How and why is the 2013 Yarnell Hill Fire SAIT Investigator allegedly unethically continuing to attempt to foist his vision quest upon us while making a profit from the 19 GMHS deaths in 2025? P2
- 22 hours ago
- 81 min read
Restating the post title beyond the limited Wix title allowance: How and why is the 2013 Yarnell Hill Fire SAIT Investigator allegedly unethically continuing to attempt to foist his vision quest upon us, avoiding the truth of the matter, failing to utilize all the available evidence at his disposal, all while making a profit from the 19 GMHS deaths in 2025? Part 2
Author Fred J. Schoeffler and other contributing authors
Views expressed to "the public at large” and "of public concern"
(Crystal Cox vs. Obsidian Finance Group, 2011),
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This post is based on the author's professional judgment and opinions based on available evidence, with no intention to defame individuals.
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Abbreviations used: Wildland Firefighters (WFs) - Firefighters (FFs).
All emphasis is added unless otherwise noted. All Figures are Snippets.
We swallow greedily any lie that flatters us, but we sip only little by little at a truth we find bitter.
2 Samuel 1:16-17 (NKJV)
'Truth thrives under inquiry; dogma fears it. It’s better to explore the unknown than to blindly accept certainty. Questioning is the soul of science—and freedom. The assertion that "Truths when backed by science or evidence don't fear scrutiny" is a foundational principle of empirical reasoning. This perspective, grounded in a commitment to facts, mathematical rigor, and verifiable evidence, posits a clear demarcation between two distinct realms of human understanding: the demonstrable and the dogmatic.' The Importance of Skepticism: Who Are You Going to Believe, Me or Your Own Eyes? (OAR, Dec. 20, 2010).
“Some things are believed because they are demonstrably true, but many other things are believed simply because they have been asserted repeatedly and repetition has been accepted as a substitute for evidence.”
Thomas Sowell
They must find it difficult, those who have authority as truth, rather than truth as authority.
Gerald Massey
Moreover, this author gives credence to Aldous Huxley's prescient statement, "Never have so many been manipulated so much by so few."
Figure 1. Animated Pastor Brad Mayhew Source: Red Helmet Training
Taking advantage of another author's comments validating the alleged Pastor Mayhew's typical histrionic actions here: "All of a sudden, all this other chaos happened. The clarity, the certainty, says Brad Mayhew, tossing his hands up like he’s throwing confetti." Dickman, Outside (2018)
Profitting financially from wildland firefighter deaths raises significant ethical
and moral concerns.
The Author
"Collective fear stimulates herd instinct, and tends to produce ferocity toward those who are not regarded as members of the herd."
Bertrand Russell
The story goes like this: On June 30, 2013, this author was a Safety Officer in Colorado on the West Fork Complex near Pagosa Springs. A Contract Engine Captain showed me a Tweet stating something to the effect of ’30 FFs are unaccounted for on a fire in Yarnell, AZ.’ This author told him, “That’s impossible.” The following day, at our July 1, 2013, briefing, the Incident Commander (IC) verified that the GMHS had, in fact, perished. A phone call to YH Fire OPS Paul Musser, verified it further. At this point, this author made a lifelong commitment to delve deeply into this epic, astonishing, and mind-boggling tragedy, concluding early on that it was likely going to be the biggest cover-up, lie, and whitewash in wildland fire history. This paragraph will be added to Part 1, as an edit ASAP.
Wix denied us the ability to add the following paragraph in Part 1 due to space restrictions. This author anticipates and prays that those of you holding onto the actual, truthful YH Fire and GMHS tragedy information, for whatever justification, are failing to expose, release, and/or share it, including the tenuous “protecting your Brothers, willing to take it to the grave,” or for whatever excuse you're using to justify it, would come forth after all these years and honorably do the right thing.
As noted previously in Part 1, and reiterated here, the goal of this author on this YHFR post is to call out and reveal, in this author's professional opinion, that the alleged "legend in his own mind" Mr. Brad Mayhew was also allegedly covertly christened to become the self-proclaimed, groomed-for-years, pre-planned YH Fire & GMHS Lead Investigator by the U.S. Forest Service (USFS). The goal of this author on this YHFR post is to call out and reveal, in this author's professional opinion, that Mr. Brad Mayhew was supposedly christened to become the self-proclaimed, groomed-for-years, pre-planned YH Fire & GMHS Lead Investigator by the U.S. Forest Service (USFS). In addition, in this author's professional opinion, he was alleged to be and did eventually become so by deceit and design. And so, for years, this author has further alleged that Mr. Brad Mayhew, a former Los Padres Hot Shot, at the behest of his at-the-time HS Supt's recommendation for this author to check out his proposed LCES training, with this author approving what he had to offer, suggested going forward with it. And he did. This began his alleged meteoric career after vouching for him. He eventually formed his highly profitable and successful "Fireline Factors - Human Factors, Risk, Operational Learning" company in 2007. The issues in question, contained within our post title, include his alleged unethical continuing to attempt to foist his vision quest upon us, while avoiding the truth of the matter, failing to utilize all the available evidence at his disposal, all while allegedly making a profit from the 19 GMHS 2013 deaths in 2025. He claims he "serves as a WF on the Santa Ynez Helitack Crew in southern California" as of this posting.
Consider now John Dougherty's InvestigativeMEDIA (IM - 2015) informative and revealing post titled: Key evidence in Yarnell Hill Fire tragedy never provided to official investigators noting: "Key evidence that could explain why the [GMHS] moved from a safe location into a treacherous box canyon where 19 men died on June 30, 2013 was in the possession of the Office of the Maricopa County Medical Examiner but was not provided to the state-contracted investigation into the tragedy, autopsy records recently obtained by [IM] show. A cell phone belonging to [GMHS Supt.] Eric Marsh [RiP] and a functioning camera belonging to hotshot Christopher MacKenzie [RiP] were with the men’s bodies when they arrived at the medical examiner’s office on July 1, 2013, but were not listed as evidence that was later collected by the Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office, autopsy records for Marsh and MacKenzie show. The Maricopa County medical examiner conducted autopsies on all 19 hotshots for Yavapai County on July 2, 2013. The YCSO has no record of Marsh’s cell phone or MacKenzie’s camera among the evidence collected from the medical examiner, according to a YCSO police report. Marsh’s cell phone and MacKenzie’s camera ended up with family members outside the formal chain-of-custody."
This author has stated for years that the GMHS autopsy reports should be used in every annual RT-130 Fire Refresher to alert FFs and WFs to the consequences of failing to follow the tried-and-true Rules of Engagement, and know, heed, and mitigate the Entrapment Avoidance Principles.
Please reconsider this evaluation, directly below from Part 1, for context:
"Schoeffler’s 2023 San Diego Wildfire Safety Summit Evaluation
"Did the information provided here meet your
expectations?
"Yes **
"No
"Please explain briefly*
"Overall excellent conference until Brad Mayhew's histrionic "The Firefighter Tradition of Learning and Innovation" and "American Fire Saga" animated performance, including ignoring one of the two YH Fire eyewitnesses, Joy A. Collura's "comments, questions, or smart remarks" which he requested. And his assertive response, "Not you Fred," when I raised my hand to respond to his request for "any other comments or questions." And Bill Bondshu spearheading me with his assertive response and shutting down the presentation.
"Both Joy and I always behaved and spoke professionally
and respectfully, as expected and also as requested by Bill
Bondshu. And yet Mayhew was allowed to act and speak both
unprofessionally and disrespectfully. Why the double
standard? Why were we the only ones subjected to the bold
restriction of our First Amendment right of Free Speech?
How and why is it that Mayhew is given the ONLY source, venue, individual, whatever to have a monopoly on all things about the Federally-funded June 2013 YH Fire and GMHS SAIT-SAIR debacle? Most of us consider this tragedy to be the biggest cover-up, lie, and whitewash in wildland fire history.
"And, of course, the YH Fire and GMHS "Lead Investigator" Brad Mayhew's histrionic "The Firefighter Tradition of Learning and Innovation" and "American Fire Saga" animated performance, where he danced around laughing, and joking about what most of us consider to be the biggest cover-up, lie, and whitewash in wildland fire history. And how and why you all allow Mayhew to be the ONLY source, venue, individual, whatever to have a strictly enforced monopoly on all things about the Federally-funded June 2013 YH Fire and GMHS SAIT-SAIR debacle. You aligned with and honored your “LEARNING FROM THE PAST” theme with ALL other presentations EXCEPT for Mayhew's histrionics and feckless attempt."
"History gives answers to only those that ask questions and know how to listen."
Dutch historian Johan Huizinga
The immediate and ongoing crux of the above and addressed in this paragraph below is that the 2023 matter is Mayhew allegedly giving no public or published credit to this author regarding his assistance in helping him achieve his alleged fame and fortune. And his question to the entire audience at the 2023 San Diego Wildland Fire Safety Summit - “Are there any questions, comments, or smart remarks?” He instantly ignored and failed to answer or even respond to Joy A. Collura’s comment that he did “successful interviews on the YH Fire,” and Collura replied that he never interviewed her. And then he posed his modified question to the group: “Are there any other questions or comments?” To that, this author merely raised his hand, and Mayhew forcefully and straightaway blurted out: “Not you Fred.” Bill Bondshu spearheaded me with his assertive response, shutting down the presentation with something to the effect of ‘That’s it, we’re done.’
And then, in typical Groupthink fashion, the vast majority of the Safety Summit participants were alleged Sheeple and Kool-Aid Drinkers, based on subsequent comments, and thankfully, several of the knowledgeable and reasonable participants later inquired about what that whole incident was concerning and why Mayhew responded in that fashion with those remarks, especially after obviously asking for questions to the group.
“Some things are believed because they are demonstrably true, but many other things are believed simply because they have been asserted repeatedly and repetition has been accepted as a substitute for evidence.”
Thomas Sowell
Moreover, our Yarnell Hill Fire Revelations website title is about the wildland fire on the weekend of June 28-30, 2013. The revelations portion of our website title concerns the continual journey of documentation, including accounts of those who were there (e.g., local citizens, wildland and municipal firefighters, etc.). Others on this path choose to focus on the first two days before the fatalities occurred on the afternoon of Sunday, June 30, 2013. Whereas we focus on the crucial fatality day, particularly in the afternoon. Citing YH Fire eyewitness Joy A. Collura: "Early on, during the alleged 'factual' investigation, these 'people of authority' used nefarious methods to try to divert attention away from what we [the two local hikers] experienced, documented, and recorded. For example, telling us that we never saw or photographed certain persons or events when, in fact, we did. The alleged 'investigators' used others of the same ilk to attempt to manipulate the truth of what occurred on June 30, 2013."
YH Fire eyewitness Collura's statements strongly suggest the SAIT's and USFS's alleged demonic use of what this author considers to be the nefarious Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP) created by the despicable Jesuits, refined by the Cheka, the precursors to the KGB, and adopted by the National Institute of Justice (Federal Probation, 1991) note it “as a tool that probation officers can use to develop rapport and communicate effectively with their clients ... It approaches language as transformational grammar in which the full linguistic expression is not always fully expressed by what is actually said and is dependent on biological and cultural influences reflected in individual linguistic patterns. These transformations allow certain predictable forms that an experienced interviewer can intuitively identify or analyze where the data have been omitted, distorted, or generalized, in order to then demand further elucidation upon these perceptions.” Refer to The Dark Side of Dangers and Manipulation Techniques. Souldis. Steamit accessed 2025. And Dark Persuasion: A History of Brainwashing from Pavlov to Social Media. Joel E. Dimsdale. DokumenPub accessed 2025. This author alleges the nefarious NLP was also used on the deadly Thirty-Mile Fire on the Wenatchee-Okanogan NF in Washington (2001), when Investigators argued with certain key survivor witnesses attempting to adversely manipulate and sway what they factually saw and heard from those USFS Northwest Regulars No. 6 Crewmembers who perished; telling them they never heard what they claimed they heard. The Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center (WLF LLC), following link has the "official" report and lessons learned. WLF LLC,
This author also experienced NLP from USFS contracted “professionals,” one trained in Nicaragua, who attempted unsuccessfully to get their desired result from “mirroring” me during a several-hour employee, Agency-imposed, alleged "counselling session" in Albuquerque.
"When I look upon seamen, men of science and philosophers,
man is the wisest of all beings;
when I look upon priests and prophets
nothing is as contemptible as man."
Diogenes, also known as Diogenes the Cynic, Greek philosopher.
Furthermore, our YHFR Mission Statement states: "Accepting that wildland firefighting is inherently dangerous, our mission is to promote “complete” lessons learned in the wildland fire service, a quasi-military endeavor, by promoting the sacred responsibility of all supervisors as fire service warriors, to ensure the safety and welfare of those they supervise. This is realized by focusing on sound leadership; considering human factors, human errors, and human failures; the Normalization of Deviance; the Swiss Cheese Model; and High Reliability Organizations."
"We also strive to provide accurate, relevant, and truthful disclosures about the June 2013 Yarnell Hill Fire (YH Fire) and Granite Mountain Hot Shot (GMHS) Crew fatalities, and the ensuing Serious Accident Investigation Team (SAIT), Serious Accident Investigation Report (SAIR), and Learning Reviews (LR) and their dubious fact-finding practices and subsequent conclusions. The basic central theme is a likely rogue firing operation that occurred along the 'Sesame Street and Shrine Corridor area.'"
