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  • Arizona Desert Walker Joy A. Collura and

Part Two - Who Do We Continue to Distinguish And Read About as the Likely Participants in the Undeni

Part One - Who Do We Continue to Distinguish And Read About as the Likely Participants in the Undeniable Sesame to Shrine Corridor Fuel / Fire Break Possible Firing Operation?

2018-08-19 | Arizona Desert Walker Joy A. Collura and contributing other(s)

Views expressed to "the public at largeand "of public concern"

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Due to the fact many cell phone and laptop users were having difficulty with the size of the original post and the inordinate time to download, we broke the post into two more manageable posts, hopefully. Also, I try to keep the main content at size 18, font Arial and the figure captions at a 15 yet at times the system, not me, defaults back to 15. I do my best to show "quotes" and sources when it is not me or highlight in a different color to show different person(s) or me in the paragraph. This is new to me. I will be placing out my data over time so the world can properly assess it. I am a non-expert. I have limited online skills. I am all for incoming feedback yet I trust you readers to use your own computer skills to do your own research. I am always there to assist where I can.

This is now the continuation from Part 1 with same title.

Consider now the furtively posted and newly revealed to many of you, the mostly unredacted YH Fire overhead and BRHS statements and interview "notes compiled from recollections of, and discussions between, the [SAIT] members who interviewed people involved with the [YH Fire.]" Spend the time to read through these, especially the BRHS notes. . (emphasis added)

Please take the time to read my additional post to my statement below in the "notes compiled from recollections of, discussions between, the accident team members who interviewed people involved with the [YH Fire]" at PDF JPEG image page 31 (ASF 002313-INV to ASF 002314-INV),as well as links to some of the photographs and statements that I submitted to the YH Fire SAIT. These links reveal germane photos and information that the SAIT did NOT want included in their SAIR.

They begin below at PDF JPEG images on pages 31-32 below (ASF002312-INV to ASF002314-INV) and have forest green text and red bordered text boxes. "Note: This is what the SAIT and ADOSH and the MEDIA and OTHERS received from us, the hikers, Joy A. Collura and Tex Harold Eldon Gilligan "Sonny" in the links below: "This is my [photographic and written] account and what we read from when providing ALL this information to the SAIT Investigators and to everyone else and the same thing to all we talked with on my hikes: ... NOT ACCURATE NOTE TAKING ON THEIR PART ... This is not a complete interview ..." (emphasis added) The 24 links I provide below are most informative and revealing and contain both photographs and narratives.

The BRHS "recollections and discussion" accounts are a must read - filled with details on tactics, strategy, fire weather, fire behavior, human factors, DIVS Z, STPS Gary Cordes (Cortis), constructing and improving the "dozer line" along the Sesame and Shrine Road Fuel/Fire Break Corridor, "overwhelmed" Air Attack, a helitanker splitting the head into two heads, fixed wing and helicopter aircraft dropping at will with no direction, no good anchor points, discussions with GMHS Steed and DIVS A Marsh while in "the good black" in their Safety Zone and leaving and "making their way through [their] Escape Route, ... picking their way through the black to the [road] in the bottom out towards the ranch, ... non-stop, total chaos, scatter brained overhead, with the Rookie "seasonals say[ing] this is just like [the] Swiss Cheese effect," with the BRHS Foreman noting that "we need a piece of cheese. This is just one big hole." (emphasis added).

Moreover, the "recollections and discussion" accounts of the Air Attacks and IC Roy Hall regarding the "Yavapai County investigation team ... [began] electronic preservation of the site and capture of the scene." (emphasis added) The "electronic preservation of the site and capture of the scene" Faro 3-D Imaging (Faro link below) that the YCSO collected was challenged in the Courts and an injunction against publishing them was issued. I have countless times have had Wildland Firefighters and Professors and folks just challenge me on this and state "No, the FARO was not used Joy." and let me now for the the first time show the world I did "fact check" this with YCSO and here is that email showing it was used:

( ) (This is some amazing technology to research. Focus on their Public safety sector)

