Did the ERAU Meteorologists’ and Academics’ Joint June 27-30, 2013, Wildland Fire Weather Research Answer How Anomalous Weather Events Added to the YH Fire GMHS & June 2026 Knowles WF Deaths?
6 days ago
75 min read
Updated: 18 minutes ago
Restating the post title due to the Wix title restriction: Did the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ. (ERAU) Meteorologists’ and Academics’ Collaborative June 27-30, 2013, Wildland Fire Weather Research Finally Answer How Anomalous Weather Events Contributed to the Yarnell Hill Fire 19 Prescott FD GMHS Deaths and the several June 27, 2026, Knowles, Gore, and Snyder Fire(s) Helitack Fatalities?
Fred J. Schoeffler and contributing authors
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This entire post is the personal and professional opinion of Fred J. Schoeffler. It is commentary on a matter of public concern. It is not a finding of fact by a court, a board of inquiry, an agency, or this site. Where the author uses words such as cover-up, whitewash, fatally messed up, clearly predictable and preventable, Groupthink, rogue firing operations, or banality of evil, those phrases are his personal and professional characterizations, rather than established legal or official conclusions. Readers should treat every such phrase as such unless the sentence names a specific public report, FOIA record, map, radio log, or other cited source and quotes what that source actually says. Named individuals remain identified only as the author chooses to discuss them. Nothing here is a charge, a verdict, or a claim that any named person committed a crime. If a sentence reads as an accusation, it is still the author’s personal and professional opinion unless a cited record states the same thing in those words. This website avoids adopting the author’s personal and professional conclusions. For official accounts, read the official SAIT/SAIR, ADOSH, and the primary records the author cites. This disclaimer is far from legal advice, so consider it accordingly.
Abbreviations: Wildland Firefighters (WFs), Firefighters (FFs), Smokejumpers (SJ). Yarnell Hill Fire (YH Fire), Prescott Fire Dept. (PFD), Granite Mountain Hot Shots, Granite Mountain, Granite (GMHS, GMIHC), Hot Shots (HS), Blue Ridge IHC/Hot Shots (BRHS), US Forest Service (USFS), Bureau of Land Mgmt. (BLM), US Wildland Fire Service (USWFS), Serious Accident Team (SAIT) & Serious Accident Team Report (SAIR), AZ Dept. Occupational Health & Safety (ADOSH), Cardinal Directions, Incident Response Pocket Guide (IRPG), PowerPoint (PPT), Escape Route(s) (ER), Safety Zone(s) (SZ), Eric Marsh Foundation (EMF), AZ State Forestry (ASF), Dept. of Forestry and Fire Management (DFFM), Facebook (FB), Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center (WLF LLC), InvestigativeMEDIA (IM), Yarnell Hill Fire Revelations website (YHFR)
All emphasis is added unless otherwise noted.
Authors: Fred J. Schoeffler and contributing others
[The blog administrator is not affiliated with this post or any content published after April 2, 2025, and bears no responsibility whatsoever for it.]
Figure 1. The ignoble, fatal June 2013 Yarnell and June 2026 Knowles, Gore, and Snyder Wildfires. Source: YHFR Gallery (left), Hot Shot Wakeup (right)
For the benefit of all of you dedicated, diligent, intelligent, prescient, and serious-minded FFs and WFs like yourselves, we respectfully implore you to make and take the crucially necessary time to judiciously wend your way through the many articles, links, research papers, statements, and quotes concerning this YHFR post title question regarding the historic June 30, 2013, wildland fire weather to become more literate to accurately come to your own personal/professional conclusion(s) drawn, and decipher incomplete lessons learned, on both of these alleged equally predictable and preventable June 30, 2013, YH Fire and GMHS debacle, and the June 27, 2026, Knowles, Gore, and Snyder Fire(s) Helitack Fatalities. And the worthy, and yet fairly unknown, Australian (AU) bushfire Dead Man Zone (WordPress.com): AU fire service officials codified it as the bushfire boundary area that will inevitably burn within five minutes if wind conditions change suddenly. "An extremely dangerous place to be," where they claim to strictly forbid placing Bushfire-fighters, FFs, and WFs under high-risk conditions. Please educate yourselves on the Dead-Man Zone - a neglected area of firefighter safety (YouTube video).
Figure 1b. GMHS last (publicly released) video, June 30, 2013, approx. 4 PM, YH Fire, GMHS SZ. Source: GMHS MacKenzie (RiP)
"Sept. 28, 2013. [GMHS] Christopher MacKenzie shot these last two video clips shortly after 4:00 p.m. on June 30, 2013. These are the last images of the [GMHS] before they tragically died fighting the [YH] Fire at approx. 4:50 p.m." Key evidence in the Yarnell Hill Fire tragedy never provided to investigators. (Dec 16, 2015, Dougherty, IM) Oct. 2018 (Outside magazine, 2018): [YH Fire Investigator] Mayhew plays the video and, at one point, jumps in a way that looks like an edit. “People seized on that and said we’d doctored the clip, ... They discounted the entire investigation because they thought they’d caught us in a lie.” ... [It was two separate, back-to-back video clips, each precisely 9.24 seconds long. Honestly, you must ask yourselves, who takes exactly 9.24-second video clips? Nobody!] "Many [FFs] don’t trust investigations. History gave them good reasons. That’s because for a long time they went out and created reasons to blame workers,' ... One blog still active today has tens of thousands of comments. [And yes, we've humbly claimed this as factual on the IM Blog since 2018 and/or our enlightening YHFR website, best viewed on a laptop or PC!] ... some of those ideas have infected fire culture, ... constantly having to correct dangerous misperceptions. "It’s comforting to think, ‘I never would have done that. I’m not like them, ... They were just [FFs], and we’re just [FFs].'” (Outside, 2018). "He thinks the way to learn from Yarnell is to ask [FFs] to put themselves in [GMHS’s] boots and ask what could have lured them to make the same choice. On this point, he’s bullish. “They were trying to save lives, ... They knew people were threatened down there. That must have weighed on them.” His conclusion was allegedly, virtually confirmed here (YHFR, 2023): What Fatality and "Prescott Way" Causal Factors Does PFD Wildland BC Willis Reveal in the July 2013 GMHS Deployment Zone News Conference?
“For if anyone thinks himself to be something,
when he is nothing, he deceives himself.”
Galatians 6:3 (NKJV)
"Who controls the past controls the future:
who controls the present controls the past.”
George Orwell
Figure 1c. June 30, 2013, idealized image of the South-to-North shifting winds indicating fire weather/behavior that should and would have been visible to the GMHS below their SZ. Source: AZ Republic
Praise the Lord and pass the ammunition! Thank you, Sweet Lord Jesus, for the wildland fire weather, fire behavior, and human factors for this extremely pertinent June 30, 2013, Fig.1c. Kudos to the AZ Republic Staff and Digital Copies Guy Carl for his particularly knowledgeable assistance, patience, and persistence in calmly and steadfastly guiding this author through the maze-like trek here on their website! (www.newspapers.com)
Figure 2. Tried-and-true & Watch Outs (left). Fig. 2a. USFS "5100-16" file designation Snippet of a Fire Orders shield circa 1977. (right) Note that Fire Order No. 4 mentions only Escape Routes, without Safety Zones (right). Sources: NWCG, IRPG (left); Natl. Museum of USFS History website (right)
The glaring significance of Figs. 2. & 2a. is the fact that, circa 1977, there are only ERs mentioned, with no mention of Fire Order No. 4. SZs, compared to the Fire Order No. 4. noted in Fig. 2. above. Consider the article: Retired Forester Frustrated With Lack Of Fire-Fighting Common Sense (Cowboy State Daily, Brauneis, 2020). Please critically discuss and ponder this former USFS Hot Shot, SJ's ostensibly Original Fire Orders, obviously in a logical, progressive order for a reason, right? They logically start with fire weather and gradually, systematically progress to fighting fire safely. You can imagine the Attack of the Good Idea People's version, leading to its logical conclusion: fight fire aggressively first, and then the current weather forecasts last!? That could and should include death, destruction, and mayhem! Consider Former Prineville HS Foreman Bryan Scholz's bold, accurate assessment: The 10 Standard Firefighting Orders and 18 Watch Out Situations: We Don’t Bend Them, We Don’t Break Them, We Don’t Know Them. His criticism sparked former Natl. USFS Health & Safety Officer Larry Sutton's ire, countering with this rather bold assertion. "There is no such thing as a “safety guarantee” in the dynamic wildland fire environment." From Another Perspective—The 10s, 18s, and Fire Doctrine. (FMT, 2010) And his Norwegian (Norddjurs Libraries).
F —Fight fire aggressively but provide for safety first.
I —Initiate all action based on current and expected fire behavior.
R —Recognize current weather conditions and obtain forecasts.
E —Ensure instructions are given and understood.
O —Obtain current information on fire status.
R —Remain in communication with crew members, your supervisor, and adjoining forces.
D —Determine safety zones and escape routes.
E —Establish lookouts at all times.
R —Retain control at all times.
S —Stay alert, keep calm, think clearly, act decisively.
Researcher Jennifer Ziegler noted these immediately above reversed Fire Orders version in 1994, coinciding with the fatal South Canyon Fire (CO, BLM, 1994) when 14 highly experienced and skilled WFs were killed. Those of us who were acutely aware of and concerned about Skookum Hot Shots, SJs, and other knowledgeable FFs and WFs hopped onto this posthaste and, in the long run, did our level best to collectively address and correct this near-disastrous blunder by the alleged self-anointed, self-appointed almighty Powers-to-Be. One takeaway is that the definition, mention, and even the notion of "Safety Zones" were basically non-existent. The WFT article (accessed 2026) also includes a YouTube video. Her worthy research is extensive, including titles like A Genealogy of Wildland Firefighters and 10 Standard Fire Orders (Taylor & Francis, accessed 2026).
"An individual’s reality model, as a rule, will be both incomplete and wrong. People are most inclined to insist that they are right when they are wrong and when they are beset by uncertainty. The ability to admit ignorance or mistaken assumptions is indeed a sign of wisdom, and most individuals in the thick of complex situations are not, or not yet, wise.” (The Logic of Failure by Dietrich Dörner (ResearchGate, 1990), a German professor specializing in cognitive psychology/complex systems.)
Fuels, Weather, Topography, and Fire Behavior. At a basic level, FFs and WFs discuss wildland fires in terms of fuels and what is burning: fuel type, fuel loading, fuel availability, and live and/or dead material, including structures (a tree with many doors). Weather is the most variable, with nighttime temperatures most critical; Watch Out No. 14 (Weather becoming hotter & drier) being one of the absolute worst, in this author's professional opinion! [FMT] article (63 Summer 2003) titled "A Key to Blowup Conditions in the Southwest?" His research holds: "A deadly one-two combination of an unusually warm night followed by a warm day may indicate blowup fire conditions." [It has nothing to do with Fuel Moisture Recovery; it's strictly a temperature-to-temperature variable! It rarely applies in the SE Region due to higher RHs.] Wind is obviously the most unpredictable/variable causal factor. Watch Out No. 15! (Wind increases and/or changes direction). Topography includes steep slopes, drainages (chimneys and chutes), etc. Knowledgeable WFs know the fire always signals its intentions. Briefings and debriefings should always include these topics. The IRPG and other sources further clarify these terms in the overall WFF Rules. It Could Not Be Seen Because It Could Not Be Believed on June 30, 2013. (ResearchGate, accessed 2026).
Figure 2b. June 30, 2013, time-lapse (4:30-4:50 PM), YH Fire video, GMHS location. View from the South off Hwy. 89. Source: Matt Oss, ASFASF0000414 INV
Matt Oss's fiercely intense time-lapse video of the YH Fire’s Spread puts the fire's fatal intensity into perspective. The initial "official" clip has the alleged GMHS location(s)/movements rather than merely asserting an intent to conceal. Internet Archive Wayback Machine.
For all of us Old School Wildland Fire Weather & Fire Behavior Nerds, Doug Campbell (RiP), the creator of the Campbell Prediction System (CPS) accessible here: (Emxsys-CPS, accessed 2026). Recognizing the alignment of forces, trigger points, terrain, wind, and fuels before changing conditions compromise ERs. Doug Campbell (RiP) Did the Prescott FD [GMHS] Even Know, Train In, or Ignore his Tried-and-True [CPS] leading up to and including their detriment on June 30, 2013? (YHFR, 1-4)
Consider Fig. 2c. Nov. 2014 official USDA/AZ Attorney General letter regarding the alleged GMHS withholding of YH Fire/GMHS records.
Figure 2c..Nov. 2014 USFS/AZ Att. Gen. and GMHS records. Source: YHFR
Trusting Your Gut. Intuition is real - and there’s a way to tap into it to help you make big life choices. (Self, 2024). Your gut is quasi-scientifically considered your "second brain." Most importantly: "Take courage and make space for the still small voice within you." (John 11:35, NKJV)
Dr. Gary Klein’s Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model is a key
cornerstone of the Naturalistic Decision Model (NDM). ”Fireground commanders will make 80% of their decisions in less than one minute” (Klein, literally scores of links, accessed 2026). Combining these two models has led to the term NPDM. WFs often describe this as pulling up mental slides, tacit knowledge, subtle cues, and a spidey sense from past experiences to quickly match the current crisis with a workable solution. Your intuition is telling you, and question your initial “gut feeling ...The information we get is ambiguous. But it also makes it hard to know exactly what we can trust.” Consider now: Zander et al. (2016), Frontiers in Psychology (Intuition & Insight), is basically unconscious intelligence ... Dr. Friston says. Intuition article (Self). Can you trust your gut? (Harvard Kennedy School, Lerner) Study finds new evidence that systematic thinking, as opposed to intuitive thinking, is more likely to produce a more empathically accurate result. “Highly-experienced experts who have perceived a particular target numerous ... [FFs] who predict the direction a fire will move represent an excellent example. ..., and systematic thought will outperform intuition.”