Citing from the renowned Richard C. McCrea's (2014) International Association of Wildland Fire (IAWF) "The Yarnell Hill Fire: A review of lessons learned, "The real story is Yarnell Hill was much like many other entrapments in the last 20 years, and the mistakes made are nothing new. I might as well have been writing about the South Canyon Fire of 1994. Other reviews of entrapment fires during the last 20 years have pointed out many of the same deficiencies in team management and safety practices. Are we condemned to keep making the same mistakes far into the future? Skookum is a native American word used by some tribes in the Pacific Northwest, which means someone that could be counted on, and reliable, and hard-working. ... compiled for the ADOSH report included a review of fire fatalities from burnover entrapments from 1990 to 2013. This review looked at common denominators during entrapment fires and at fuels, weather, topography, fire behavior, and firefighter and fire team factors. The results of this review showed that the predominant cause of entrapments are fire crews working in mountainous terrain, uphill from a fire, when a sudden upslope fire run entrapped them. Factually, the data shows that about 80% of the fatalities on fires from 1990 to 2013, due to entrapments, occurred due to the situation of firefighters working upslope from a fire. This situation was repeated on the YH fire. The GMIHC was working upslope from the fire, when thunderstorm winds turned the winds and pushed the flames to the south, and the flames channeled up mountain canyons and slopes enveloping the crew. ... [This author alleges that, McCrea, after ignoring or being unaware of the Sesame-Shrine Corridor firing operations], goes on: Wildland urban interface (WUI) is a major problem that is only going to get worse, and some communities, homeowners, and politicians will continue to push firefighters to act on every fire and not to disengage from any given fire situation. In addition, some homeowners are filing lawsuits against wildland fire suppression agencies over the loss of property and structures, which further complicates the situation, and this trend is going to get worse. The wildland fire culture has a real “can do” attitude, and many FFs find it nearly impossible to disengage from a fire. We need to change the fire culture and better educate ourselves and the general public that safety comes first, and when blowup fires occur that some homes will have to be allowed to burn. Homeowners in the WUI need to be told and retold that it’s their responsibility to reduce the fuels around their structures." ...
Quoting the often cryptic and insightful renowned author Stephen Pyne: "Sometimes checklists can sort through the clutter. But lists cannot be too long and they have to be memorable. The lessons of history reveal human character, not natural laws. Their true lessons are such things as the fragility of knowledge, the tenacity of ignorance and fantasy, and the appreciation that wisdom relies on character rather than information. Flawed judgment is more often a source of error than faulty equipment or protocol. Humility matters as much as know-how.— Stephen Pyne, Proceedings of 3rd Fire Behavior and Fuels Conference, October 25-29, 2010, Spokane, WA, USA. International Association of Wildland Fire."
"Yarnell Hill has been claimed by the current generation. This is their fire. They know it, they're learning from it right now. I would like to be clear what's being learned from it (through more investigation)."
Author John Maclean
Consider now the Lessons of Storm King as they relate to the YH Fire and GMHS debacle by Reporter Dennis Webb from his June 29, 2014, updated Sept 28, 2017, Glenwood, CO, Daily Sentinel article, dated a year after the YH Fire on June 30, 2013, updated Sep 28, 2017; author John Maclean's, forthright Yarnell Hill Fire statements are quoted above and here: "Yarnell Hill has been claimed by the current generation. This is their fire. They know it, they're learning from it right now. I would like to be clear what's being learned from it (through more investigation)." Maclean's article also claims the blatant, yet typical Yarnell Hill Fire fairy tale and disproven "30-minute gap" assertion that, "But for all that's been learned from the tragedy, events in Arizona just a year ago, on June 30, showed that perhaps not all the lessons of Storm King are being heeded and pointed to potential new opportunities for improving safety. That day, 19 members of the [GMHS], associated with the Prescott [FD], died in a fire on Yarnell Hill when a fire blew up and overran them. In other echoes of Storm King, communications broke down and the latest weather forecast didn't reach the crew, which got caught without means of escape to a safety zone. ... The [GMHS] died after heading into what proved to be a fire trap in an unburned canyon. Their motivations are unclear[,] thanks to a 30-minute gap in communications with them, possibly due to the heavy radio traffic at that point as the fire picked up. But an initial investigation report by a team that included representatives of multiple agencies surmised they may have been trying to better position themselves to try to protect threatened homes."
Continuing with the above 2017 Lessons of Storm King article with minor edits, e.g. spelling, punctuation, grammar, bolding, etc. here: "When winds fanned flames that swept away 14 young lives on Storm King Mountain near Glenwood Springs two decades ago, it changed forever how wildland firefighters would approach safety on the fireline. ... 'So many things have happened as a consequence of South Canyon," said John Maclean, whose book 'Fire on the Mountain' chronicled what took place on Storm King, adjacent to the area that gave the July 6, 1994, fire its official name — the South Canyon Fire. Most know the event by its more widely used moniker, the Storm King Fire. ... Chief among the changes after Storm King, many in the firefighting community agree, is a firefighter's ability to second-guess leadership if a safety concern arises. ... 'Back then it just wasn't encouraged in our culture to speak up unless assigned authority or ability to speak up,' said Todd Richardson, state fire management officer in Colorado for the Bureau of Land Management, who 20 years ago was working out of Montrose and was headed to Storm King before the blowup when he was turned around and sent to the Wake Fire in Delta County. ... The firefighters' deaths also placed a renewed emphasis on safety practices, such as the need for lookouts watching out for crews, and adequate communications, escape routes and safety zones, all of which proved lacking on Storm King. ... But for all that's been learned from the tragedy, events in Arizona just a year ago, on June 30, showed that perhaps not all the lessons of Storm King are being heeded and pointed to potential new opportunities for improving safety. ... That day, 19 members of the [GMHS], associated with the Prescott Fire Department, died in a fire on Yarnell Hill when a fire blew up and overran them. In other echoes of Storm King, communications broke down and the latest weather forecast didn't reach the crew, which got caught without means of escape to a safety zone."
MacLean wrote: "Jim Roth, who lost his brother on [the] Storm King [Mountain Fire]. Roth worries about the U.S. Forest Service's decision to redact portions of reports from some witnesses for use in the second investigation and decline access to witnesses. ... The firefighters' deaths also placed a renewed emphasis on safety practices, such as the need for lookouts watching out for crews, and adequate communications, escape routes and safety zones, all of which proved lacking on Storm King. ... But for all that's been learned from the tragedy, events in Arizona just a year ago, on June 30, showed that perhaps not all the lessons of Storm King are being heeded and pointed to potential new opportunities for improving safety. ... That day, 19 members of the [GMHS], associated with the Prescott Fire Department, died in a fire on Yarnell Hill when a fire blew up and overran them. In other echoes of Storm King, communications broke down and the latest weather forecast didn't reach the crew, which got caught without means of escape to a safety zone. ... 'It's really hard," said Jim Roth, who lost his brother, Roger, on Storm King and has become involved in firefighter safety issues in the ensuing years. 'I know we tried to work so hard on the fireline to be safe … and learn from the South Canyon Fire[,] and yet it happened. I couldn't believe it. I could not believe (it happened) not just to 14 but it happened to 19.'... Bill Gabbert [RiP], a former firefighter who runs the Wildfire Today [WFT website], said he remembers 20 years ago thinking it couldn't be true when he heard 14 firefighters had died. That many people didn't die on firelines anymore. So for even more to die at Yarnell Hill, "in the 21st century, that's just incredible," he said. ... the [GMHS] crew died after heading into what proved to be a fire trap in an unburned canyon. Their motivations are unclear, thanks to a 30-minute gap in communications. [which was later hastily disproven by Truth Seekers and Truth Tellers. And yet, WFT posts the alleged Naysayers Neill's and Maclean's puzzling article titled (WFT, 2014 - Discoveries in Yarnell Hill Fire recordings provide new information about location of Eric Marsh), stating: "There is no 33-minute gap" when they supported the 30-minute gap theory where Mayhew would aggressively dispute and deny that there was a 30-minute gap theory two years later at the 2016 Southern California Foresters and Fire Wardens (SC FFW) Conference during MacLean’s and Neill’s “Yarnell Hill – Five Years Later” presentation.] with them, possibly due to the heavy radio traffic at that point as the fire picked up. But an initial investigation report by a team that included representatives of multiple agencies surmised they may have been trying to better position themselves to try to protect threatened homes. ...That investigation "found no indication of negligence, reckless actions, or violations of policy or protocol," according to its report. ... But a separate investigation for the Arizona Division of Occupational Safety and Health [ADOSH] pointed to shortfalls involving planning, supervision, risk management and other factors, resulting in the State Forestry Division being hit with a $559,000 fine, according to news reports at the time. ... Roth worries about the U.S. Forest Service's decision to redact portions of reports from some witnesses for use in the second investigation and decline access to witnesses. Gabbert reported that the Forest Service cited issues including employee privacy laws, and sought to distinguish between a regulatory/compliance investigation and the first one, which was focused on understanding why the accident happened. ... 'There's a tendency now for the people involved to not have full disclosure because they're afraid of lawyers,' Roth said, 'and that's extremely frustrating to me and dangerous because we're not going to be able to learn from that Yarnell Hill event because we don't know the truth.' ... Author Maclean said the two investigative reports are highly contradictory, and he hopes further investigation will occur and "come up with information, analysis and conclusions that are different and more thorough than the ones we have seen so far.' ... Other lessons from Yarnell Hill may involve things such as equipment. The federal government has sped up a planned review of fire shelters, which were deployed by Granite Mountain firefighters without success. There's also talk of whether something such as fitting each firefighter with a global-positioning-system location device might have value. And the multi-agency Yarnell Hill report notes that personal cellphone use by firefighters sometimes is prohibited except on breaks, and asked, "Should some crews, working under certain conditions, be able to access their own weather intelligence to increase the accuracy and timeliness of information that affects their own safety?' ... Richardson said such questions need to be weighed against questions such as how reliable the technology is and whether it would help firefighters make better decisions or contribute to them ending up deployed in places where they shouldn't be."
'SOUTH CANYON HAS SAVED LIVES'
"As disheartening as the Yarnell Hill deaths were, observers agree that it doesn't mean the costly lessons of Storm King haven't been learned. Roth believes the deaths there led to lots of situations in which firefighters refused to accept unsafe assignments, or survived scares due to good decisions, 'and you never hear about them. ... Maclean said that, 'Absent the catastrophe in Yarnell last summer, you could say the South Canyon Fire had been learned from properly and well.' ... Since the fire on Storm King, firefighter deaths by flame have dropped dramatically, Maclean said. ... 'To say because Yarnell Hill happened South Canyon is meaningless is wrong. South Canyon has saved lives,' he said. ... As a specific example of safety improvements, he cited an increased focus on the importance of weather forecasting since Storm King. There, Chris Cuoco, then and now a meteorologist for the [NWS] in Grand Junction, accurately predicted the dangerous change in weather and strong winds, a forecast that never made it to the firefighters on the ground. ... One change Maclean would like to see as a result of both fires is a call from top BLM and Forest Service officials, and even the president, for strict limits on how far firefighters should go to protect homes, and a willingness to have their backs politically when they decide to back off.... Richardson said the biggest lesson over the last 20 years is 'you can't continue to do things the same old way.' ... After tragedies like Storm King and Yarnell Hill, 'The question is, are we willing to address them and are we willing to listen to those messages and … try to take some of those things and improve ourselves as a firefighting community.' ... Maclean called Storm King' 'the landmark for the last generation of firefighters.' ... Yarnell Hill 'has been claimed by the current generation. This is their fire. They know it, they're learning from it right now. I would like to be clear what's being learned from it (through more investigation).' ... If enough can be learned as in the case of Storm King, 'maybe 20 years from now we won't have another one of these things,' Maclean said."
Yarnell Hill 'has been claimed by the current generation.
This is their fire. They know it, they're learning from it right now.
Maclean
From the outset, several of us current and former Hot Shot Supts., other experienced WFs, and two psychologists hold that Marsh was safely ensconced at the BSR and yet allegedly committed suicide because he realized that his bad decisions were going to get all his men killed and he would have to live with that guilt. Now consider the following insightfully prescient statement by Pyne implicating the GMHS Supt. & YH Fire DIV A. Marsh in his own and his Crew’s deaths.
They were safe. He took them to the flames. His drive became a fatal flaw and carried the others with him. At Yarnell Hill, the [GMHS] did the calculations and added the sums incorrectly
Stephen Pyne
Consider this accurate, controversial, interesting, intuitive, and somewhat cryptic, well worth reading in the Pacific Standard, November 12, 2013, article by author, Stephen Pyne, titled: A Refusal to Mourn the Death, by Fire, of a Crew in Yarnell, highlighted in this sentence referring to GMHS Marsh: "what here looks like an obsession. They were safe. He took them to the flames. His drive became a fatal flaw and carried the others with him." Interpreting the Yarnell Hill Fire as the deadliest wildfire ever in Arizona - "Instead of ascribing blame, the investigative team sought to appreciate how the hotshots engaged in sensemaking in an effort to explain decisions that, to nearly all observers, make little sense. But the need for sensemaking extends also to the meaning of the fire for American culture at large. ... For anyone conditioned to read landscape for fire behavior, Yarnell Hill is a Google of clues ready to be coded into the existing algorithms of fire behavior. The fundamentals point to fuels of mixed brush and grasses, parched by seasonal drought, to the terrain of Yarnell Hill, and to record temperatures, blustery winds, and the downdrafts (“outflow boundary”) from passing thunderheads. There is nothing in the reconstruction of the fire’s behavior that suggests it was anything other than a high-end variant of what happens almost annually."