What follows are numerous YH Fire IMT and other WF and FF personnel interviews (60 pages): "These notes are compiled from recollections of, and discussions between, the accident team members who interviewed people involved with the Yarnell Hill Fire." (From (ASF002283-INV to ASF002342-INV)

Note: This is what the SAIT AND ADOSH and MEDIA and OTHERS received from us the hikers Joy A. Collura and Tex Gilligan in the links below:

This is my account and what we read from when providing ALL this information to the SAIT Investigators and to everyone else and the same thing to all we talked with on my hikes:

Figure 11. SAIT Interview notes compiled from recollections of, and discussions between, the [SAIT] members who interviewed people involved with the [YH Fire.]" Source: Yavapai County Records Request 7-9-14\SAIT Report and Documents (From (ASF002283-INV to ASF002342-INV)

Go to the "Interview with Chief Darryl Willis July 6, 2013" above (PDF JPEG image pp. 59-60), where Willis is discussing his actions on June 30, 2013 in the Modal [sic] Creek and Double Bar A Ranch area. His statement was recorded as: "Heard rumor that the crew fired about on[e] mile of line??" (emphasis added) The Sesame Street and Shrine Road Fuel / Fire Break Corridor is 1.28 miles long. This recorded statement highly suggests that "the crew" (What crew is Willis referring to here?) "fired about on[e] mile of line??" Even with the added two question marks (??) into the recorded statement, this fired out line noted in Willis' record was likely in the area of concern being discussed above.


Now we will consider the one I aptly named "Mystery Man" and his YH Fire involvement on June 30, 2013. Take a close look at this photo because this is what it looked like near the 'Lunch Spot' area between 9:30 AM (0930) to 10:30 AM (1030) in the morning. My photos evidently did not fit the SAIT's "conclusion first, then facts" preconceived method to be included in the SAIT-SAIR.

Figure 12. "Mystery Man" photo on June 30, 2013 between 9:30 AM (0930) and 10:30 AM (1030). Eric Marsh and "Mystery Man" talking on ridgeline (upper left). Source: Joy A. Collura

Figures 12a. "Mystery Man" on June 30, 2013, between 9:30 AM (0930) and 10:30 AM (1030) photo (pixelated for better clarity) reduced to the limits of clarity on this website, without enhancement software. Source: Joy A. Collura

This is a WF Supervisor (highest on the ridgeline) wearing a white (usually designates a supervisor according to WFs and FFs) full-brim hardhat that talked with GMHS Supt. / DIVS A Eric Marsh on the morning of June 30, 2013. This was witnessed by a Moki Helitack Crewmember and documented during a SAIT / ADOSH interview, as well as the Eyewitness Hikers (Collura and Gilligan).

Moki Helitack Crewmember Nate Peck "Heard conversation of GM hiking in, saw someone standing by sling location. Thought he spoke w/ Eric Marsh at that time he was asking excellent questions about conditions. Someone made the comment that 'he’s really on it.' Mentioned that the fire had really blown up yesterday afternoon." (emphasis added)

“I have felt that things were poor at this time and little faith in IC and process. Stayed on the clock with crew all night. I have struggled with the IC and process.” (emphasis added) (Moki Helitack Nate Peck SAIT interview notes).

Because of my inquiry to Mr. Nate Peck regarding the "Mystery Man," Peck responded to me in a June 2018 email. In his response, Mr. Peck wrote " I don’t remember his name, but I do remember the conversation and transfer of information ... I do not recall any communication from ICP regarding the resources making their way up to the fire. ... I just don’t recall his name or position. A lot was in flux at that time. ... I think a lot of us have questions about what exactly happened. It was a chaotic 48hrs." (emphasis added)

Nate Peck is apparently the only person from that crucial Moki Helitack Crew that was ever even interviewed by anyone and the SAIT note taking from his interview are obtuse, sketchy, and almost worthless. Why were none of these other Moki Helitack Crew, including the pilot, ever interviewed? Maybe they were - and those interviews have ‘accidentally’ fallen behind the filing cabinet right there beside all the Peeples Valley FFs interviews, photographs, and cellphone records.