From the outset, you've noticed how complex and long this post is, and how detailed the ERAU manuscript it came from is. There is a ton of very detailed wildland fire weather catalyst information to digest. Fire weather was only one of several causal factors behind these WF's preventable deaths. This author has taken considerable formatting and literary liberties throughout the post, including abbreviations, arrangement, clarity, agreement, conciseness, numbering, and so on, to save the limited allowable Wix space by combining most sentences into paragraphs, using ellipses (...), and combining some paragraphs. That said, this author and other experienced and knowledgeable WFs and FFs who work on wildland fires know that, for a fact, this June 27-30, 2013, Wildland Fire Weather collaborative research (e.g., SAIT-SAIR, YHFR, AHFE, ERAU, AMS, and others noted in this post only partially answers how anomalous weather events contributed to the YH Fire 19 PFD GMHS deaths. Wildland fire weather and the first Fire Order always influence fire behavior. The YH Fire case falls squarely within the (False Cause Fallacy) realm because the former 2006 Esperanza Fire FBAN (Yumpu, accessed 2026), an LA County FD Fire Captain, was asked to be the YH Fire FBAN. He refused that offer!
In addition, augmenting the Watch Out Situations (used as Guidelines warning of dangers, etc., that we experience on all wildfires dealing specifically with wildland fire weather clearly states: (4) Unfamiliar with weather and local factors influencing fire behavior. (14) Weather becoming hotter and drier. And (15) Wind increases and/or changes direction. And it's impossible to violate the Watch Out Situations!
It's both disturbing and interesting to note that the GMHS, a highly experienced local wildland fire crew, acted as if they were somehow Watch Out No. 4: "Unfamiliar with local factors influencing fire behavior" deficient. This was their turf, basically their own backyard. So, what were they thinking, and what were we doing during that critical time? Former LA motorcycle police officer Gordon Graham, a 33-year law enforcement veteran and co-founder of Lexipol, is a practicing attorney and risk management expert. His "What's predictable is preventable" quote is - only in concept - noted within the 2013 Federally-funded YH Fire (USDA USFS SAIT-SAIR), and it is referred to there as "hindsight bias," allegedly attempting to discredit those individuals who hold to it.
Watch Out No. 15 once included the invaluable issue that when the wind "stops." It was removed and never replaced. This post concerns wildland fire weather, which determines fire behavior; it is prudent to begin with the recognized, tried-and-true Rules of Engagement and Entrapment Avoidance Principles ("10 & 18") for Municipal and Structural FFs and WFs, and all our interested non-FF and non-WF readers. You MUST know these by heart and be able to write them out perfectly, spelling, grammar, and punctuation, instead of relying on your IRPG. And for all of you Sports Aficionados memorizing hundreds of virtually meaningless sports statistics but fail to memorize 43 life-saving core operational principles, grouped logically around fire behavior, safety, and organizational control.
For your lifesaving-leadership benefit, here are this author's detailed, specific Bonehead (101) Fire Orders in one to two words. Are you kidding me? (1) WEATHER, (2) OBSERVE, (3) ACTIONS, (4) ERs & SZs, (5) LOOKOUTS, (6) RE-EVALUATE, (7) COMMUNICATIONS, (8) INSTRUCTIONS, (9) CONTROL, (10) FIGHT FIRE
On Sheep, Wolves, and Sheepdogs - Dave Grossman - LTC (RET) Dave Grossman, author of "On Killing." (Kutzco, accessed 2026). "The degree to which you move up that continuum, away from sheephood and denial, is the degree to which you and your loved ones will survive, physically and psychologically at your moment of truth."
Please remember that fire, specifically, and generally, is definitely an Equal Opportunity, non-discriminatory, (in)animate object employer, and formidable master - caring neither if you're a man or woman, short or tall, thin or fat, irrespective of your Breed, Creed, nationality, marital status, Race, fast or slow, or whatever entity else you want to conjure up! It can and will take you out whenever it wants to, unless you're well-informed, knowledgeable, and tough on weather, fire behavior, human factors, and leadership. And so, here is this official, discreet, very own, personal, readily fillable Hurt Feelings Report if you're 'offended' for any reason whatsoever, courtesy of (www.army.writer.com). In all seriousness, as discussed here, the wildland firefighting realm can and does have very serious consequences in this "inherently dangerous" occupation dealing with confusion, death, and destruction; e.g., your suppressing rather than dealing with the so-called "demons" because if you do, they will often resurface at the most unlikely and/or the worst times. One of many (re)sources includes the Grassroots Wildland Firefighters (GWFF, accessed 2026), Wildland Firefighters on the Front Lines: Inside the lives of these people who risk their lives. (Sierra, 2022), Psyche Magazine. Know your self (link), Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR Institute. Inc.), and Ketamine Therapy (AZ Ketamine Specialists).
Because the fire always tells you what it will do, there's no reason to run away from a wildfire hastily! It follows the scientific principles of Fluid Dynamics, flowing like water. Fluid Dynamics Provides Insight into Wildfire Behavior (American Institute of Physics, 2010). "Researcher Linn describes a few of the many ways that fluid dynamics controls the behavior of fires. It’s incorrect to view wildfires as advancing walls of flame, as they often are conceptualized. The movement and behavior of fires are far more complex. The buoyancy caused by the energy release of the fire itself interacts with the ambient winds to produce complex patterns of air movement that dictate the fire’s behavior... The main way wildfires spread is through the motion of hot gases caused by ambient wind pushing air through the gaps between the towers of flame created by updrafts." And Turbulent Fluid Dynamics of Wildland Fire-Atmosphere Interactions. (American Institute of Physics, Desai & Banjeree, 2025). "Complex turbulence patterns emerge from the interaction of a wildland fire-front with its surrounding atmosphere in a variety of terrain and ambient conditions. i.e. fire-atmosphere interaction, frequently begets unexpected fire behavior that is difficult to control and threatens communities residing at the boundaries of wilderness. Fire–atmosphere interactions also inform ember-driven ignitions and smoke dispersion patterns that affect respiratory health and visibility downwind. ... At small scales, the analysis is akin to the microscopic observation of a fire in its infant stages: tracking velocity vectors in the vicinity of a propagating flame at high temporal and spatial resolutions allows a meticulous examination of the characteristic organized (coherent) flow structures. Besides being able to quantify the presence of counter-rotating vortex pairs along the fire front, which play a key role in fire spread, potential mechanisms for the interaction between neighboring spot fires are illuminated. ... Comprehensive knowledge of these processes can help develop improved parameterizations for the process-level phenomena in coarser-resolution, fast-running, predictive fire-behavior and plume-dispersion models. Improved models can be utilized for the careful planning of prescribed burns intended to reduce hazardous fuels and forewarning fire managers regarding conditions conducive to unexpected fire behavior, leading to efficient wildland fire management practices."
"Basically, the Myth of the Yarnell Hill Fire
completely overtook the Truth of the Yarnell Hill Fire"
IM Marti Reed
"Truth, Justice, and the American Way."
Superman
It was a combination of wildland fire weather, fire behavior, most definitely human factors, and those pesky tried-and-true Rules of Engagement and Entrapment Avoidance Principles mentioned below that follow the WFT article! Given all that, a slight digression is necessary here. This author considers WFT's self-labeled "blunt" Commenter Old DRHS's apparently trained professional opinion defending another WFT commenter Old Guy's likewise apparently trained professional opinion on their ERAU manuscript spot-on! "Do not blame the WX for this tragedy, was it a contributing factor … sure it was, however this was 100% human error, sorry to be so blunt, I mean no disrespect at all, it was human decisions that led that crew off the hill and put them on a path of no return, it's the truth, Old Guy nailed it, we have the 10 & 18 for a reason, if you have some time look up the report on the Inaja [F]ire" (EMF, accessed 2026) "and from [Bill G. RiP WFT] I know that there are those that know exactly what happened, and I do hope that one day they will tell their story, we deserve to know the truth, we all know that some really bad decisions were made, but for some reason no one interceded and stopped the ensuing trainwreck. By that I am suggesting that there were those that should have spoke up, that is a real mystery to me, I know for a fact that my crew would have had very strong and very direct words for anyone leading them into a similar situation. 100% know it for a fact." And several others, including an Incident Meteorologist (IMET) in these spot-on, informative Cliff Mass articles: (1) (June 2013), (2) (May 2016) articles, and several worthy, thought-out, safe actions taken and lessons learned comments: "No matter what we do as well, as Incident Meteorologists, there are some realities to face. For instance, while serving as an IMET on a fire near Stanley, ID, in 2006, I forecast isolated dry thunderstorms to occur in the afternoon around the fire area. The region around Stanley is outside of WSR-88D radar coverage from either Boise or Pocatello. All I had to go on for my weather watching was lightning detection and satellite. At 4 pm that day (9/02/2006) isolated thunderstorms developed over one of the fires in the complex, and a strong downburst wind pushed the fire toward 34 crewmembers. I was not able to warn for this, lightning detection just showed 1-2 strikes after the fact some miles away. The fire was 20 miles from camp where I was stationed, and not even visible from it. Yet all 34 [FFs] were able to run through their pre-defined [ER] to their [SZ], and made it. They were out of radio contact with our base for 90 minutes while this was occurring! You can bet we all were petrified at that time, So it is the training and quick action of the firefighters following their standard orders, in addition to our weather support, that keeps everyone safe. ... There have been countless burnovers and close calls from thunderstorms. Hell, the [D]ude fire did the same thing. Predictable is preventable [Gordon Graham, Lexipol, accessed 2026)]. You can count on a fire being unpredictable under such conditions. That's the thing. In the end it is predictable. You can bet on the lack of acting on intuition which brought flam[e] on there (sic) backs. Just like Mann Gulch [1949] and South Canyon [1994]. Assumptions of the person above you in rank or in other agencies who knows what they are doing and not wanting to question their actions. We will see." (Anonymous) and "It is hard for me to understand how, with the strict standards set for US [WFs], especially LCES, and the modern understanding of the effect of rapidly moving convective activity on wildland fires, especially in steep terrain with many closed drainages, how the [GMHS] were assigned the task that led them to their entrapment and how spot forecasts were not demanded by their superintendent, and how Yarnell Incident Command did not order their withdrawal when the convective activity moved so rapidly toward them. I am sure the [WLF, LLC] will do their usual good job of determining where the breakdown occurred in forecasting, or communicating, or on the ground decision making. My condolences to all involved" (Tacoma Sailor) and "Is there some reason that a direct comparison couldn't be made between this fire and the Dude Fire? [WFLDP (link)]. Sincerely, it appears that virtually the same situation occurred again, yet nobody had learned from the last one, so it was repeated. The USDA [USFS] has to understand that when forecasted weather conditions show the risk of extreme fire behavior, it is going to be awfully hard to explain why people were exposed to it merely to protect property, despite the increased risk. No fire on extreme fire days is routine and no one should send crews in assuming it will be routine.[OSHA] requires the provision of a safe work place. Any fire on extreme fire days is by definition, not a safe workplace. By all means, take risks if lives are at stake, even some risks if property is saveable, but on no account should risks be taken to save property or material that is shown by modeling to be unsaveable given the potential conditions. The rest of the world has adapted to reality and imposed virtually those same restrictions upon ]FF] managers (notably the UK, Canada & AU). It is well past time that the US did the same. Anyone who willfully ignores the risk and flouts it, should be held to account, like any other manager, in the criminal courts." (Aaron Troy Small) and “[H]i Cliff - I read through your material and it fit exactly what occurred in [CO] Springs last year. I happened to be on I-25 just north of the Springs when the fire jumped the mountain and came down into town. There was a storm at that moment, causing airflow from [W] to [E] where as before the storm the airflow was [S-N]. The [S-N] airflow gave confidence to the people in the Springs that the fire would not affect them. The sudden shift in winds caught everybody off guard. Thankfully, no [FFs] lost their lives. But, an unfortunate elderly couple were trapped and died in their home. I hope that the meteorological community becomes aware of the critical role they have to play in predicting forest fire activity. Thanks for your efforts.”
Figure 3. June 30, 2013, early morning hours; unburned chaparral 4'-5' high in the eventual GMHS DZ/Fatality Site photo. Source: Joy A. Collura
Most definitely check out the following noted SAIT-SAIR 'official' dialogue and alleged (mis)management progression to better understand the initial alleged (in)competence and their (in)actions in the ever-so-critical initial stages of the YH Fire. And their alleged reasons why the wildfire became so large, so wildly out-of-control, inevitably contributing to their alleged clearly 'predictable and preventable' GMHS deaths.