"Yarnell Hill will become another 'race that couldn’t be won.” But the analogy stumbles. The smokejumpers at Mann Gulch had no choice: they were trapped in a closed basin, almost a chute, and would perish unless they could outrace or outsmart the flames. The hotshots at Yarnell Hill were safely on a ridge, in the black, and chose to race with the fire by plunging into a box canyon thick with brush. Theirs was an act of volition denied the jumpers at Mann Gulch. At Mann Gulch[,] the fatal numbers were coded into the scene at its origin. At Yarnell Hill[,] the [GMHS] did the calculations and added the sums incorrectly."
Figure 1a. 1949 Mann Gulch Fire map drawing Source: NWCG
Consider now the insightful comments from renowned and well respected Doug Campbell (RiP), a retired Forest Service fire-management officer who’s widely respected for developing a wildfire-prediction system used in more than 20 European countries, noted, “They knew the rules were against them when they were going downhill in the green. ... Everybody’s lawyering up … That’s why the report’s written that way.”
"Experts, including Doug Campbell, say a woeful lack of basic training in wildfire behavior has led to a lack of such awareness among firefighters on the front lines, as well as among managers directing operations. “If firefighters can make accurate predictions as to the specific time and place where fire-behavior changes will occur, then no attack should fail — no firefighter should lose [his] life or be injured by fire,” Campbell states in his book The Campbell Prediction System. The Yarnell Hill investigation report, Campbell and other experts say, fails to adequately address what was a clear lack of situational awareness by the state management team from the start of the fire. Instead, it focuses almost exclusively on dead firefighters whose actions and decisions cannot be explained. The report “is a shell game in so many ways that it does a disservice to what we know about fire management,” says Paul Orozco, a retired U.S. Forest Service fire-management officer who participated in the investigation into the deaths of four firefighters in the 2001 Thirtymile Fire near Winthrop, Washington." InvestigativeMEDIA (2013)
Stephen Pyne continuing: "On the afternoon of June 30th[,] Marsh was a division superintendent, but he left the line to rejoin his crew and then personally lead it away from a blackened ridge and back into the action. He showed an élan and initiative that in many circumstances of life we would applaud[,] but what here looks like an obsession. They were safe. He took them to the flames. His drive became a fatal flaw and carried the others with him."
"Why this crew? At this time? In this way? … The [GMHS] had for its original logo a pair of flaming dice that always came up seven. This time the dice rolled snake eyes. … That doesn’t guarantee it will happen. But my guess is that the enduring voice of the tragedy will be the writer who recognizes that this is not just human-interest journalism, a gripping story of a disaster, or a political parable about misplaced national priorities, but someone who appreciates it as great literary character whose meaning must depend on the ambiguities of art to extract significance from the indecipherable. Not just someone who can see patterns in the flames and hear cries among the roar, but someone who can say with Dylan Thomas (All Poetry) that … After the first death, there is no other.”
The following online 2018 Firehouse magazine article is well worth reading because Mayhew does his level best to word salad his way out of revealing anything resembling the truths about the YH Fire; link provided just below. Brad Mayhew's Firehouse magazine, June 1, 2018, article
Figure 2. YHl Fire GMHS image Source: Firehouse online magazine
These Comments (Neill, Mayhew, Schoeffler) Were Hidden From View in the Firehouse article. (Accessible at the link below, Mayhew's name next to the number "5")
The following online 2018 Firehouse magazine article is well worth reading because Mayhew does his level best to word salad his way out of revealing anything resembling the truths about the YH Fire; link provided just below. Brad Mayhew's Firehouse magazine, June 1, 2018, article:
"Brad Mayhew offers training exercises for developing yourself and your crew for the future. ... On June 30, 2013, 19 members of the Granite Mountain Interagency Hotshot Crew (IHC) were entrapped and lost their lives on the Yarnell Hill Fire in Arizona. In the fire service, we honor our fallen by learning from them. With the five-year anniversary approaching, this is a good time to ask a question: How have we learned from this accident? ... The incident - Late afternoon on June 28, the Yarnell Hill Fire started on a remote ridgetop west of Yarnell, AZ. Located in a boulder field in steep terrain, the fire showed little activity or spread potential. The incident commander (IC) prepared for full suppression on the following morning. ... On June 29, firefighters held the fire in check until around 4 p.m., when winds increased and the fire spotted outside containment lines. That evening, the Type 4 IC ordered a Type 2 incident management team (IMT) and additional resources. ... By the morning of June 30, the fire had grown to approximately 300–500 acres. In a 7 a.m. briefing, the incoming Granite Mountain IHC superintendent accepted the role of Division Alpha Supervisor. His assignment was to establish an anchor point at the heel of the fire. ... For most of the day, the fire spread to the northeast, threatening structures in Model Creek and Peeples Valley. Around 3:50 p.m., the wind shifted and the fire started pushing aggressively to the southeast, toward Yarnell. ... Fire resources shifted to resident evacuation and structure protection in town. Only the Granite Mountain IHC remained out on the ridge, on the southwest perimeter of the fire. Personnel who communicated with the Granite Mountain IHC knew the crew was using the black as a safety zone at the southwest end of the fire—and believed they would stay there. When the crew said they were moving, they were not fully understood. ...Sometime after 4:04 p.m., the crew left the black and headed for the town of Yarnell. They were hiking through an unburned box canyon when the wind shifted again. At 4:30 p.m., thunderstorm outflows reached the southern perimeter of the fire, driving the fire directly south. The fire overran the Granite Mountain IHC at about 4:42 p.m. ... Gaps in our knowledge - The crew left the road (upper right) and hiked down into an unburned box canyon, taking the most direct route to a ranch, which was a safety zone (left), on the edge of town. Note: The dozer line to the deployment site was constructed for access after the entrapment. It seems part of the crew’s story was lost with them, even to those of us who served on the Investigation Team. We may speculate, but we do not know for certain how they decided to leave the black and hike through the box canyon. The crew’s earlier decisions are clear, and we can make sense of them in hindsight. So we know there must be more to their story, but we don’t know what it is. This level of uncertainty is unusual in wildland fire accidents. ... With that said, following are some approximate timeframes: 7 a.m.–3:45 p.m.: The crew arrived at the fire and attended a briefing. ... They worked near the heel of the fire, on the edge of the black, which was their safety zone. ...3:45–3:55 p.m. The crew heard about and then experienced a wind shift that caused the fire to change direction. Other resources were relocating to Yarnell. ... 3:55–4:04 p.m.: The crew hunkered in the black and discussed their options. ... 4:04–4:20 p.m.: The crew left the black, hiking south along a two-track road near the ridgetop. ... 4:20–4:39 p.m.: The crew descended from the two-track road into an unburned box canyon. They were heading directly for a ranch (a safety zone) on the edge of town. ... 4:39 p.m.: Realizing they were entrapped, the crew called for help and prepared to deploy fire shelters. The fire overran them soon after. ... For deeper detail, read the [YH] Fire [SAIT-SAIR] (2013) or the Yarnell Hill Fire Case Study (2014), both available at firelinefactors.com/resources.
Crew learning exercises - In the fire service, we learn from our accidents. Over our history, we have gotten better at fighting fire, and we’ve gotten better at learning. Many believe we have not learned enough from this accident. One reason is we don’t fully understand the events of June 30, 2013. It can be hard to see what the lessons are, and how to improve for the future. ... View of the column at 4:41 p.m. Matt Oss. If our learning has stalled for this event, we should try a different approach. But how can we learn for the future when there are gaps in our knowledge of the past? ... Following are exercises I’ve found useful in training sessions and workshops. They can be good discussion tools for your crew as well. ... Exercise 1: We don’t know for certain why the crew left the black. But we can learn a lot by trying to put ourselves in that scenario, and asking what could motivate us to do the same thing. Sometimes people react to this exercise by simply stating that they would not make the same decision. That may be true, but can you remember when you’ve done this sort of thing before? Or when you have (sic) seen it? The point is to relate to the natural human motivations that drove them. We have the same drives; they sometimes lead us to success, and sometimes into trouble. The better we know our own human instincts, the better leaders and decision-makers we can become. One of the Wildland Fire Leadership Principles is, “Know yourself and seek improvement.” With this in mind, you can use this question as a tool: “If we were safe in the black, what might motivate us to leave?” ... Exercise 2: After Granite Mountain left the black, they hiked on a two-track road for about 15 minutes. Then they left the road and hiked down into an unburned box canyon, taking the most direct route to a ranch on the edge of town. Prior to this, the crew had options: They could return to the black or take a number of other routes. As they hiked down into the canyon, their options disappeared. In hindsight, we know the outcome. At the time, however, this path must have made sense to them. It must have felt better than their other options. ... ... Humans are not completely objective. We are influenced by social, political and emotional factors. We don’t pay much attention to how such factors affect us, so they can push us and pull us without our knowing. Think what it may have been like if you were with the crew, hiking through the canyon. And with this in mind, ask yourself: “If we were there, why would that path feel right to us?” ... Exercise 3: Trying to take the crew’s perspective (or at least imagine it) is a powerful learning exercise. Their perspective matters because we are trying to develop ourselves for when we may be in similar situations. Their actions must have made sense to them, based on their expectations. We can be sure they did not expect the outcome they faced. When has a fire caught you off guard? To try to get a sense for their decision-making, ask yourself: “How were they expecting this to turn out?” ... Respect for the past, learn for the future. ... You will get more out of these exercises by comparing notes with other firefighters. You might be surprised at what they come up with. And it’s better to be surprised in the training room or at the dinner table rather than on a fire. ... The most important point about learning is why we do it—and who we are doing it for. These are not academic exercises. The purpose of these exercises is to help you make yourself stronger and more effective for the future. And the reason we do that is for our pride in our own performance, and the men and women who we work shoulder to shoulder with, the public we swore to serve, and the people who need us to come home. ... We can’t change the past or what happened to their crew. But if we respect the past, we can use it to develop our crew for the future. We may not know exactly how they chose their path, but we can see ourselves on a similar path, then learn from it. As firefighters, the best way to honor the fallen is to respect the past and learn for the future. What we do with our performance and our crew is the most meaningful memorial we can build."
"COMMENTS - My name is Holly Neill. I am a former Wildland Firefighter and I am working with John Maclean on a book about the Yarnell Hill fire. I have a few comments about this article. Mr. Mayhew states: Personnel who communicated with the Granite Mountain IHC knew the crew was using the black as a safety zone at the southwest end of the fire—and believed they would stay there. When the crew said they were moving, they were not fully understood. The Serious Accident Investigation Report states on the Executive Summary page 1: "No one realized that the crew left the black and headed southeast, sometime after 1604. There is a gap of over 30 minutes in the information available for the Granite Mountain IHC. From 1604 until 1637, the Team cannot verify communications from the crew, and we have almost no direct information for them." There is a great deal of evidence to the contrary. A careful study of official and private interviews, audio recordings and other evidence indicates numerous overhead had specific intel on what GMIHC was doing during the "gap in over 30 minutes in the information available…from 1604 to 1637." I will go into more detail in our book, but documented evidence will show that numerous overhead personnel stated the following about GMIHC’s movements: • The last communication with Eric Marsh was: we are on the west ridge descending a predetermined escape route. • Eric said he was headed to his pre designated safety zone, and the assumption was he was headed to the Boulder Springs Ranch, not the black. • Granite Mountain said they were using their predetermined route towards the structures… obviously whoever they were talking to knew what that meant. • They (Granite Mountain) were gonna move out and start coming in a southerly direction based on the fire behavior. • From an audio recording of Eric Marsh himself, he is answering to a status update check at 16:13: “Granite is making their way down our escape route from this morning, it’s SOUTH…” This is by no means a complete list of reported communications involving Granite Mountain during the SAIR’s gap of over 30 minutes in the information available. The Team states "we cannot verify communications from the crew and have almost no direct information for them." These communications also contradict what Mr. Mayhew said above: Personnel who communicated with the Granite Mountain IHC knew the crew was using the black as a safety zone at the southwest end of the fire—and believed they would stay there. Mr. Mayhew also stated “When the crew said they were moving, they were not fully understood.” This issue will be discussed further in our book. Perhaps for now, at the 5 year anniversary of the Yarnell Hill fire, we can honor The GMIHC by learning more about communications on the Yarnell Hill fire on June 30, most notably the communications that occurred during the SAIR’s "gap of over 30 minutes in the information available for the Granite Mountain IHC, from 1604 until 1637." Esse Quam Videri - To be, rather than to seem.