Initial Attack ICT4 Russ Shumate assigned Moki Helitack Nate Peck, "a carded ICT4 from 4HX Helitack," as the Operations (OPS) in the early stages of the YH Fire (emphasis added) (Russ Shumate SAIT interview notes). In Type 3 Incidents, Single Resource Bosses, (i.e. Crew Boss, Engine Boss, Felling Boss, etc) can be assigned to these Operational positions. So then, it is a permissible inference that the same would apply to less complex Type 4 Incidents as well.

So then, who exactly is/was this "Mystery Man" and what was his position on the YH Fire? And even more vital, what did he and Marsh talk about and what tactical direction did he give to the newly assigned OPS Nate Peck and/or GMHS Supt. / DIVS A Eric Marsh? This is a critical question that needs to be asked and answered.

The following "officially authorized and sanctioned'' Wildland Fire direction will examine whether Moki Helitack Nate Peck would have been qualified to perform as an OPS in the early stages of the YH Fire; based on the referenced records, it is permissible to conclude that he was qualified for that OPS position in a Type 4 fire.

Per the Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations (The Red Book), pertaining to Type 3 Incidents in Chapter 11, Incident Management & Response: "The NWCG has not established Command and General Staff positions at the Type 3 complexity level, with the exception of Incident Commander Type 3 (ICT3). However, a Type 3 incident may require additional functional positions to assist the Incident Commander. The following table lists minimum qualification requirements for these functional responsibilities:" (emphasis added) Red Book link provided here. ( )

Type 3 Functional Responsibility Specific 310-1 or Equivalent Qualification Standards Required to Perform ICS Function at Type 3 Level

Incident Command Incident Commander Type 3 (ICT3)

Safety Line Safety Officer (SOFR)

Operations Task Force Leader (TFLD)

I gave all that I had at the time of my photos, either on a CD or the online links (some are provided above) to the SAIT, including this one of "Mystery Man," and they just weren't interested. It was as if he didn't exist. The only photo included in the SAIT-SAIR was the June 30, 2013 morning photo of the GMHS hiking up to the fireline. ( ) Follow the WLFLLC links to the SAIR PDF and more. Here is an AZ Forestry link to the SAIR and other YH Fire Public Records as well. ( )

I am mentioned as the photo courtesy credit on the GMHS photo on page 17; Figure 5. Page 116 in Appendix J: Acknowledgements. By the way, the SAIT-SAIR did a disservice to the public and all WFs by not placing our photos in their SAIT-SAIR. They had only the one photo of the men hiking. Eventually, I will tell the story of each photo on this website because I have photos of the various aircraft, terrain and smoke columns (plumes), Fire Weather and Fire Behavior, and yet they only put this in report on hikers without our names:

Figure 12b. Snipping Tool image of SAIT-SAIR page 34 indicating the only documented record of ("avid hikers" and "The hikers" (Tex Gilligan and Joy A. Collura) being on the YH Fire. Source: SAIT-SAIR and Snipping Tool

Consider now these two (Part 1 and II) YouTube videos from InvestigativeMEDIA - John Dougherty interviews with YH Fire hikers Tex Gilligan and Joy A. Collura.

Figure 12c. Yarnell Hill Hikers Part I (Tex Gilligan and Joy A. Collura). Source: YouTube and InvestigativeMEDIA

Figure 12d. Yarnell Hill Hikers Part II (Tex Gilligan and Joy A. Collura). Source: YouTube and InvestigativeMEDIA


The following informative, albeit dogmatic and thus somewhat debatable, articles are worth considering from two separate Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center (WFLLC) "Two More Chains" articles by Travis Dotson, about the Granite Mountain Hot Shots (GMHS) - one is a special tribute edition ("Two More Chains" - "Ground Truths - Now What?" - Summer 2013, Vol. 3, Issue 2) and another one compares the YH Fire and GMHS Eric Marsh to the 2000 Los Alamos Escaped RX Burn and Cerro Grande Fire and the RX Burn Boss Paul Gleason (Ground Truths - Bad Apples? - The Mirror Works, Spring 2018, Vol. 8, Issue 1) in these huge links to the PDFs of the two separate articles. Just copy and paste them into the URL to read them.