"June 28, 2013, 7:05 PM - Fire is reported to be on State-owned land, is 1/4 to 1/2 acre with 80% of fire out, only active on one corner, and has low spread potential with no structures or people at risk." "June 29, 2013, 6:49 AM - First person on scene reports a few smokes showing. ... 12:22 PM - ICT4 reports the fire is 2 acres, the south and west flanks were “hit” with retardant and the east flank is an old road. ... 2:42 PM - ICT4 releases Air Attack. 3:40 PM - ICT4 releases the BLM and Peeples Valley engines. 3:55 PM - ICT4 requests the launch of an Air Attack for a reconnaissance flight. 4:10 PM - ICT4 requests two SEATs and an Air Attack be launched. 4:13 PM - Dispatch reports only one SEAT is available as they are holding the other one for a new start near Kingman. 4:15 PM - ICT4 reports they are still having problems catching it and they’ll use more retardant on it if needed but will wait until Air Attack gets over the fire to confirm. 4:55 PM - ICT4 orders the closest heavy helitanker, which is located at Prescott. 5:18 PM - ICT4 reports the fire has jumped the two-track road on the east side and gained about 2 acres but has started to quiet down, and a helitanker and SEAT should be effective. 5:29 PM - ICT4 orders a heavy airtanker. 5:30 PM - ICT4 orders an AZ IMT 5:42 PM - Dispatch is notified the heavy airtanker (Tanker 06) and the Heavy Helicopter in Prescott both declined the mission due to unsafe weather conditions. 5:43 PM - Dispatch offers the VLAT from Albuquerque in place of the heavy airtanker that could not respond. 5:50 PM - Based on conditions over the fire, ICT4 elects not to order the VLAT. 6:01 PM - ICT4 requests the second SEAT if it is available; Dispatch responds they will check with the Dean Peak incident and check availability. 6:03 PM - SWCC tells Dispatch, who advises ICT4 they would not be able to support the Yarnell Hill incident with heavy airtankers (LAT) due to weather concerns and other priority fire commitments. 6:21 PM - ICT4 places 2 orders for Type 1 Interagency Hotshot Crews to be at Yarnell at 0600. 8:10 PM - Dispatch places order for Type 1 Crew to be filled by the [GMHS]. 8:10 PM - ICT4 reports fire is running to the north lateral of topography, 1 1/2 miles from the closest structure and 2½ miles from a subdivision, about 100 acres in brush operations. Tactics are to anchor and flank the southeast corner to the north. 8:33 PM - NWS Flagstaff issues a spot weather forecast for Yarnell Hill. 9:05 PM - ADC advised by SWCC to assign the [GMHS] internally to Yarnell Hill incident and to retrieve their order from SWCC. 9:55 PM - IMT Type 2 ordered ~11:40 PM - SPGS1 arrives at fire, starts assessing structures, and building strategy and contingency plans." "June 30, 2013 ~7:00 AM - Briefing at Yarnell Fire Station includes SPGS1, OPS1, OPS2, ICT2, [GMHS], FBAN, and YCSO deputies. SPGS1 and [GMHS] drive out to the fire together. 8:00 AM - [BRHS] arrives at ICP, stage in trucks ~8:45 AM - [BRHS] drives to Yarnell Fire Station and stages there. ~9:30 AM - OPS1 directs [BRHS] to drive into fire area and tie in with SPGS1 ~9:30 AM - Team briefing begins at ICP In Model Creek School in Peeples Valley 9:45 AM - Spot weather forecast is received and relayed during the 0930 briefing 10:22 AM - Formal transfer of command to ICT2 is announced on Command frequency 10:45 AM - YCSO issues evacuation notices to residents of Model Creek and Double Bar A Ranch 11:53-12:39 PM - [BRHS] Supt. and Capt drive UTV up to the anchor point just below saddle; meet [GMHS]. there; leave with the [GMHS] Lookout in the UTV and drop him off at lookout location 2:02 PM - NWS-Flagstaff calls FBAN with weather update; FBAN relays the update to OPS1 and OPS2 using Tac 1. ICT4 requests a Type 1 IMT. ~2:47 PM - ASM2 arrives over fire ~3:10 PM - Fire reaches ICP Model Creek/Peeples Valley 3:26 PM - NWS-Flagstaff calls FBAN with weather update; FBAN relays the update to OPS1 and OPS2 3:30 PM - Shifts in wind direction begin, in advance of the outflow boundary. Fire spread begins shifting from NE to SE. ~3:50 PM - [GMHS] Capt hears weather update, relays to [GMHS] Lookout 3:52 PM - [GMHS] Lookout sees slight wind shift and increase in fire behavior. He tells [GMHS] Capt he is leaving [his] lookout location due to fire reaching his trigger point. He then heads to the end of Sesame Street where [BRHS] Supt picks him up 3:55 PM - [GMHS] Lookout and [BRHS] start moving [GMHS] trucks to Shrine area 3:58 PM - Air Attack leaves fire, heads to Deer Valley 4:00 PM - Evacuation of Yarnell. ASM2 and OPS1 discuss [GMHS's] comment about a [SZ] 4:18 PM - Outflow boundary reaches northern perimeter of fire 4:22 PM - Fire reaches the trigger point for firefighters to start pulling out of Yarnell 4:30 PM - Outflow boundary reaches southern perimeter of fire, brings drastic increase in wind speed and drives the fire south. Winds of 50 mph+ funnel west and southwest into the box canyon which will become the future deployment site. 4:37 PM - ASM2 flies a drop path for a VLAT north of Yarnell [W] to [E]. DIVS A acknowledges the drop. ~4:39 PM - [GMHS] attempts to contact Air Attack; ASM2 attempts to contact [GMHS] 4:40 PM - Last [FFs] leave the northern subdivision of Yarnell and reach Hwy 89 ~4:41 PM - Division A tells Air Attack their [ER] has been cut off and they’re deploying shelters. ASM2 asks if they are on the south end of the fire. Division A says “Affirm!” 4:43 PM - Fire resources regroup at the Ranch House Restaurant in southern Yarnell 4:53 PM - Electricity goes off at [BSR] 5:16 PM - DPS helicopter Ranger 58 is requested to assist with search and rescue and begin near the anchor point. Ground resources work their way in. 6:29 PM - OPS2 reports to the IC the fire has crossed Hwy 89. 6:35 PM - DPS officer/medic on scene confirms 19 fatalities."
Consider now some of the more in-depth wildland fire weather images relative to this post, especially Fig. 4a. clearly indicating the winds shifting from S to N on June 30, 2013, seriously lacking in the SAIT-SAIR. Note Fig. 1b: June 30, 2013, 1550 photo of the N-to-S wind shift and fire weather/behavior visible to the GMHS, noted and mentioned in the SAIT-SAIR.
Figure 4. June 30, 2013, 1550 photo of North-to-South wind shift and fire weather/behavior visible to the GMHS. Source: GMHS, Fireline Factors
The SAIT-SAIR notes the 1550 wind shift on p. 34: "~1550 GM Capt relayed the update to GM Lookout around 1550, advising of possible wind direction shifts and thunderstorms."
Figure 4a. June 30, 2013, 1642 MST outflow boundary on FAA radar image screenshot. Source: SAIT-SAIR (Fig. 14.)
Figure 4b. June 30, 2013, 1100-1700 YH Fire wx readings. Source: BRHS
Summary of Wind Shifts in the Afternoon: Until about 1550, winds have been pushing the fire generally northeast. At about this time, pressure changes start happening ahead of the outflow boundary. These pressure changes cause the air to become more erratic, even before the outflow boundary itself reaches the fire. Personnel on the fire see significant changes in wind and fire spread direction, even before the outflow boundary arrives and brings its full increase in wind speed. ... At the [GMHS's] location near the anchor point, wind shifts began at [approx.] 1550. Before that, the fire was moving generally northeast. Around 1550, the fire shifted to moving southeast and aggressively pushing toward Yarnell. The outflow boundary itself had not arrived yet. It did not hit the southern perimeter of the fire until 1630. When the outflow boundary hits, winds drastically increase and drive the fire south."
"We have become a force of nature. Not long ago, hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, drought, forest fires, even earthquakes and volcanic explosions were accepted as “natural disasters" or “acts of God.” But now, we have joined God, powerful enough to influence these events."
David Suzuki
Suzuki on his warming planet (2010)
And most definitely consider now the very complex ERAU Abstract of the extremely detailed 2021 collaborative manuscript regarding the above post title (even for a formerly acknowledged wildland fire weather Nerd). "The deadly shift of the Yarnell Hill, AZ wildfire was associated with an environment exhibiting gusty wind patterns in response to organized convectively driven circulations. (NOAA.gov) The observed synoptic (>2500 km) through meso-β (approx. 100 km) scale precursor environment that organized a mid-upper tropospheric cross-mountain mesoscale jet streak circulation and upslope thermally direct flow was examined. Numerical simulations and observations indicated that both circulations played a key role in focusing the upper-level divergence, ascent, downdraft potential, vertical wind shear favoring mobile convective gust fronts, and a microburst. This sequence was initiated at the synoptic scale by a cyclonic Rossby Wave Break (RWB) 72 h prior, followed by an anticyclonic RWB. These RWBs combined to produce a mid-continent baroclinic trough with two short waves ushering in cooler air with the amplifying polar jet. Cool air advection with the second trough and surface heating across the Intermountain West (IW) combined to increase the mesoscale pressure gradient, forcing a mid-upper tropospheric subsynoptic jet around the periphery of the upstream ridge over Southern UT and Northern NM. Convection was triggered by an unbalanced secondary jetlet circulation within the subsynoptic jet in association with a low-level upslope flow accompanying a mountain plains solenoidal circulation above the Mogollon Rim (MR) and downstream mountains."
Kaplan, M. L., James, C. N., Ising, J., Sinclair, M. R., Lin, Y. L., Taylor, A., Riley, J., Karim, S. M., & Wiles, J. (2021). The Multi-Scale Dynamics Organizing a Favorable Environment for Convective Density Currents That Redirected the [YH] Fire. (MDPI and Climate). Their 54 references are listed here due to Wix limitations: (link). Some confusion may arise between the numbered YHFR figures and the MDPI figures in the detailed article. 4. Summary and Conclusions - The fundamental sequence of weather events organizing the YHFT can be summarized as follows: (1) The circulation over North America transitioned to a transport of cool arctic air equatorward, creating a meridional temperature gradient across the U.S.–Canadian border. (2) A polar jet streak encounters this meridional temperature gradient across the U.S.–Canadian border causing the primary baroclinic, cyclonic RWB to occur, resulting in equatorward PV transport. (3) Broad trough thinning accompanying the RWB is followed by a weaker secondary anticyclonic RWB, which reinforces the equatorward reversal of the PV maxima aloft. (4) Two short-wave troughs associated RWBs advected cool low-level air from the Central U.S. towards and over the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains, where low-level IW frontogenesis occurs. (5) Low-level moist air was advected by the nocturnal [LLJ] into the river valleys of NM and AZ. (6) A secondary jet streak developed near the low-level IW front and organized a tertiary finer-scale jetlet in its unbalanced right entrance region. (7) This jetlet subsequently increased the divergence above the MPS over the MR and adjacent mountains, enhancing the ascent from the low-level thermally direct circulation. (8) This intensifying jetlet resulted in ageostrophy, divergence, vertical wind shear, and ascent between the MR and Yarnell. (9) Convection just [N] and [NE] of Yarnell organized into dual convective lines and a [SW] propagating density current. (10) The density current and its [NE] winds approached Yarnell through Peeples Valley. It then organized new convection in a less-sheared, more unstable environment along the slopes of the Eastern Weaver Mountains, producing a propagating microburst with outflowing easterly winds that converged with the dying density current’s [NE] winds near the [FFs]. A higher resolution WRF 259-m nested-grid simulation is presently being generated to better analyze the local microburst-induced airflow near the [FFs'] location, which, in turn, will be employed to initialize WRF-FIRE to diagnose the local fire/atmosphere interactions at the canyon scale.
Figure 4c. (a) Vertical cross-section between (A) Peeples Valley and (B) Black Hills of Central AZ for WRF-ARW 777-m simulations only. (b) Map of Yavapai County and Southwestern Coconino County, AZ from Google Maps. The black and white stars represent the approx. location of Yarnell, AZ, black square = Prescott, black triangle = Dewey Humboldt, black X = Cherry, large black diamond = Camp Verde, small black diamond = Cottonwood, and black circle = Flagstaff. Source: MDPI
The [YH] Fire was a wildfire near Yarnell in Yavapai County, AZ (see Fig. 4c for regional AZ topographic features surrounding Yarnell, AZ, and the local topography relative to the fire area at 0600 MST 1 July 2013). ... ignited by lightning on 28 June 2013. Late in the afternoon on 30 June, it overran and killed 19 City of Prescott ... [GMHS]. ... the [YH] Fire Tragedy (YHFT). ... The YHFT [F]ire front motion shifted from east–northeastward to southeastward to southward and, finally, southwestward over a brief period during the late afternoon of 30 June. The fire front shifts were consistent, with observed surface wind shifts and the estimated fire progression depicted in Fig. 3d.
Figure 4d. (a) YHFT progression map; (b) rainfall percents. Source: MDPI
June 2013 was a remarkable month for AZ weather, the fourth-hottest June ever recorded up to that time. [NOTE: The germane FMT article (63 Summer 2003) titled "A Key to Blowup Conditions in the Southwest?" by former Tonto NF District Ranger Robert Bates (1962) clearly applied to the June 2013 YH Fire: "A deadly one-two combination of an unusually warm night followed by a warm day may indicate blowup fire conditions." This is strictly temperature-to-temperature and has nothing to do with Fuel Moisture Recovery.] This also represented a period of prolonged drought in the SW U.S. The last week of June was the hottest week of what would become a hot summer, with numerous daily high-temperature records set on the 30th, e.g., [102° F] at Prescott (KPRC), located at approx. 1600 m above sea level (ASL) and approx. 60 km northeast of Yarnell. Temperatures on 30 June approached and/or exceeded [100° F] at the Stanton and Peeples Valley [RAWS] only a few kilometers from Yarnell ... [Those] RAWS both confirm a significant wind shift from the [SW] and [W] to the [N-NW] and [NE], respectively, close to the time of the YHFT between 1600 and 1700 MST (2300 and 0000 UTC). Fig. 2b. emphasizes the ongoing drought conditions in the southwest, mostly in AZ at the beginning of July 2013. Most of the state was in a precipitation deficit approaching or even exceeding 50% for the 2013 water year, which began the previous Oct. Yarnell was in the middle of the 50–75% deficit region up to July 2nd for the 2013 water year, as depicted in Fig. 2b, while [NW] AZ exceeded a 75% deficit. These, along with others across the state's western and northern regions, reflected extreme drought conditions favorable for substantial diurnal surface sensible heating. This extreme heating is exemplified at Stanton, AZ, with an observation of [100°F] at 10:01 MST in response to a surface sensible heat flux of approx. 756 W m-2.
