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  • JOY A COLLURA

2- Was the June 26, 1990, Dude Fire a precursor for the incomplete lessons learned on June 30, 2013?


Views expressed to "the public at largeand "of public concern"


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If you are a family, friend, or loved one of one of these inmates (RiP) or DOC employee Sandra Bachman (RiP), and this is your first exposure to these revelations, we want to express our deepest condolences. Please read our disclaimer before continuing further. Some content may be graphic or offensive.

Authors: Douglas Fir, Joy A Collura, and other contributing authors

Teach me your way, O LORD, that I may walk in your truth; unite my heart to fear your name. Psalm 86:11 (KJV)


“Today not only in philosophy but in politics, government, and individual morality, our generation sees solutions in terms of synthesis and not absolutes. When this happens, truth, as people have always thought of truth, has died.” ~ Francis Schaeffer (evangelist and pastor)

We need this to be a "learning organization" using "complete lessons learned." You will all need to be more willing to include the "human mental elements" in this, which would entail including this into your annual training and fire refreshers.


I "get" it that we are in a world of poor mannerisms; some because of temporary issues and some by permanent birth defect. My duty is to "call them out" and have them brought to the "forefront" if they are not certified and qualified to do a task or job.


It is the difficult right thing to do.


My innocuous mannerisms have been bothersome to some, and I have been told by some of the highest levels in the wildland fire arena that I intimidate them. That is their problem, not mine. I should not be looked at in such way. I should not be shown to the Wildland industry as such. I should be looked at as I am addressing the "harm" and "dangers" their actions will do in the long run.


When a person denies their participation - full well knowing they were there on the Yarnell Hill Fire and or any other Fire Fatalities - even though there is a way to show the documented proof they were there yet won't unless it entered a court setting. Or when you see them try to "justify," "minimize," "deflect," refuse to show empathy, get too caught up in their career and culture within it and will take it to the grave, offended how they are affronted, etc. that is all THEIR issues not mine. Yet, I will bring you all to the front to make sure "complete lessons" are told.


Look at this image (below) in Figure 1. from our Records File on the Dude Fire. This is the Day Shift Cover page two days after the six fatalities. I find it is most disturbing and despicable that the Incident Commanders and Plans personnel allowed this to be approved. These are some sick and twisted individuals indeed.


Figure 1. June 28, 1990 Day Shift Plan Cover Page Source: Our Dude Fire Files


This image in Figure 1. is the same one in the link (below), but I removed the "post it" note on it, so we have the original grey toned colored Shift Plan instead of the black and white one shown here with no "image credit" of origin from one of our contributing authors.


June 28, 1990 Shift Plan Cover ( https://www.nwcg.gov/sites/default/files/wfldp/docs/sr-dude-iap-28.pdf ) This is included in the Dude Fire Staff Ride Information Sources listed below.


NWCG Wildland Fire Staff Ride Guide (2010) Leadership Toolbox Reference: ( https://www.nwcg.gov/sites/default/files/wfldp/docs/sr-workbook.pdf ) 22 pages

Dude Fire Staff Ride ( https://www.nwcg.gov/wfldp/toolbox/staff-ride/library/dude-fire )

( https://youtu.be/3mEVDY9tPQk ) Alpine Hotshot Crew - The Dude Fire

Gene Garate - The date noted 10 and 11 years ago, so do the math. 2009 or 2010. See Niemi comment below.

Superintendents describe the scene at Bonita Estates, Dude Fire

( https://youtu.be/y-_uBRRPJNw ) (powfindr13) "The involved hotshot sup'ts describe the situation at Bonita Estates subdivision on June 26th, 1990, on the Payson RD's Dude Fire. They are facilitating a staff ride to a group of 20-30 people."

Dude Fire Story by Phoenix News Channel 3 ( https://youtu.be/_jbs2waR56U ) Nov 7, 2016

"Over time though, maybe we’ve learned to celebrate people’s lives and their worth more than the past and to recognize the harm that traumatic events have on peoples souls instead of just brushing it by the wayside. It wasn’t only those who died who paid the price but those that survived and had to live w/ their survival and brush w/ near death and lifesaving actions." (Alpine Hot Shot David Niemi comment)


Figure 2. Accident Investigation Report, Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality June 26, 1990 Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest (numbered 22) USDA US Forest Service Logo (center bottom) Source: Anonymous source


Shortly after the Dude Fire fatalities had occurred and a Fatality Investigation Team was ordered - according to the TNF Dispatcher at the time - prior to the Investigation, both Type 2 and Type 1 Fire Bosses (ICs) took the fire package records to the TNF Supervisors Office in Phoenix and shredded fire package records. The Dispatcher and / or Center Manager told them that 'the Investigators would need those documents and records for their investigation,' According to the Dispatcher, the Fire Bosses allegedly told him: 'if you don't like it you can just leave.'