- Thank you for your insightful article. I agree with you in part and respectfully take issue with the rest. I am a retired USFS Hot Shot Crew Superintendent with several years of experience. Over the years, besides becoming a student of Fire Weather (our first Fire Order) and Fire Behavior, I have become an avid student of fatality fire case studies. From these I do my best to draw what conclusions I can garner from the many, often ineffectual, litany of Investigations, Reviews and Learning Reviews, Facilitated Learning Analysis, Accident Prevention Analysis, and many others regarding the crucial, yet ignored, issue of human factors. Human factors, no matter what the activity or profession, either keeps you out of trouble or gets you into trouble almost every time. ... I agree that we should “honor our fallen by learning from them” and it is always “a good time to ask a question: How have we learned from this accident?” ... I find it discomforting that you ask “how” - and not what - we have learned from this accident. How I have learned was from good supervisors and good mentors that required us to know, recognize, heed, and follow the proactive Basic Wildland Firefighting Rules, (i.e. the 10 Standard Fire Orders and the 18 Watch Out Situations). The Watch Out Situations are more or less guidelines whereas the Fire Orders are rules. In other words, you cannot violate the Watch Out Situations which you must mitigate in order to remain safely engaged or escape to elsewhere to safety. I also learned by passing these valuable lessons learned along to our young Hot Shots and other WFs in both formal and informal training sessions. And, of course, from practical experiences on many wildland fires. Most WFs are unaware that the term ‘Safety Zones’ had not yet been included in the Standard Fire Orders as late as April 1980 according to the “Preliminary Report of Task Force on study of Fatal / Near-Fatal Wildland Fire Accidents.” ... Yes indeed, the GMHS “were hiking through an unburned box canyon when the wind shifted again.” Two flagrant items come to mind here. The fact that they were hiking through the “unburned” AND a “box canyon” at that time of day and under those readily observable adverse weather and aggressive fire behavior conditions was totally contrary to our WF training. And that is not “hindsight bias.” From the SAIT report, you will also infer that they had no lookout while they were doing this, and that they did not tell Air Attack or anyone else they were leaving their Safety Zone (S/Z). ... From their Lunch Spot/ S/Z they had the best vantage point of the fire, save Air Attack. They well knew what was happening before they made the decision to leave. The WFSTAR NWCG image titled “Only Minutes – Blowup to Burnover” indicates that the Yarnell Hill Fire time was only “52 minutes.” ... The “4:30 p.m., thunderstorm outflows reached the southern perimeter of the fire” and did indeed drive “the fire directly south.” And yes, “the fire overran the Granite Mountain IHC at about 4:42 p.m.” in an unburned, lethal bowl near the Boulder Springs Ranch. Chimney, chutes, and especially bowls are specifically mentioned in WF as being deadly based on historic fire fatalities. ... Yes indeed, “the crew left the road (upper right) and hiked down into an unburned box canyon, taking the most direct route to a ranch.” Yes, this BSR was considered “as a safety zone (left), on the edge of town.” However, you failed to mention a key point, that they were already in a good S/Z in the ‘good black.’ ... Correct again, “part of the crew’s story was lost with them, even to those of us who served on the Investigation Team.” You state: “We may speculate, but we do not know for certain how they decided to leave the black and hike through the box canyon.” On the contrary, we do know how they made that decision. ... Prescott City Attorney Jon Paladini recounted in an AZ Republic article (“New account of hotshot deaths in Yarnell fire” - April 5, 2015), discussing conversations between PFD Wildland Battalion Chief Darrel Willis and GMHS survivor Brenan McDonough. Paladini is quoted as saying: “My understanding of the argument between Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed ... was that Steed did not want to go down.” Even though there were no “official” recordings of this, there were many other WFs that heard these radio transmissions over the discreet GMHS Crew Net channel. The Division Supervisor of that operational area was Marsh and the Acting Superintendent in charge of the GMHS was Steed. ... We refer to it as the highly abridged and redacted “discussing our options” video, available on YouTube. The Serious Accident Investigation Team (SAIT), of which you were the lead Human Factors Investigator, had the original full length recordings of this entire GMHS Crew Net entire discussion. ... I agree that the crew’s earlier decisions are clear, and we can make sense of them in hindsight. We definitely know there is in fact, “more to their story, but we don’t know what it is,” yet. This level of uncertainty certainly is unusual in wildland fire accidents because all the men, except one, died that day. Please read the Yarnell Hill Fire Serious Accident Investigation Report (2013) or the Yarnell Hill Fire Case Study (2014) and look for the Human Factors section of the report. There isn’t one. There is only a “recommendation” on page 44: “The Team recommends that the State of Arizona request the NWCG [National Wildfire Coordinating Group] and/or Fire Leadership Council (WFLC) to charter a team of interagency wildland fire and human factors experts to conduct further analysis of this event and the wildland fire communications environment.” ... To the best of my knowledge, no such “team of … experts” has ever been chartered. ... "In the fire service, we do learn from our accidents when we are told what and why the accidents and fatalities happened. Throughout our history, I will agree that we have gotten better at fighting fire; however, it depends on the actual units and their supervisors whether or not we’ve gotten better at learning. I am in the group of many that strongly believe we have not learned enough from this epic multiple fatality event. ... I believe that one of the key “reasons we don’t fully understand the events of June 30, 2013,” is because the SAIT concluded: “… the [SAIT] found no indication of negligence, reckless actions, or violations of policy or protocol.” Really? Framing that into a more positive assertion, those men did everything right – yet 19 men burned to death in one fell swoop. How is that possible when the SAIT basically concluded that the GMHS performed their inherently dangerous job according to “policy” and “protocol? You are absolutely correct that “it can be hard to see what the lessons are, and how to improve for the future” when dubious conclusions like that are made. You stated “If our learning has stalled for this event, we should try a different approach. But how can we learn for the future when there are gaps in our knowledge of the past?” Good question. We can truly “learn for the future” when we close or fill those “gaps in our knowledge of the past” with forthright, straightforward conclusions about why these tragedies occur instead of their “story,” where nobody did anything wrong and nobody is to blame. Realistically, when WFs die on fires, it is almost always because someone made bad decisions. Beware the training instructors that begin WF training sessions with “There are no wrong answers.” ... I have thought about what it may have been like if I was with the Crew, hiking through the canyon. And with this in mind, I ask and then immediately tell myself: What the heck are we doing in here because this path is not right and it certainly does not feel right based on our WF training, and case studies of past fatality fires in similar conditions. And it is the worst possible time to be making these decisions and taking these actions. ... Comparing notes with other WFs does not surprise me at all what they come up with. For the most part, we come to the very same conclusion(s) - bad decisions that contradict all we know about decision-making and the human factors that influenced all of the many wildland fire fatality case studies where WFs are killed by fire. ... "On the contrary, we know almost exactly how they chose their path. I cannot see myself or others that I have supervised and trained over the years, on a similar path, because we learned valuable human factors lessons of the many historic fatality fires. As WFs, the best way to “learn for the future” and honor the fallen is to respect the past, provide sound leadership, and learn and follow the proper, aggressively safe way to fight fires based on the tried-and-true WF Rules. Realizing that our ultimate responsibility as WF Supervisors is the safety and welfare of those we supervise, that is the most meaningful and redeeming “memorial we can build for the future.”
Consider this 2023, YHFR post clarifying MacLean's comments above, best viewed on a laptop or PC titled: How are the Alleged "Historical Fiction" Writer John Maclean and the Alleged YH Fire "Lead Investigator" Brad Mayhew Both Off Track About the June 30, 2013, YH Fire? Dr. Ted Putnam read Maclean's book titled: Fire on the Mountain: The True Story of the South Canyon Fire. Dr. Putnam formally requested that Maclean correct several errors and inaccuracies in his book, and Maclean basically disregarded them. They allegedly entailed over forty errors, inaccuracies, and inconsistencies that were conceded by Mr. Maclean in writing to Dr. Putnam but never corrected. This is addressed in Dr. Putnam's perceptive, somewhat elusive, and hard-to-come-by IAWF (2011) paper. Below are some of Dr. Putnam's excerpts from the Safety Summit proceedings listed in the following IAWF link here: Proceedings of 11th International Wildland Fire Safety Summit, April 4-8, 2011, Missoula, MT, USA. Published by the IAWF, Missoula, MT, USA, Accidents, accident guides, stories and the truth. Ted Putnam, PhD.
"My first entrapment investigation began with the Battlement Creek Fire in 1976. Years later as a member of the 1990 Dude Fire fatality investigation team I wrote a special report on the fatality site specifics resulting in the deaths of six firefighters. This skill was captured as a primary duty in my formal job description as of March 1994 and said "Conducts complex and detailed analysis of firefighter entrapments to determine interactions of firefighter behavior, the equipment used, fire behavior, and the resulting injuries or fatalities. Specialist is the pioneer in advancing scientific knowledge in this area.” Thus I read Maclean's book after the South Canyon Fire from the viewpoint of a very skillful fire fatality specialist. ... In the reading of Maclean's book I was aware of many fire behavior points he made that were fictional elements as opposed to factual elements. For example saying people will be burned breathing in 140º F air when research shows people have breathed in air temperatures up to 450-500º F. This indicated that Maclean did not have the advice of a fire accident expert at the time of collecting the book materials who could skillfully interpret the relevant evidence or more importantly, notice the lack of it.”
Figure 2a. Former USFS IC Rowdy Muir Source: BIA 2014 Smoke Signals
Consider now the informative and insightful 2014 BIA Smoke Signals interview article from the highly respected, Skookum, and trusted former USFS District Ranger and IC Rowdy Muir, noted above in Fig. 1b. "Editor’s note: This article was written several months before the investigation report was completed and released. ... On the evening of June 30, 2013, the news confirming that nineteen hotshots had died on the Yarnell Hill [F]ire shocked not only the fire community but the whole nation. I know there were others like myself who were wondering how something so tragic could happen to nineteen hotshots. ... In 1994, after the South Canyon [F]ire fatalities, people were asking the same question. Many were convinced that the investigation report would tell a story of some unrealistic, freakish event that claimed the lives of fourteen wildland firefighters. Yet nothing came out in the report that was unusual, ... phenomenal or bizarre. It wasn’t an act of God. [This author takes umbrage with Muir’s “Act of God” claim. In reality, everything in our lives and in the world is an Act of God when you think about it as a believer.] Instead, the reality is that as a culture we read about things we were familiar with—things we should have already known. ... I anticipate the same realization when we find out what happened to the Granite Mountain 19 on the Yarnell Hill Fire once the investigative report is published. My bet is the report won’t tell us anything new has happened. We will once again find out something we already know. ... LCES - In the news conference with crew co-founder Darrell Willis he mentions that “one of the most emphasized things we do is to establish LCES.” Yet, in the same sentence he mentions that “there are points during the day that we didn’t have [LCES] in place.”... How many times have we heard that said? If we don’t have LCES in place then there is something wrong. Even if it’s only for a moment - one might bring to the attention of others the need to establish LCES. LCES needs to be continually monitored throughout the shift. If they are not in place, then we don’t engage until they are in place. ... Tactics and Strategy - In the same interview with Darrell [Willis] he talks about the crew abandoning a tactic of anchor and flank to address some independent action (to do point protection on the structures). Most agree that independent action is critical to the success of catching many wildfires. What we need to learn from this is that when we change tactics and strategies that are working, we need to evaluate the risk vs. gain. We need to think things out before we engage in another tactic. Someone might ask, “Why are we leaving something that’s working to take the risk of something?" Eric Hipke, the only survivor from the uphill run that proved fatal for others at South Canyon, may tell you that the ... there is only a 1 in 14 chance of outrunning a fire burning uphill. Anytime we commit to any type of downhill egress, the option of successfully going back up the hill in an emergency is “slim to none.” ... This is partly because it is so difficult to measure how long it takes to get back up, and then over or through these geographical barriers. We should reevaluate any type of downhill operation, knowing that the only way to safety is back up the hill. ... The Value of Situational Awareness - In an interview with [GMHS widow] Juliann Ashcraft, she mentions the text she received from Andrew about how “things are getting wild,” and how “Yarnell was looking to burn.” She acknowledges that those words weren’t common language for Andrew. It was a different scenario which she hadn’t heard from him before. Her situational awareness told her that something was different. ... Why is it that Andrew didn’t recognize the same awareness? Many of us recognize changes in our surroundings, and have “situational awareness.” ... However, even though we are aware of our surroundings, we sometimes fail to take intelligent action based on what we observe. We get caught up in the moment and sometimes our field of focus narrows, and we don’t rely on someone else to help us with our blind spots. ... We need to recognize that when the slightest thing changes we need to adjust. When I first learned to ride bulls, I was taught that when a bull makes a move you need to make a counter move equal to the bull’s move. If you made a move that was too extreme or not equal to the bull’s move, it was much harder to react to the next move the bull made. In most cases, if you can’t make counter moves equal to the bull, the consequences are you got thrown off. It takes many years of practice to be able to compensate for either over-aggression or the lack of equal aggression. ... I find this to be true with situational awareness. We need to be able to recognize the change and make decisions to equalize the change. [Consider our (YHFR, 2023) post about Muir's on-point comment regarding former PFD BC Willis's LCES statement above titled: "What Fatality and "Prescott Way" Causal Factors Does PFD Wildland BC Willis Reveal in the July 2013 GMHS Deployment Zone News Conference?].
"Sometimes we either overreact to the change or ignore it; the consequences are the same. We become out of balance. ... Weather and the Collapse of Columns - In discussions with personnel who were on the Dude Fire, I found out that no one really recognized the collapsing column that brought about what they thought was a weather event with rain, hail and strong down drafts. ... I am currently the District Ranger on a district that had 3 fatalities related to a similar weather event."