Yarnell is situated within a group of complex terrain features, including a local valley and a terrain gap. While Yarnell is situated in a narrow gap between low rolling hills (Fig. 1b), much more extreme topography exists regionally to the east–northeast and immediate southwest (Fig. 1a). To the east–northeast is a sequence of terrain features extending well above 2000 m MSL, including, sequentially, the Bradshaw Mountains, Black Hills, and Mogollon Rim (MR) (approx. 30, 75, and 150 km from Yarnell, respectively). Deep valleys exist between the Bradshaw Mountains and Black Hills, as well as between the Black Hills and MR, including Prescott Valley and Verde Valley, respectively. The Colorado Plateau (CP) is located to the [NE] of the MR. About 5 km [SW] of Yarnell, a sharp topographic drop approaching 1000 m over about 2 km separates the Western Arizona low desert region from Central Arizona’s high semi-arid terrain. The Weaver Mountains flank Yarnell to the immediate [WNW] and [E]. As a result, meteorological features propagating from multiple directions encounter substantial variability in the complex terrain elevation near Yarnell. ... The convection associated with the YHFT occurred early in the summer. The National Weather Service (NWS) provided adequate forecasting support, and the High-Resolution Rapid Refresh (HRRR) model's real-time forecasts were also generally representative of the weather hazards. Both indicated the possibility of gusty surface convective outflows [5]. The gusty surface winds could exacerbate wildfire danger in a dry, hot region such as Central [AZ]. Our research motivation is not to review forecasts of the event but to understand in detail the larger-scale influences and downscale dynamical processes that drive the shifting gusty winds leading up to the YHFT. ... Severe convection in Central AZ has not been extensively analyzed in the literature with this goal in mind. One could separate this literature into three general categories: (1) in-depth observational climatologies of convective events, (2) regional simulations of seasonal climate and their relationship to the North American Monsoon (NAM), and (3) individual severe convective event observational analyses. The first category entails climatologies of severe convection and/or flooding rainfalls [6,7,8]. The most seminal is Maddox et al. [6], who identified three types of synoptic-scale environments favorable for severe weather in Central AZ; however, they also noted that these environments are often ambiguously linked to reliable real-time severe-weather forecasting. Furthermore, at the time of their climatological study, operational reanalyses were limited to meso-α and larger scales, lacking mesoscale details critical to the complex geography of Central AZ. More contemporary, observationally comprehensive climatological studies by Mazon et al. [7] and Yang et al. [8] largely focused on synoptic-scale predictive indices involving static stability, water vapor, and geopotential height fields. Again, these represent broadscale predictive signals for large amounts of heavy rainfall or severe convective events, without in-depth mesoscale detail. ... The second category uses regional simulation models to diagnose seasonal trends in the NAM's response to forcing functions that control climate variability [9,10,11]. This type of study only deals with seasonal dynamical processes not individual case study multiscale processes. Finally, the third category, which is quite rare, focuses on a single intense convective event [12,13]. McCollum et al. [12] analyzed the “surprise” 23 to 24 July 1990 Southwest Area Monsoon Project (SWAMP) extreme rainfall event in Phoenix, where few, if any, downscale dynamical linkages from the synoptic to mesoscales were unambiguously identified, given the lack of upper air observations. The surface and radar data were substantial and analyzed in depth but not high-resolution rawinsondes or numerical simulations. In another manuscript recently submitted on the [YH], Ising et al. [13] demonstrated that the general evolution of key density-current features from the MR to Yarnell depended on evaporational cooling, surface sensible heating, and the unique terrain structure near Yarnell. We will show some of these results in this manuscript as well, in so far as they support the density current evolution. Finally, comprehensive studies of terrain-induced convection have been conducted, such as those during the Cumulus Photogrammetic, In-situ, and Doppler Observations (CuPIDO) campaign in the Santa Catalina Mountains of [SE] AZ, as published in Damiani et al. [14] and Demko et al. [15]. These studies focus primarily on local convective initiation rather than severe convection driven by downscale dynamical organization. Analyses of downscale forcing in Central AZ are relatively unique. ... In this study, we address this cascading multiscale set of processes, focusing on the meso-β scale, and provide evidence that may help link these circulations to the environment that favored convective forcing near the YHFT. This study is presented with an understanding that the literature on density currents and multiscale convection is extraordinarily rich. The studies by Carbone et al. [16], Wakimoto [17], Rotunno et al. [18], Xu and Moncrieff [19], Liu and Moncrieff [20,21], Xue et al. [22], and Moncrieff and Liu [23], among others, supported the importance of significant along-stream vertical wind shears in the multicellular storms that generate long-lived gravity or density current outflows. Moncrieff and Liu [23] ran numerical experiments showing that downshear forcing is important in producing density currents with deep ascent zones favorable for continuously regenerating convection. The focus of the study presented herein is intended to represent the synoptic-to-meso-β-scale components in the development of a paradigm of dynamical processes linking the planetary to the storm scale, including the generation of upper-level divergence, thermally direct upslope circulations, and low-level vertical shears at the meso-β scale, thus extending the previous research findings described above. ... Section 2 of this manuscript represents a summary of the observational and numerically generated datasets used in the analysis. In Section 3.1, we will primarily use synoptic- and regional-scale observational analyses (synoptic-to-meso-α scale) to diagnose the precursor circulations that established a convectively favorable meso-β-scale environment. Section 3.2 will focus on the mass and momentum adjustments at the meso-β scale that led to ascent and vertical wind shear conducive to multiscale convection and density currents. Section 3.3 will present observed radar indicating the evolution of organized convection, along with simulated wind perturbations in the PBL resulting from the convection. We will summarize our results in Section 4. Methodology - We employed observational and numerically generated datasets in this study to describe the state of the synoptic-to-meso-β-scale atmosphere both over and upstream of Central AZ to diagnose the environment favorable for the convectively forced wind systems responsible for the YHFT. ... 2.1. Observations - The following observational datasets were employed in the subsequent analyses: (1) Plymouth State Weather Center hourly surface meteograms [24], (2) European Centre for Medium Range Weather Forecasts ERA-Interim and ERA5 6-hourly and hourly upper-air analyses of dependent variables [25,26], (3) high-frequency radar control message datasets from the Plymouth State Weather Center archive [24], as well as high-resolution Doppler radar datasets and dual polarimetric radar datasets from the NOAA NIDS archive for the TPHX Doppler [27] and the Flagstaff, AZ NWS Forecast Office [28], (4) soundings plotted from data downloaded from the NCEP NCEI (formerly NCDC) integrated global radiosonde archive [29], and (5) remote automatic weather station (RAWS) [30] surface data. ,,, Synoptic-to-meso-β-scale maps were created using both ERA-Interim 0.75 × 0.75-degree resolution and ERA5 0.25 × 0.25-degree resolution reanalyses. The ERA-Interim reanalyses were employed to focus on synoptic-scale adjustments, including Rossby Wave Breaks (RWB) and the motion of the baroclinic short wave troughs. The finer details of the ERA5 were applied to understand the Central AZ mass, momentum, temperature, and moisture evolution during the subsequent organization and evolution of convection. Soundings and ECMWF reanalysis data were plotted using Meteorological Analysis and Diagnosis Software (MADS) [31] on isobaric surfaces. For brevity, times and dates are hereafter formatted as HH/DD, two-digit hour/two–digit day of the month in Universal Coordinated Time (UTC). 2.2. Numerical Simulations - The nested grid numerical simulation employed Weather Research and Forecasting-ARW Version 4 (WRF-ARW) [32], as specified in [13]. Their simulations were employed in this manuscript to focus on the mesoscale jet adjustments and organizing circulations for convection and density current initiation and motion across the Black Hills, Bradshaw Mountains, and Weaver Mountains [NE] of Yarnell. The numerical experiment consisted of three grids (Fig. 3): a 7-km coarse and 2.33-km medium, as well as 777-m nested fine-scale mesh grids with one-way lateral boundary conditions. The 777-m grid was centered over Yarnell. The domain top was set at 50 hPa, with 50 stretched vertical levels most densely structured in the lower troposphere. The initial and D01 boundary condition data were derived from ERA5 with the lateral boundary conditions on the coarse mesh updated hourly. The grid nests employed lateral boundary conditions from the next coarser grid. D01 was run from 0000 UTC 30 June to 0000 UTC 1 July 2013, D02 was run from 1200 UTC 30 June to 0000 UTC 1 July 2013, and D03 was run from 1500 UTC 30 June to 0000 UTC 1 July 2013, with data output for D03 every 15 min. The convective parameterization, the Grell-Freitas ensemble scheme [33], was applied in the 7-km simulation only, while the 2.33-km and 777-m domains explicitly resolved the moist convection. The other physics configurations were the same for all domains: the Purdue-Lin microphysical scheme [34], the Mellor–Yamada–Janjic (MYJ) planetary boundary layer (PBL) scheme [35,36,37], the Noah Land Surface Model [38,39], the Dudhia shortwave radiation scheme [40], and the RRTM longwave radiation scheme [41]. The figures depicting meteorological fields from the model simulation were created using the MetPy collection of tools for Python [42].00/30 can be described as a secondary RWB exhibiting anticyclonic characteristics. 3.1.2. Dual Short Waves in Response to the Primary and Secondary RWB Leading to Subsequent IW Frontogenesis - ..., we will outline how the synoptic-scale dynamics described in the previous subsection were focused downscale by the organization of two short-wave troughs and their subsequent cold frontogenesis. These dynamics act to concentrate mass and momentum perturbations along the western side of the Rocky Mountain Front Range that ultimately organize mid-upper tropospheric mesoscale jets. These adjustments were critical to creating the mid-upper tropospheric pressure gradient and eventual mesoscale jet/jetlet organization across the IW near the Four Corners region before 12/30. ... The dual lobes of upper-tropospheric PV that evolved within the polar jet stream during the deepening and thinning of the upper-air trough first prior to 00/30 and then after 00/30, respectively, are both sequentially associated with these mid-lower tropospheric baroclinic short waves. Fig. 5a,b and Fig. 6a,b depict the 12-h evolution of the 700- and 850-hPa temperatures, wind, relative humidity, and height commencing at 06/30 and ending at 18/30 prior to the YHFT. At 06/30, short wave #1 (SW1) was in a transition zone between an upstream northwesterly flow and downstream southwesterly flow centered over the lower Mississippi River Valley. At the same time, short wave #2 (SW2) was in a transition zone between the upstream north–northeasterly flow and downstream west–northwesterly flow centered over the Northern Great Plains. Both waves exhibited confluent flow and horizontally nonuniform cold air advection below 300 hPa consistent with cold frontogenesis. They represented the lower tropospheric reflection of the dual lobes of PV in Fig. 4e,f that have developed and propagated into lower Mississippi River Valley first during trough thinning accompanying the primary cyclonic RWB and, subsequently, with the secondary anticyclonic RWB. However, the most confluent flow resulting in zonal temperature, wind, and relative humidity gradients, particularly at 850 hPa, existed where the far western periphery of both SW1 and SW2 interface with the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains. ... Deep tropospheric penetration of the unseasonably cool air into the IW occurred in association with these short-wave troughs. Cool air at both 700 hPa and 850 hPa penetrated over the Front Range into Western CO and Western NM, moving close to the CP as early as 06/30. The organization for this upstream cool air transport was the [E] and [NE] flow accompanying the pressure rise zone depicted in Fig. 7a,b along the Front Range of the CO and NM Rocky Mountains in Fig. 7a, subsequently, farther [SW] into [NE] AZ in Fig. 7b. here. Here, we see the 1008-hPa isoline in Fig. 7a. supplanted by the 1014-hPa isoline in Fig. 7b over the northeastern half of Arizona during this 12-h period. These wind and mass adjustments, at least early on, are similar in structure to edge wave cold surges over the Western Great Plains adjacent to the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains [46]; however, they are advected unusually far west in this case. Shallow planetary boundary layer (PBL) damming of air against the Front Range occurred primarily during 03/30 and 15/30, as can be seen in Fig. 6b at 850 hPa and, to a lesser extent, at 700 hPa in Fig. 5b. ... We define the unseasonably cool air in the PBL as being cool enough to cause the isoline of 850-hPa frontogenesis to be greater than 50 K 10−3 m−1 d−1, as depicted in Fig. 8a,b. In Fig. 8a, the boundary at 06/30 is in West–Central CO and NM, while, in Fig. 8b, 12 h later, it is split into two zones: (1) in West–Central CO extending into North–Central and [SW] NM and (2) along the MR. These boundaries were established by the upstream (east–northeast origin) lower tropospheric penetration of polar air westward towards the Front Range followed by large-magnitude surface sensible heating over the CP. They were established first in proximity to 105° W at 06/30 accompanying cold air advection, then farther west 12 h later by 18/30 due to the surface heating of the CP, as indicated by the 700-hPa temperature increase in Fig. 5b. The 700-hPa 318 decameter (dam) isoheight in Fig. 5a,b was closely aligned with these fronts, indicating a boundary established by the combination of cold air advection and elevated terrain surface heating west of the Front Range. Note the effect of the differential heating and cooling across the frontogenesis regions on the isoheights accompanying the ridge over the Four Corners region. The differential heating has the effect of shifting the frontal geometry from a zonal orientation to a meridional orientation. This restructuring of the isoheights is consistent with the evolving mean sea level pressures, which increased in time across this region, as can be seen in Fig. 7a,b, i.e., moving mass [S-SW] across the High Plains of CO, NM, and the TX Panhandle towards and subsequently west of the Front Range. 3.1.3. Moisture Transport in Response to Downscale Trough Organization and Frontogenesis - The previous adjustments in the mass and momentum fields were also accompanied by moisture transport predominantly westward into Eastern AZ. More than 18 h prior to the YHFT, and during the early stages of the organization of the kinematics in the previous subsection, the modest, albeit important, moisture for Central AZ convection was transported westwards into NM and then AZ. A shift to easterly flow at the surface over the plains and the Rocky Mountains accompanied the movements of pressure rises into the upper Rio Grande River Valley during the period spanning Fig. 7a,b. Fig. 9, Fig. 10, Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 reinforce this finding of the penetration of cool moist easterly wind up the Rio Grande and Pecos River Valleys of TX and westward towards NM in multiple pathways. This low-level moistening, particularly below 750 hPa, is evident in the 12/30 Santa Teresa (EPZ) and Albuquerque (ABQ) NM soundings overnight during the early period of 30 June in Fig. 9a,d. Fig. 9b,d indicates that both low- and mid-level moisture increased in these soundings. The winds within the nocturnal PBL indicate a shallow easterly flow below an increasing northerly flow aloft. There are substantial dew point increases in both soundings (Fig. 9b,d) overnight on 30 June. ... Additionally, in Fig. 11a–d, the moisture flux vectors highlight how the moisture is transported westwards out of the High Plains and splits over the Rio Grande River Valley. One lobe moved across the San Juan River Valley into [NE] AZ and a second lobe across the Gila River Valley into SE AZ. The Chinle Wash and Little Colorado River Valley in the Navajo Nation, [NE] of the MR and west of the Chuska and Carrizo Mountains seems to be a weak conduit of moisture towards the south–southwest in between the San Juan and Gila River Valleys. Little moisture arrived in the region from the Gulf of CA, as the main flux was primarily towards [NE] AZ from the [E]. In Fig. 12a–d, note the generally steady 10–15 ℉ dew point increases in the surface meteograms, primarily from 00/30 to 06/30, at Gallup (KGUP) and Deming (KDMN), NM and somewhat later at Farmington, NM (KFMN) and Prescott (KPRC), AZ. Thus, the whole sequence of upstream RWBs, trough thinning, pressure rises, cold air advection, and subsequent frontogenesis described above allowed moisture to stream westward, displacing a very dry airmass over AZ and preconditioning the region for convective development. 3.2. Regional Circulations Organizing Convection at the Meso-β Scale - In this section, we use WRF-ARW 2.3-km and 0.777-km simulations to explore the organization of the environment for the triggering and subsequent propagation of convection. 3.2.1. Dual Jetlet (J1 and J2) Evolution and Divergent Circulation Organizing Convection - As early as 12/30, the flow over the IW exhibited subsynoptic jets analogous to mesoscale jetlets [47,48,49]. These features were shifted westwards from the polar jet located over Eastern KS (Fig. 4e). The jets modify the upper-level divergence and vertical shear that control the triggering and structure of convection. The WRF-ARW 2.3-km simulated wind vectors resolve a weak secondary flow maximum in the 200–300-hPa layer from the west–northwest at the meso-α scale located over the region extending from SW UT through SE NM (note elongated wind and potential vorticity maxima in Fig. 13a,c,e). This feature, the primary jetlet (J1), encompassed an area of approx. 1300 km in length and 200 km in width and was centered near the SW CO–NW NM border at 12/30. J1 represents a subsynoptic west–northwesterly airflow with a maximum core of approx. 15–20 m s−1 surrounded by a broader scale region of winds > 10 m s−1. This is located far (>1500 km) upstream from the polar jet core and main baroclinic zone in Eastern KS. The J1 core propagated through NW NM just east of the AZ border during the 14/30–18/30 period (Fig. 13b,d,f). J1 was closely aligned with the 700–850-hPa thermal boundary in Fig. 8a that is just east of the Four Corners region. ... Commencing just before 12/30 and thereafter, the right entrance region of J1 split off into another, a smaller (meso-β scale) jetlet, the secondary jetlet (J2), that propagated into NE AZ: (1) between the MR and the Chuska and the Carrizo Mountains and (2) southwest of Canyon de Chelly and the Defiance Plateau. J2 organized into an anticyclonically curved wind maximum (Fig. 13a,b). J2 within the J1 right entrance region enhanced the upper-level divergence as the surface sensible heating proceeded above the MR and southwestward through the Weaver Mountains on 30 June. It was shown that J2 was associated with an enhanced vertical wind shear that could support the multicellular convective density currents [23]. ... The calculations were performed in this section to establish the fundamental dynamical characteristics of J1 and J2 during 12/30–18/30. J1 achieved a scale of approx. the Rossby radius of deformation (Lr) in the region between SW Utah and SE NM. Thus, J1 could be considered to become a coherent or autonomous jet at the meso-α scale with an along-stream length of approx. Lr. J2, in contrast, represents an adjustment within the right entrance region of J1 and is a jetlet that likely deviates from the thermal wind balance at a scale much less than Lr. J1 is more closely approaching a semi-geostrophic jet streak circulation in scale, and J2 is highly ageostrophic and non-gradient during J1’s developmental process. J2’s ageostrophic vector is directed opposite to the balanced semi-geostrophic thermal wind flow, i.e., streamwise and towards the right in the entrance region as it strengthens in response to the inertial–advective forcing directed towards the [SSE]. This inertial–advective acceleration in J2 opposes the cross-frontal pressure gradient force directed to the NE within J1’s entrance region.