Here is the link for: Ground Truths - Now What? Summer 2013, Vol. 3, Issue 2. (YH Fire and GMHS tribute)

Here is the huge link for: Ground Truths - Bad Apples? - The Mirror Works, Spring 2018, Vol. 8, Issue 1. (YH Fire and Los Alamos RX Burn Comparison)

This other huge link is for the report titled: "Managing the Unexpected in Prescribed Fire and Fire Use Operations - A Workshop on the High Reliability Organization" is the USDA USFS RMRS-GTR-1317, published in October 2004. I use this document for several reasons, including verification that Paul Gleason was the actual initial ("temporary") RX Burn Boss.

The first article (from link above) on the YH Fire and GMHS special tribute edition is discussed here below. "Darrell Willis, Division Chief of the Prescott Fire Department, informs us that the following is a letter written earlier this year by Eric Marsh, Superintendent of the Granite Mountain Hotshots, who perished with 18 of his fellow crewmembers on the Yarnell Hill Fire. “Eric,” says Division Chief Willis, “wanted to let others know about who GMIHC is.” (emphasis added)

I think it is somewhat peculiar that PFD Willis would use the present tense of "is" here instead of the past tense. Next are some excerpts from the "Who are the Granite Mountain Hotshots? - a well known paper written by GMHS Supt. Eric Marsh. (emphasis added)

"... Quite often, we solve problems for people that they don’t even know they have." (p. 2) (emphasis added)

Really? Hopefully, one would communicate those "problems that they don't even know they have" with those people first, BEFORE solving them. So then, maybe one of the "problems [to be solved for the [IMT] ... that they don't even know they have" was when the GMHS left their Safety Zone for whatever reason they decided on, and never informed their Supervisor, as it states in Fire Order No. 7, and/or Air Attack of this critical tactical move. So then, what "problems" were they trying to solve?

"... [W]e are not expendable ... " (p. 2) (emphasis added) Sonny and I recognized the fire weather and fire behavior potential; and we based it all on observations, Sonny's experiences, and intuition, and we "got the hell out" as Sonny put it. If they considered themselves "not expendable" then WHY did they leave on their Safety Zone in the black, at the worst possible time, under noticeable forecast deteriorating fire weather conditions, under conspicuous, aggressively increasing fire behavior conditions, (see Brian Lauber's two June 30, 2013, 1629 photos including the Google Earth overlay images) downslope into chutes and chimneys choked with unburned fuel, against all that their training (i.e. Ten Standard Fire Orders, Watch Out Situations, LCES, Downhill Checklist, and the Common Denominators of Fatality Fires) told them otherwise?

"We are approachable and we have no secrets." (p. 2) (emphasis added) Really? So then, why is it that so many former GMHS have refused to come forward and share their stories, especially the GMHS alleged "lookout" Brendan McDonough, who refused to be deposed numerous times, after he retained a criminal attorney, and then wrote and published a book instead? All to the chagrin of the many family, friends, and loved ones of the GMHS and the Investigators as well.

In contrast, at least former GMHS Brandon Bunch seems to "have no secrets." In author Kyle Dickman’s book ‘On the Burning Edge,’ Brandon Bunch left GM after the Thompson Fire in May 2013, shortly before Yarnell (page 54) stated that one of the reasons Brandon Bunch applied for a transfer to another crew prior to the 2013 season is because: “The more seasons Bunch worked for Granite Mountain, the more he felt that under Marsh’s command, the Hotshots were always having to prove themselves.” (emphasis added)

However, Brandon, I wish you would share the real reason why you left the GMHS and (hint, hint) the Doce Fire because you know I know ...

What follows are select excerpts from the WLFLLC "Two More Chains" Summer 2013, Vol. 3, Issue 2, article by Travis Dotson titled: "Ground Truths - Now What?"

"The last time I saw Granite Mountain was on the Thompson Ridge Fire in New Mexico a couple weeks before Yarnell Hill. They participated in an AAR about a firing operation that didn’t go as planned. I knew Eric and Jesse, mostly from the Arizona Wildfire Academy." (emphasis added) Have you noticed that many of the Arizona Wildfire Academy cadre were the June 2013 YH Fire IMT members? And WFs have been removed from the Academy for speaking about the YH Fire and the GMHS in some of the classrooms. Even I had my own experience in this in March 2018 due to the lack of professionalism by some.