[Muir further references the little-known fatal 2007 North Neola Fire in Northern Utah - Investigators look at deadly Utah fire, (UPI 2007)], "I was on an incident in Utah a few years ago in which a homeowner had me come look at his residence, which had burned down. He wanted to know why. ... He couldn’t understand why the front of the yard where he had parked a truck and tractor was still green and the vehicles untouched. The front of the residence would have been the head of the fire being pushed down valley from down drafts. One would have thought all his property would have been lost. In reality the weather event caused spotting way ahead and down valley of the main fire and when finished, the fire consumed the residence from the back side because the fire took a normal route of burning uphill. That may not work?” ... Downhill through Bowls, Chutes, and Chimneys - Eric Hipke, the only survivor from the uphill run that proved fatal for others at South Canyon, may tell you that the, there is only a 1 in 14 chance of out-running a fire burning up hill. Anytime we commit to any type of downhill egress, the option of successfully going back up the hill in an emergency is “slim to none.” ... This is partly because it is so difficult to measure how long it takes to get back up, and then over or through these geographical barriers. We should reevaluate any type of downhill operation, knowing that the only way to safety is back up the hill. ... The Value of Situational Awareness - In an interview with Juliann Ashcraft, she mentions the text she received from Andrew about how “things are getting wild,” ... and how “Yarnell was looking to burn.” She acknowledges that those words weren’t common language for Andrew [Ashcraft RiP]. It was a different scenario which she hadn’t heard from him before. Her situational awareness told her that something was different. Why is it that Andrew didn’t recognize the same awareness? Many of us recognize changes in our surroundings, and have “situational awareness.” However, even though we are aware of our surroundings, we sometimes fail to take intelligent action based on what we observe. We get caught up in the moment and sometimes our field of focus narrows, and we don’t rely on someone else to help us with our blind spots. ... We need to recognize that when the slightest thing changes we need to adjust. When I first learned to ride bulls, I was taught that when a bull makes a move you need to make a counter move equal to the bull’s move. If you made a move that was too extreme or not equal to the bull’s move, it was much harder to react to the next move the bull made. In most cases, if you can’t make counter moves equal to the bull, the consequences are, you got thrown off. It takes many years of practice to be able to compensate for either over-aggression or the lack of equal aggression. ... I find this to be true with situational awareness. We need to be able to recognize the change and make decisions to equalize the change. ... Sometimes we either overreact to the change or ignore it; the consequences are the same. We become out of balance. ... Weather and the Collapse of Columns - In discussions with personnel who were on the Dude Fire, I found out that no one really recognized the collapsing column that brought about what they thought was a weather event with rain, hail and strong down drafts. ... I am currently the District Ranger on a district that had 3 fatalities related Operations to a similar
weather event. I was on an incident in Utah [North Neola] a few years ago in which a homeowner had me come look at his residence which had burned down. He wanted to know why. ... He couldn’t understand why the front of the yard where he had parked a truck and tractor was still green and the vehicles untouched. The front of the residence would have been the head of the fire being pushed down valley from down drafts. One would have thought all his property would have been lost. In reality the weather event caused spotting way ahead and down valley of the main fire and when finished, the fire consumed the residence from the back side because the fire took a normal route of burning uphill. ... The Yarnell Hill fire had experienced some of the same types of weather events throughout the day. Those events were broadcast by radio to those on the fire line. Whether what happened was caused by a column collapsing, a frontal passage, or the buildup of clouds which resulted in down drafts, fires that experience these types of weather occurrences should make us mindful that there is really no main or head of the fire. An established fire can, and will come from all directions once down drafts occur. ... WUI and the Values at Risk - The days of “anchor, flank and pinch” were the days of firefighters being out in the woods chasing fire that didn’t have much in the way of “values at risk.” The only “values” we were asked to watch out for were ourselves. ... It’s rare anymore to have a fire that doesn’t include many different “values at risk,” that need protecting. The perception of these “values” takes away from the real mission, and that is again, to protect ourselves as we are the real and primary “values at risk.” ... Our training curriculum is fairly narrow and focuses on the mission of wildland fire. Keep this in mind: you are truly the only “values at risk.” And yes, I would say are truly the only value that needs to be protected. And yes, I would say the protection of others falls into the category of “we.” ... No one would ever downplay the value of other lives at risk. Somewhere in our culture, our perception changed and we took upon ourselves the responsibility of structure protection. ... This has never been our mission or our responsibility. ... I believe when we get into a WUI situation we really need to evaluate our thought process. This situation gets our adrenaline pumping, and blurs our ability to make sound and rational decisions. Especially if we are familiar with the community or know who lives in the houses. It’s much harder for us to disengage when we have an emotional attachment to the structures in addition to the people who inhabit them. ... I know all too well the emotional aspect. When I was in Florida in 1998, working in around various communities, I grew to know and like the people in those communities. ... As time moved on the aspiration of trying to save every home in every community became a personal challenge and obligation. On one occasion, we were being run over by fire and doing the best we could to save structures. During the heat of the battle I recognized my shortcoming[s] and pulled everyone out of the situation. The need to reassess the situation is obvious now—yet for that small moment[,] I was caught up in an unrealistic task. Pulling back was the best move I ever made. The perception is real. Don’t think for a moment you can’t get caught up in it. ... Values and Crew Cohesion - All decisions are based on values. I believe we should share our personal values with our co-workers and team members. The more we share our values, the more cohesive we become. ... If we know and understand the values of our team members, we can appreciate and accept their decisions more easily. I find this to be critical in our quest to become better team players. ... Teams, as a group, also have shared values. We make decisions based on what our team’s values are. If we accept the team values, then the team reaps the rewards or pays the consequences as a team. If we only navigate by our own values, then the rewards or consequences are only ours. ... There are a lot of rewards in being on a team that succeeds or excels. We see this in the film story of the 1980 US Olympic Hockey team winning gold[,] or Shackleton’s crew navigating their way home through the Antarctic. We see it in our modules, crews, sections, and staffs. ... Each individual had to give up some personal values for the team to be successful; some personal and team values don’t mix. The reality is when decisions are made as a team, when there is a consensus that “this is what we are going to do, or not do”— a team owns the decision and the team may lose. Our value system can compromise our situational awareness. ... There are no new ways to get into trouble. ... Our culture has been here before[,] and I’m quite certain we will be here again—an acknowledgment that may or may not help us heal depending on how we choose to process the information—the “what we know.” ... If we take what we already know and put it to good use, it will help us come to the full understanding of the real, tangible, human values at risk." END
Perception - Do you see - a Duck or a Rabbit? Or a Rabbit or a Duck?
Figure 3. Perception image Source: The Illusions Index
Dr. Ted Putnam's somewhat obscure 2011 IAWF Accidents, accident guides, stories and the truth research paper has a great deal of valuable information and insight on the historical fatal 1949 Mann Gulch Fire, so it is well worth delving into here (WLF LLC). Among other things, in this author's professional opinion, it was the first documented case of a fatality wildfire "investigation" establishing a conclusion first and then attaining the alleged "facts" to support it. The Board of Review's (BoR) (WLF LLC BoR) strict requirements, which required the District Ranger to testify first and prohibited anyone from contradicting his testimony, thus setting the stage for the dubiously historical YH Fire and GMHS debacle: "conclusions first, then facts" premise; bizarre, unethical, and predictable in hindsight.
The role of leaders and HR managers isn’t just to support the strong — it’s to remove the weak elements that undermine team dynamics.
Strong performers will thrive on their own, as long as no one is poisoning the collaborative atmosphere.
Australian University Professor Phelps
Ask yourself whether the 2013 YH Fire Investigator, Brad Mayhew, also allegedly claims to be a "hero" in his Fireline Factors journey, revealing his ostensible latent lessons that he now claims he learned from mistakes and errors that he made after the fact, allegedly considering himself the only one to reveal these insights. Consider Mike Mooney's (2018) germane LinkedIn article titled: "Making Change Stick with Storytelling - How to ensure the message, meaning, and momentum of your organisation's change journey lasts the distance." Especially mythology and storytelling researcher Joseph Campbell's well-known Storytelling with the Hero's Journey portion in Fig. 2. below. The hero's journey is a great metaphor to explain the four main stages of a successful change journey for any organization: Disruption, Resistance, Courage, & Transformation.
"Nobody is going to pour truth into your brain.
It's something you have to find out for yourself."
Noam Chomsky
Figure 3a. The Hero's Journey image Source: Medium, Diego Ramos
Consider reading the somewhat controversial article: The Hero Myth of Wildland Firefighting by Southwest Area (SWA) Hot Shot Crewmember Emily Shepard (Undark, 2021). "It’s not heroic to fight a problem that could have been averted with responsible policy. It’s tragic."
Notwithstanding the derision the following Undark author experiences from several zealot commenters, this author supports her two seasons as an experienced and credible SWA Hot Shot Crewmember because she dared to speak out. This author contends that Shepard accurately stated: "I speak for many wildland firefighters when I say it’s not really heroic to fight a problem that could have been averted with responsible policy. Most fatalities that do occur are not heroically tragic, but rather just tragic. The [GMHS] didn’t perish while saving innocent lives, or even homes. They perished in the middle of nowhere, for reasons most wildland firefighters will not claim to understand."
They perished in the middle of nowhere,
for reasons most wildland firefighters
will not claim to understand
Because she was somewhat vilified because of her lack of experience, in support, this author posted this trenchant comment on her Undark article on Sept. 26, 2021, at 5:17 pm. "I’m a retired USFS HS Crew Supt. with more than I care to remember, numerous shelter deployments, burnovers, entrapment, and fatalities, including a 1996 shelter deployment. We got briefed to 'establish a conclusion' and then get 'facts' to support it. Now with the 'no blame, no-fault' FLAs, Learning Reviews; feckless means to avoid telling the truth about what happened and why. Learning 'incomplete lessons' guarantees we will continue to maim/kill WFs and FFs for the same reasons. Indeed, the YHF and GMHS debacle is the biggest cover-up, lie, and whitewash in wildland fire history. I’ve been on numerous YH Fire and GMHS site visits over the years. During the Oct. 2013, SW Area IHC AAR, one senior HS Supt, during the Integration Phase, stated: 'This is the final, fatal outcome of a long chain of bad decisions with good outcomes; we saw this coming for years;' buttressed by numerous others. Some felt these GMHS supervisors killed their men. They violated their solemn duty to do their best to guarantee the safety and welfare of those they supervised. I prefer to remain on the solid ground of honoring these dead GMHS as one of the many Truth Tellers."
Reality cannot be ignored except at a price;
and the longer the ignorance is persisted in, the higher and more terrible becomes the price that must be paid.
Huxley's quote is for you, Mr. Mayhew, because he reminds us that denial is not protection - it is delay. Because ignoring the truth only piles up consequences, waiting to be paid in full with interest. And you know full well what truths you are allegedly avoiding that need to be faced today, so when do you plan on clearing your conscience and revealing them?
Consider this 2023 YHFR post titled: "Leave it alone ... you shouldn't go down this road ... let it be." How many times have you heard these same statements from others when mentioning the Yarnell Hill Fire?" from a forthright, supportive former El Cariso HS Supt. and former Angeles NF Fire Staff's unable to relocate Facebook post to one of the alleged YHFR and GMHS debacle's alleged "Investigators," Jay Kurth and supporter and former USFS SWA Public Disinformation Officer and seemingly ardent GMHS supporter Franklin Otis Carroll, giving credence and credibility to this author: "Don Feser: "Franklin, the one thing that resonates with me more than anything else with the GMHS, was their apparent comfort zone with positioning and maneuvering in the green. I spent many years as a IHC firefighter in SoCal and throughout the country, and irregardless of ground or air delivery to the line, we maintained one foot in the burn, and our escape routes and safety zones were into the burn. This was more than just an SOP learned in training, we knew from experience that we survived to fight another day because of this principle. I can't reveal all my information and thoughts in this forum, but I know that Kari Greer is a great photographer, and Fred Shoeffler, whom I've known since the 70's, would be my source for IHC tactics."
Figure 3b. YH Fire, Feser, Carroll, and this author GMHS dialog Source: FB
Indeed, Mayhew should consider in the future following the Substack Effectiviology regarding Debunking Misinformation - "Effective debunking of misinformation should generally open with the truthful facts, then warn the audience about the misinformation (potentially alongside any associated manipulation techniques), and finally reiterate the facts. As you do this, repeat the misinformation as little as possible. This is to avoid issues like the illusory truth effect, which increases people's belief in statements that they encounter repeatedly. Explain the truth in a way that’s simple, memorable, and supported by authoritative sources, while making sure it provides a credible alternative explanation to the situation. Try to address key issues that make people more susceptible to misinformation, like inattention (like when someone doesn’t take time to consider the reliability of news sources) and motivated reasoning (like when someone listens to information only to confirm their preexisting belief)."
Consider also this informative and instructive InvestigativeMEDIA (IM) WTKKT post regarding the SAIT Air Attack BRAVO 33 INTERVIEW, July 9, 2013 – 1700, regarding Interviewees: John Burfiend-ATS Specialist, Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee, Thomas French – AT Specialist, Interviewers: Mike Dudley, Brad Mayhew, Tim Foley, Jay Kurth, Jimmy Rocha
_______________________________________________
"Got a call from Division A stating they were going down their escape route to the safety zone. Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent of the Granite Mountain hot shots. Asked him “is everything OK?” He replied “everything is ok, just heading to the safety zone”. We came around, made a practice run through the bowl, west to east. I was talking to Tom about the rising terrain on exit. Division A [called] and said “that is what we are looking for, that is exactly right”. Within 5 minutes of that, they went in shelter."
