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Part Two - Who Do We Continue to Distinguish And Read About as the Likely Participants in the Undeni

Part One - Who Do We Continue to Distinguish And Read About as the Likely Participants in the Undeniable Sesame to Shrine Corridor Fuel / Fire Break Possible Firing Operation?


2018-08-19 | Arizona Desert Walker Joy A. Collura and contributing other(s)

Views expressed to "the public at largeand "of public concern"


DISCLAIMER: Please fully read the front page of the website (link below) before reading any of the posts ( www.yarnellhillfirerevelations.com )

The authors and the blog are not responsible for misuse, reuse, recycled and cited and/or uncited copies of content within this blog by others. The content even though we are presenting it public if being reused must get written permission in doing so due to copyrighted material. Thank you.


Due to the fact many cell phone and laptop users were having difficulty with the size of the original post and the inordinate time to download, we broke the post into two more manageable posts, hopefully. Also, I try to keep the main content at size 18, font Arial and the figure captions at a 15 yet at times the system, not me, defaults back to 15. I do my best to show "quotes" and sources when it is not me or highlight in a different color to show different person(s) or me in the paragraph. This is new to me. I will be placing out my data over time so the world can properly assess it. I am a non-expert. I have limited online skills. I am all for incoming feedback yet I trust you readers to use your own computer skills to do your own research. I am always there to assist where I can.

This is now the continuation from Part 1 with same title.

Consider now the furtively posted and newly revealed to many of you, the mostly unredacted YH Fire overhead and BRHS statements and interview "notes compiled from recollections of, and discussions between, the [SAIT] members who interviewed people involved with the [YH Fire.]" Spend the time to read through these, especially the BRHS notes. . (emphasis added)

Please take the time to read my additional post to my statement below in the "notes compiled from recollections of, discussions between, the accident team members who interviewed people involved with the [YH Fire]" at PDF JPEG image page 31 (ASF 002313-INV to ASF 002314-INV),as well as links to some of the photographs and statements that I submitted to the YH Fire SAIT. These links reveal germane photos and information that the SAIT did NOT want included in their SAIR.

They begin below at PDF JPEG images on pages 31-32 below (ASF002312-INV to ASF002314-INV) and have forest green text and red bordered text boxes. "Note: This is what the SAIT and ADOSH and the MEDIA and OTHERS received from us, the hikers, Joy A. Collura and Tex Harold Eldon Gilligan "Sonny" in the links below: "This is my [photographic and written] account and what we read from when providing ALL this information to the SAIT Investigators and to everyone else and the same thing to all we talked with on my hikes: ... NOT ACCURATE NOTE TAKING ON THEIR PART ... This is not a complete interview ..." (emphasis added) The 24 links I provide below are most informative and revealing and contain both photographs and narratives.

The BRHS "recollections and discussion" accounts are a must read - filled with details on tactics, strategy, fire weather, fire behavior, human factors, DIVS Z, STPS Gary Cordes (Cortis), constructing and improving the "dozer line" along the Sesame and Shrine Road Fuel/Fire Break Corridor, "overwhelmed" Air Attack, a helitanker splitting the head into two heads, fixed wing and helicopter aircraft dropping at will with no direction, no good anchor points, discussions with GMHS Steed and DIVS A Marsh while in "the good black" in their Safety Zone and leaving and "making their way through [their] Escape Route, ... picking their way through the black to the [road] in the bottom out towards the ranch, ... non-stop, total chaos, scatter brained overhead, with the Rookie "seasonals say[ing] this is just like [the] Swiss Cheese effect," with the BRHS Foreman noting that "we need a piece of cheese. This is just one big hole." (emphasis added).

Moreover, the "recollections and discussion" accounts of the Air Attacks and IC Roy Hall regarding the "Yavapai County investigation team ... [began] electronic preservation of the site and capture of the scene." (emphasis added) The "electronic preservation of the site and capture of the scene" Faro 3-D Imaging (Faro link below) that the YCSO collected was challenged in the Courts and an injunction against publishing them was issued. I have countless times have had Wildland Firefighters and Professors and folks just challenge me on this and state "No, the FARO was not used Joy." and let me now for the the first time show the world I did "fact check" this with YCSO and here is that email showing it was used:

( https://www.faro.com/ ) (This is some amazing technology to research. Focus on their Public safety sector)

What follows are numerous YH Fire IMT and other WF and FF personnel interviews (60 pages): "These notes are compiled from recollections of, and discussions between, the accident team members who interviewed people involved with the Yarnell Hill Fire." (From (ASF002283-INV to ASF002342-INV)

Note: This is what the SAIT AND ADOSH and MEDIA and OTHERS received from us the hikers Joy A. Collura and Tex Gilligan in the links below:

This is my account and what we read from when providing ALL this information to the SAIT Investigators and to everyone else and the same thing to all we talked with on my hikes:

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/jGhnf1wuEYX4RmtSA )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/KF7Fjnjpmbpp7LYP9 )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/4VuBCHWzaKedesx57 )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/HFA15mJyoUpvJNbn6 )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/HDXnFQ1xNkBcpVvg6 )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/PZYDeA2dLb5NnDNaA )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/9Bc9E6jptudU84Rr6 )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/qiv21frkHM9QVmZy9 )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/4isgM5VUJo2ES2kQA )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/JFufUe2saGGR3MSN8 )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/nJXteu6qKFHgTgPE9 )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/1pbcTvsdv93wohUu5 )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/cb7JoRuvwvRWUP8o8 )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/YawqihtxxDg6wv9V6 )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/jtw31vYa4sqL6h37A )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/8vWjKpHUUbAwZyFu7 )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/ruMvCgBU1dtJvCNk8 )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/ngk4uZzDUCMqSTmk6 )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/RvQSYBYi8v65RgWd6 )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/2Ya8t8VxLSm85Dqj7 )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/GUnn245cUWemWQoL6 )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/3w7VoMp6LSZqNTBi9 )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/FTu43iTdybWtRcmDA )

( https://photos.app.goo.gl/mgaGMzQ8kBFBidWC7 )

Figure 11. SAIT Interview notes compiled from recollections of, and discussions between, the [SAIT] members who interviewed people involved with the [YH Fire.]" Source: Yavapai County Records Request 7-9-14\SAIT Report and Documents (From (ASF002283-INV to ASF002342-INV)

Go to the "Interview with Chief Darryl Willis July 6, 2013" above (PDF JPEG image pp. 59-60), where Willis is discussing his actions on June 30, 2013 in the Modal [sic] Creek and Double Bar A Ranch area. His statement was recorded as: "Heard rumor that the crew fired about on[e] mile of line??" (emphasis added) The Sesame Street and Shrine Road Fuel / Fire Break Corridor is 1.28 miles long. This recorded statement highly suggests that "the crew" (What crew is Willis referring to here?) "fired about on[e] mile of line??" Even with the added two question marks (??) into the recorded statement, this fired out line noted in Willis' record was likely in the area of concern being discussed above.


Now we will consider the one I aptly named "Mystery Man" and his YH Fire involvement on June 30, 2013. Take a close look at this photo because this is what it looked like near the 'Lunch Spot' area between 9:30 AM (0930) to 10:30 AM (1030) in the morning. My photos evidently did not fit the SAIT's "conclusion first, then facts" preconceived method to be included in the SAIT-SAIR.

Figure 12. "Mystery Man" photo on June 30, 2013 between 9:30 AM (0930) and 10:30 AM (1030). Eric Marsh and "Mystery Man" talking on ridgeline (upper left). Source: Joy A. Collura

Figures 12a. "Mystery Man" on June 30, 2013, between 9:30 AM (0930) and 10:30 AM (1030) photo (pixelated for better clarity) reduced to the limits of clarity on this website, without enhancement software. Source: Joy A. Collura


This is a WF Supervisor (highest on the ridgeline) wearing a white (usually designates a supervisor according to WFs and FFs) full-brim hardhat that talked with GMHS Supt. / DIVS A Eric Marsh on the morning of June 30, 2013. This was witnessed by a Moki Helitack Crewmember and documented during a SAIT / ADOSH interview, as well as the Eyewitness Hikers (Collura and Gilligan).


Moki Helitack Crewmember Nate Peck "Heard conversation of GM hiking in, saw someone standing by sling location. Thought he spoke w/ Eric Marsh at that time he was asking excellent questions about conditions. Someone made the comment that 'he’s really on it.' Mentioned that the fire had really blown up yesterday afternoon." (emphasis added)

“I have felt that things were poor at this time and little faith in IC and process. Stayed on the clock with crew all night. I have struggled with the IC and process.” (emphasis added) (Moki Helitack Nate Peck SAIT interview notes).

Because of my inquiry to Mr. Nate Peck regarding the "Mystery Man," Peck responded to me in a June 2018 email. In his response, Mr. Peck wrote " I don’t remember his name, but I do remember the conversation and transfer of information ... I do not recall any communication from ICP regarding the resources making their way up to the fire. ... I just don’t recall his name or position. A lot was in flux at that time. ... I think a lot of us have questions about what exactly happened. It was a chaotic 48hrs." (emphasis added)

Nate Peck is apparently the only person from that crucial Moki Helitack Crew that was ever even interviewed by anyone and the SAIT note taking from his interview are obtuse, sketchy, and almost worthless. Why were none of these other Moki Helitack Crew, including the pilot, ever interviewed? Maybe they were - and those interviews have ‘accidentally’ fallen behind the filing cabinet right there beside all the Peeples Valley FFs interviews, photographs, and cellphone records.