[Complex calculations and equations removed here to make/save space. Refer to the ERAU link above]. These calculations support a circulation that evolves into J2 that is not in a quasi-geostrophic, semi-geostrophic, or gradient wind balance. In short, J2 is one where both the Eulerian and the Lagrangian Rossby numbers at 250–300 hPa defined as: 𝑜𝐸=(𝑉·∇𝑉)𝑓𝑉 (7) 𝑅𝑜𝐿=1𝑓𝑉𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑡 (8) approach 1.25 and 1.15, respectively, exceeding the criterion for imbalance [51] in the right entrance region of the jetlet. These calculations assume: (1) approx. 7.5 m s−1 total wind velocity, (2) approx. 5 m s−1 total velocity gradient over 50 km, (3) approx. 2.5 m s−1 average Lagrangian acceleration over the 3600 s periods between 1300 UTC 30 June and 1600 UTC 30 June, 2013 encompassing the region in between 110.5° and 111.5° W and between 34.25° and 35.5° N, i.e., above the MR and Black Hills during this period, and (4) f is approx. 8.35 × 10−5 s−1 at 35° N. RoE and RoL are both >1.00 consistent with an unbalanced flow deviating from thermal wind balance. Fig. 14c,d depicts the development of a 250-hPa–700-hPa differential divergence, which is generally juxtaposed with rightward- and equatorward-directed ageostrophic flows within J2 emerging from J1′s entrance region. This ageostrophy reflects the splitting plume of the momentum away from J1 into J2. This momentum advection is evidenced by a strengthening of the wind observed in J2′s right exit region between 111.5° and 112.5° W and between 34.25° to 35° [NE] and [E] of Yarnell during the 14/30–18/30 period above the MR and Black Hills (Fig. 15a,c). ... Vertically differential divergence develops above the MR in the right exit region of J2. This ageostrophy, consistent with these calculations in this section, can be seen in Fig. 15a,c, as well as vertical cross-sections in Fig. 15 b,d. The locations for ageostrophic vectors directed first to the south–southeast and, subsequently, to the SW, respectively, primarily surround the black dot representing the location of KFLG in Fig. 15a,c. These features above 6000 m MSL in Fig. 15b,d can be seen to the [NE] of Flagstaff over the MR (right side of the cross-section extending downstream from the location at 34.81° N and 112.08° W). Additionally, seen in Fig. 15b,d is the early mid-tropospheric ascent over the MR, Verde Valley, and Black Hills, followed by late-morning lower tropospheric ascent due to Mountain Plains Solenoidal (MPS) forcing [52,53]. This ascent intensifies primarily on the northeastern side of all the mountains between the MR and Weaver Mountains. This indicates the transition from the divergence aloft with J2 to MPS differential heating between the mountains and plains during the morning hours. Note how the cross-sections in Fig. 15b,d depict the shift in ageostrophic airflow from (1) the NNW to SSE to (2) ENE to S–SSW aloft as the low-level thermally direct circulation comes into the phase with the exit region of J2. This reflects, at 600 hPa, the broader-scale and lower-level height/thickness rises due to diurnal sensible heating immediately above the elevated plateau, which gives way to a region of moist convective heating-induced height falls as the level of moist convective heating becomes more elevated relative to MPS heating, the net effect being to reorient the acceleration vector aloft towards the [SW], as is shown in Fig. 15 and Fig. 16. 3.2.2. Signal of Enhanced/Spatially Variable Convective Instability, Downdraft Potential, and Vertical Wind Shear - The downscale circulations resulted in organized patterns of ascending motions and changes in static stability, as well as vertical wind shear that control the triggering and evolution of convective density currents. Fig. 16. demonstrates the organization of the simulated squall line over the MR and its intensifying northwesterly low-level flow. Fig. 17 and Fig. 18, respectively, depict the WRF 2.3-km-simulated evolution of (1) MUCAPE and (2) soundings from which we calculate the Downdraft Convective Available Potential Energy (DCAPE) from NE to SW across the MR and Yavapai County between 16/30 and 22/30 UTC. This is during the period when the mesoscale ascent accompanying J2 gives way to the growing MPS circulation and its interaction with J2 above the MR. These processes signal a rapidly increasing zone of both convective instability and strong downdraft potential over the MR and most of Yavapai County in Central AZ. ... As can be seen in Fig. 17 and Fig. 18, the initial MUCAPE maxima at 1700 UTC are separated from the MR, as they are in [SW] and Eastern AZ representing, respectively, the hotter low-level PBL air and richer plume of integrated moisture flux, as depicted in Fig. 8b and Fig. 11h. The early significant Surface-Based Convective Inhibition (SBCIN) in [SW] AZ rendered this large magnitude zone of MUCAPE irrelevant to the organization of convection. This changed later in the period as the ascent under J2 propagated towards the [SW] and surface heating increased. In time, the ascending flow over and just [SW] of the MR, in conjunction with the intensifying surface heating accompanying the multiple MPS above the Black Hills, Bradshaw Mountains, and Weaver Mountains, created a juxtaposed region of increasing MUCAPE over and [SE] of the MR, as well as increasing the DCAPE in Central AZ. The SW-NE gradients of MUCAPE and DCAPE and NE–SW gradients of lower mid-tropospheric vertical wind shears can be inferred from Fig. 17 and Fig. 18. The SW-NE gradient of MUCAPE increases temporally in Fig. 17. In Fig. 18, the northeast–southwest gradient of the vertical wind shear increases, as the descending layer of the northeast flow was greater to the NE under a slightly stronger north–northeasterly flow with J2. The northerly wind component extends down to 700 hPa in the Black Hills in Fig. 18b, with a nearly southerly flow at the surface, but weakens to the SW, e.g., the northerly wind component is above 650 hPa in the Weaver Mountains in Fig. 18d, with nearly uniform westerly flow at the surface. During 18/30– 22/30, the MUCAPE in Fig. 17 increased and filled in the region between the Black Hills and Yarnell, with the largest values increasing towards the [SW]. Additionally, the specific simulated soundings in Fig. 18a–d, moving from the MR to the Black Hills, Bradshaw Mountains, and Weaver Mountains, respectively, showed a progression during the period from 1800 UTC 30 June to 2300 UTC 30 June, 2013 of more DCAPE (1165, 1561, 1690, and 1924 J kg−1, respectively) and reduced the directional wind shears in the vertical in the lower mid-troposphere (700–850-hPa layer) as one progressed [SW], indicating a transition from an environment favorable for linear density current or squall line structures towards an environment conducive to microbursts. This was exemplified by an increased vertical wind shear to the NE and increased downdraft potential to the SW, with a 1924-J kg−1 value representing an exceptional downdraft potential. ... The evolving radar imagery indicates the organized nature of the convection that propagated from the MR to Yarnell. The first organized convective cells on 30 June developed at ~1815 UTC in two fundamental clusters that evolved into lines: (1) over the immediate region near KFLG just after 1815 UTC, which is the best-developed line (L2), and (2) between Kingman, AZ (KIGM), and Seligman, AZ just before 1815 UTC, which is the first line (L1) (Figure 19a). By 1915 UTC, new cells developed in these two lines along and just NW of the MR and SE of KFLG (Fig. 19b), with the strongest cells NW of KFLG in L2 and SE of KIGM in L1. These locations are close to the early divergence and ascent under J2 in Fig. 13, Fig. 14, Fig. 15 and Fig. 16. During this hour, better organization of the cells southeast of KFLG created a new line along the MR (Fig. 19b). This line is under the divergent J2 flow, as depicted in Fig. 13, Fig .14, Fig. 15 and Fig. 16, but is short lived. ... Following these initial, somewhat transitory signals of convection, a second wave of convection develops, stronger and better organized than the first stage, just southwest of the MR over the Black Hills. The radar reflectivity mosaics in Fig. 19c,d suggest that this second stage of convection was coupled to low-level outflow from the initial L2 convection near KFLG. At 2115 and 2132 UTC, in Fig. 19d and Fig. 20a,b, the reflectivity mosaics and comparisons between Doppler radars at KFSX and PHX Sky Harbor Intl. Airport (TPHX) strongly suggest that there was: (1) a surface outflow boundary that was bow-shaped, extending SE against the low-level [SW] flow from the NE corner of Yavapai County to [SE] Yavapai County and (2) a well-organized cell or cell cluster in NW Yavapai County. At approx. 2115 UTC, an isolated but strong cell developed with L2 over the Black Hills in NE Yavapai County between Cherry and Dewey-Humboldt. This strong cell quickly approached 50 dBZ and then became flanked by many more cells, both to the NW and SE over the next 30–60 min, forming a vigorous bowing line propagating against the low-level southwesterly flow, derivative of the L2 in Fig. 19a,b, as it moved through the Prescott, AZ (KPRC) area. 3.3.2. Simulated Meso-β/γ-Scale Low-Level Winds - Fig. 22a–g indicates the longevity and intensity of the convectively driven surface density current and its southwestward propagation against the surface flow from the MR to Yarnell. These figures from the WRF 777-m simulation are located along the vertical cross-section depicted in Fig. 3a, while the WRF 777-m-simulated Fig. 22h is centered near Yarnell [13]. ... The first group of figures (Fig. 22a–g) indicates the continuity of convective density current-induced momentum surges from the Black Hills to the Bradshaw Mountains to the Weaver Mountains during the 21/30–2345/30 period after the initial density current over the MR propagated into the Verde Valley and dissipated. The surges ranged in depth from 0.5 km to 1 km AGL and propagated at speeds generally ranging from 10 ms-1 to 20 ms−1. The model is slightly fast, slightly too expansive, and biased NW in terms of the density of convective forcing. The key simulated features are: (1) three density currents launched by the Black Hills: one SW, one NE, and the dominant one SW (Fig. 22a) and (2) a continuity of the southwestwards propagating current analogous to radar feature L2 all the way from the Black Hills through the Bradshaw Mountains into Peeples Valley approaching Yarnell (Fig. 22b–f) and (3), the shift in airflow in Fig. 22g supported by the horizontal cross-section in Fig. 22h, indicating an increased easterly–southeasterly flow during the period beginning at 2330 UTC 30 June and lasting through 2345 UTC 30 June, 2013 near Yarnell juxtaposed with the ENE flow SE of Yarnell. The wind pattern in Fig. 22g indicates a likely microburst outflow caused by new convection along the western slope of the Eastern Weaver Mountains interacting with the remnants of the SW propagating density current between Yarnell and the location of the [PFD FFFs] (also, note the NW part of the red line in Fig. 20g). This microburst is consistent with the drier sub-cloud layer, deeper mixed layer, larger DCAPE, and weaker bulk vertical shear in the Weaver Mountains sounding in Fig. 18d as compared to the earlier soundings farther northeast in Fig. 18a–c. The added momentum from a microburst, in conjunction with the dying L2′s momentum, where virga and light rain were observed, could have produced the strong wind gusts from the ENE observed at the Stanton RAWS Station (not shown) and evidenced by the rapid spread of the fire towards the SW from 2330 UTC 30 June to 2345 UTC 30 June (Fig. 2a). 4. Summary and Conclusions - The fundamental sequence of weather events organizing the YHFT can be summarized as follows: The circulation over North America transitioned to a transport of cool arctic air equatorward, creating a meridional temperature gradient across the U.S.–Canadian border. A polar jet streak encounters this meridional temperature gradient across the U.S.–Canadian border, causing the primary baroclinic, cyclonic RWB to occur, resulting in equatorward PV transport. (1) Broad trough thinning accompanying the RWB is followed by a weaker secondary anticyclonic RWB, which reinforces the equatorward reversal of the PV maxima aloft. (2) Two short-wave troughs accompanying the RWBs advected cool low-level air from the Central U.S. towards and over the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains, where low-level IW frontogenesis occurs. (5) Low-level moist air was advected by the nocturnal low-level jet ]LLJ] into the river valleys of NM and AZ. [The LLJ is a very important weather phenomenon rarely researched in the US. And then consider this Australian source since they are far more LLJ-knowledgeable: (Atmosphere-fire simulation of effects of low-level jets on pyro-convective plume dynamics. Simpson et al., 20th Intl. Congress on Modeling and Simulation, AU, 1–6 Dec. 2013, (USFS, 2013)] (6) A secondary jet streak developed near the low-level IW front and organized a tertiary finer-scale jetlet in its unbalanced right entrance region. (7) This jetlet subsequently increased the divergence above the MPS over the MR and adjacent mountains, enhancing the ascent from the low-level thermally direct circulation. (8) This intensifying jetlet resulted in ageostrophy, divergence, vertical motion, and ascent between the MR and Yarnell. (7) Convection just N and NE of Yarnell organized into dual convective lines and a southwestward propagating density current. (9) The density current and its northeasterly winds approached Yarnell through Peeples Valley. It subsequently organized new convection in a less sheared and more unstable environment along the slopes of the Eastern Weaver Mountains, organizing a propagating microburst with outflowing easterly winds converging with the dying density current’s NE winds near the FFs. A higher-resolution WRF 259-m nested-grid simulation is presently being generated to better analyze the local microburst-induced airflow near the FFs' location, which, in turn, will be employed to initialize WRF-FIRE to diagnose the local fire/atmosphere interactions at the canyon scale. Convection just N and NE of Yarnell organized into dual convective lines and a [SW] propagating density current. The density current and its northeasterly winds approached Yarnell through Peeples Valley. It then organized new convection in a less-sheared, more unstable environment along the slopes of the Eastern Weaver Mountains, producing a propagating microburst with outflowing easterly winds that converged with the dying density current’s [NE] winds near the [FFs]. NOTE: This author intentionally omitted the ERAU Author Contributions, Funding, Acknowledgments, Contacts of Interest, and Abbreviations, which are readily available at the initial respective ERAU link above.