Continuing to expose the alleged greedy and unethical YH Fire Lead Investigator, Mr. Brad Mayhew, the assertive InvestigativeMEDIA Woodsman supports our post title and says on June 20, 2019, at 5:11 pm: "I hope to God lots & lots of people from all around the wildfire world read this blog because I have something to say…please listen carefully. Mr. Brad Mayhew? You are a bona fide 100% USDA choice piece of shit. Praise Jesus that I’m not in any way shape or form like you. Hallelujah! That is all. Woodsman." Continuing here on the same day, a few minutes later: Woodsman says June 20, 2019, at 5:36 pm. Wait, I have more therapeutic venting to do: You are worse than incompetent. You’re a shill. That’s the worst thing you can be. A hack. Your “work” is a joke. Think about that each time you cash your fraudulent paycheck. Enjoy your retirement, you clueless fuck. It’s all coming down, bro. And you are the face of the fiction. You should have shown respect to your elders. I’m going to enjoy your world crashing down." In a word, do you think Woodsman is pissed off, or what?
Figure 3c. YH Fire Investigator - Children versus adult image Source: Facebook
"Are these statements, standing up to date as such uncontradicted, such that we ought to remain silent and close our eyes? ... Do we want to cover it up? Do we want to say there is nothing to it? ...
There is nothing sought but the truth; there is no attempt in the resolution to bring out anything but what is a fact; and the result of such an investigation ought not to hurt anybody."
Senator Norris (Nebraska) - December 29, 1924, submitted Senate Resolution 286, Congressional Record January 20, 1924, pp. 1925-2126 [Proposed Investigation of Power Companies] directing the Federal Trade Commission to investigate the alleged Power Trust in the United States and its financial relationship with certain other public-utility companies and associations.
Consider now this germane article titled: Is it wrong to profit from one's death? PQED Philosophical Questions Every Day - No degree required. (Feb, 13, 2012) about the well-known, successful former singer Whitney Houston's (RiP) death. Citing a quote, albeit from an anonymous poster from this article, is germane and well worth posting here: "This is not a free market supply-and-demand thing. It is about human decency and dignity. Opportunistic/parasitic profiting from someone's death or misfortune shows a fundamental lack of decency and respect for their life. You are just using them and are actually happy about their death because it makes you money, as if money is more precious than life itself. You are free to ask whether or not it is ok to profit from somebody's death/misfortune. However, the fact that you actually have to argue to sort this out, and attempt to disconnect the moral aspect from the money aspect by saying that it is expected in our culture is a disgrace to you and our “culture”, an affront to humanity, and shows there is something fundamentally lacking in you, like a conscience, or compassion."
Figure 4. Artificial Intelligence image Source: ChatGPT, Above the Law
Consider this Above the Law (AtL) blog article about Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Supreme Court cases. So then, if it is approved in our Supreme Court, it should be allowed here, ey. You Can Replace Supreme Court Lawyers With AI Now. Honestly, That Tracks. Jenner & Block’s Adam Unikowsky experiments with AI oral argument, and it passes the test. "AI opens the bullpen to infinity," states Joe Patrice (2025), Above the Law.
In full disclosure of intellectual honesty, given the legally relevant AI article cited above as a credible source, here's an interesting AI response with several in-depth germane paragraphs about the alleged unethical implications of Mayhew's financial prosperity based on our above YHFR post title and focus: Exploitation of Tragedy: Using tragic events, like the death of a firefighter, to promote products or services for financial gain is generally seen as unethical and exploitive. This leverages the emotional response to a tragedy for profit rather than focusing on the product or service itself.
"Manipulation and Insensitivity: Such practices can be viewed as manipulative, as they attempt to influence consumer decisions based on emotional responses to a tragedy rather than the merits of the product. Additionally, it can be deeply insensitive to the families and communities affected by the loss, causing further distress and harm.
"Lack of Respect for the Deceased and Grieving: There's a strong argument that respecting the deceased and those who mourn them holds a higher non-monetary value than financial gain. Profiting from their death can be seen as a failure to show proper respect.
"Undermining the Sacrifice: Wildland firefighters take on significant risks and hardships in their work, according to the US Forest Service. Profiting from their deaths can be seen as devaluing their sacrifice and the dangers they faced.
"Potential for Distrust and Erosion of Public Confidence: Practices seen as exploitative can erode public trust in organizations and individuals engaging in such actions. This can damage the reputation of businesses and potentially lead to legal or regulatory issues.
Figure 4a. Snake distrust image Source: Facebook
"In summary, while profiting from death in itself is not inherently wrong (e.g., insurance companies, funeral services), the context matters. When profit is derived by exploiting a tragedy or causing further suffering, it becomes ethically and morally problematic. Honoring the sacrifice of wildland firefighters and supporting their families should be the primary focus, not financial gain. Organizations dedicated to supporting wildland firefighters and their families, like the Wildland Firefighter Foundation, exist to provide assistance and resources." (End of AtL AI).
Figure 4b. Avoid following the herd image. Source: Guarnieri, Getty Images
Consider reading our "It Could Not Be Seen Because It Could Not Be Believed on June 30, 2013. Schoeffler and Honda (AHFE-2018)" YHFR post.
Abstract: Nineteen Prescott Fire Department, Granite Mountain Hot Shot (GMHS) wildland firefighters (WF) perished in Arizona in June 2013 Yarnell Hill Fire, an inexplicable wildland fire disaster. In complex wildland fires, sudden, dynamic changes in human factors and fire conditions can occur; thus, mistakes can be unfortunately fatal. Individual and organizational faults regarding the predictable, puzzling human failures that will result in future WF deaths are addressed. The GMHS were individually, then collectively fixated with abandoning their Safety Zone to reengage, committing themselves at the worst possible time, to relocate to another Safety Zone - a form of collective tunnel vision. Our goal is to provoke meaningful discussion toward improved wildland firefighter safety with practical solutions derived from a long-established wildland firefighter expertise/performance in a fatality-prone profession. Wildfire fatalities are unavoidable; hence, these proposals, applied to ongoing training, can significantly contribute to other well-thought-out and validated measures to reduce them."
“This constant lying is not aimed at making the people believe a lie, but at ensuring that no one believes anything anymore. A people that can no longer distinguish between truth and lies cannot distinguish between right and wrong. And such a people, deprived of the power to think and judge, is, without knowing and willing it, completely subjected to the rule of lies. With such a people, you can do whatever you want.”
Hannah Arendt (Oct. 1906 – Dec. 1975) German historian and philosopher.
"People will believe a big lie sooner than a little one, and if you repeat it frequently enough,
they will believe it."
Both Walter Lippmann, American newspaper commentator and author
and Nazi Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels
Lippmann captures how propaganda works. Large-scale lies, when repeated, wear down resistance and become familiar, eventually accepted as truth. This quote shows how manipulation can become mainstream if it’s loud and persistent. Are we recognizing the big lies that have become “normal”? How many truths have we lost to repetition?
Obviously, Mayhew is no Nazi! However, in this author’s professional opinion, many of the consummate propagandist Goebbels' quotes, in many cases, allegedly analogously mirror Mayhew’s actions and comments that we experienced at Wildland Fire Safety Summit conferences and such.
"Given the widest powers to move and direct the civilian population and even to redistribute manpower within the armed forces, Goebbels imposed an austerity program and pressed for ever greater civilian sacrifice. ... As the war neared its end, Goebbels, the supreme opportunist, emerged as the Fuhrer’s most loyal follower, spending his last days together with his family, in the Führerbunker under the Chancellery. Convinced that the Nazis had finally burnt all their bridges and increasingly fascinated by the prospect of a final apocalypse, Goebbels’s last words on dismissing his associates were: “When we depart, let the earth tremble!” (Antisemitism Historian Robert Wistrich)
Goebbels: "I decide what is true. And true is what the German people benefits from ... The propaganda must be there where the people are. ... To attract people, to win over people to that which I have realised as being true, that is called propaganda. In the beginning there is the understanding, this understanding uses propaganda as a tool to find those men, that shall turn understanding into politics. Success is the important thing. Propaganda is not a matter for average minds, but rather a matter for practitioners. It is not supposed to be lovely or theoretically correct. I do not care if I give wonderful, aesthetically elegant speeches, or speak so that women cry. The point of a political speech is to persuade people of what we think right. ... That is a matter of practice, not of theory. We do not want to be a movement of a few straw brains, but rather a movement that can conquer the broad masses. Propaganda should be popular, not intellectually pleasing. It is not the task of propaganda to discover intellectual truths. Those are found in other circumstances, I find them when thinking at my desk, but not in the meeting hall." Goebbels (Wikiquotes)
"I decide what is true."
"If you repeat a lie often enough, people will believe
it, and you will come to believe it yourself"
Goebbels
To make more sense of this post and Mayhew's mindset, it is worthwhile considering the USFS-funded Mayhew's alleged cock-and-bull version of the "official" GMHS story to deceive and beguile those seeking the truth and lessons learned about the historical YH Fire and the non-hindsight bias, nonsensical, predictable, and assuredly preventable GMHS debacle. "Yarnell Hill Fire Case Study. A Learning and Discussion Tool For Firefighters. Brad Mayhew. Fireline Factors (BM FLF) Slideplayer (81 slides) (June 9, 2014)."
Figure 4c. YH Fire Case Study Learning & Discussion Tool Source: BM FFC
Figure 4d. YH Fire Case Study GMHS - BSR movement Source: BM FFC
“A man who lies to himself and believes his own lies becomes unable to recognize truth, either in himself or in anyone else, and he ends up losing respect for himself and for others. When he has no respect for anyone, he can no longer love..."
Fyodor Dostoevsky - Russian novelist, short story writer, essayist, and journalist
Consider now the germane Effectivology article titled: Fallacy of False Balance, also called fake balance, the balance fallacy, and bothsidesism, occurs when multiple things (like theories) are presented as more equal to each other in some regard (like level of supporting evidence) than they really are. It also misleadingly presents stances from alleged "experts" and non-expert contrarians like Mayhew, as if they’re equally supported by evidence. It also gives undue weight to fringe opinion, which could mislead people into thinking that it’s to be just as well-supported as more robust theories about a certain phenomenon. Also appearing in various other domains, including ones where this technique was to have been allegedly used intentionally by Mayhew to spread doubt, as we clearly experienced at the 2023 San Diego Wildland Fire Safety Summit.
"Tolerance will reach such a level that intelligent people will be
banned from thinking so as not to offend the imbeciles."
Fyodor Dostoevsky - Russian novelist, short story writer, essayist, and journalist
Allegedly, from the outset of his highly influential YH Fire Investigator position and to this day and into the future, while prohibiting others from disagreeing with him or discounting his comments and conclusions, while spewing his untruths, and unethically profiting from it all!
This author suggests that Mayhew consider: "How to avoid false balance
"To avoid promoting false balance, you should first consider the following to understand the situation better: (1) What sides are involved in the discussion? For example, are there two sides, and if so, then how would you describe them in terms of relevant factors such as their domain expertise? (2) How balanced are the two sides? For example, how do they compare in terms of the scientific evidence that supports their stance? (3)
What’s your role? For example, are you discussing a controversy as an expert on the topic or as a journalist covering it for the first time? (4)
What’s the context? For example, are you providing a brief summary of some topic as an entry for a website or are you guiding an in-depth television debate? (5) Who’s your audience? For example, are you talking to laypeople or academic experts? (6) What are your goals? For example, are you trying to inform people about a topic or persuade them that a certain position is true?"
In a safety zone,
a firefighter can
survive without
using a fire shelter.
NWCG
Consider this insightful paper by associate contributing editor Brandon Lingle, who writes for Coffee or Die Magazine. His article is aptly titled: Friends, Family Remember the Granite Mountain 19 Seven Years After the Tragic Accident. (June 30, 2020). A journalist and writer, his works appear in The American Scholar, The New York Times (At War), Guernica, Narrative, and more. He served as a U.S. Air Force public affairs officer and Air Force Academy English professor. He is an Iraq and Afghanistan war veteran; he currently lives in Texas and edits War, Literature &the Arts.
Brandon Lingle: "Despite the investigation, there will never be a full understanding of the loss. ... As time went on, we start to figure stuff out, but more importantly, we know that it doesn’t really matter what happened at this point — it is what it is, and it sucks,” said [Prescott Fire Dept. Captain and former GMHS] McCarty. “It’s just really strange because no matter how many times I went down there, it doesn’t make sense. ... I can see why those guys would have gone there to try to get to the ranch house, if that’s what they were doing, to try to make a difference.” (Lingle, 2020).