Initial Attack ICT4 Russ Shumate assigned Moki Helitack Nate Peck, "a carded ICT4 from 4HX Helitack," as the Operations (OPS) in the early stages of the YH Fire (emphasis added) (Russ Shumate SAIT interview notes). In Type 3 Incidents, Single Resource Bosses, (i.e. Crew Boss, Engine Boss, Felling Boss, etc) can be assigned to these Operational positions. So then, it is a permissible inference that the same would apply to less complex Type 4 Incidents as well.

So then, who exactly is/was this "Mystery Man" and what was his position on the YH Fire? And even more vital, what did he and Marsh talk about and what tactical direction did he give to the newly assigned OPS Nate Peck and/or GMHS Supt. / DIVS A Eric Marsh? This is a critical question that needs to be asked and answered.

The following "officially authorized and sanctioned'' Wildland Fire direction will examine whether Moki Helitack Nate Peck would have been qualified to perform as an OPS in the early stages of the YH Fire; based on the referenced records, it is permissible to conclude that he was qualified for that OPS position in a Type 4 fire.

Per the Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations (The Red Book), pertaining to Type 3 Incidents in Chapter 11, Incident Management & Response: "The NWCG has not established Command and General Staff positions at the Type 3 complexity level, with the exception of Incident Commander Type 3 (ICT3). However, a Type 3 incident may require additional functional positions to assist the Incident Commander. The following table lists minimum qualification requirements for these functional responsibilities:" (emphasis added) Red Book link provided here. ( https://www.nifc.gov/PUBLICATIONS/redbook/2014/RedBookAll.pdf )

Type 3 Functional Responsibility Specific 310-1 or Equivalent Qualification Standards Required to Perform ICS Function at Type 3 Level

Incident Command Incident Commander Type 3 (ICT3)

Safety Line Safety Officer (SOFR)

Operations Task Force Leader (TFLD)

I gave all that I had at the time of my photos, either on a CD or the online links (some are provided above) to the SAIT, including this one of "Mystery Man," and they just weren't interested. It was as if he didn't exist. The only photo included in the SAIT-SAIR was the June 30, 2013 morning photo of the GMHS hiking up to the fireline. ( https://www.wildfirelessons.net/orphans/viewincident?DocumentKey=1a2dac92-1d79-420f-be0e-1aa616a40a70 ) Follow the WLFLLC links to the SAIR PDF and more. Here is an AZ Forestry link to the SAIR and other YH Fire Public Records as well. ( https://sites.google.com/site/yarnellreport/ )

I am mentioned as the photo courtesy credit on the GMHS photo on page 17; Figure 5. Page 116 in Appendix J: Acknowledgements. By the way, the SAIT-SAIR did a disservice to the public and all WFs by not placing our photos in their SAIT-SAIR. They had only the one photo of the men hiking. Eventually, I will tell the story of each photo on this website because I have photos of the various aircraft, terrain and smoke columns (plumes), Fire Weather and Fire Behavior, and yet they only put this in report on hikers without our names:

Figure 12b. Snipping Tool image of SAIT-SAIR page 34 indicating the only documented record of ("avid hikers" and "The hikers" (Tex Gilligan and Joy A. Collura) being on the YH Fire. Source: SAIT-SAIR and Snipping Tool

Consider now these two (Part 1 and II) YouTube videos from InvestigativeMEDIA - John Dougherty interviews with YH Fire hikers Tex Gilligan and Joy A. Collura.

Figure 12c. Yarnell Hill Hikers Part I (Tex Gilligan and Joy A. Collura). Source: YouTube and InvestigativeMEDIA

Figure 12d. Yarnell Hill Hikers Part II (Tex Gilligan and Joy A. Collura). Source: YouTube and InvestigativeMEDIA

The following informative, albeit dogmatic and thus somewhat debatable, articles are worth considering from two separate Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center (WFLLC) "Two More Chains" articles by Travis Dotson, about the Granite Mountain Hot Shots (GMHS) - one is a special tribute edition ("Two More Chains" - "Ground Truths - Now What?" - Summer 2013, Vol. 3, Issue 2) and another one compares the YH Fire and GMHS Eric Marsh to the 2000 Los Alamos Escaped RX Burn and Cerro Grande Fire and the RX Burn Boss Paul Gleason (Ground Truths - Bad Apples? - The Mirror Works, Spring 2018, Vol. 8, Issue 1) in these huge links to the PDFs of the two separate articles. Just copy and paste them into the URL to read them.