Next, consider the March 2022 (ERAU article) noted immediately below. NSF-Funded Research Sheds Light on Yarnell Hill Fire Tragedy
Figure 4e. NSF-Funded Research Sheds Light on YH Fire Tragedy Screenshots Source: Natl. Science Foundation. ERAU, Ginger Pinholster
"Nineteen [FFs] who lost their lives in AZ’s 2013 [YH] [F]ire were likely victims of the same meteorological event that caused a deadly 1985 airplane crash, [ERAU] researchers have reported. [PFD FFs] who also were members of the [GMHS] were probably surprised by a sudden microburst during the [YH] [F]ire, according to [ERAU] meteorologists Curtis N. James and Michael Kaplan. ... A microburst, and the wind shear induced by it, was also what sent a commercial airliner careening off the runway at Dallas/Fort Worth Intl. Airport, killing 137 people on Aug. 2, 1985. That accident prompted major improvements in aviation safety. The NTSB concluded that the L-1011 aircraft had no way to detect microbursts and wind changes. In response, NASA researchers developed new warning technology, and the U.S. FAA required all commercial aircraft to have on-board wind shear detection systems. ... [FFs] do not yet have equivalent protections. ... Although Doppler weather radar can detect microbursts by scanning right above the ground, radar signals are blocked over mountainous terrain or in remote areas where wildfires occur. With funding from the Natl. Science Foundation, James and Kaplan have been collaborating with researchers and graduate students at NC A&T Univ. and the Natl. Weather Service to better understand and learn from the [YH] [F]ire tragedy. On June 28, 2013, “Firefighters knew about the squall line over the Bradshaw Mountains and its outflow moving toward Yarnell,” said James, professor of Meteorology on [ERAU's] Prescott Campus. “What they weren’t anticipating was that a storm cell would develop and create a microburst just to the east of Yarnell. We think the outflow from that microburst rushed westward toward the fire, which then redirected the fire’s motion. ... Microbursts can form very quickly around the periphery of larger, previously identified storms", explained Kaplan, an Embry‑Riddle adjunct faculty member and professor emeritus with the Desert Research Institute. “When they hit the ground, microbursts barrel outward, often at high speeds,” added Kaplan, who worked on a team that studied the 1985 crash of Delta Air Lines Flight 191 in Texas. "The [YH] [F]ire, ignited by lightning amid a drought and extreme summer temperatures, turned in response to the microburst outflow. The fire then rapidly and unexpectedly advanced on the [FFs]as they were trying to make their way to safety through a ravine, James said. Analysis of historical meteorological data showed that wind on the north side of the fire, at the Emergency Operations Center, was moving from the north-northeast at 13 miles per hour (mph), whereas in Stanton, southeast of the fire, the wind was gusting to 47 mph. James said. “It was a very different situation on the south side versus the north side of the fire,” James noted. “Fine-scale convective storm cells can create that type of variability in the wind. That’s something the firefighters weren’t anticipating.”
Staying Safe on the Front Lines - First responders should have access to more information about microbursts, the Embry‑Riddle researchers said. Even as an initial thunderstorm may seem to be waning, “It may spawn new storm cells that are extremely focused and intense, and incredibly small sometimes, yet they can wreak havoc,” Kaplan said. To help raise awareness of the risks of microbursts, James and Kaplan recently shared their findings at the Annual Meeting of the [AMS]. The work has also been published by the journal Climate and Atmosphere. ... "The next step for the research," Kaplan said, "is to run higher-resolution model simulations coupled with a fire behavior model. If all goes well, this “forensic meteorology” approach will show the motion of the fire as it moved through the complex terrain toward the ]FFs] at Yarnell Hill. At a resolution of 50 meters, “That would get us pretty close to the scale of what th[FFs]e firefighters actually saw that day,” Kaplan said. “That’s our goal.” The research team includes Mark R. Sinclair, ERAU, researcher Yuh-Lang Lin, and graduate student Andrew A. Taylor, NWS.
It is most important to note, on this tragic wildland fire, that the ... USFS funded (Serious Accident Investigation and Report) (SAIT-SAIR) that their alleged foregone conclusion states on pages 3-4 and 43: "The judgments and decisions of the incident management organizations managing this fire were reasonable. [FFs] performed within their scope of duty, as defined by their respective organizations. The Team found no indication of negligence, reckless actions, or violations of policy or protocol." This paper, drawn from specific historical real-world wildland fire human, psychological, and fire-weather research, demonstrates that preventing fatalities in any work group, especially wildland fire fatalities, is patently impossible. We can only significantly reduce burnovers, entrapments, fire shelter deployments, and casualties by speaking up intuitively, applying lessons learned from honest investigations and reports, and heeding and applying the tried-and-trued RoEs and established Entrapment Avoidance principles.: "How was it possible to do everything right and yet 19 [PFD FFs] died in one fell swoop on June 30, 2013? (Schoeffler, 2025, AHFE) Similar known and later discovered wildland fire human, psychological, and fire weather causal relationships saved lives on two separate wildfires 23 years apart, including acknowledging, accepting, setting straight, and countering Harvard intellectual George Santayana’s alleged false and misplaced notion: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” (Internet Philosophy, 2025). (YHFR - July 2023).
“Until death, all defeat is psychological.”
Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius:
In the spirit of intellectual honesty and integrity, this is a Google AI response, with this author's bolding, highlighting, reference links, etc., to the above July 2023 YHFR post titled question, minus the consecutively numbered linked references it provided: "June 2013 YH Fire and GMHS groupthink attitude." - "In the context of the June 30, 2013, Yarnell Hill Fire, the [GMHS] tragedy has been heavily analyzed by human factors experts and wildland fire researchers who identify Groupthink, destructive goal pursuit, and organizational culture as critical components in the crew's fatal decision-making. While the initial SAIR stated, "The Team found no indication of negligence, reckless actions, or violations of policy or protocol," subsequent independent research points strongly to group dynamics and specific psychological attitudes. [This author's several germane (Academia.edu) papers link] The primary "Groupthink" and attitude-driven factors that contributed to the event include: 1. Groupthink and Go Along to Get Along. The GMHS was an elite, tight-knit group with a highly respected leadership structure under Supt. Eric Marsh. In high-cohesion teams, members may suppress dissenting opinions to maintain group harmony or because of immense trust in their leaders. Independent research indicates that even if individual crew members recognized the escalating danger of leaving their safe zone in "the black," the collective dynamic created an illusion of invulnerability. This fostered a "go along to get along" mindset that overrode critical safety questions. 2. Destructive Goal Pursuit and Fixation - The crew exhibited what human factors researchers call destructive goal pursuit. Once a goal was set - abandoning their safe zone to travel through a dangerous, unburned box canyon to reach the [BSR]—the group became single-mindedly fixated on executing it. As weather deteriorated and fire behavior became increasingly erratic, the team interpreted these warnings unrealistically rather than re-evaluating their plan, a classic symptom of Groupthink where external threats are minimized. 3. The "Bad Decisions with Good Outcomes" Phenomenon. Researchers suggest the GMHS developed an organizational attitude shaped by past successes after risky maneuvers. When a team repeatedly makes high-risk choices that yield successful outcomes, it reinforces a false sense of safety. This normalized a cultural acceptance of bending strict safety rules, rendering the crew more susceptible to collective tunnel vision when conditions suddenly became unprecedentedly hostile. 4. Leadership Culture and the "Prescott Way" - External reviews and investigative reports (such as those by the (ADOSH) highlighted a broader systemic attitude that prioritized aggressive action and structure protection over absolute [FF] safety. This structural pressure, combined with Marsh’s alleged assertive leadership style, created top-down momentum that led to a highly controversial and hazardous tactical move executed without clear, collaborative communication back to the main [IMT]. 5. Cognitive Entrapment Under Stress - As the situation grew desperate, the crew suffered from severe cognitive limitations brought on by intense stress, including auditory exclusion and tunnel vision. In this state, group reliance on the leader intensifies, and the collective ability to step back, process new data (like shifting wind profiles), and apply standard wildland fire protocols (like LCES—Lookouts, Communications, Escape Routes, Safety Zones) completely broke down." End of AI Response.
“He who is of a proud heart stirs up strife,
but he who trusts in the Lord will be prospered.”
Proverbs 28:25
“Success tends to move away from those who try to capture it and toward those who try to help others achieve it.”
Farnam Street -Shane Parish
In this author's professional opinion, this SAIT-SAIR conclusion and the alleged GMHS human factors and psychology strongly suggest the Hazardous Attitude of Groupthink (IRPG, p. xi). To avoid this hazardous attitude, please consider this highly successful, worthy advice from the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) (Tzahal): "The Tenth Man Rule: How to Take Devil’s Advocacy to a New Level." (The Mind Collection, Chris Meyer, accessed 2026). "In a group of ten, everyone is given the same information. If nine group members come to the same conclusion, the tenth person becomes the devil’s advocate. The tenth person is now responsible for disproving the others. The devil’s advocacy is triggered regardless of how improbable it may seem that everyone else is wrong."
Figure 4f. "Factual/Mgmnt. Report" screenshot. Source: SAIT-SAIR
Consider now the above Fig, 4e. image. This YHFR author boldly alleges that their "factual” and "fact-based narrative” noted just below is far afield of anything either "factual” or "fact-based." Consider the DFFM reference (link) to the YHF SAIT-SAIR and refer to the ("Press Kit") link for these alleged gems: Sensemaking - A goal of any SAI Team is to attempt to reconstruct the context in which a person or crew was operating, while trying to avoid oversimplifying and judging actions in hindsight. Instead, any SAI aims to understand how people, crews, and others on the fire made sense of their situation at the times when they took the critical actions. Sensemaking refers to how people select what seems important to attend to, and how this influences their actions. ... Sensemaking is a very active process whereby people literally “make sense” of the world around them at each moment. ... In fire, the term situational awareness describes sensemaking: how comprehensively and how accurately are you making sense of the actual fire environment you are working in? Collective sensemaking is about communication: it is about how crews, IMTs, and host agencies determine potential strategies and tactics, and how they convey and update these during planning meetings, briefings, operations, debriefings, and in after-action reviews. Effective risk management communication involves more than simply reporting and transmitting messages. It requires developing effective shared meaning together through dialogue and inquiry. ... Sensemaking is social and ongoing. The SAI report works toward introducing issues and questions to readers that may be useful for discussion points among colleagues, as they try to understand an accident and learn from it. • The primary goal of an SAI report is to tell the story of what occurred and facilitate learning, in order to reduce the likelihood of future accidents. ... Part One includes the fact-based Narrative, the Analysis, Conclusions, and Recommendations. Part Two, the Learning Discussion section, explores multiple concepts and perspectives that may help readers to understand and learn from this accident. ... This process does not identify causes in the traditional sense of pointing out errors, mistakes, and violations but approaches the accident from the perspective that risk is inherent in firefighting. The SAI process tries to minimize the common human trait of hindsight bias, which is often associated with traditional accident reviews and investigations. The term “hindsight bias” refers to the tendency people have to view past events as more predictable than they really were before the events took place. After an event occurs, people often believe they could have predicted the outcome of the event before it actually happened. [This spurious “hindsight bias” concept, addressed earlier, Gordon Graham personally invalidated it at a SC & FFW Conference]. [SAITs] begin with the philosophy that [FFs] are expected and empowered to be resourceful and decisive, to exercise initiative and accept responsibility, and to use their training, experience, and judgment in their decision-making. The wildland fire community uses a doctrine approach to fire suppression, which requires the use of judgment. An individual’s judgment in a given situation depends upon their unique training and experiences. The 10 Standard Firefighting Orders and 18 Watch Out Situations (10 and 18) are the foundation of training in fire suppression operations, but they require judgment in application. These principles ... outline the [SAIT’s] perspective regarding the use and consideration of the 10 and 18 ... Principles of Suppression Operations (Source (link): Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations. “The primary means by which we implement command decisions and maintain unity of action is through the use of common principles of suppression operations. These principles guide our fundamental fire suppression practices, behaviors, and customs, and are mutually understood at every level of command. They include Risk Management, Standard Firefighting Orders and Watch Out Situations, LCES [Lookouts, Communications, [ERs], and [SZs], and the Downhill Line Construction Checklist. These principles are fundamental to how we perform fire suppression operations and are intended to improve decision-making and [FF] safety. They are not absolute rules. They require judgment in application.” In light of this doctrine, [SAITs] attempt to use foresight rather than hindsight. ... the [SAIT] tries to stand with the crew to try to understand, as they could, what crewmembers were seeing and how they were making sense of unfolding conditions, when it was time to act. The [SAIT] also looks at broader cultural factors that may influence a crew. This helps set the stage for ongoing learning." Based on their USFS-funded 'no blame, no fault' conclusion, if you believe this blather, did you drink their Kool-Aid?