"I went to the memorial and hugged lots of folks who feel just as twisted-up inside as I do. We all looked at each other with bloodshot eyes and shook our heads slowly, not knowing what to say. We asked each other “How are you doing?” and told each other who’s taking it really hard. We patted each other on the back and said: “Hang in there.” We all said: “How does this happen?” We all wondered about the specifics and our voices trailed off as we tried to discuss them." (emphasis added) We all want to know PUBLICLY "how does this happen."

"Just a few nights ago, I sat straight up from troubled sleep at 3 in the morning and thought: “There is no way I am a better decision maker than Eric.” Everyone has their own version of this. We are all struggling. Even if you have been out on fires this whole time, it’s sitting there in the back of your mind—19 Hotshots gone." (emphasis added) Yes - we are "all struggling. ... , it’s sitting there in the back of many of [our] mind[s] — 19 Hotshots gone."

"How does this happen? I want the details. I want all the pieces so I can puzzle over them in my constant attempts to make sense of this. I seem to think that if I can just figure out why and how it will somehow relieve the pain. I basically want to skip grief. But we all know that ain’t happening—no free pass on that one. I know there are stages and you go through them all at different times and you loop back and it’s confusing and it affects your family and all that stuff. ... You ask - "How does this happen?" (emphasis added) It happens from not following the basic WF Rules. I want the details public. I want all the pieces public. Others may puzzle over them in their constant attempts to make sense of this. I puzzle over their continued lack of transparency and lack of speaking up. So does everyone else that wants to know the truth about the YH Fire and the GMHS.

"But knowing that doesn’t make right now suck any less. We don’t know exactly what happened. We won’t know for along time. We may never know. It was a month and a half before the investigation report came out on South Canyon. The first phase of the Wildland Firefighter Safety Awareness Study (Tri-Data) was published two years later, in 1996. Fire Behavior Associated with the South Canyon Fire didn’t come out until 1998. The first Staff Ride for South Canyon happened in 2002. And to this day,every year at the Staff Ride, new details and lessons are

revealed." (emphasis added) On the contrary, from the beginning, we DO know what happened and this website and these posts are helping interested people learn about all of it. And all to the chagrin of those that have done their level best to hide the truths and cover it all up - until now! Dr. LeRoy Anderson quoted in his "How we got here and why should we speak up?" post: "FROM THE GRAVE I hear the 19 men cry out for justice[,] for truth and fore reform that others will not suffer their fate. It seems that the unjust know no shame in these matters. Woe to the leaders that hide the real facts, woe to those who seek to cover up the real truth and sidetrack those seeking it. (capitalized emphasis in original and underline is added)

"As I write these words, we are three weeks out from Yarnell Hill. It’s going to take some time. So what do we do right now?" (emphasis added) Really? How about we strive for the remainder of our lives to discover what happened and why and SHARE IT TO THE WORLD.


We are angry, frustrated, confused, sad, sick, tired, lonely, scared, tormented, and all kinds of other stuff."all kinds of other stuff" KNOWTRUE "I think, right now, there are a lot of us who feel like “tipping cars over.” Yes indeed, all of these and much, much more in the what happened. Yet they won't let the world know, so that " (emphasis added) lessons can be learned from this tragedy. category. My anger, frustration, confusion, sadness, sickness, fatigue, loneliness, fright, and torment come from those who

Let's talk about the lack of transparency in the Fire Industry. Recently, there were some new revelations about the Draper FD FF that was killed on the CA Mendocino Complex here in this link and Snipping Tool excerpt: ( )

Figure 13. InvestigativeMEDIA post by RTS. Source: InvestigativeMEDIA

"We are not the best at dealing with grief. Most of us are horrible at it. I tell people I’m doing OK, but I still can’t sleep tonight. ... Help each other through this. Help each other avoid the traps we wander into when we don’t know what to do. ... They say talking is a good thing; I don’t know. ... Talking about these things is always good." (emphasis added) These are emotionally charged, fairly accurate statements. I think about the YH Fire and the GMHS EVERY DAY! This website is one of the ways I heal my grief.