Because it was my District and I (DF) worked on the Dude Fire, I was tasked with putting together the Dude Fire Staff Ride by USFS Staff Ride Coordinator Bequi Livingston. All of the many photos, documents, and records that I was familiar with were now gone, mostly of extreme fire behavior and specifically evidence of the Horizontal Roll Vortices (HRV) after-effects (needle set) in Walk Moore Canyon.

Regional Staff Ride Coordinator Livingston scheduled a "Region 3 Staff Ride Development Workshop" in Payson from November 6-9, 2006, with the product to be the "Dude Fire Staff Ride for inclusion into the National Staff Ride Library." We had four teams that consisted of: Orientation, Mapping, Research, and Facilitation. Our Team Advisors were Jim Cook, Dan Kleinman, Lori Messenger, Larry Sutton, Chris Wilcox, Pete Gordon, Julian Affuso, and Chad Fisher. We obtained a copy of the original Investigative Report that was provided to the Development Group by an anonymous source by one of the original investigators.



Figure 3. Accident Investigation Report, Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality June 26, 1990 Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest - Investigation -page 2 Source:Anonymous source


The entire Dude Fire Accident Investigation Report document, as presented to us, is somewhat confusing. Figures. 2 to 3 goes from the Cover Page to opposite side of the page is labelled "2". I would imagine page one is considered as the Cover Page in Figure 2.


Figure 4. Accident Investigation Report, Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality June 26, 1990 Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest - Narrative - page 3 Source: Anonymous source


Consider now the third to the last paragraph (above): "A. Narrative - Interviews were conducted with key members of the overhead teams and all surviving members of the Perryville Crew. Statements or records were obtained from several other key persons knowledgeable of the incident, ..." (emphasis added) This is somewhat of a false statement because there were many of us that were qualified as "key persons knowledgeable of the incident" and yet we were not interviewed. For example, those of us that witnessed and talked with Crew Boss Terra on the Control Road and the Fuller Creek junction driving an AZ DOC vehicle back and forth as the fire crossed the Control Road between there and the Bonita Creek Subdivision. And right there he admitted twice to witnesses on that spot: "I should have never left my crew." And the SAIT investigators that I talked with years ago and recently stated that they knew three days after the fatalities that he was gone from the crew and something to the effect of "it would have had no influence on the final outcome."

If the facts don't fit the theory, change the facts.   Albert Einstein



More document confusion explained here. Either they misnumbered and / or another page is missing, but the way it was copied has the Figure 4. as "page three" and then on the backside of that page, there is the Figure 5. as "page five" - There is no page four.

Figure 5. Accident Investigation Report, Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality June 26, 1990 Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest - Findings - page 5 Source: Anonymous source


The "B. Findings (d) Weather" portion is listed here (above - Figure 5.) but not in any of the numbered pages below.

Figure 6. Accident Investigation Report, Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality June 26, 1990 Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest - Findings cont. -page 6 Source: Anonymous source


"(7) The shift plan ... fire behavior forecast accurately predicted the potential for extreme fire behavior and thunderstorm buildup." (emphasis added) Well, of course it did. It was dated and timed June 26, 1990, at 2200 hours (10:00 PM), and unsigned by the FBAN (Figure 27.) long after the fatalities had occurred. And the Fire Weather Forecast, listed above, but conspicuously missing, was also dated and timed June 26, 1990, at 2200 hours (10:00 PM).

This is a transcript of a July 11, 2020, interview with an Anonymous By Request WF Supervisor on June 25-26, 1990. Some minor to editing to correct for proper nomenclature, punctuation, and grammar.