Check out the Outside magazine, Sept. 17, 2013, article titled: What We Learned from the Yarnell Hill Fire Deaths: "One of the worst tragedies in the history of firefighting prompted little change to a culture that regularly puts young lives at risk. A few seasoned veterans are working to fix that. ... Yarnell prompted a modest update to the fire shelter, the flimsy aluminum heat shields the hotshots died under, and the development of a new phone app that helps [FFs] get real-time weather updates. But as Honor the Fallen predicted, it led to no significant policy changes." This author takes umbrage with his conclusions here, e.g., fire shelters, phone app, Honor the Fallen (HTF), "significant policy changes." What changes is he referring to, or is he referring to something else here?
Here's a gem from former Santa Fe Hot Shot turned author Kyle Dickman's Outside magazine article, "What We Learned from the Yarnell Hill Fire Deaths." Before we venture into the credible (yet most often misunderstood) concept of "sensemaking" below, first consider the Sept. 24, 2024, effectiviology article titled "Knoll's Law of Media Accuracy," warning us to be mindful to avoid believing and/or falling for half-truths. The following information comes from his article. He states: "Here are the key practical points you should know: Knoll’s law of media accuracy is the adage that 'everything you read in the newspapers is absolutely true, except for the rare story of which you happen to have firsthand knowledge. ... This phenomenon can be caused by the infeasibility of verifying many claims made by the media, the tendency to assume that perceived authority figures are reliable, and the desire for one's preferred source of information to be right, among other issues. ... When assessing the reliability of sources, consider not just whether there are errors, but also how many and how big they are, while remembering that their presence in one instance doesn't guarantee the presence of errors in other instances.”
It is a glaring, permissible, and necessary inference from Fig. 5. below that the GMHS were safe in the black for at least "52 minutes." And then left the safe black to hike downhill into an unburned chute, and then into their unburned Death Bowl at the worst possible time! Watch Out No. 9!
"Time is a great teacher, but unfortunately it kills all its pupils."
Hector Berlioz - French Romantic composer
Figure 5. Only Minutes - Blowup to Burnover image Source: NWCG
Compare and contrast the application and relevance of the three bold statements below from the SAIT-SAIR "story," then use an Internet search regarding the controversial American journalist, essayist, satirist, cultural critic, and scholar H.L. Mencken. (Britannica, accessed 2026)
"The primary goal of an SAI report is to tell the story of what occurred and facilitate learning, in order to reduce the likelihood of future accidents." SAIT-SAIR (2014)
"The men the American people admire the most are the extravagantly are the most daring liars; the men they detest most violently are those who are most violently are those that are trying to tell them the truth."
H.L. Mencken (A Mencken Chrestomathy)
In times of universal deceit, telling the truth will be a revolutionary act. The most effective way to destroy people is to deny and obliterate their own understanding of their history.
George Orwell
Consider this from the 'official' designated YH Fire "Lead Investigator" Brad Mayhew and his (Fireline Factors) (BMFF) YH Fire Case Study - A Learning and Discussion Tool For Firefighters with human factors, wildland fire weather, and associated fire behavior references in the following PPT images. However, it is the professional opinion of this author that BMFF instead allegedly gives superficial acknowledgment and accolades to the many Subject Matter Experts (SME) and Beta Groups and the 'fire community['s] invaluable service in developing this learning tool,' while allegedly steering them away from the truth about the YH Fire. This author alleges he's far from any true and worthy "lessons learned," and that we should "provide facilitated discussion and learning exercises for operational firefighters" after we judiciously analyze and critique it; go to our YHFR website for the three separate posts on him. Yet, to the best of this author's knowledge, none of us current and/or former Public Official Truth Seekers & Truth Tellers have ever relinquished any of our respective Oaths of Office, a pillar of the Rule of Law! "I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same: that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God." (Penn State Law Review)
"When you pass through the waters, I will be with you; And through the rivers, they shall not overflow you. When you walk through the fire, you shall not be burned, Nor shall the flame scorch you."
Isaiah 43:2 *NKJV)
"Sometimes people don't want to hear the truth
because they don't want their illusions destroyed."
Friedrich Nietzsche
Courtesy of our favorite YH Fire Investigator Brad Mayhew and his BMFF website, consider his YH Fire Case Study below a learning and discussion tool for FFs who espouse the alleged strictly weather-causal factor fallacy. (PPT). The following nine (Fig.6.- 6i.) Brad Mayhew Fireline Factors Consulting (BMFFC) PPT title slide, Acknowledgments, Intent, YH Fire Behavior, column images from 1627. Images from 1640, 1641, and 1648.
Figure 6, Views of the YH Fire column from SW 1627. 1640, 1641, and 1648. Source: BMFFC
ew, F YHF C
Therefore, given the seemingly professional PPT, you must be forewarned; the alleged truthful so-called Graduate-degreed "Lead Investigator" Brad Mayhew - under the alleged guise of transparency- knows full well that "individuals tend to consume information that is consistent with their vision of the world and accept it as true" (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Likewise, (Pennycook et al, 2018) also showed that "even a single exposure to misinformation contents increases perceptions of accuracy and overall believability through an ‘illusory truth effect'." And yet, in the Outside magazine article, he claims this: "The fire community clammed up after the lawsuits. 'Just talking about Yarnell became radioactive,” Mayhew says. ... 'How can this profession make progress if people aren’t comfortable talking about it publicly?'”
Truth is not what you want it to be; it is what it is.
And you must bend to its power or live a lie.
Miyamoto Musashi
Figure 7. Yes, you are all wrong image. Source: Facebook
“Is it right for you to be angry?”
Jonah 4:4 (NKJV)
Could this image of our favorite YH Fire Investigator Brad Mayhew, caricatured with posturing like this, as seen below in Figs. 8. “All of a sudden, all this other chaos happened. The clarity, the certainty,” says Brad Mayhew, tossing his hands up like he’s throwing confetti.'
Figure 8. YH Fire "Lead Investigator" Brad Mayhew. Source: Todd Conklin PA Pod 297 Podcast.
And because Wildland Fire Weather determines wildland fire behavior - in reality - from an experienced and trained wildland firefighter's perspective, it is safe to say that all of the other Watch Out Situations are affected in one way or another by fire weather during firefighting and aircraft operations. Yes, even when taking a nap near the fireline.
Consider now this (WFT) article also included in their ERAU research: Researchers try to shed new light on the weather related to 19 firefighter deaths." And this series of four uncaptioned screenshots and/or Snippets from that WFT article as Figs. 9.-9c.
Figure 9,10. Fire spread and wind simulation video. Source: Janice Coen, Ph.D., NCAR Project Scientist, YouTube, WFT
Consider now a series of fourteen individually uncaptioned screenshots of that WFT article as Figs. 11.-11.n. You will most likely want to benefit from reading the numerous and varied interspersed "thoughts" of several of the WFT commenters because there are many of them that do, in fact, "speak with authority in this author's professional opinion regarding the tried-and-true Rules of Engagement and Entrapment Avoidance principles.
Figure 11.-11n. WFT and NSF Funded Research Sheds Light on YH Fire Tragedy article screenshots Source: ERAU
Sadly, this last one alleges to toe the Party Line of no blame, no fault.
Now, many of you may have had to suffer through (or not) some well-intentioned but allegedly highly emotional Eric Marsh Foundation (EMF) Facebook post comments wanting to 'avoid laying blame' and the need for better fire shelters and such from what appear to be mostly non-FFs and WFs listed in their comments quoted below. If you have to deploy your fire shelter or rely on air support, you screwed up. There is, and never will be, a bona fide fire shelter you could carry on the firelines, developed to withstand the YH Fire temperatures noted in the YH Fire (SAIT-SAIR) ("Temperatures exceeded 200o F, and the deployment site was not survivable"). To be sure, the only man-made device that could have saved the GMHS's lives that fateful day would have been a literal, solid shipping container made of extremely durable Black Box material encasing their required avionics and/or communication equipment. (Gatewaytips.com)
Consider several alleged Eric Marsh Foundation (EMF) Facebook viewer comments that you may dubiously benefit from, or not. Most deal with the alleged blame, improving existing fire shelters, learning from tragedy, and lauding the alleged factual Only the Brave movie: "While others flee fires, the [GMHS] run toward them. A fateful blaze forges an elite firefighting team of heroes in this true tale." Really? A "true tale" fake burning bear?
Figure 11-'o'. Only the Brave burning bear image. Source: Dailymotion
Please bear with these 19 GMHS families, friends, loved ones, and empathetic others in their required Twelve Steps of Grief (Psychology Today, 2025): alleged times of shock, denial, disbelief, confusion, guilt, anger, bargaining, depression, loneliness, upward turn & reconstruction, acceptance & hope, and integration & hope. Posted here earlier, by you suppressing rather than dealing with these so-called "demons" ensures they will resurface at the most unlikely and/or worst possible times!
The following eleven Snippets are Figs. 12.-12j. and Sources: EMF.
Figures 12.-12j. EMF YH Fire weather Sources: EMF
Author Richard McCrea's spot-on with his YH Fire and GMHS tragedy professional assessment: “The real story is the [YH] Fire) was much like many other entrapments in the last 20 years and the mistakes made are nothing new. I might as well have been writing about the South Canyon Fire of 1994. Other reviews of entrapment fire during the last 20 years have pointed out many of the same deficiencies in team management and safety practices. Are we condemned to keep making the same mistakes far into the future?” McCrea said. He's a 32-year veteran of fire management with the USDI, and he wrote about the YH Fire lessons here: (Wildfire Magazine). And he also addressed: Yarnell Hill Fire, Five Years Later: Lessons Not Learned and Five Potential Hot Spots. Weather and fuel conditions help predict fire behavior, so state officials now rank the dangers of AZ communities online. (New Times, Sean Holstege, July 1, 2018). And guess what? The "Wayback Machine failed to return archive information." Well, imagine that! It must be just a coincidence, right?
Because fire weather determines fire behavior, from a FF/WF perspective, it is safe to say that all the other Watch Out Situations are affected, in one way or another, by wildland fire weather during firefighting and aircraft operations. Yes, even Watch Out 18. when you're taking a nap near the fireline. Watch Outs are just that: basically 'allowing' you to do them, as long as you're 'watching out' when you are doing/experiencing them. How can you violate the following: (2) 'In country not seen in daylight, (4) Unfamiliar with weather and local factors influencing fire behavior, (9) Building fireline downhill with fire below, (10) Attempting frontal assault on fire. (11) Unburned fuel between you and fire. (13) On a hillside where rolling material can ignite fuel below. (14) Weather becoming hotter and drier. (15) Wind increases and/or changes direction. (16) Getting frequent spot fires across the line. and (17) Terrain and fuels make escape to safety zones difficult? You can only fail to know, recognize, and mitigate them!
Figure 13. Snippet of YH Fire photo series in the Sesame Street and Shrine Corridor and Peebles Valley, June 30, 2013, afternoon revealing separate and distinct smoke columns, some suggesting firing operations, and most certainly increasing fire behavior. Source: YHFR Gallery
Based on a video of FFs/WFs firing out with drip torches, shown at the Yarnell Library and never seen again: “The burn out at the Shrine area where you see men lighting up things with a Zip (sic) torch had to be early when the winds were headed north, but that does not make sense to me even now since from the Shrine if the fire goes north from where they were it would possible spread to the NE which would take it to U-Stow it area, before that houses including Chuck Tidy residence behind U-Stow It. ... It was on YouTube a long time ago and it just disappeared. Joy and I both saw it and when I saw the rock fence to the left we immediately knew where it was filmed. Joy might be able to fetch it again somewhere. Definitely, they had their drip torches going as they were coming back toward the shrine and lighting up along the road. Joy also maybe can remember the firefighter who posted it. It was tied to a guy named Red something YouTube uploads, and Joy found it off his comment wall. That same YouTube showed the other side of [Hwy.] 89 activity as well. Plus the firefighters just hanging out at the Presbyterian church." (IM, YH Fire 'avid hikers familiar with the area' Sonny Gilligan and Joy A. Collura, (June 5, 2015) and (YHFR, FJS, JAC, 2023 post)
Please keep doing your part to reduce the inevitable accidents, injuries, mishaps, burnovers, fire shelter deployments, and fatalities caused by human factors and/or psychological and mechanical causes. Wildland firefighting is legally considered "inherently dangerous." They're inevitable; never completely preventable; FFs and WFs make stupid decisions, things break, etc. All we can effectively do is reduce them.
This YHFR post includes the following: ERAU (Prescott, AZ), Wildfire Today); Researchers try to shed new light on weather related to 19 firefighter deaths; (Front Page) from the 14th Annual Fire and Forest Meteorology Symposium, The Yarnell Hill Fire: Microbursts, Density Currents, and 19 Lost Lives; How are the Alleged "Historical Fiction" Writer John Maclean and the Alleged YH Fire "Lead Investigator" Brad Mayhew Both Off Track About the June 30, 2013, YH Fire? (Part 1) and (Part-2); Most Weather-Related Wildland Firefigh[t]er Deaths Can Be Prevented: Here's How (May 2016); Slow Response, Predictable Path of Thunderstorms, Were Precursors to Yarnell Hill [FFs'] Deaths (May 2015). The crushingly inclusive, overarching Synthesis of knowledge of extreme fire behavior: vols. 1&2 for fire managers. (Werth et al. (2011) Gen. Tech. Rep. PNW-GTR-854.) "NWCG’s definition of extreme fire behavior indicates a level of fire behavior characteristics that ordinarily precludes methods of direct control action. One or more of the following is usually involved: high rate of spread, prolific crowning/spotting, presence of fire whirls, and strong convection column."