It’s just really strange because no matter how many times I went down there, it doesn’t make sense. ... I can see why those guys would have gone there to try to get to the ranch house, if that’s what they were doing, to try to make a difference. (GMHS McCarty)
“It really is a struggle for us to find that position where we continue to honor and respect their memory without it feeling like we’re ripping off the Band-Aid every time.” (PFD Conrad Jackson)
This author alleges and asserts that former PFD GMHS McCarty, obviously having mixed emotions, is doing his level best to continue spewing the Party Liner untruths about his deceased GMHS Brothers to this very day. And Mr. Lingle is spot on in many ways, mainly regarding it all making no sense. One of those ways was using Prescott FD McCarty's above quotes regarding the GMHS actions and decisions, and the alleged "factual" SAIT-SAIR "investigation." Those alleged Investigators with Mayhew in charge had made up their minds that the SAIT-SAIR, page 43, primary causal factor was going to be primarily based on the alleged GMHS's fatal corporate human factors. Incident Response Pocket Guide (IRPG) Hazardous Attitude Groupthink decisions, actions, and known fatal Friendly Fire instead of the SAIT Commander Mayhew's alleged fatal YH Fire winds, one of several causal factors: "A combination of factors influenced wind speeds in and around the deployment site, including general outflow winds, topographic channeling and eddying, and the influence of the fire’s convective heat. Evidence found at the site indicates that the combined influences resulted in winds causing flames to impinge [on] the entire deployment site. The fire front continued past the deployment site and topped out at the crest of the ridge, merging with the fire from the middle basin."
However, we have known for quite some time now that the outflow winds were, in fact, merely one of the many human factors, fuels, weather, and topography causal factors. The main causal factor(s) were the rogue "friendly fire" firing operations in the Sesame Street-Shrine Corridor (AHFE, 2020), with the Shrine Corridor being the fatal one. However, the SAIT-SAIT only used the term "firing operation" in the following context on page 110 to attempt to justify the GMHS's feckless attempt to create an alleged Safety Zone by hand on the fatal afternoon of June 30, 2013, by attempting to fire out around themselves. "DIVS A (now more urgent): “Yeah, I’m here with Granite Mountain Hotshots. Our escape route has been cut off. We are preparing a deployment site, and we are burning out around ourselves in the brush, and I’ll give you a call when we are under the sh— the shelters.” (SAIT-SAIR p. 28). However, the NWCG has officially defined a Safety Zone properly here: "In a safety zone, a firefighter can survive without using a fire shelter. The deployment site is used when fire conditions are such that escape routes and safety zones have been compromised." And to justify their conclusion, the SAIT-SAIR stated that the term "Safety Zone(s)" is used 49 times! And then the SAIT most skillfully and disengenuously clarified it thusly on page 110: "Safety Zone: An area cleared of flammable materials used for escape in the event the line is outflanked or in case a spot fire causes fuels outside the control line to render the line unsafe. In firing operations, crews progress so as to maintain a safety zone close at hand, allowing the fuels inside the control line to be consumed before going ahead. Safety zones may also be constructed as integral parts of fuelbreaks; they are greatly enlarged areas which can be used with relative safety by firefighters and their equipment in the event of blowup in the vicinity." Experienced and qualified WFs and FFs know that if one must deploy their fire shelter or rely on air support to save themselves, then someone royally f**ked up!
Please consider this detailed research paper regarding paradoxes and inconsistencies germane to the unfathomable YH Fire and GMHS debacle and its incredible USFS Federally-funded SAIT-SAIR preconceived no blame, no fault “conclusions” here: "Firefighters performed within their scope of duty, as defined by their respective organizations. The Team found no indication of negligence, reckless actions, or violations of policy or protocol." And so, placing this negative statement into the positive, seriously ask yourselves this: How is it possible to do everything right and yet kill 19 GMHS in one fell swoop?
Prepositions, Properties, and Paradox. Hartry Field. Phil Papers, accessed 2025. With literally scores of informative research papers on the subjects of truth and lies.
“Abstract: Contrary to views that diagnose the paradoxes of truth and related notions in terms of sentences not expressing propositions, or expressing non-paradoxical propositions different from the propositions they appear to express, or expressing multiple propositions none of which are paradoxical, the paper argues that the basic paradoxes are paradoxes of propositions; or alternatively, of sentential quantification. Similarly for the paradoxes of satisfaction: the basic paradoxes arise for properties, or for quantification into predicate position. (In the latter case, it’s argued that adopting the syntactic restrictions of Russellian type theory is not the best way to go.). The basic paradoxes can be handled either in classical or non-classical logic, but the paper focuses mostly on non-classical options.”
And to give full credit to the integrity of the highly ethical, experienced, and qualified Municipal FD Captain and Fire Behavior Analyst (FBAN), whom the SAIT, allegedly at the behest of the Lead Investigator, initially wanted him to fill that critical position. However, he knew about the verifiable primary Sesame Street-Shrine Corridor rogue firing operation causal factor, and so he refused to be part of their bogus "conclusion first, then facts to support it" investigation that wanted to utilize the outflow winds as the primary causal factor. So then, he ethically and boldly opted out because he knew that, e.g., "At the [GMHS’s] location near the anchor point, wind shifts began at approximately 1550. Before that, the fire was moving generally northeast. Around 1550, the fire shifted to moving southeast and aggressively pushing toward Yarnell. The outflow boundary itself had not arrived yet. It did not hit the southern perimeter of the fire until 1630. When the outflow boundary hits, winds drastically increase and drive the fire south." (SAIT-SAIR p. 25). Thus, this author validating the fact of the rogue firing operation(s) in the Sesame Street - Shrine Corridor being intensified by the adverse wildland fire weather and ensuing extreme fire behavior.
Consider below in Fig. 5. the IMT Plans Chief Lauber's June 30, 2013, 1629 (4:29 PM) photo utilizing the unique Google Earth overlays with annotations by WantsToKnowTheTruth (WTKTT), depicting intense fire behavior from the Sesame St. - Shrine Corridor rogue firing operation when the GMHS fatally hiked down to their deaths under alleged threats by their Supt. Unabridged photo evidence number, IMG_1334.JPG, was matter-of-factly provided to the YH Fire Lead Investigator Mayhew, who instead utilized the idealized image depicted as Fig. 18. in the SAIT-SAIR.
Instructively, the astute and renowned Professor of Psychology at the University of Bamberg, Germany, Dietrich Dörner's Logic of Failure states: “Our minds have extreme trouble tackling problems that cannot be visualized." (Dörner, 1990). Further illuminating: "As Brehmer and Dörner (1993) have stated, people have difficulties in understanding the regularities in the time-course of events when they receive the information about these regularities in the form of isolated events over the time. At the same time, programming shortcomings impedes the implementation of this prediction component in the theoretical strategy. The libraries included in the Firechief simulation module do not contain any function to obtain information about wind direction and/or fire spreading time constraints. Therefore, the assumption is that people have difficulty in understanding the time regularities." Cited in Dynamic Decision Making: Learning Processes and New Research Directions. (Gonzalez, Fakhari, and Busemeyer, Carnegie Mellon Univ. (2017), citing Brehmer, B. and Dörner, D. Experiments with computer-simulated microworlds; Escaping both the narrow straits of the laboratory and the deep blue sea of the field study. Computers in Human Behaviour, 9, 171-184. And significantly noted: "Such tasks include commanding a group of firefighters in an unknown environment."
Compare and contrast the palpable reality of Fig. 5. 1629 YH Fire and GMHS movements photo versus the alleged obvious fiction of Mayhew's Fig. 5b. below. Clearly, this is a very short step to conclude that this alleged Smoke and Mirrors effort from real to imagined used by the intricately involved Lead Investigator Mayhew, was officially given the unedited Fig. 5a. photo below, minus the WTKTT's Google Earth overlay icons.
Figure 5. 1629 YH Fire and GMHS movements Source: Lauber, WTKTT
Figure 5a. June 30, 2013, 1629 YH Fire Img1334 photo Source: Lauber
"Brian Lauber took these photos on June 30, 2013, and provided them to Brad Mayhew, a member of the [SAIT]. His photos correlate to his kmz file showing photo points: Photo Point 1: next to the Assemblies of God church (img1334, taken 1629 based on cell phone metadata)."
Figure 5b. SAIR Fig. 18 idealized alleged fire splitting image Source: SAIT
Figure 5c. Intense June 30, 2013, YH Fire, fire behavior, unknown time. Source: Pacific Biodiversity Institute
"Our prejudices are so deeply rooted
that we never think
of them as prejudices
but call them common sense."
George Bernard Shaw, Irish playwright and critic.
Consider the following several links of Yarnell Hill Fire Serious Accident Investigation Report Supporting Documentation (January 2014), YHF Investigation photos from Mayhew (BM), and others. "A-36 Brad Mayhew, member of the Accident Investigation Team, took these 19 photos on July 3, 2013." It includes the Deployment Zone (DZ), hand tools, chainsaws, etc.
A13-Brian Lauber Photos: "Brian Lauber took these photos on June 30, 2013 photos and provided them to Brad Mayhew, member of the [SAIT]. His photos correlate to his kmz file showing photo points: Photo Point 1: next to the Assemblies of God church (img1334, taken 1629 based on cell phone metadata), Photo Point 2: back end of the church, the fire is rolling in, you can see what it's doing, Photo Point 3: a little further up the road, just as you're leaving Yarnell just before turnoff to Peeples Valley (taken 1633)." (SAIT-SAIR Dropbox, June 30, 2013)
A-38 YCSO Evidence Technician Kattie Waldock GMHS DZ, (July 3, 2013), Dropbox containing 108 somewhat disturbing photos.
A45-Mayhew Site Visit Photos, consisting of 25 photos, including the bizarre puzzling one in Fig. 6a. below by Mayhew (7/05/2013).
A44 and A49-Shelters, some clothing, and PPE Photos: 73 photos (7/05-13). (Warning — Viewer discretion advised.)
Joy A. Collura, Daily Courier photos (7/21/13) Heroes off to battle: Hikers' photos capture Hot Shots' final hours
Hiker's seven videos (June 30, 2013)
"Never have so many been manipulated
so much by so few."
Aldous Huxley
Mass influence by a select few highlights the power of control in society. Critical awareness empowers professionals to resist manipulation, fostering independent thought and ethical decision-making to navigate modern complexities with integrity and discernment. This author alleges that the self-acclaimed Pastor Mayhew fits squarely into this manipulation mold. Mayhew asked questions in an open Wildland Fire Safety Summit forum, with Collura and this author responding and attempting to respond. He ignored Collura and berated this author, merely raising his hand to ask a question. At the same time, he allegedly sent the message that he demanded and would berate all of us who failed to bow down to him and drink his YHFR and GMHS Kool-Aid!
Arizona Public Employee Oath of Office states: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution and laws of the State of Arizona, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same and defend them against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of the office of (name of office) according to the best of my ability, so help me God (or so I do affirm).” This author has maintained and never rescinded either his Federal Oath of Office while a USFS employee, a USFS AD Casual or Emergency Hire, or his PSFD Cooperator's Oath of Office. Did YH Fire Investigator Mayhew maintain or rescind his Oaths of Office?
Regarding the germane subject of manipulation, in addition, immediately below is an in-depth review of the classic (1957, 1980) book titled "The Hidden Persuaders" by Academia.edu author Vance Packard, accessed August 2025 by Dave Edwards. (Marketing, Psychology, Psychoanalysis, PR and Advertising, Image Processing, Propaganda, Advertising, Public Relations, Depth Psychology, Advertising and Branding, Vance Packard, and Edward Bernays"
"Whilst it might seem quite obvious, if not trite, to write a review of one of the seminal critiques of marketing techniques, whose effects and tactics are largely well known to students of manipulation. I thought that a refresher in the approach of selling products via the study of the social sciences in today's ideas-driven age is appropriate. Vance Packard's book analyzes the adoption by the advertising industry of the "motivational research" approach. The concept is fairly simple, by appealing to the deeper layers of the public's subconscious drives, marketing gurus sought to increase the sales of their products in an attempt to stave off economic stagnation and fuel capitalism by creating a consumer driven society. ... Its architects rapidly devised such a system of creating perpetual need for new products, instead of creating products that last, in the wake of the Great Depression of the 1930s. To keep the unipolar capitalist system going, unfortunately, means that there is a perceived need to perpetually stimulate the growth of new capital. ... While some of the persuaders brood occasionally about the implications of their endeavours, others feel that what is progress for them is progress for the nation. ... This was what the Western world witnessed after the financial crisis of 2008, the perpetrators of the crash, i.e. the very banking system whose unregulated actions had created it, were largely unreprimanded, bailed out, and allowed to continue on as normal. The public, whose taxes had paid for the bail-out were told to keep spending to keep the economic system afloat. The increase in conflict, which has been steadily advancing since the inception of the War on Terror in 2001, and the increased global destabilisation witnessed in various nation states as result of this conflict, whether through population displacement, or economic implosion, all seems to be moving the globe towards a desired technocratic, consumer-driven mono-culture, masquerading systematically as the illusion of choice. We will all be free to choose our lifestyles from a seemingly endless, but ultimately prescribed and limited, range of distinctions, all carefully designed to appeal to our innermost desires. Not surprisingly, the experts who rule in this fashion regard the mass of the population as little more than cud-chewing cattle, receptive to elite will, and easy to govern."
Not surprisingly, the experts who rule in this fashion regard the mass of the population as little more than cud-chewing cattle, receptive to elite will, and easy to govern.
So saith Dave Edwards, the self-acclaimed "Independent researcher into alternative world-views in social, political and cultural analysis" with a plethora of related research posted here in his Wimbledon College of Art, Fine Art Sculpture Alumnus, well worth visiting as they relate to the YH Fire and GMHS debacle. Academia dot edu link.