Now let's move on to the May 29, 2018, Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center (WFLLC) "Two More Chains - Underslung Heroes" by Travis Dotson ( ) Link is here.

"I am all the mistakes I make. I am all the success I stumble into. I own the unpredictable combination of skill, luck, and the miracle of wind shifts. Some call it grace. We all tend to put faith in the existence of a merit-based system—good outcomes as rewards for good decisions. This does exist, but it’s not absolute nor consistent. We pat ourselves on the back for the expertise and sound decisions involved in a favorable wind shift. We shake our heads disapprovingly at the dead whose unclever choices weren’t powerful enough to shift the wind. It’s all made up with an obstructed glimpse through a broken rearview mirror." (emphasis added)

Just what are "the miracle of wind shifts that the author is referring to here?" Does this set the stage for those gullible enough to believe that they may be "clever enough and powerful enough to shift the wind"? OMG, are you kidding me? God forbid that we have WFs and FFs that actually believe this. I don't know of any FFs or WFs that are "powerful enough to shift the wind." Only Almighty God has the power to do that! The vast majority of experienced WFs and FFs tell me that heeding "The WF Rules" would have averted and certainly lessened what occurred.

"I would follow them without hesitation up a narrow-ass overgrown two-track to nowhere with the freight train roaring just because it’s them." (emphasis added) Really, are you friggin kidding me - "follow them without hesitation up a narrow-ass overgrown two-track to nowhere with the freight train roaring just because it’s them?" This sounds a lot like the recognized Hazardous Attitude of Groupthink. And it also sounds a lot like PFD Wildland BC Willis at the July 2013 Fatality Site News Conference where he stated that he would have "followed them blindfolded."

"Luck counts, but you have to count it—good or bad. An honest accounting of everything involved is a step toward clarity. Clarity is useful when preparing for tough decisions. Get humble. Get honest. Get better." (emphasis added) Luck, really? How many "lucks" do you get when you're born or do you just purchase or trade them somehow? Experienced Wfs and FFs often say: "Beware the FFs and WFs that tell you 'we might get lucky.'"

"Paul Gleason and Eric Marsh [compare and contrast]:

"... How about 2013? It’s so easy. Eric Marsh might not have been Paul Gleason, but he’d led his crew on a hike off a fire more than once. Bad Outcome = Bad Apple? Try giving Marsh the leeway you give Gleason."(emphasis added) As one experienced WF noted, this is the logical fallacy of Equivocation here in this statement ("but he’d led his crew on a hike off a fire more than once.") Well of course, he (Eric Marsh) led his crew on a hike off a fire more than once, HOWEVER, on June 30, 2013, the GMHS were led to their deaths on a hike off the ridge in DIV A from their Safety Zone down to the DZ. "The fallacy of equivocation occurs when a key term or phrase in an argument is used in an ambiguous way, with one meaning in one portion of the argument and then another meaning in another portion of the argument." ( ) Texas State Department of Philosophy link here.

"What if the personalities were reversed? What if Eric Marsh was the Burn Boss/ICT3 at the House Burner Rx and Paul Gleason was hiking his crew to the ranch when they were overrun by fire?" (emphasis added)

"If the personalities were reversed," that if Eric Marsh was the Burn Boss/ICT3 at the House Burner Rx then the mostly older, experienced WFs and FFs that I have talked to believe that would have been nothing new. I have heard from these same seasoned WFs and FFs that they strongly believe that Paul Gleason would have never hiked his Crew to the Ranch under those conditions at that time. So then, based on their word and their professional opinions, Gleason would NOT have been overrun by fire in that way.

"Stand accountable for your beliefs. Stand accountable for your expectations. Stand accountable for how you judge the decisions of others, whether you know them or not. Stand accountable for your contribution to our collective learning." (emphasis added) That's what I am attempting to do here. Stand accountable for how I judge the decisions of others, whether or not I know them. And I stand accountable for my contribution to the wildland firefighting collective learning. And at times, paying a heavy price for it emotionally.