Figure 14. June 30, 2013, US surface map (left), US 500 mb map (right). Source: WPC Surface Analysis Archive
Sources, Summary, and Conclusions
Except for our YHFR and AHFE excerpts, these are all alleged Party-Line "conclusions" following the numerous SAIT-SAIR wind(s) mentioned 133 times and weather 103 times. NSF Funds Study of SW Wildfires (ERAU March 2019), What Are The Known Wildland Fire Weather Factors Regarding the June 30, 2013, YH Fire Pt.1? (YHFR, 7/13/23). Univ. of Wisconsin-Madison Cooperative Institute for Meteorological Satellite Studies (CIMSS) Satellite Blog for the "Yarnell Hill Fire in Arizona" on June 30, 2013, Academic Researcher Scott Bachmeier. Requires a (CIMSS, 2013) link, which must be posted to the (Internet Archive Wayback Machine) website to work; strongly suggesting an alleged 13-year-long YHF cover-up, lie, and whitewash attempt! The YH Fire: The Meteorological Origins Cliff Mass Weather Blog (June 2013) website posts are always beneficial, educational, and informative!
The YH Fire weather amazingly began in the Western CO Front Range and SD Black Hills!
NSF-funded research sheds light on the Yarnell Hill Fire Tragedy (ERAU, 2022) article includes an embedded link to their report: "On 30 June 2013, 19 members of the [GMHS FFs] were killed fighting a wildfire near Yarnell in the mountains of Central AZ. They succumbed when the wildfire, driven by erratic winds, blocked their [ER] and subsequently overran their location. In this manuscript, we extend previous analyses of the environment and downscale organization of convective circulations that redirected the wildfire. That analysis started at the scale of Rossby Wave Breaking over western North America and extended to a local convective gust front that redirected the wildfire, which trapped the [FFs]. In this manuscript, we delve deeper into the organization of circulations triggered by that (primary) gust front close to the location of the tragedy. We do so by employing a Large Eddy Simulation down to near canyon scale focused on five convectively-driven features: 1) the initial deep and prolonged gust front and its dynamic hydraulic head, 2) a front-rear jet and it’s coupled hydraulic head’s ascending motions that organized high-based convection, 3) a high-based microburst-induced downdraft organized initially by ascending flow in 2) that eventually transported mass and entropy to the surface causing a 4) meso-high pressure center and confluence zone to encompass the [FFs'] location which established a favorable environment for 5) near canyon scale circulations surrounding the fire. These complex meso-γ scale circulations were the result of terrain-modified convective forcing in an environment with progressively increasing large-scale Downdraft Convective Available Potential Energy and decreasing large-scale vertical wind shears. The atmosphere thus transitioned from supporting a very deep and long-lived convective density current to an isolated elevated convective microburst with substantial mass and wind outflow into a canyon redirecting the ongoing wildfire. Summary and Conclusions - 1. The fundamental sequence of weather events organizing the YHFT can be summarized as follows: 2. The circulation over North America transitioned to a transport of cool Arctic air equatorward, creating a meridional temperature gradient across the U.S.–Canadian border. 3. A polar jet streak encounters this meridional temperature gradient across the U.S.–Canadian border, causing the primary baroclinic, cyclonic Rossby Wave Break (RWB) to occur, resulting in equatorward PV transport. 4. Broad trough thinning accompanying the RWB is followed by a weaker secondary anticyclonic RWB, which reinforces the equatorward reversal of the isobaric potential vorticity (PV) maxima aloft. 5. Two short-wave troughs accompanying the RWBs advected cool low-level air from the Central U.S. towards and over the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains, where low-level IW frontogenesis occurs. 6. Low-level moist air was advected by the [LLJ] into the river valleys of NM and AZ. 7. A secondary jet streak developed near the low-level IW front and organized a tertiary finer-scale jetlet in its unbalanced right entrance region. 8. This jetlet subsequently increased the divergence above the MPS over the MR and adjacent mountains, enhancing the ascent from the low-level thermally direct circulation. 9. This intensifying jetlet resulted in ageostrophy, divergence, vertical wind shear, and ascent between the MR and Yarnell. 10. Convection just N and NE of Yarnell organized into dual convective lines and a SW propagating density current."
Figure 14a. MDPI Fig. 18, June 30, 2013, WRF-ARW skew-t soundings representing an exceptional downdraft potential. (a) Mogollon Rim (b) Black Hills (c) Bradshaw Mountains (d) Weaver Mountains. Source: MDPI
First off, you should have learned from the outset that wildland fire weather is only one of many causal factors, and this complex, collaborative research only partially answered how atypical weather events contributed to the YH Fire 19 PFD GMHS deaths. Because fire weather, the first Fire Order, is definitely one of the causal factors that influence fire behavior. Hopefully, you learned a great deal about the extremely complex June 30, 2013, from the wildland fire weather research available and posted here and fire weather in general. Hopefully, you want to delve into it further and share it with other FFs, WFs, and like-minded individuals, especially citizens with no clue beyond what they hear and see from what the English call News Readers and the television Talking Heads. You learned that several of the alleged odious Eric Marsh Foundation (EMF) Facebook viewer comments that you may have benefited from them - or not - mostly dealt with blame, improving existing fire shelters, learning from tragedy, etc., based on their alleged times of anger, arrogance, disbelief, dismay, frustration, shock, lack of knowledge, and, of course, suffering, along with many others. Also consider "The Art of War by Sun Tzu and The Book of Five Rings by Musashi Are Godlike" (linked here) by Peter N. Alpha's proxy for knowing and applying leadership skills regarding the tried-and-true basics (e.g., Rules of Engagement and Entrapment Avoidance guidelines) relative to the ERAU wildland fire weather research influencing the June 2013 YH Fire.
"The [USWLFS] said in a statement that it "stands united" with the [USFS] in grief and 'in our unwavering support for the loved ones left behind,' adding that 'Their bravery, dedication, and sacrifice will never be forgotten.'" Say what!? "and sacrifice will never be forgotten.'" Sacrifice!? This author and others allege that their lives were taken from them!
Mother of Arizona firefighter killed in Colorado wildfire demanding answers about her son's death. (YouTube.com) Because she knows!
Three firefighters killed, two injured while responding to wildfires in far western Colorado. (CIMSS Satellite Blog, Bachmeier, 27 June 2026)
June 2026 Knowles Fire Origin Point Lat: 39.074192, Long: -108.946872
The following quoted FB verbiage is from a brave Knowles Fire survivor who revisited that fatality site, revealing his highly informative photos. There were utterly NO values at risk; WTF were they doing there!? From former USFS Happy Jack Hot Shot Sawyer and Santa Fe Hot Shot Supt. and Criminal Investigator Gary Olson's FB posts on this fatal wildfire: "Hey man, I saw your post about the Knowles fire and instead of posting it to the public I thought I’d rather send it to you. As someone that’s worked with them, had [two] of my current crew mates in there and one former crew mate & has heard first hand from the lone survivor of what happened. ... I can say you are wrong about them being adrenaline filled. Yes, in my honest opinion they shouldn’t have been there with the fire weather that was predicted. I did hike out to where they deployed and all I’m gonna say is thank you to the pilot for doing what he could to get them out of there, and until more information gets publicly released I wouldn’t speculate on what did or did not happen. ... If you’d like to sure, if you’re gonna share their location photo I sent you just crop out their names as well please. If you’d like I’ll give you the coordinates for your own personal research of the area. ... If you’d like to sure, if you’re gonna share their location photo I sent you just crop out their names as well please. ... If you’d like I’ll give you the coordinates for your own personal research of the area. ... If you’d like to, sure, if you’re gonna share their location photo I sent you, just crop out their names as well please. If you’d like I’ll give you the coordinates for your own personal research of the area. I have the Lat/long for where they deployed and you're kinda close to it, but it's not it. Yes, they did deploy in flat terrain, but they were surrounded by cliff sides. The Snyder Fire moved 8 miles in 30 minutes due to the wind. Their closest ['SZ'] and I say that lightly cause really it was a two-track road, was about a half mile away and they would've had to traverse through some very thick PJ trees and sage brush. I appreciate what you're doing and what you're trying to say, but please keep all of this stuff between you and me. ... There really was no reason for them to be out there, with the weather they had forecasted and the no values at risk. It should’ve been a let it burn for the day, and when the winds calm down, we go direct ... [The WF's response to Olson's comments about making it up & tunnel vision]. No, I totally get you, they started making their way back to the helispot for their [ER] and ]two] of them got cut off by a spot. The pilot turned around to go get them before they even asked him to, but it was way to[o] smoked in for him to even attempt a landing or locate them. They had to stick their hand out with a strobe to give their exact location to the ship, he just had to wait until it was cool enough for them to land. ... There were [two] fires they were working. [three] were on one fire, and [two] were on another both fires were about 300 yards apart so they tried dividing and conquering. Saw it was getting bad, made their ways down their escape routes back to the helispot, and that’s when shit started hitting the fan with long range spotting from the Snyder. [WF's response to Olson's comments regarding their common knowledge and helping Nick's Mother]. That’s kinda just general knowledge on the inside between us and the survivor. My crew mates were up there for a roll with them. I personally think it would just be best to be kept on the DL [Down Low] until more stuff comes out about it. I’m just tryna let you know so that way when you’re mapping it out or coming up with theories, it helps gives you a more calculated solution on what happened instead of people commenting on your stuff like they have been about the GMIHC fellas. ... Oh, I know she is, at his memorial her and I had a long talking with each other. He was my best friend on the crew, and I had just gotten stuff delivered for him for his birthday that I was gonna give to him when he got back from filling in with them. Hutch was my best friend on the crew, and [Sydney Watson] lived in the bunkhouse with me last year. I completely agree with you on that, especially after hiking out there to see it. These photos kinda pinpoint a little bit more of where they were in relation with the values out there. Absolutely nothing at risk. Whole area got nuked out. I’ll definitely let you know more when I find out more and when I know more can be released." (See Fig. 16. below)
Forham Law Review. Judging Cases v. Public Opinion. George F. Will, Bob's Decision Undoes Bill's Campaign Strategy, N.Y. Post, Aug. 15, 1996, at 35.(Bellacosa, JW., 1997) "An old adage suggests that when people do not like the news they hear, they should go out and make their own. ... Where my effort goes afterwards is up to others."
Considering the adage: "A picture is worth a thousand words' (left>right clockwise) Fig. 15. archive June 27, 2026, NWS WPC daily weather map, 500 mb map, revealing high nighttime temps, and archive GOES Satellite Water Vapor Imagery (WVI) indicating critically dry air aloft covering CO and UT for June 27, 2026. Strong subsidence signal on WVI article here: (CIMS S, S. Bachmeier, 2012). Note the strong subsidence signal in the WVI, with red and darker-orange water-vapor brightness temperatures! Consider also (Schoeffler Academia.edu, 2016): Dry Slots and Dry Intrusions Visible in Water Vapor Imagery are Responsible for Rapid Surface Drying, Increased Gusty Winds, and Intensified Fire Potential.
Figure 15. (left-right) Archive June 27, 2026, daily wx map, 500 mb map, and 0Z Skew-T sounding, & Satellite WVI. Source: WPC, Plymouth, GOES
Figure 15a. Snyder, Jones, Knowles (SJK) Fires alignment Snippets (left & right), Source: Lunder, The Lookout
Check out Lunder's virtually precise The Lookout post regarding the 'alignment of forces' principle: Critical WUI Fire in Colorado, and an Epic Rant about our Global Shit-show. Controversial "full suppression strategy." (Zeke Lunder, June 29, 2026). Official Knowles Fire SAIT (WLF, LLC, accessed 2026): Citing w/o quoting: [FF] Insertion: IA load of Rifle Helitack earlier that day. Knowles and Gore Fires were approx. eight miles East of two additional IA Fires (Snyder & Jones). Ignitions and Fire Growth: At 1232, crews detected a new ignition approx. ¾ mile NE of the Snyder Fire, exhibiting extreme fire behavior. ... believed to be a Snyder Fire spot fire. Rapid Fire Behavior: ... strong [WSW] winds (30–50+ mph with terrain-enhanced effects and a [S-ward] shift [Clearly indicating the WFs would have to have flown onto the wildfires prior to these winds because aircraft is grounded with gusts over 30 mph.] (NBC, 2025)], ... Ongoing Investigation: SAIT continues to examine all aspects of the incident. ... on July 30, 2026, 13 years and one month, to the day, of the historical, also alleged 'predictable and preventable' YH Fire. Heinlein, BLM - CO, P. Hohn, USWFS, E. Phelps, USFS, A. Richards, USFS, J. Nuttal, USFS. At least one alleged Kool-Aid-drinking party liner is in there. It's also permissible to expect a 'conclusion first, then facts to fit it' pattern!
The Fig. 16. images below must be considered as noticeably analogous vs. identical causations. The official June 30, 2013, YH Fire 122-pg. SAIT-SAIR was completed in late 2013 and concluded: "The Team found no indication of negligence, reckless actions, or violations of policy or protocol." The impending June 27, 2026, Knowles Fire SAIT-SAIR work on the respective significant fatal causal effects of its adverse fire weather, ensuing intense fire behavior, human factors, psychology, the yet-to-be-determined psychological after-effects, and the potential alleged failure to determine and learn from the alleged YH Fire "factual" Lessons Learned (WLF LLC)
that ultimately overwhelmed the Knowles Fire FFs & WFs, is ongoing. This author also alleges that it's clearly permissible to expect their respective SAIT-SAIR finding will follow a 'conclusion first, then facts to fit it' pattern, and reach the same or a similar alleged 'no-blame, no-fault' conclusion! Almost 13 years to-the-day after the fatal 2013 YH Fire.
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