Here is the link for: Ground Truths - Now What? Summer 2013, Vol. 3, Issue 2. (YH Fire and GMHS tribute)

( https://www.wildfirelessons.net/communities/community-home/librarydocuments/viewdocument?DocumentKey=030d4990-30a4-481b-8814-5146f7676de8 )

Here is the huge link for: Ground Truths - Bad Apples? - The Mirror Works, Spring 2018, Vol. 8, Issue 1. (YH Fire and Los Alamos RX Burn Comparison)

( https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=2ahUKEwiql6_N-_bcAhUPJ3wKHa9MAmkQFjABegQICRAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.wildfirelessons.net%2FHigherLogic%2FSystem%2FDownloadDocumentFile.ashx%3FDocumentFileKey%3Dbbcf3b98-3915-9036-65f1-202f7f784468%26forceDialog%3D1&usg=AOvVaw0UjWqbTK3pBN5GZu6rr5NL )

This other huge link is for the report titled: "Managing the Unexpected in Prescribed Fire and Fire Use Operations - A Workshop on the High Reliability Organization" is the USDA USFS RMRS-GTR-1317, published in October 2004. I use this document for several reasons, including verification that Paul Gleason was the actual initial ("temporary") RX Burn Boss.

( https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=2ahUKEwiql6_N-_bcAhUPJ3wKHa9MAmkQFjABegQICRAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.wildfirelessons.net%2FHigherLogic%2FSystem%2FDownloadDocumentFile.ashx%3FDocumentFileKey%3Dbbcf3b98-3915-9036-65f1-202f7f784468%26forceDialog%3D1&usg=AOvVaw0UjWqbTK3pBN5GZu6rr5NL )

The first article (from link above) on the YH Fire and GMHS special tribute edition is discussed here below. "Darrell Willis, Division Chief of the Prescott Fire Department, informs us that the following is a letter written earlier this year by Eric Marsh, Superintendent of the Granite Mountain Hotshots, who perished with 18 of his fellow crewmembers on the Yarnell Hill Fire. “Eric,” says Division Chief Willis, “wanted to let others know about who GMIHC is.” (emphasis added)

I think it is somewhat peculiar that PFD Willis would use the present tense of "is" here instead of the past tense. Next are some excerpts from the "Who are the Granite Mountain Hotshots? - a well known paper written by GMHS Supt. Eric Marsh. (emphasis added)

"... Quite often, we solve problems for people that they don’t even know they have." (p. 2) (emphasis added)

Really? Hopefully, one would communicate those "problems that they don't even know they have" with those people first, BEFORE solving them. So then, maybe one of the "problems [to be solved for the [IMT] ... that they don't even know they have" was when the GMHS left their Safety Zone for whatever reason they decided on, and never informed their Supervisor, as it states in Fire Order No. 7, and/or Air Attack of this critical tactical move. So then, what "problems" were they trying to solve?

"... [W]e are not expendable ... " (p. 2) (emphasis added) Sonny and I recognized the fire weather and fire behavior potential; and we based it all on observations, Sonny's experiences, and intuition, and we "got the hell out" as Sonny put it. If they considered themselves "not expendable" then WHY did they leave on their Safety Zone in the black, at the worst possible time, under noticeable forecast deteriorating fire weather conditions, under conspicuous, aggressively increasing fire behavior conditions, (see Brian Lauber's two June 30, 2013, 1629 photos including the Google Earth overlay images) downslope into chutes and chimneys choked with unburned fuel, against all that their training (i.e. Ten Standard Fire Orders, Watch Out Situations, LCES, Downhill Checklist, and the Common Denominators of Fatality Fires) told them otherwise?

"We are approachable and we have no secrets." (p. 2) (emphasis added) Really? So then, why is it that so many former GMHS have refused to come forward and share their stories, especially the GMHS alleged "lookout" Brendan McDonough, who refused to be deposed numerous times, after he retained a criminal attorney, and then wrote and published a book instead? All to the chagrin of the many family, friends, and loved ones of the GMHS and the Investigators as well.

In contrast, at least former GMHS Brandon Bunch seems to "have no secrets." In author Kyle Dickman’s book ‘On the Burning Edge,’ Brandon Bunch left GM after the Thompson Fire in May 2013, shortly before Yarnell (page 54) stated that one of the reasons Brandon Bunch applied for a transfer to another crew prior to the 2013 season is because: “The more seasons Bunch worked for Granite Mountain, the more he felt that under Marsh’s command, the Hotshots were always having to prove themselves.” (emphasis added)

However, Brandon, I wish you would share the real reason why you left the GMHS and (hint, hint) the Doce Fire becau