'To the Dude Fire Archives (07/11/2020) I acted as a Division Supervisor (DIVS). My Division was that portion of the fire that hit the top of the Mogollon Rim (The Rim). That Division was approximately 17 miles long. I observed the fire activity from a thousand feet above on the day of the fatalities. The fire was creating its own weather. The smoke column took on all the features of a thunder cell. I saw a fire whirl in the vicinity of the fatality area indicating extreme fire behavior. The accident occurred shortly after our IMT took charge of the fire. The weather was hot and dry with little wind generally. The winds associated with the extreme fire behavior were quite high. The crews on my Division were able to construct fireline down the Western flank, and I was then relieved and sent back to the Main Fire Camp as that line was fired out. As I recall I worked most of my ten days on top of The Rim.' (emphasis added)


Either they misnumbered and or it is missing but the way it was copied has Figure 6.'s "page six" then on backside of paper has the number 8. More ??? - There is no page seven.


Consider the interesting extreme fire behavior observation mentioned (below) in Figure 7. that strongly suggests Horizontal Roll Vortices (HRV) as stated in the SAIR (page 8) at: "(e) Fire Behavior (7) The fire flashed from the west to the east side of Walk Moore Canyon. This was followed immediately by the burning of the surface fuels." (emphasis added)


Flashing from the West to East side of Walk Moore Canyon has fairly strong probative value when all the evidences are considered as a whole.



Figure 6a. (left) Cross section through idealized fire illustrating occurrence of vortices owing to horizontal gradient of vertical motion produced by buoyancy from the fire. Source: USFS Synthesis of Knowledge of Extreme Fire Behavior: Volume 2 for Fire Behavior Specialists, Researchers, and Meteorologists.


Figure 6a. (right) Cross section through idealized fire illustrating occurrence of vortices owing to horizontal gradient of vertical motion produced by buoyancy from the fire. Source: USFS Synthesis of Knowledge of Extreme Fire Behavior: Volume 2 for Fire Behavior Specialists, Researchers, and Meteorologists.



Figure 6c. (above) Evidence of HRV fire behavior needle set. Note how the needles are dried ("set") in a lateral and downward top left to bottom right curl when the hot gases preceded the flaming front. Source: Cedar Fire Entrapment Report (2017), Wildland Fire LLC


The SAIR states (below) in Figure 7. "(11) A transcription error resulted in the Spot Weather report in the day shift plan not accurately reflecting the National Weather Service spot weather forecast." (emphasis added) The SAIT is being disingenuous here because the Fire Behavior Forecast also reflects that same date and inaccurate time - long after the fire shelter deployments and fatalities.

Figure 7. Accident Investigation Report, Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality June 26, 1990 Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest - Findings cont. - page 8 Source: Anonymous source

Figure 8. Accident Investigation Report, Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality June 26, 1990 Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest - Causal Factors- page 9 Source: Anonymous source



Note that they failed to mention anything about causal "human factors." Also note "(f) The fire spread so fast that the victims, without warning, did not have sufficient time to escape." (emphasis added) The fact of the matter is that the WFs and FFs, especially the Perryville CREP and alleged Lookout, ignored the escalating, numerous warnings about the imminent aggressive to extreme fire behavior apparent throughout the narrative, witness statements, and videos.

Figure 9. Accident Investigation Report, Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality June 26, 1990 Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest - Supporting Data -page 10 Source: Anonymous source

Figure 10. Accident Investigation Report, Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality June 26, 1990 Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest - Sequence of Events- page 11 Source: Anonymous source


This is where they begin to lie about Crew Boss Terra being with 'Crewmember Fred Hill leaving to get water at the Control Road, leaving Assistant Crew Boss Bachman in charge with CREP LaTour. Terra sent the water up the line on an [ATV] and began walking back with Hill.' (emphasis added)


Once again, the TNF PRD employee was always delivering water in Walk Moore Canyon via ATV without any assistance from Terra.



“Whoever is careless with the truth in small matters cannot be trusted with important matters.” Albert Einstein



Either they misnumbered and or it is missing but the way it was copied has Figure 10's "page eleven" then on the backside of paper has the number 13. ??? - There is no page twelve.