Consider now several official YH Fire, GMHS Fatality Site, Lead Investigator BM, and YCSO evidence photos, each with its own unique YCSO Evidence Number, beginning with IMG.0001.
Figure 6. YCSO IMG .0001 of Mayhew (left) & unknown investigator at GMHS DZ, July3, 2013 Source: YCSO Waldock
Figure 6a. July 5, 2013, BM Image 1853, strange and weird hand-selfie at the GMHS DZ Source: IM, BM
Figure 7. July 5, 2013, GMHS DZ & BSR Image 1853 Source: IM, BM
Consider now the InvestigativeMEDIA (2013) post titled: Yarnell Hill Fire Investigation Ignored Major Mistakes by the State. Former Yarnell Fire Chief Peter Andersen (RiP) sat under a tree in his front yard having his morning coffee on Sunday, June 30, when the Granite Mountain Hotshots drove past his Glen Ilah home. "At 8:03, [their] two buggies went by," Andersen says."Right after they went by, the leaves started to blow. I shook my head. [The state] didn't listen to me." ... Like tens of thousands of people who've closely examined the circumstances leading up to the hotshots' deaths, Anderson doesn't understand why the crew was in the box canyon in the first place, much less at a time of day when wildfires typically display their greatest intensity and when thunderstorm warnings had been issued. ... The question of why the men were there haunts Andersen. And, he says, the lack of substantive conclusions in a report issued September 28 after a state-commissioned investigation into their deaths has left him unsatisfied. "I think it's a big cover-up, a big snow job," he says. "It tries to take any semblance of blame off anybody." ... When the investigation team, headed by Florida State Forester Jim Karels, released its report to the public three weeks ago, the 116-page document's astonishing conclusion was that everybody involved in the Yarnell Hill Fire did everything right -- despite the incineration of the 19 hotshots by flames so hellish that granite boulders fractured." These are fairly telling statements made by Chief Anderson (RiP). Did Mayhew interview him, never revealing it, or was he never interviewed by him?
Figure 8. Former Yarnell Hill Fire Chief Peter Andersen Interview Oct. 8, 2013 Source: IM John Dougherty
The complete USFS-funded Mayhew-influenced, SAIT-SAIR allegedly deduces unbelievably and incontrovertibly: "The judgments and decisions of the incident management organizations managing this fire were reasonable." The report states: "Firefighters performed within their scope of duty, as defined by their respective organizations. The Team found no indication of negligence, reckless actions, or violations of policy or protocol." Given this statement, and then placing this in the positive, how is it possible to do everything right and yet 19 GMHS died in one fell swoop with Marsh, safe at the BSR, after profanely berating Steed on their discreet Crew Net, allegedly committing suicide to avoid having to live with that guilt.
"There appears to be a kinder, gentler, and softer approach" to enforcing the 10 Standard Fire Orders, says Dick Mangan, a retired wildfire accident investigator who has participated in many high-profile, wildfire-fatality reviews -- including ones concerning the 1990 Dude Fire near Payson that killed six firefighters and the 1994 South Canyon Fire in Colorado that claimed 14 lives. ... "I have a hard time understanding that everybody did everything right, and 19 people died," he says. Phx. New Times, John Dougherty. October 16, 2013.
"I have a hard time understanding that everybody
did everything right, and 19 people died,"
Former USFS Investigator Dick Mangan
For all you current and/or budding FF and WF Leaders, please consider delving into and signing up for this worthwhile, informative leadership blog - Leadership Now 140: August 2025
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Why working in an office still matters via @FastCompany by Jim Misener
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Leaders Who Attention Bomb via @AdmiredLeaders
3 Reasons Leaders Must Care About the Details No One Else Sees by @BrianKDodd
The Cult of the Rewatch: Why Nostalgia Is Eating Innovation via @LBBOnline In this climate - war, collapse, too many tabs open - people weren’t craving new ideas. They were craving control. Control felt like the past
A Meretricious Meritocracy 1 of 5 by @jamesstrock This is the first of five posts relating to the modern American meritocracy
A Meretricious Meritocracy 2 of 5 by @jamesstrock The bureaucratization of everything
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The surest way to work up a crusade in favour of some good cause is to promise people that they will have a chance of maltreating someone... To be able to destroy with a good conscience, to be able to behave badly and call your bad behavior ‘righteous indignation’—this is the height of psychological luxury, the most delicious of moral treats.
Aldous Huxley
Surely, at this point, you experienced, and curious others have considered these issues and questions regarding the GMHS's alleged Unfamiliar With Weather And Local Factors - NWCG – "Six minutes for safety - By the firefighter, for the firefighter" Watch Out Situation No. 4: Unfamiliar with weather and local factors influencing fire behavior.
This author has stated several times here and on other relevant forums that it was as if Marsh and the GMHS - literally on their turf, in their own backyard, and having worked on the nearby Doce Fire just a week before - yet fatally acted as if Watch Out No. 4 (“Unfamiliar with weather and local factors influencing fire behavior”) never applied to them. Why was this ignored? Was it never "officially" mentioned as intentional to square with the bogus, predetermined SAIT-SAIR "conclusion" of no blame, no fault?
Consider this short, somewhat non-committal GMHS book review: "To some firefighters, Marsh’s mistake was understandable; to others, it was an “egregious and unforgivable error in judgment. ... Still, no one man led the Granite Mountain Nineteen to their deaths. ... The [YH] Fire may have been sparked by lightning, but it was partly a manmade calamity, exacerbated by uncertain hierarchies, miscommunications and breaches in safety protocols." Kyle Dickman Burning Edge. Young men and fire. Review of “On the Burning Edge: A Fateful Fire and the Men Who Fought It” by Kyle Dickman. High Country News. Ben Goldfarb. August 3, 2015.
"Fierce witnesses rise up; They ask me things that I do not know. They reward me evil for good, To the sorrow of my soul.13 But as for me, when they were sick, My clothing was sackcloth; I humbled myself with fasting; And my prayer would return to my own heart. I paced about as though he were my friend or brother; I bowed down heavily, as one who mourns for his mother. But in my adversity they rejoiced And gathered together; Attackers gathered against me, And I did not know it; They tore at me and did not cease; With ungodly mockers at feasts they gnashed at me with their teeth."
"Let them not rejoice over me who are wrongfully my enemies; Nor let them wink with the eye who hate me without a cause. For they do not speak peace, But they devise deceitful matters Against the quiet ones in the land. They also opened their mouth wide against me, And said, “Aha, aha! Our eyes have seen it.” This You have seen, O Lord; Do not keep silence. O Lord, do not be far from me. Stir up Yourself, and awake to my vindication, To my cause, my God and my Lord. Vindicate me, O Lord my God, according to Your righteousness; And let them not rejoice over me. Let them not say in their hearts, “Ah, so we would have it!” Let them not say, “We have swallowed him up.”
"Let them be ashamed and brought to mutual confusion Who rejoice at my hurt; Let them be clothed with shame and dishonor Who exalt themselves against me. Let them shout for joy and be glad, Who favor my righteous cause; And let them say continually, “Let the Lord be magnified, Who has pleasure in the prosperity of His servant.” And my tongue shall speak of Your righteousness. And of Your praise all the day long." Psalm 35 (NKJV)
“A lie doesn’t become truth. Wrong doesn’t become right. Evil doesn’t become good,
just because it’s accepted by a majority.”
Booker T. Washington - Black American educator, author, and orator.
"There is but one thing of real value -
to cultivate truth and justice,
and to live without anger in the midst of
lying and unjust men."
Marcus Aurelius
Author John Maclean and Holly Neill were the keynote speakers at the Southern California Foresters and Fire Wardens (SCFFW) conference in May 2018 (Yarnell Hill 5 Years Later), noted earlier in Fig. 7c. above. We were prewarned by some of the SCFFW Directors that none of us was allowed to interrupt or ask questions during their planned two-hour presentation; and that we could ask our questions later that evening at the planned mixer. Their presentation was unexpectedly cut short a little over an hour into this very issue, when someone [this is you Brad] persuasively disagreed with their “facts” regarding “the communications on the Yarnell Hill Fire on June 30, most notably the communications that occurred during the SAIR’s ‘gap of over 30 minutes in the information available for the Granite Mountain IHC, from 1604 untilI 1637. ... Several FFs and WFs in the group were heard loudly saying, “It’s about [f**king] time.” This author later thanked the gentleman [it was you, Brad] for mustering the courage to do that, and he [you again, Brad] told this author that “I've waited for that moment for almost five years.”
Given the bold and instructive WLF LLC Fall 2017 WLF LLC Mission Statement: "Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center actively promotes a learning culture to enhance and sustain safe and effective work practices in the wildland fire community. The Center provides opportunities and resources to foster collaboration among all fire professionals, facilitates their networks, provides access to state-of-the-art learning tools, and links learning to training." (emphasis added)
Given that statement, please consider now the WLF LLC (2021) podcast: Episode 23 - Reading, Reflecting, and Changing Behavior. Better yet, see our detailed (2022) YHFR post titled: Why Has the Wildland Fire LLC Lost Its Ethical Compass Defending The YH Fire SAIT-SAIR? on the same subject. It should be fairly obvious to most of you, however, you will need to seriously dig deep and ask yourselves why the former WLF LLC Center Manager, Kelly Woods, never even once mentioned the YH Fire or the GMHS tragedy, instead preferring to justify mistaken beliefs, behavior, numerous mistakes, misjudgments, or misfortune and practices about the YH Fire and GMHS debacle, rather than positively change them for more truthful, reliable ones for the benefit of the many WFs, FFs, and interested and discerning public? This author alleges that the WLF LLC, under the allegedly questionable leadership of figures like Center Manager Kelly Woods and supported by the "Underground Honor the Fallen (HTF) Group," has veered far from its foundational mission of fostering a learning culture to enhance wildland firefighter safety by instead aligning itself with a troubling defense of the federally funded Serious Accident Investigation Team’s (SAIT) report. This report concludes no blame, no fault, or wrongdoing in the June 30, 2013, YH Fire and GMHS debacle that claimed 19 lives is widely contested by this author and many others as a potential deliberate cover-up.
"The best leaders are those who make it a point to listen more than they talk. They know the magic happens when everyone gets a chance to share their ideas and insights. By holding off on their own opinions for a bit, they create a relaxed atmosphere where team members feel comfortable expressing themselves. Plus, these leaders love to recognize and celebrate the awesome contributions of others. Giving credit where it’s due not only makes everyone feel great but also strengthens the whole team. In this way, they build strong connections and a positive vibe, knowing that great teamwork leads to amazing results." Leadership First (Facebook)
The WLF LLC’s "Reading, Reflecting, and Changing Behavior" one-and-a-half-hour podcast (9/16/21) post, using the incredibly accurate Otter.ai transcription method, quoting: "Kelly Woods talks with Erik Apland about his assignment to read all of the entrapment reports housed in the LLC Incident Review Database. Erik provides perspective on the evolution of reports spanning over a century. He highlights how old reports contain modern topics, and he also provides some unique thoughts on PPE. In addition, Erik discusses how reading the reports has changed him and will affect his future actions."
Relative to the WLF LLC’s 2021 podcast above, please definitely consider this 2022 YHFR post titled:" Why Has the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center Lost Its Ethical Compass Defending The Federal USFS-Funded June 30, 2013, SAIT-SAIR Conclusion of No Wrongdoing?"
This author boldly and unapologetically states, alleges, and asserts that the WLF LLC’s obviously omitting any mention whatsoever about the historic YH Fire and GMHS tragedy is quite telling and exemplifies the continuous conspicuous intentional deception and fraud upon the generally interested FFs, WFs, and uninformed public and specifically the less-than-well-informed wildland firefighting community despite literally hundreds of extensive available WLF LLC Incident Reviews (database link) documentations and evidence revealing an alleged intentional, Federally-funded, calculated effort to shield Mayhew, the USFS, and other Govt. institutional interests over the FF's, WF's, and public's need for the truth.
Consider this fitting analogy and proxy of a classic, well-known deliberate April 2004 cover-up, lie, and whitewash predating by nine years, the similarly deadly "friendly fire” June 2013 YH Fire and GMHS tragedy here: Part 1 of 2 - Why Were Vital Human Factors Influencing the June 30, 2013, YH Fire GMHS Fatalities Never Revealed? (YHFF 2023) as depicted in "The Tillman Story' movie, directed by Amir Bar-Lev, critiqued here by Spirituality Practice's Frederic and Mary Ann Brussat. "A scathing and troubling documentary about a high-level military cover-up by the U.S. government and media to garner support for the war in Iraq. Pat Tillman was a star football player at Arizona State University who graduated summa cum laude in 1997. He was drafted by the Arizona Cardinals and broke the record for the most number of tackles in his rookie season in the NFL. Then, in 2002, Tillman and his brother signed a three-year commitment with the Army. When Donald Rumsfeld, President Bush's Secretary of Defense, heard that this young and talented pro-football star had given up a multi-million dollar contract to join the Army Rangers, he sent him a congratulations letter thanking him for serving his country. Tillman was sent to Iraq and then, in 2004, was deployed to Afghanistan. On April 22, 2004, the military reported that he was killed during an ambush by the Taliban while trying to save the lives of his comrades. The president hailed his act of heroism, and the national media touted him as an outstanding patriot. Tillman was awarded a posthumous Silver Star, America's third-highest military decoration."
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