by someone else.”
A scoundrel plots evil, and on their lips it is like a scorching fire.
Proverbs 16:27 (NKJV)
There is a way that appears to be right, but in the end it leads to death.
Proverbs 16:25 (NKJV)
"We are all capable of believing things which we know to be untrue, and then, when we are finally proved wrong, impudently twisting the facts so as to show that we were right. Intellectually, it is possible to carry on this process for an indefinite time: the only check on it is that sooner or later a false belief bumps up against solid reality, usually on a battlefield."
George Orwell, 1946
The 1985 wildland fire season was a watershed experience beyond comprehension at the time because it exhibited so many aggressive to extreme, bizarre wildland fire weather, fire behavior, human and psychological factors, burnovers, entrapments, fire shelter deployments, near-death experiences, and fatalities. Because of that, the renowned Payson Hot Shots added a 19th Watch Out 19. We aptly coined it "Death From Above," e.g., Overhead, trees, rocks (Gravity), powerlines, aircraft, aerial ignition, weather modification. The overhead prong was the most controversial because they thought we meant “they” were intentionally doing things to kill FFs and WFs, when, in fact, it was because of their often alleged arrogant, dangerous attitudes, actions, and failures to accept the fact that the tried-and-true Rules of Engagement and Entrapment Avoidance Principles were the responsible elements, and the Overhead failed to realize them.
The Deep Survival - True Stories of Miraculous Endurance and Sudden Death author Laurence Gonzales (Leadership Under Fire) coined the phrase: "Gravity is on duty all the time." (AZ Quotes)
Figure 20. (left) Standards for Survival Snippet. Source: Red Bubble
Figure 20a. (right) Standards for Survival NWCG FF training video (1980s) Screenshot Source: WLF LLC
The title question will be deferred to Part 3: On The Aug. 29, 1985, Salmon NF (ID) Butte Fire IMT Aerial Ignition Firing Operation Entrapped 118 WFs & FFs, 73 Required Fire Shelters. Is There Proof Of Pre-Purchasing Cases of Military Body Bags?
Part 1:
Part 2:
Part 3:
part 1 recording: https://youtube.com/live/vZOm6_lXwgc?feature=share
rest of posts saved as PDF by FJS 8-6-25 vs. recording due to Joy's health.
Declaration:
Recording of Declaration:
Fred J. Schoeffler served as the Superintendent (Crew Boss) of the Payson Hotshot Crew during the 1985 Butte Fire on the Salmon National Forest.
Jim Steele
Jim Steele held the role of Division Supervisor (DIVS) on Division A, functioning in an overhead supervisory capacity rather than as a member of a specific crew.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1FuWyE0-BHI This Channel on YouTube has their account showing ZERO comments when it is obvious I made many- so placing them here and if anyone else leaves a comment on that video- you also can place your comments freely on this comment area. They are unable to allow people to freely share or maybe it is YouTube or Unknowns doing it but I left comments:
I watched the old videos just now...I can comprehend now...sounds like compartmentalizing...and we address those topics when we do...I do that for my own fire. And I am just a housewife..this was their professional life
I have reviewed the declarations presented in these posts and was present for the "live", yet I remain unable to fully comprehend the underlying reasoning for their dissemination all these decades later except to tell their story. That is okay. I reckon. What tangible benefit or objective did they serve? The approach appears somewhat unconventional. It is conceivable that this originates from an internal whistleblower possibly seeking to highlight historical oversights; however, given that these events transpired four decades ago, the timing prompts questions regarding its current relevance. Ultimately, I find it challenging to endorse this content, as my considered advice is to prioritize more pressing contemporary matters that demand our collective attention. I want to be there for people,…
https://youtube.com/live/vZOm6_lXwgc?feature=share
Honorable Governor Hobbs-
I am writing as a concerned citizen and advocate for wildland firefighters to urge your support in reevaluating the Wildland Firefighter Protection Act, introduced in 2023(also the 2025 -S. 160). This legislation, aimed at enhancing safety standards, compensation, and health protections for firefighters, warrants renewed examination in light of both historical and recent wildfire events that underscore persistent vulnerabilities in our nation's fire management systems.
As an advocate for understanding wildland fire and aviation trends across the United States and internationally, I have been deeply engaged in collecting and analyzing historical and current wildfire data. My goal is to ensure that accurate, authoritative information—such as that from the National Interagency Fire Center or Arizona’s Department of Forestry…