Figure 11. Accident Investigation Report, Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality June 26, 1990 Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest - Site Investigations- page 13 Source: Anonymous source

Figure 12. Accident Investigation Report, Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality June 26, 1990 Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest - page 14 - Maps Source: Anonymous source

Figure 13. Accident Investigation Report, Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality June 26, 1990 Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest - page 14a - Maps Source: Anonymous source

Figure 14. Accident Investigation Report, Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality June 26, 1990 Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest - page 14b - Maps. Walk Moore Canyon on the left (West and Northwest) side of Bonita Creek Subdivision Source: Anonymous source


Note the almost bowl-like feature in the Southwest of the Northeast quarter of Section 31 the headwaters of Walk Moore Canyon on the left (West and Northwest) side of Bonita Creek Subdivision



Therefore, having put away falsehood, let each one of you speak the truth with his neighbor, for we are members one of another. Ephesians 4:25 (KJV)

Figure 15. Accident Investigation Report, Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality June 26, 1990 Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest - page 14c - Maps Source: Anonymous source

Figure 16. (Accident Investigation Report, Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality June 26, 1990 Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest - Page 15. - 2. Perryville Crew Members List Source: Anonymous source


Please note (below - Figure 17.) the Perryville Crew Member List that denotes "Name, Age, Title, Injured, Doc. No., Pack No., and Entrapped"


Larry Terra is clearly listed first and clearly indicates "NO" under the "Injured" column. In other words, he is officially listed as UNINJURED.


Whoa now - the Terra enigma intensifies even more.


According to AZ AUSA Johns (RiP) Chronology, (6/30/90 1419) Terra falsely claims he "received 2nd degree burns on the back of his neck, along with upper airway thermal damage and smoke inhalation as he ran out." I (DF) confidently allege that Terra self-inflicted the burns on his neck and threatened the inmates regarding him and Hill allegedly going for water. When I talked face-to-face with him on June 26, 1990, as he sat in his AZ DOC truck. I noticed no burns on his neck nor did he ever mention to me that he had been burned.

So then, how is it possible for Crew Boss Terra to both be with his crew in Walk Moore Canyon during all this and yet be seen and talked with on the Control Road and the Fuller Creek junction? And admit twice to witnesses on that spot: "I should have never left my crew." And the SAIT stated that they knew three days after the fatalities that he was gone from the crew. And the Chronology states in many places that he was with the Crew in Walk Moore Canyon alone and then with Crewmember Fred Hill. How is that f**king possible?


So then, which one is it now? (1) With the Crew in Walk Moore Canyon with injuries? Or is it (2) Away from the Crew in his vehicle on the Control Road and Fuller Creek junction without injuries? Or is it (3) Officially listed as "NO Injuries?" Which one is it?


Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored.  Aldous Huxley



Figure 17.Accident Investigation Report, Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality June 26, 1990 Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest 2. Perryville Crew Members List Names Source: Anonymous source

Figure 18. Accident Investigation Report, Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality June 26, 1990 Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest - Page 16 - 3. Crew Deployment Positions Source: Anonymous source

Figure 19. Accident Investigation Report, Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality June 26, 1990 Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest - 3.Crew Deployment Positions. Dark, solid dots denote fatalities. Note WF Ellis movement from top of the Crew to below the powerline ROW where he died. Source: Anonymous source


Figure 20. Accident Investigation Report, Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality June 26, 1990 Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest -Page 17. - 4.Crew Equipment Locations Source: Anonymous source


Consider now the Perryville Equipment Locations map (below - Figure 21.). Note that all their gear was numbered making it much easier for investigators to match and correlate equipment and fire gear with particular inmates. Also note the litany of nouns describing what may have likely occurred: chaos, disarray, mayhem, pandemonium, panic, confusion, hysteria, and frenzy. These likely took place as these WFs attempted escape from flames, heat, and injury, and /or while seeking safety in their fire shelters scattering equipment and gear in the process.


Figure 21.Accident Investigation Report, Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality June 26, 1990 Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest - 4.Crew Equipment Locations Source: Anonymous source

Figure 22. Accident Investigation Report, Dude Fire Incident Multiple Firefighter Fatality June 26, 1990 Southwestern Region, Tonto National Forest - C. Witness List - Page 18 Source: Anonymous source


Please note the asterisk (*) identified personnel and who was interviewed or not. Inmate Fred Hill who was allegedly with Crew Boss Terra was NEVER interviewed. Surely you would want to corroborate that connection, right? Nor were any of the DIVS nor the Bonita Group Supervisor interviewed except for Phil Gil, and NO Type 1 IMT Safety Officers were ever interviewed.