"Holly Neill May 29, 2018 at 8:27 pm; This is Holly Neill's ("Safety Matters" website and author John MacLean's researcher, along with Alan Sinclair noted in his website link here: ) statement below as posted in the comment, with emphasis added and noted).

"Underslung Heroes hits very close to home. I currently work with John Maclean on a book about the Yarnell Hill fire, and I think the “bad apple” points between Mr. Gleason and Mr. Marsh are very interesting and relevant to the Yarnell Hill fire discussion. I was on the BAND Fire Use Module in 2000 and we lit the Cerro Grande fire. For me, one of the greatest gifts to come from this terrible tragedy was the opportunity to work with Paul Gleason. A lasting lesson and strong impression I have carried with me for 18 years is of Paul’s great character and integrity during and after the fire. It was clear to me that efforts were made to protect his level of involvement, but he would have none of it. He went on to teach and talk to as many fire folks as possible, about his role in Cerro Grande and his level of responsibility and accountability. Paul was a true fire manager and leader, with special qualities of honesty, transparency and a deep desire to make a difference. It takes a rare courage and wisdom to admit “There is no way to get around how uncomfortable it is to stand accountable for your decisions”, and then go out and actually do it, stand accountable. Mr. Gleason, you are missed." (all emphasis added)

Figure 13. Holly Neill's comment on WF LLC Web Page Two More Chains "Underslung Heroes" May 29, 2018 Source: Wildfire Lessons Learned

What does she mean about "It was clear to me that efforts were made to protect his level of involvement, ...?" It looks like both Gleason and Holly Neill were heavily involved with this predictable and preventable event.

So then, now to answer the original question as to: "Who Do We Continue to See And Read About as the Likely Participants in the Strongly Inferred Sesame to Shrine Corridor Fuel / Fire Break Firing Operation?"

So far, we may answer it by including at least the following based on statements and photographs: Yarnell, Peeples Valley, Wickenburg, Glendale, Surprise, Central Yavapai, Peoria, and Sun City West FDs. And what about these FFs and WFs? Todd Abel? Paul Musser? Rance Marquez. Cougan Carothers. BRHS? GMHS?

I will go into all who were Red Card qualified that were involved in the Sesame to Shrine Corridor Fuel / Fire Break in a future post.

Figure 14. This image has special significance to one of the YH Fire and GMHS players. "Enough said." Source:

Reposted photo from: ( )

Earlier in this article I mentioned one of several research specialists visiting the YH Fire. "That comment triggered one of the research specialists to recall that they had found burnt fusees in that area along the Sesame Street and Shrine Road Corridor during their subsequent site visit after the YH Fire.


A Psalm of David when he was in the wilderness of Judah.

God, You are my God; Early will I seek You; My soul thirsts for You; My flesh longs for You, In a dry and thirsty land, Where there is no water. To see Your power and Your glory, I have looked for You in the sanctuary. Because Your lovingkindness is better than life, My lips shall praise You. Thus I will bless You while I live; I will lift up my hands in Your name.

My soul shall be satisfied as with marrow and fatness, And my mouth shall praise You with joyful lips; When I remember You on my bed, I meditate on You in the night watches. Because You have been my help, Therefore in the shadow of Your wings I will rejoice. My soul follows close behind You; Your right hand upholds me. But those who seek my life, to destroy it, Shall go into the lower parts of the earth. They shall fall by the sword; They shall be a portion for jackals. But the king shall rejoice in God; Everyone who swears by Him shall glory;

But the mouth of those who speak lies shall be stopped. Psalm 63 (NKJ)

"And he said, Hearken ye, all Judah, and ye inhabitants of Jerusalem, and thou king Jehoshaphat, Thus saith the LORD unto you, Be not afraid nor dismayed by reason of this great multitude; for the battle is not yours, but God's. (emphasis added) 2 Chronicles 20:15 (King James)

Updates: Most Figure captions made uniform; grammar and spelling errors corrected; some sentences and paragraphs rearranged for clarity and logic;

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